Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005217
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52249/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

BH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Gibson, solicitor of Gibson Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 20 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 24 September 2025, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim.
2. The appellant had claimed to be at risk on return to Iraq having been discovered in an intimate relationship with a member of a powerful Kurdish family. The respondent did not accept the truth of the appellant's account, and the judge also found the appellant’s account incredible.
Grounds of Appeal
3. The grounds of appeal assert in short that the judge erred as follows. She wrongly categorised the appellant’s claim as arising from a blood feud, whereas it was a fear of honour violence, and so reached a perverse adverse credibility conclusion. The judge failed to consider whether the appellant could obtain an INID. She failed to give adequate reasons why she rejected the appellant’s claim no longer to be in contact with his family. The judge gave weight to an immaterial matter: the representative’s supposed failure to address matters in submissions. The judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting as incredible the appellant’s account of his discovery by and escape from his girlfriend’s family. The judge failed to address the fact that the appellant had provided a school ID.
4. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted on renewal to the Upper Tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato. He considered grounds one and three in particular to be arguable. He considered the remaining grounds to be of less obvious merit but did not limit permission.
5. In her rule 24 response, the respondent conceded that the judge had erred as alleged in ground 1, and consequently that the entire credibility assessment was flawed. The respondent conceded that the judge’s assessment of whether the appellant was in contact with his family and whether he could access his CSID was consequentially impacted.
6. The respondent submitted that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh. However, in a decision dated 19 January 2026, Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan considered that further argument might be necessary to determine whether there was any material difference in relying on background evidence relating to blood feud rather than honour crimes, and also that the remaining grounds would require further consideration at a hearing in any event. Consequently, the matter comes before me.
The Hearing
7. The representatives made oral submissions based on their pleadings and, in the applicant’s case, a helpful skeleton argument. Whilst I refer below only to such matters necessary to understand my decision, I took the parties’ submissions, and the evidence to which I was referred, into account in their entirety.
Grounds One, Four and Five
8. The appellant asserts in ground one that the Judge misunderstood the basis of the core of his claim, which he categorised as a risk of ‘honour violence’, as instead being an instance of a blood feud.
9. The relevant passages of the judge’s decision are found at [21]-[23]:
‘21. I have considered the Appellant’s account against the country information. Both parties relied on the Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, version 1.0 of July 2024 (“2024 CPIN”).
22. Ms Kailla submitted that the Appellants account, that L’s family repeatedly went to his family’s house but did not harm them, was not consistent with [3.1.5] of the 2024 CPIN. In a blood feud the families would take retaliatory action against each other’s families which would lead to prolonged cycles of violence. This was not consistent with the Appellant’s account. Mr Gibson did not address this point. I attach significant weight to this factor and I am satisfied that the Appellant’s account is not consistent with the country information.
23. I therefore find that the Appellant’s relationship with L was not discovered by L’s family and therefore L’s family do not seek to take revenge against him.’
10. Whilst the respondent had conceded in her rule 24 response that the judge had erroneously miscategorised the appellant's claim, given Judge Canavan’s decision, Ms Simbi argued that no material error of law arose. She further argued that the respondent had never accepted that male potential victims of honour violence constituted a particular social group in Iraq. Consequently, it had never been the case that the respondent accepted that the judge was entitled to consider the appellant’s asylum claim on the basis of honour violence per se. Instead, the only way on which the appeal could have been advanced on asylum grounds was as a risk of revenge killing akin to a blood feud.
11. The appellant’s witness statement says the following in respect of his claimed fear from his girlfriend’s family:
‘4. Liza and I, along with her younger brother, attended a friend’s party on 25th or 26th August 2020. My friend was called Bahast. There was music, the television was on and there was food. 30 minutes after the party started, Liza and I decided to go upstairs to a separate room. At that time, her brother was playing on the PlayStation. We started talking and then we were kissing and cuddling each other. We were alone in the room for around 15 to 20 minutes before her brother walked in. When he saw us, he swore at me, called me bad names and said he would tell his father that I ruined their dignity so that he would kill me. Liza’s brother ran away and we followed him. Liza’s home was not far away from the party. When I saw them enter their home, I decided to ran back to my home. When I arrived home, I told my father, grandfather and maternal uncle about the relationship I had with Liza and we had been discovered by her brother. They were shocked and told me I was wrong to do what I did.
5. At Part 4., Point b). of the Refusal, the Respondent states that I gave a lack of detail in my answers regarding the marriage proposal to Liza. My family tried to negotiate twice with Liza’s family. The first time was when Liza’s family came to my home after the party on 25th or 26th. My family spoke to her family, who wanted to attack, and offered money and marriage (anything to resolve it). Liza’s family refused and said that as I have damaged their reputation, I must be killed. At that time, I was not at home as I had left to Sulaymaniyah with my maternal uncle. The second negotiation happened on the 27th August 2020. My maternal uncle went to Liza’s home and they did not accept. My maternal uncle came to me, said that I must leave because of how serious the situation is.’
12. The judge makes reference at [22] to paragraph 3.1.5 of the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, version 1.0 of July 2024. Mr Gibson properly notes that that paragraph is to be found in the ‘risk’ section of the CPIN under the heading ‘Blood feuds and tribal disputes/violence’. He submits in essence that blood feuds and honour crimes are distinct categories of risk and that the judge therefore took into account immaterial matters.
13. The passage in question states:
‘3.1.5 A blood feud (‘Thar’) usually involves members of one family or tribe threatening to kill, or take retaliatory acts of vengeance against another family or tribe in accordance with an ancient code of honour and behaviour. Several sources stated that if a tribe member is murdered or injured, the males of the victim’s tribe (‘Khamsa’) are obliged to avenge this by killing someone in the perpetrator’s tribe. Blood feuds can lead to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge, sometimes escalating after years of inactivity. Violence associated with blood feuds include armed confrontations, the shooting at or burning of homes, abductions and killings (see Blood feuds and tribal disputes/violence).’
14. However, the following passages of the CPIN are also illustrative:
‘Women fearing ‘honour’ crimes, and victims or potential victims of blood feuds both form a particular social group (PSG) in Iraq. Male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes do not form a PSG in Iraq unless based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression. Men fearing retribution for engaging in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a family’s daughter whose honour has been lost may be at risk, however due to differing notions of male and female honour, this would be classified as a revenge killing rather than an ‘honour’ crime’ (paragraph 1 of the executive summary).
3.1.8 Tribal disputes or violence may be triggered by a range of different reasons including, but not limited to, intentional or unintentional killing, infliction of injuries, theft, insults, loss of honour or honour violations, being LGBTQI, unpaid debts, access to water, property, resources or land disputes. One source stated that even minor disagreements, such as social media posts or children of two competing tribes fighting, could escalate into a tribal dispute (see Motives).
3.2.3 In general, a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not at risk of serious harm or persecution from his own family. This is because a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not perceived to have stained his own honour.
3.2.5 Available evidence indicates that males involved in premarital or extramarital relationships with a female may be targeted by the female’s family in acts of revenge. There have been cases where a male has been killed. However, there is limited data and evidence regarding the prevalence of such incidents (see Honour crimes against men). As such, it does not amount to a generalised risk. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
10.2.7 The January 2024 UNHCR report stated, citing various sources: ‘In Iraq, conflicts between (extended) families can reportedly be triggered by intentional or unintentional killing, but also by other offences such as the infliction of injury, loss of “honour” (e.g. as a result of the kidnapping or rape of a woman or girl, or socially unacceptable behaviour), theft, unpaid debts, or unresolved disputes over land, access to water supplies or property. ‘… Blood feuds may give rise to long cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge and can sometimes flare up after being dormant for years.’
11.7.4 The DIS and LandInfo honour related conflict report citing various sources, stated:
‘Men who engage in extramarital relationship are not perceived as staining the family honour. A man in this situation can often easily escape the conflict. Nevertheless, men are still under pressure to get married and there are cases of killings. When a man is killed in an honour conflict, it has to do with revenge or a consequence of a blood feud rather than the honour of the family. Normally in these cases, both families agree to the killing. The sources did not know of any cases where only the man in such a couple got killed and not the woman.’’
15. It is clear from the CPIN as a whole (and in particular the passages above) that there is no bright line between ‘honour violence’ and ‘blood feuds/tribal violence’ when the potential victim is a man believed to have damaged the honour of another family. If anything, the material shows that such an individual would much more likely be the victim of the latter than the former. In his grounds of appeal, the appellant argues that his account never involved the killing or injuring of another family. However, that naively seeks to distinguish between physical injury and damage to honour, and is immaterial in any event in light of the passages quoted above.
16. It was perfectly open to the judge, notwithstanding the appellant’s self-description of the risk he faced as being ‘honour violence’ to consider the credibility of his account in accordance with what was said in the CPIN about the risk from bloods feuds/tribal violence. The important matter in any event, and one which the judge was entitled to take into account, was the girlfriend’s family’s failure to mete violence on the appellant’s family when there had been an opportunity to do so but not to have their revenge on the appellant.
17. In short, I do not accept that the judge materially erred in law in her findings at [21]-[23]. In any event, the preceding paragraphs contain a number of significantly damaging credibility findings:
‘15. Ms Kailla adopted the points made in the refusal letter and respondent’s review and raised the following issues arising from the Appellant’s oral evidence. Firstly, it was not credible that the Appellant would have chosen to enter a relationship with the daughter of someone who was as powerful and influential as the Appellant claims. Secondly, the Appellant failed to provide a cogent explanation for why he would have sought to have an intimate relationship with L at the party when she was chaperoned by her 14 year old brother, who was there for the sole purpose of preventing her from being alone with men. Thirdly, his account of what happened after the relationship was discovered was not credible. He claimed that they both lived in the same village. L lived close to the house where the birthday party was being held, the Appellant lived a ten minute walk, approximately, from the party house. When L’s brother discovered the Appellant and L he immediately ran home to tell his family what had happened and L ran after him, they would have been home in minutes. The Appellant saw them run home before he walked home himself. When he arrived there he told his father and uncle what had happened. In the time it took the Appellant to walk home and tell his family what occurred, L’s family would have had sufficient time to drive to the Appellant’s home and take revenge. It was not credible that he would have been able to escape to Sulaymaniyah as he claimed.
16. Mr Gibson relied on his skeleton argument and did not address these specific credibility points in his submissions. He submitted that the Appellant’s participation in the asylum and appeal process and his detailed answers in his questionnaire and statement strengthened his credibility.
17. When questioned the Appellant stated that he took L to the room because he saw that L’s brother was on the play station and was with the siblings of his friends. He also stated that there was no lock on the bedroom door and was unable to lock it.
18. I accept Ms Kailla’s submissions on the Appellant’s credibility. The Appellant has not provided a cogent explanation for why he took the risk of taking L to a separate room, which did not have a lock on the door, during a birthday party where others were in attendance, including her brother, who was there to act as her chaperone, and then proceed to engage in intimate acts. It is not credible that the Appellant would have taken such a risk when according to him, he and L had endeavoured to keep their relationship a secret for two years. The factual difficulties in his account are exacerbated by his account of what happened next. The Appellant was unable to explain how he managed to leave his village before L’s family came to his house, when they lived so close to him and were told of the relationship almost immediately after it was discovered.
19. I also accept Ms Kailla’s submission that it is not credible that the Appellant was unable to provide details about the positions held by L’s father and brother when in oral evidence he confirmed that he and L had discussed L’s father and brother’s roles with Asayish and the PUK before they entered into the relationship. This further undermines his credibility.’
18. Even if I had accepted that the judge erred in accepting that the girlfriend’s family’s failure to harm the appellant’s family undermined the credibility of his account, it is clear that that she did not believe his account in any event. Moreover, that disbelief was plainly open to her for the reasons given. The appellant’s criticisms of these findings in ground five is mere disagreements. Ground four was abandoned.
19. Grounds one, four and five therefore fail.
Ground Three
20. Having permissibly rejected the appellant's account as untruthful, it was open to the judge to reject his claim not to be in contact with his family and so ground three fails for the same reasons.
Grounds Two and Six
21. It was the appellant’s case that he left his CSID in the IKR with his family. Having rejected the appellant's claim not to be in contact with his family, it was open to the judge to find that they could meet him on return with his CSID and that he could thereby secure entry to Iraq and safe transit home, and thereafter avoid Article 3 mistreatment.
22. Frankly, I do not understand Mr Gibson’s reasons for submitting that such findings were perverse or irrational. There was no evidence before the judge that an individual in possession of only a CSID would be unable to obtain an INID or suffer Article 3 mistreatment before being able so to do. Indeed, the most recent country guidance (AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 00150 (IAC)) makes clear that such a returnee to the IKR will not be at real risk of such mistreatment if returned to and remaining in the IKR. In any event, the country guidance also makes clear that an INID application can now be made before the appellant’s return, with the benefit of the CSID sent by his family.
23. Ground 6 criticises the judge’s failure to take into account the fact that the appellant had provided a school ID. No comprehensible basis has been given for why this is material to the resolution of any of the principal controversial issues. It could have had no reasonable bearing on the judge’s assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account of events in the IKR, or whether he was in contact with his family. Neither could it negatively bear on whether he could obtain an INID. The grounds pose rhetorical questions on each of these points, but no sensible answer was given either in the grounds or in submissions.
24. In short, it was open to the judge not to address in her decision the fact that the appellant was in possession of a school ID and had provided the same to the respondent.
25. Grounds two and six therefore fail.
26. For the above reasons, I dismiss this appeal, and the judge’s decision stands.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law, and stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 April 2026