Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005244
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52507/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

DA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Shabbir, instructed by JRI Law
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Pakistan who seeks asylum. His application for protection was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 12 January 2024. He appealed.
2. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed in a decision dated 9 September 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Byrne. FTTJ Byrne, while accepting that the appellant faced a real risk of persecution for a convention reason in his home area, dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant would be able to safely internally relocate.
3. The appellant appealed the decision of FTTJ Byrne and permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys on 12 November 2025. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the decision of FTTJ Byrne contained a material error of law.
Grounds of appeal
4. There are three grounds of appeal:
a. Ground 1: The First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in law in failing to assess internal relocation on the basis of current circumstances.
b. Ground 2: The First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in law in failing to give sufficient weight to the Appellant’s personal circumstances and the expert report.
c. Ground 3: The First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in law in mischaracterising the Appellant’s political opinion and concluding that he would not be required to suppress genuinely held beliefs.
5. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds, though it is clear from the grant that FTTJ Le Grys thought that Grounds 2 and 3 were the strongest by some way.
6. The respondent filed and served a Rule 24 response opposing the appeal on all grounds.
The hearing
7. The matter came before me at Field House with the parties appearing remotely. I am grateful to Mr Shabbir and to Ms Clewley for their helpful submissions which I found to be of notable quality.
8. Mr Shabbir submitted at the outset that the FTT had found that the appellant was a member of the Pakistan People’s Party. The FTT had found moreover that he had been targeted and had a genuine fear of persecution. The only question was whether he could safely relocate to Rawalpindi.
9. The FTT’s findings included that the appellant had been harmed in 2017 and that he did not have his passport any longer [19]. The FTT relied heavily on the fact that the appellant had not been politically active in Rawalpindi, but it was clear from the FTT’s own consideration of that issue [25] that the reason for that lack of political activity was fear of persecution – he was in hiding. In that context, the FTT relying on the fact that the appellant had not been harmed in Rawalpindi as a basis for concluding that he would not be harmed if he relocated there again [26] fell foul of the principle in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2011] 1 AC 596.
10. The FTT dealt at [27] with the difficulties the appellant would face in renewing his ID card (CNIC) and his passport. It was Mr Shabbir’s submission that what the FTT was requiring of the appellant was in reality that he would lie in order to secure a passport.
11. The finding at [28] was that the appellant would have no interest in political activity if returned to Rawalpindi once he was “outside the orbit” of his current “patron” to whom he was particularly devoted. However that conclusion too appeared to derive in part from the conclusion that he had previously been safe in Rawalpindi. Moreover, it contradicted the earlier finding that he is a member and supporter of the PPP [19]. A persecutor would not care why the appellant supported the PPP.
12. Turning to Ground 1, he submitted that the FTT had failed to assess the appellant’s case on the basis of the current circumstances, instead relying on what had happened previously in Rawalpindi. The reason he had not been politically active in Rawalpindi was that he had been in fear.
13. I raised the question of whether the conclusion that the appellant had not politically active due to fear while in Rawalpindi that appeared to be made at [25] was consistent with the conclusion at [28] that the appellant would not in any event be politically active outside the orbit of his patron.
14. It was Mr Shabbir’s submission that the conclusion in respect of the “orbit” at [28] cannot be reconciled with the findings at [19-20] that the appellant has a genuine political belief which has already resulted in him being persecuted. The acceptance of the genuineness of his political activity was unqualified at [19]. I put to Mr Shabbir that it might be said that the FTT was entitled to consider the nature of his political beliefs in more detail at [28]. Mr Shabbir maintained that the FTT, having accepted the risk, was not entitled to revisit this issue and restrict a finding already made.
15. He submitted that the FTT assumed that it would be safe in Rawalpindi because it was safe ten years ago. That was an error. I put to him that the FTT was entitled to have regard to the fact that the appellant had been safe in Rawalpindi ten years ago, which he accepted.
16. In respect of Ground 2 he submitted that there had been no challenge to the qualifications of the expert. He noted that the appellant had submitted that there had been a breakdown in his family relations which was simply not considered by the FTT. The FTT had however accepted that the appellant had mislaid both his ID and his passport [19][27]. It was not suggested that the appellant had any official connections.
17. Mr Shabbir took me to the expert report at paragraphs 54-56 which dealt with the difficulties of renewing a passport in the context of having made an asylum claim. This tended to show that the Pakistani government was not willing to provide passports for those who had claimed asylum. He said the clear implication of paragraph 56 was that those who were applying for passports would be asked about whether they had claimed asylum. It was also stated that the CNICs of those who had claimed asylum would be blocked. I asked Mr Shabbir whether there was evidence that those who applied to the Pakistani government for a passport were actually asked at any stage while applying from overseas whether they had made an asylum claim. He relied on paragraph 57 of the report, though this in fact only addresses the situation on return to Pakistan.
18. Mr Shabbir submitted that the FTT had conflated the issues of identity card and the issue of passports. The question of family assistance was relevant only to obtaining a new identify card but not a passport. As regards obtaining a new identity card or CNIC, there were in effect two options: this could be done via links to government officials or via family members. Although the FTT had not made any findings on the issue the appellant’s case was that he was estranged from his family. The FTT did not engage with the question of how he could obtain a CNIC.
19. If the appellant lied about his circumstances, for example by denying that he had claimed asylum, that would have severe consequences. Without an ID card he could not access basic services. He could not even access a police station.
20. In respect of Ground 3 his submission was that the FTT’s findings at [19-20] were irreconcilable with his findings at [28]. A question arose as to whether the FTT’s conclusions were consistent with RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 AC 152. The Judge’s conclusion that the appellant would not engage in political activity once out of the orbit of his sponsor was not consistent with the earlier finding that the reason he had not engaged in political activity in Rawalpindi was that he was at risk. It was the perception of the perpetrator that would put the appellant at risk – perpetrators would not care why he had been involved in this political activity.
21. In respect of disposal he submitted that the appeal should be allowed outright on the basis of the expert report. Alternatively, it should be set aside.
22. For the respondent Ms Clewley maintained that the appeal should be dismissed. There was no inconsistency between the “narrower” finding in [28] and the “wider” finding in [19-20]. The appellant had undertaken the actions described at [19-20] to secure his patron’s election as the FTTJ accepted. That had now been accomplished. The fact that the FTTJ considered matters in more detail in [28] did not undermine the earlier findings; it clarified them. There was no fundamental inconsistency in the appellant being devoted to that particular individual rather than the cause more widely.
23. The fact that he previously avoided involvement in politics in Rawalpindi because he was at risk does not mean that this would be a material reason this time. The election was some time ago.
24. In respect of Ground 1 it was important to consider the FTTJ’s findings on internal relocation as a whole [26-30]. Contrary to what was said in the grounds of appeal it is not clear that the FTTJ did in fact accept the expert report in its entirety. The FTTJ considered that there was insufficient evidence to show that any issues in obtaining an ID document would mean that it was not feasible for the appellant to internally relocate.
25. There was not sufficient evidence to show that he would be unable to obtain replacement documents even taking the appellant’s case at its highest. The expert report said that there was another route available to obtain such documents, by approaching members of the authorities. It was not accepted that the FTTJ had conflated the question of ID cards and the question of passports.
26. I asked Ms Clewley whether she accepted that the FTTJ did not deal in terms with the question of how a CNIC could be obtained absent family support. She did not. As in the Rule 24 response she submitted that the expert report had significant deficiencies, in particular around referencing. In any event, nothing in the expert report suggested that the anti-terror law referred to had been implemented. The highest the expert report went was to say that the relevant policy existed, and it was open to the FTTJ to find that there was insufficient information on that issue.
27. The expert report did not say that a person seeking a new passport or ID would actually be subject to inquiries that might identify them as a person who has claimed asylum. It is not clear that there is a “pinch point” when obtaining a passport. At the point that he was seeking an ID he would already have a passport. The report did not support the claim in the manner suggested.
28. If the appellant were to act discreetly as regards the fact of his asylum claim on return that would not be contrary to the principle in HJ (Iran). The fact of having made an asylum claim was not in itself protected – it was the political activity that was protected.
29. In respect of disposal she submitted that if the matter were set aside on the basis of inconsistency in the findings it would need to be remitted to the FTT because of the need for findings on credibility.
30. In reply Mr Shabbir returned to the question of whether the FTTJ had examined the possibility of internal relocation by reference to the current situation. The appellant’s relocation to Rawalpindi had been some time ago. The FTTJ had found that the appellant faced a real risk of persecution now and so should have considered internal relocation on the same basis.
Decision and reasons
31. I shall deal with the grounds of appeal in the order in which they were argued.
Ground 1
32. It was the view of FTTJ Le Grys granting permission that this ground was the weakest because “the decision when read as a whole suggests that a lack of past difficulties was simply one factor that was taken into account when considering the future risk”. I agree.
33. I do not accept that the FTTJ erred in law in failing to consider what the position would be if the appellant were to relocate to Rawalpindi now. The fact that the appellant had previously been safe in Rawalpindi was plainly relevant to the question of whether he could safely internally relocate and the FTTJ, subject to what I deal with below, was entitled (indeed required) to consider it.
34. The determination does not suggest, as the grounds argue, that this was in substance the only factor considered. As Ms Clewley submitted, the findings must be read as a whole and it is clear that at [26-30] the FTTJ considered the relevant factors.
35. There is however one aspect of the pleaded case under Ground 1 that I consider does disclose an error of law. The grounds include the following:
“Secondly, the Judge recorded at [25] that the Appellant ‘agreed that he had not been politically active during the time he was in Rawalpindi as he had been advised by his mentors in PPP to move there for his safety’. That evidence shows that his apparent safety in 2017-2018 was protective, not voluntary. The Appellant could not be required to conceal indefinitely; HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31.”
36. It is clear from the determination that the appellant’s case, which the FTTJ appears to accept (though does not explicitly accept) was that he relocated to Rawalpindi because he was at risk. He then refrained from political activity because of that fear. That would, on its face, fall foul of the principle in HJ (Iran).
37. However, when the FTTJ was deciding whether the appellant could safely internally relocate now he relied on the fact that the appellant had not previously been at risk in Rawalpindi. That safety had, at least on the appellant’s case, been specifically predicated on the fact that the appellant had refrained from political activity because of fear. This was in the context of, as Mr Shabbir rightly notes, the FTT’s earlier finding that the appellant was a genuine political activist who was harmed as a result of that activity [19-20].
38. Ms Clewley points to the FTTJ’s finding that the appellant would not engage in political activity because the appellant was quite attached to an individual politician, and would no longer be active once outside that person’s “orbit” [28]. As Mr Shabbir says, it is difficult to reconcile that finding with the unqualified findings at [19-20] that the appellant is a genuine political activist as a member and supporter of the PPP. I do not, however, accept the submission that the FTTJ was not entitled in principle to reach these more detailed findings later in the determination.
39. What I consider more problematic is the fact that the FTTJ does not appear to consider the appellant’s account that the reason he previously refrained from political involvement in Rawalpindi was fear of persecution when deciding on the safety of internal relocation. It is treated as a relevant consideration that the appellant was previously safe in Rawalpindi without any consideration of the reasons that he was safe – on his case because of fear. The FTTJ could either have rejected or accepted that case but could not disregard it. Indeed, as noted above, if anything it appears to have been impliedly accepted.
40. It is striking that at the time of his previous internal relocation, the appellant was also out of the “orbit” of his “patron”. It is not clear from the determination whether the FTTJ considers that he did not engage in political activity at that time: (i) only because he was out of that “orbit” – certainly there are no findings to that effect; or (ii) whether fear was also a factor; or (iii) whether fear was the only factor. Two of those three possibilities would be contrary to the principle in HJ (Iran) and RT (Zimbabwe).
41. It follows that in respect of this specific issue, the FTTJ has failed to take account of a material consideration, or took account of an irrelevant consideration, or failed to make findings on material matters. The determination cannot stand. Given the apparent inconsistency between the findings as identified above, and what I accept is at least an uneasy coexistence in the findings on the nature of his political beliefs, I consider that the matter should be remitted for a full rehearing with no findings preserved.
Ground 2
42. Ground 2 asserts that the FTTJ erred in “failing to give sufficient weight to the Appellant’s personal circumstances and the expert report”. That is on its face an unpromising ground as weight is the quintessential matter for the first instance Judge.
43. However what is in reality being argued is that the FTTJ erred in: (i) conflating the issue of whether the appellant could obtain a passport with the issue of whether the appellant could obtain a CNIC; and (ii) requiring the appellant to conceal the fact that he has made an asylum claim contrary to the HJ(Iran) principle.
44. There is some force in the appellant’s assertion that the FTTJ has conflated the issues in respect of passports and CNICs, and it is striking that he refers to the section of the expert report that deals with passports but not to the section that deals with CNICs.
45. CNICs are an essential part of life in Pakistan. It is clear from the expert report at paragraph 37 that his view is that a replacement CNIC can only be obtained either with the aid of a blood relative or with the aid of an official prepared to sign and stamp the form. Neither is on the appellant’s case available.
46. However it is not clear from the report whether an official would need more than the appellant’s passport to provide a stamp. It is not said for example that the official would need to know the appellant for e.g. five years, or might refuse to confirm his identity even with a valid passport. I do not therefore accept that the FTTJ made any material error in circumstances where the appellant would be able to obtain a replacement passport.
47. On the FTTJ’s findings he could safely apply for a passport and there is simply nothing in the expert report to show that the anti-terror law referred to has any practical consequences. As I raised in argument, and as Ms Clewley says, there is no evidence of any “pinch point” at which the appellant would be required to either confirm that he had claimed asylum or deny it.
48. I would not have accepted Ms Clewley’s submission that, if such a “pinch point” did exist, the HJ (Iran) principle would not cover the fact of an asylum claim. I accept that the administrative fact of having made an asylum claim is not necessarily a political act (though it may be). However where a person who has genuine political beliefs (as this appellant has been found to have) must conceal the fact that they have made an asylum claim in order to avoid ill-treatment inter alia because of those beliefs that appears to me to fall squarely within the RT (Zimbabwe)/HJ (Iran) paradigm. It also seems virtually certain that anyone who is specifically asked about having made an asylum claim, by a regime sufficiently concerned about such claims to have a provision like the anti-terror law dealt with at paragraph 55 of the report, will be asked questions about the basis for that claim if it is revealed.
Ground 3
49. Ground 3 is in substance a rearguing of the particular aspect of Ground 1 that I have already found to disclose an error of law and does not add anything to what I have found above.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Byrne did involve the making of a material error of law. It is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing on all issue with no findings preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 April 2026