Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005213

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51636/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

XIAOLI YANG
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Richardson, Counsel instructed by Corbin & Hassan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of China. He arrived in the UK on 15 February 2000. On 31 October 2022 he applied for leave to remain based on 20 years’ continuous residence in the UK. His human rights claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated 27 August 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

Background

2. The appellant claims that he has lived in the UK continuously since 15 February 2000.

3. The respondent refused the appellant's human rights claim by decision dated 5 February 2024. Due to the lack of evidence, it was not accepted that the appellant had lived in the UK continuously since 2000.

4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Saffer on 27 August 2025.

5. The Judge made certain positive findings of fact but concluded that the appellant had failed to establish that he was in the UK continuously from 2000 to June 2007. The appeal was dismissed.

6. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge. These were rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. However, on renewal to the Upper Tribunal, by decision dated 28 November 2025 Judge Sheridan granted permission on the following terms:

It is arguable that the judge erred by not giving any reasons for not believing the appellant. This is arguably relevant both to the judge’s finding on the length of residence (as it is arguably not possible to discern from the decision why the judge did not believe the appellant was continuously in the UK prior to 2007) and to the findings on obstacles to integration (as it is arguably not possible to discern from the decision why the judge did not believe that the appellant’s mother was living in the conditions described by the appellant which would mean she could not accommodate him).

7. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Saffer’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

The Hearing

8. There was a discussion with the parties about the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence regarding his residence in the UK from 2000 to July 2007. Ms Keerthy considered the matter further and stated that the respondent accepted that the Judge had materially erred in law as detailed in ground one as the Judge had given inadequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence.

9. It was agreed that the Judge’s decision should be set aside. There was then a discussion as to the remaking of the decision. It was agreed that the findings of fact in paragraph 13 of the Judge’s decision must be preserved. At this stage I stood the matter down to see if the parties could reach agreement as to how the case should proceed.

10. On the parties return to the hearing, Ms Keerthy stated that the respondent accepted that the decision be remade to allow the appeal on human rights grounds. She confirmed that, based on the preserved findings of fact in paragraph 13, the respondent accepted that the appellant had been continuously resident in the UK since 27 October 2003.

11. Mr Richardson submitted that the respondent’s position was irrational in that it was recorded that the appellant claimed asylum in the UK on 15 February 2000 and so there was no basis to reject the appellant’s claim to have been in the UK continuously between 15 February 2000 and 27 October 2003. However, he accepted that this made no practical difference to the outcome of the appeal and that he was instructed by the appellant to accept the respondent’s concessions.

12. Thus, I informed the parties that in my judgment ground one was made out and the decision of Judge Saffer contained material errors of law such that it must be set aside.

13. I informed the parties that, considering the facts as found by the Judge, the appeal would be allowed on human rights grounds. My written reasons would follow.

Discussion and Analysis

14. As the respondent conceded that the grounds identified a material error of law and agreed that the appeal should be allowed on human rights grounds, my reasons will be brief.

15. Judge Saffer accepted that the appellant had been continuously resident in the UK since July 2007. Thus, the period prior to this date was material to the outcome of the appeal.

16. There was some documentary evidence which the Judge accepted (the Chinese Clinic evidence) and some documentary evidence he rejected (the letters of support). However, the key evidence was that of the appellant.

17. The Judge stated in relation to the appellant’s evidence that “I only have his word that he did not leave the country in the period, and I do not have to believe him just because he says it.” There was no further discussion as to the appellant’s evidence. I find that the Judge erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for not believing the appellant.

18. As the decision contained an error of law on the fundamental issue of the appellant’s evidence, the decision had to be set aside.

19. The following findings of the Judge, particularly those in paragraph 13 of his decision, were preserved:

a) the appellant arrived in UK on 15 February 2000
b) the appellant has lived continuously in UK since July 2007
c) the appellant visited the Chinese Clinic in UK on 27/10/2003, 03/11/2003, 06/05/2004, 13/05/2004,21/07/2005, 28/07/2005, 04/08/2005, 19/11/2006, 26/11/2006 & 13/06/2007
d) Ms Tang came to the UK in June 2005 & immediately found the appellant (her evidence was accepted – “I have no reason not to believe her.”)

20. Considering the preserved findings, and particularly the documented visits to the Chinese Clinic in the UK, I find that the respondent’s concession that the appellant has been continuously resident in the UK since at least 27 October 2003 to be well made.

21. I find that the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that the appellant has been continuously resident in the UK for well more than 20 years.

22. Thus, if the appellant were to make an application now, then he would meet the requirements of the relevant Immigration Rules. The respondent accepts this and concedes that this means that the respondent can no longer justify the interference in the appellant’s right to respect for private life that his removal from the UK would entail.

23. In conclusion, I find that, on balance, the appellant has established a protected private life in the UK due to his continued residence in the UK since at least October 2003. I find that, on balance, based on the appellant’s long residence in the UK, the respondent is unable to justify the removal of the appellant from the UK as he now meets the requirements of the relevant Immigration Rules.

24. Therefore, I find that, on balance, the removal of the appellant from the UK would be in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.

Notice of Decision

There is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and the decision is set aside. I remake the decision and allow the appeal on human rights (Article 8) grounds.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 February 2026