Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005216
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01474/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

M A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Gayle, Solicitor from Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(extempore)
1. This is an appeal by a person of Kurdish ethnicity and a citizen of Iraq against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State on 25 October 2023 refusing him international protection. The core point is that the appellant was not believed by the Secretary of State and was not believed by the First-tier Tribunal Judge.
2. Essentially there are two grounds of appeal.
3. The first ground begins by criticising the delay in the promulgation of the First-tier Tribunal decision. The delay was significant. The appeal was heard on 22 January 2025 and the decision promulgated on 18 September 2025. That is not impressive but of itself is not an error of law. I do not understand why it is somehow assumed that a judge in a hurry is more reliable than a judge who takes his time. However, when a decision is delayed it is incumbent upon a decision maker to make it plain that the delay has not caused the decision to be made wrongly. Mr Gayle argues, with considerable justification that it appears that the delay here has led to error. Mr Gayle drew attention to way that the Judge’s decision follows that of the refusal letter. Let me say immediately there is nothing wrong in that. The Secretary of State has taken a view on the case, raised points against the appellant and they have to be considered. The problem is that the appellant has raised arguments against the points taken by the Secretary of State that have not obviously been considered.
4. Two very clear examples were given by Mr Gayle in his submissions.
5. One is where it was thought unlikely that a mistake had been made about length of the relationship between appellant’s brother and Soma. The appellant, in his witness statement, gave a rather detailed explanation about why there was nothing surprising about that at all. That may or may not be a good explanation but it is an important point and there is nothing to indicate that it has been considered.
6. Second, there was an alleged inconsistency about whether a gun was discharged. The appellant said very plainly that there was no inconsistency in his account, there had been a wrong translation and he was attributed with saying something that he had never actually said. That is a very important answer to the point that was made and there is nothing in the Decision and Reasons that indicates specifically that that has actually been considered. I am left reading this with the deep concern that the appellant’s crafted explanations, which may not be good ones, have not been considered at all and although Ms Keerthy was rightly insistent that there is more to the Decision and Reasons than the two points that were picked up on by Mr Gayle and there are other points that may stand up. Nevertheless, I find that the Decision and Reasons as a whole is undermined by the failure to give clear consideration to detailed explanations on points of considerable importance.
7. I wish to make it plain that I am not suggesting that First-tier Tribunal judges should record and answer every point or that every submission should be considered in detail in the Decision and Reasons, but there has to be enough to be confident that the judge has considered the appellant’s case, not just the respondent’s case, and if the appellant has been disbelieved, that proper reasons have been given. That has not occurred here. The adverse credibility findings, which might be right, are not explained adequately and the appellant is entitled to better.
8. Ms Keerthy argues that I should draw a distinction between those adverse credibility findings and adverse credibility findings relating to the documentation of the appellant because it is the Home Office case that he would have no difficulty returning to Iraq because he has family who could help him establish his identity. Ms Keerthy may be right in the second part but I cannot accept the submission that the adverse credibility findings in relation his family’s ability to retrieve documents or his own possession of them depending which he believed is made out.
9. Once credibility starts to crumble, it tends to crumble or be maintained as a unity and all of the findings are undermined by the failure to give sufficient reasons.
10. It follows therefore that I find the First-tier Tribunal has erred in law. This is not something that can repaired here. The essence of the problem is the judge did not explain the decision adequately and I therefore direct that the case be redetermined in the First-tier Tribunal.
11. The first point of contention was the length of the relationship and he had given inconsistent evidence and he offered an explanation about why that was not so and the explanation was not considered.
Notice of Decision
12. The First-tier Tribunal erred in law. I set aside its decision and I direct that the case be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 March 2026