Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005210
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00890/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

RN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood, Legal Representative, Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Iraq, appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing his appeal on protection grounds. The Judge’s decision was sent to the parties on 8th September 2025.
Background
2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 17th December 2021. He made a protection claim based on his fear of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (‘the PMF’) in Iraq. The appellant asserted that he had previously been detained and harmed by the PMF in 2017, and that they had been looking for him again in 2021, which precipitated his exit and journey to the United Kingdom.
3. The respondent refused the claim on 26th January 2024. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, and his appeal was dismissed by a decision dated 2nd August 2024. That decision was subsequently set aside by this Tribunal and was remitted to be heard de novo. The appeal came before the Judge on 18th August 2025.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Judge identified the issues before him as credibility, i.e. whether the appellant has demonstrated to the lower standard that he was of adverse interest to the PMF and continued to fear persecution by them, and documentation. As far as the first issue was concerned, the Judge at [25] confirmed he had taken into account the Immigration and Asylum Chamber Presidents’ Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 on Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellants (“the Guidance Note”) and at [27] explained how he applied the Guidance Note both at the hearing and in consideration of the evidence.
5. Turning to the issue of the appellant’s detention and torture in 2018, the Judge considered two discrepancies relied on by the respondent. At [31], the Judge discounted one of these putative discrepancies, finding it did not undermine the core of the claim. The Judge then considered the second discrepancy, i.e. the ability of the appellant to remain in his locality without further issues between 2017 and 2021. The Judge commented this element of the claim needed ‘further examination’ [32].
6. The Judge proceeded to consider the medical evidence, which consisted solely [34] of a report containing a both psychiatric assessment of the appellant and an assessment of scarring by Dr Balasubramaniam. The Judge considered the report as it pertained to the appellant’s mental health, noting at [35] it was prepared following one consultation via Zoom and without any engagement with the appellant’s GP records. Noting the expert’s conclusion that the appellant suffered with PTSD, the Judge considered at [39] the appellant’s failure to consult a GP prior to the appointment with the expert, and the absence of any medical evidence suggesting the appellant was taking medication or had followed up the expert’s recommendations.
7. Turning to the scarring, the Judge noted at [41] the expert’s assessment of the appellant’s injuries. At [43] the Judge further reminded himself of his rejection of the appellant’s claim and deemed this the ‘starting point’ for his assessment of the medical evidence. The Judge highlighted at [44] the expert’s conclusion the appellant suffered with having PTSD notwithstanding the absence of medical notes. The Judge also notes the expert does not consider an alternative causation of the appellant’s PTSD. At [45] the expert’s consideration of the appellant’s injuries is explored, the expert concluding that the injuries were not consistent with the appellant’s account.
8. The Judge finds at [49] the appellant did not suffer the injuries in the way claimed and did not accept the PTSD arose from detention or torture. The issue of documentation is then considered, and the appeal was subsequently dismissed on all grounds.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds. First, the Judge had misdirected himself in law at [32] in his conclusion the appellant’s account needed ‘further examination’, but not explaining what further examination was required, leaving the appellant without an understanding as to why his account had been rejected. Second, the Judge is said to have failed to provide adequate reasons for his finding at [43] that he had rejected the appellant’s claim to have been mistreated by the PMF. The third ground of complaint was that the Judge at [43] had fell into the error described in Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 in determining the appellant’s credibility and then considering the expert evidence after that determination was made.
10. Permission was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker on 8th October 2025. The hearing took place at Field House with both advocates attending remotely. There were no issues with connectivity, and I was satisfied both advocates were able to participate effectively in the hearing. I heard submissions from both Mr Wood and Ms McKenzie, at and the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give with reasons.
Analysis and Findings
Ground One
11. Mr Wood submits the Judge failed to elucidate what was meant at [32] by ‘further examination’ of his account being needed. Mr Wood submitted that it was open to the Judge, if he had questions of the appellant, to put those questions to him at the hearing, which he did not. It is further submitted that as this was the only credibility issue the Judge relies on in rejecting the claim (having discounted the other issue at [31]), this is a material error. Ms McKenzie submitted the Judge was clearly aware of the issues surrounding credibility, having determined one element in the appellant’s favour. The ‘further examination’ the Judge considered necessary was then undertaken at [33], where the Judge says ‘I considered the Appellant’s original claim having regard not only to what he said in interview, his asylum questionnaire/statement and oral evidence with reference to the report stating the Appellant suffered with PTSD’.
12. Having considered the Judge’s reasoning in its entirety, I find the Judge did not err in the way the appellant argues. First, it is clear in my judgment that the ‘further examination’ was conducted by way of assessing the entirety of the evidential landscape, as the Judge outlines at [33]. The Judge’s comment on further examination cannot be read as a conclusion, but rather the starting point for what would then follow, which was a consideration of the rest of the evidence before him. I bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s caution against ‘concentrating on particular verbal expressions that the judge used rather than engaging with the substance of his findings’ [65], Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.
13. The Judge makes an appropriate self-direction at [24], and at [38] sets out part of MN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1746, which whilst looking at the issue of how expert evidence is to be considered, contains a reminder of the principle that an account has to be taken ‘on the totality of the evidence, viewed holistically’. I find that the Judge’s specificity at [33] about what he was considered when determining credibility means no error of law is established by the appellant’s first ground.

Ground Two
14. The appellant asserts that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his conclusion at [43] that he rejected the appellant’s claim of mistreatment at the hands of the PMF. Mr Wood submitted that nowhere in the decision is there an adequately reasoned finding of fact as to whether the appellant had been detained and mistreated by the PMF. Ms McKenzie pointed to [48] and [49] where the Judge noted the findings of the expert and subsequently found the appellant’s injuries and PTSD did not arise from ‘claimed detainment’. It would be clear, in her submission, as to why the appellant’s claim had been rejected.
15. I remind myself that ‘that judicial restraint should be exercised when the reasons that a tribunal gives for its decision are being examined. The appellate court should not assume too readily that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out in it’. [25], (Jones (by Caldwell) (Respondent) v First Tier Tribunal (Respondent) and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 19).
16. The Judge identified at [32], a ‘validly made’ point as to the absence of any issues the appellant had with the PMF over a four-year period in his locality. The Judge then proceeded to consider the medical evidence, concluding that the report did not support the appellant’s claim that his injuries were sustained in the way he claimed, and that the expert had a limited evidential basis for concluding the appellant’s PTSD was a result of mistreatment. I find a fair reading of the Judge’s decision would disclose precisely why the appellant’s claim was rejected.
Ground Three
17. Mr Wood submits the Judge, at [43] has committed the ‘Mibanga error’, that is to come to an assessment of the expert evidence only after a credibility determination has been made, rather than taking the expert evidence ‘in the round’. Ms McKenzie in turn submitted the Judge’s self-direction at [38] suggested the evidence had been considered holistically, and that findings did not have to be made sequentially.
18. Looking at [43], it is clear the Judge did not consider the expert evidence in the round. Whilst no criticisms were made of the Judge’s treatment of the medical report (nor could they be, the Judge undertaking a careful and detailed analysis of the report), the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim and then treating that rejection as his ‘starting point’ in assessing whether the medical evidence supporting the claim is an exemplification of a failure to consider the entirely of the evidence in the round.
19. Having established the Judge did fall into error in the manner suggested by the appellant, I now turn to consider whether that error was material. Looking at the expert report, it is less than helpful to the appellant. Mr Wood candidly accepted the report was ‘not the strongest’ he had seen. Had the Judge taken the report in the round, and not treated the appellant’s credibility as a foregone conclusion, could he have come to a different conclusion?
20. In my judgment, the Judge’s error was not material to the outcome of the appeal. No criticisms were made of the Judge’s assessment of the medical evidence, which had several limitations. First, the Judge considered the reality that the conclusions expressed in the report followed a single consultation over Zoom. The diagnosis of PTSD was not supported by any engagement with a GP and was based wholly on what the appellant told the expert. The expert did not explore any alternative causation of the appellant’s PTSD, nor did he consider the possibility the appellant might be feigning or exaggerating his symptoms.
21. Following examination of the appellant’s scars (conducted by video and not in person), the expert commented on the appellant’s injuries. He deemed one scar on the appellant’s head as highly consistent with the causation described (being hit with a shod foot) but advanced an alternative causation of an accidental fall on a rough surface. Three healed abrasions on the appellant’s head were not consistent with the causation described.
22. The scars on the appellant’s arm, said to be from being hit with a rough cable, were not consistent with the claimed causation. A fracture of the appellant’s wrist was not visible without an X-ray and there was no external scar to be commented on. Scarring on the appellant’s right foot was said to be consistent with the appellant being pushed to the ground but could alternatively be caused by an accidental fall. The expert concluded by saying his ‘overall evaluation of the scars is that the lesions are not fully fitting with the description given by [the appellant], but support that they were sustained probably in a struggle’.
23. Even applying the lower standard of proof applicable, I do not find that any reasonable First-tier Tribunal, properly directing itself to the law and the totality of the appellant’s evidence, could have allowed the appeal. Whilst I find there is an error of law made out by this ground, the error was not material because the outcome would inevitably have been the same.

Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appeal on all grounds shall stand.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 February 2026