Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005274

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61468/2023
LP/13266/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

AS
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chakmakjian, Counsel instructed by Descartes Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the Appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 8 September 2025 in which the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal was dismissed.
2. In summary the Appellant’s case is that he is an Iraqi national and was working in the Green Zone maintaining caravans used by coalition forces to sleep in. In September 2012 the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (“AAH”) requested he visit their offices. He did so and was told the AAH wanted him to gather and share information about the Green Zone with them. The Appellant agreed out of fear he would be killed if he did not. He then fled to Basra, then Erbil before leaving for Sweden, via Tehran on a work permit.
3. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) accepted that the appellant worked in the Green Zone as claimed. However, the Judge did not accept that the Appellant had attended the AAH offices in September 2012. The reasons given are that the Appellant has not been consistent in his account, that he was extremely vague about the meeting in his oral evidence and that it was implausible that the AAH would not have spelt out to him by way of direct threat what would happen to him if he did not comply.
4. Taking the Appellant’s case at its highest the Judge rejected the proposition that the AAH would still be interested in the Appellant given that thirteen years have passed since the single short meeting. There was no evidence that blacklists were kept in September 2012 and the AAH were much less likely to have kept a record of the meeting at that time when they were less powerful.
5. Despite the Appellant’s claim to have lost his CSID card in France in 2020, the Judge concluded that he has not lost his CSID card. Firstly, because the Judge had not found the Appellant to be a reliable witness and secondly, the Judge found it “extremely unlikely” (§36) that the Appellant would have lost his CSID in France having managed to keep it since 2012 when he left Iraq.
6. In any event, the Appellant was able to produce a photograph of his CSID card. The Judge concluded that if the Appellant was stopped at checkpoints, he would be able to show the photograph of the CSID and that would satisfy the authorities as to his identity and then he would be able to use that to obtain an INID. As such, he would not be at risk due to a lack of documentation.
Summary of grounds and submissions
7. I heard submissions from the representatives which are a matter of record.
8. The Appellant advanced four written grounds of appeal, Mr Chakmakjian was not the author of the grounds, but he relied upon them and developed the points in a helpful written note and oral submissions:
(1) Failure to give adequate or rational reasons regarding credibility
(2) Failure to consider or give adequate reasons regarding the expert evidence of Sheri Lazer
(3) Irrational findings regarding AAH
(4) Failure to give adequate or rational findings regarding the CSID.
9. The first ground of appeal is in two parts. Firstly, it is said that the Judge’s criticism of the Appellant being extremely vague in his oral evidence (§26) is deficient due to a lack of explanation:
“the appellant was extremely vague about this meeting when asked questions about it in oral evidence. The appellant was asked to give more information about the meeting and he said that all that was said to him was that they wanted him to work with them because these people had invaded their country. They just told him that he needed to get this information for them. He said that the meeting did not last long. He was asked whether they made any threats to him about what would happen if he did not comply and he stated that they didn’t need to say anything to him because it was well-known what would happen to him if he did not comply.”
10. The Appellant contends that the Judge only describes what information the Appellant did provide and fails to identify where or how the Appellant’s answers were “extremely vague” as required by the authorities (see JB (Torture and ill treatment, Article 3) [2003] UKIAT 12 §7, QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 §57, and MK(duty to give reasons) Pakistan v SSHD [2013] UKUT 00641).
11. Secondly, the finding that it is implausible that the AAH would not have enunciated their threat at the meeting (§27) is unreasoned and/ or irrational. The Judge does not refer to any evidence upon which such a conclusion is based, which appears to be based on speculation or conjecture (see Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 and HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037).
12. Ms Ahmed relied upon the Rule 24 response. In her oral response to ground one, Ms Ahmed drew attention to the fact that there were additional adverse credibility findings (§§24-25) to which there was no challenge. She contended that paragraph 26 was adequately reasoned with the Judge recording what the Appellant had said and that he expected more detail to have been provided. Although she accepted that if this part of the grounds were made out it would be material to credibility overall. With respect to implausibility, a Judge is not required to take a case at face value and is not required to suspend judgment (see Y §25-27). Applying those principles, Ms Ahmed invited me to find that the plausibility findings were open to the Judge.
13. The second ground relates to the treatment of the country expert report of Sheri Laizer. The Judge refers to specific passages of the report at paragraph 30:
“The appellant relies upon the report of Sheri Laizer at paragraphs 4(i) and (ii) where it is suggested that the appellant failed the loyalty test by not reporting and running away. However, Sheri Laizer does not remark upon the specific risk to the appellant given the passage of thirteen years since this short meeting was said to have taken place. The highest Sheri Laizer puts it is at paragraph 4(iii) of the report where it is stated “Adverse interest is not time limited and the resistance militias like AAH have long memories”.”
14. The Appellant draws attention to other specific passages in paragraphs 4(i)-(ii) of the expert report as essential context, such as the introductory paragraph where the expert sets out the question she is addressing:
“I have been instructed: “The Home Office in their review state that they do not accept that Mr al-Shammari would still be of interest to AAH upon his return to Iraq in light of the years that have passed since his encounter with the militia, an assertion he denies. In your expert opinion, and in light of your answers to the question above, please comment on the extent to which, despite his absence from Iraq, he would still be likely to be targeted by AAH.”
15. In answering that question, in addition to the quote cited by the Judge the expert also stated:
“Once you come to their adverse attention your card is marked permanently as being on the wrong side of them”

[The Appellant’s disloyalty] “That will never be forgotten.”

“Risks are not time based”
16. Furthermore, the first conclusion the expert reached (§1) was that the risks to the Appellant “are not going to disappear with time”.
17. Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge considered the expert report and the relevant passage (§30). The Judge was correct in saying that the expert did not engage with the passage of 13 years specifically. The Judge considered the report and the opinions and did not give weight to it.
18. The third ground relates to the Judges conclusion about the likelihood of the Appellant being placed on a backlist (§32):
“Again, taking the appellant’s case at its highest, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that blacklists were kept in September 2012 when the appellant claims to have had a meeting with AAH. As Sheri Laizer states at paragraph 2 of their conclusions, AAH are far more powerful now than when the appellant left Iraq, which would suggest that they were much less of a threat and much less likely to have kept a record of the meeting in September 2012. Furthermore, as I have already indicated, there is no reason to suppose that the appellant would be on a blacklist because no direct threats were made to him at the time.”
19. The Appellant challenges this conclusion because it is without evidential foundation and arises from speculation alone. Ms Ahmed submits that the findings are adequately reasoned and the onus is on the Appellant to prove his case.
20. The fourth and final ground relates to the Judge’s finding that it was “extremely unlikely that the appellant would have lost his CSID in France in 2020” because “he managed to keep it since 2012”. The Appellant submits this is speculative, without foundation and irrational. Ms Ahmed submits that the Judge plainly did not believe the Appellant.
21. I asked the parties to address the materiality of this ground in light of the Judge’s finding that having a photograph of his CSID will allow the Appellant to navigate checkpoints if stopped (§39). Ms Ahmed referred to Dr Fatah’s evidence at paragraph 26 of Annex A of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC):
“If a person had a copy of their CSID and a person to assist them in Iraq, they should be able to get a replacement identity document.”
22. The Respondent’s submission being that Dr Fatah must have factored in checkpoints in this part of his evidence.
23. In reply, the Appellant submitted that no part of the reported findings of SMO stated that a copy of a CSID was sufficient. The passage from Dr Fatah’s evidence was not the same as saying that a copy of a CSID would allow the Appellant to pass through checkpoints.
24. I reserved my decision.
Decision
25. In my judgment, all four grounds are made out for the following reasons.
Ground one
26. Firstly, the Judge fails to identify what aspects of the Appellant’s answers about the meeting with the AAH were deficient to cause him to conclude that his evidence was extremely vague. The Judge’s description of the Appellant’s answers given does not assist because on the face of it the Appellant replied adequately to each question.
27. Secondly, the conclusion that it is implausible that the AAH would not have spelt out the threat at the meeting has no evidential foundation. Although I accept that a Judge is not required to suspend judgment, it is imperative that when approaching the question of how an agent of persecution would behave, that must be answered by reference to the evidence rather than speculation or assumption.
28. As conceded by Ms Ahmed, I cannot be satisfied that the Judge would have reached the same conclusion overall on credibility without this error and in my view, it is material to credibility globally.
Ground two
29. The expert clearly had the Appellant’s specific circumstances in mind when commenting on current risk. Even on the passage quoted by the Judge (§30) the expert engaged with the passage of time issue and the Judge fails to explain why he considers this insufficient. Furthermore, there are several other references in the expert report of Sheri Laizer that addresses the passage of time and why in her view the Appellant remains at risk. The Judge has not engaged with those passages. It is not accurate in my view to categorise the expert evidence as not remarking on the specific risk to the Appellant given the passage of time since the meeting with AAH. If the Judge did not accept the expert’s view, then that is another matter which would need to be explained but here the Judge concluded that the expert did not remark on the issue at all, which is wrong.
Ground three
30. There is no evidence to support the Judge’s conclusion that because the AAH were less powerful in 2012, for that reason they would not have kept blacklists at that time. The Judge has veered into speculation.
Ground four
31. I do not see the logic in the finding that because the Appellant managed to keep his CSID from 2012, that makes it unlikely that he lost it in 2020. In any event this finding is undermined by my conclusion on ground one because the Judge approached the Appellant’s evidence about the CSID with “considerable caution” (§36) as a result of having found him to be an unreliable witness regarding the meeting with AAH.
32. Finally, there is no evidence or finding within SMO to support the contention that a photograph of a CSID would be sufficient to pass through the checkpoints which commence outside of Baghdad airport. That is obviously an important point and one that cannot safely be resolved by assumption.
Notice of Decision
33. The appeal is allowed.
34. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and is set aside with only finding preserved being that the Appellant worked in the Green Zone as claimed.
35. The appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 February 2025