Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005275
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/68389/2024
LP/03840/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

AEFP
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J. Javaherian, instructed by Marveloaks Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D. Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection, and I have not been asked to set that order aside.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Honduras, born in 1988. He entered the UK as a visitor in May 2017 and claimed asylum in October 2023. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claims on 4 July 2024. The appellant appealed, and the FtT dismissed his appeal in a decision dated 10 October 2025. In a decision promulgated on 15 January 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside that decision in part.
3. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the FtT’s decision.
The findings of the FtT
4. The appellant’s asylum claim was primarily based on his fear persecution by the Mara 18 gang. He said that they had tried to coerce him to work for them because he was employed as a driver for Coca Cola and could move around the country easily without being stopped or searched by the police. He had refused, and members of the gang had beaten and threatened him. He sought help from the police, to no avail, and then fled the country.
5. The FtT found that the appellant’s claim engaged the Refugee Convention on the grounds of actual or imputed opinion because Mara-18 “is linked to the political landscape of Honduras”. It relied for this finding on the caselaw and CPIN referred to the appellant’s skeleton argument. These were the Upper Tribunal’s guidance in EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) (CG) [2022] UKUT 335 and the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”), Honduras: Gangs, Version 1.0, published in November 2023. At [42] it stated:
“I therefore find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant does have a characteristic, his imputed political opinion, which could cause him to fear persecution on return. However, as identified by the HOPO, there are several credibility matters in the Appellant’s evidence.”
6. The FtT then set out its reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of his interactions with Mara 18, based on an inconsistency between the dates in the appellant’s account and in one of the Honduran documents he relied on, plausibility concerns, and the appellant’s prolonged delay in claiming asylum in the UK. The FtT therefore concluded that “it is more likely than not that the Appellant does not fear persecution in Honduras due to his imputed political opinion.”: [52]
7. The appellant says that in December 2023, he entered into a relationship with a citizen of Spain who is settled in the UK and that they have been cohabiting since 27 July 2024. The FtT found that the appellant’s partner was a credible witness and that their relationship was genuine and subsisting, but that as they had only been cohabiting since July 2024, they were not partners as defined in Appendix FM. When considering the appellant’s article 8 claim outside the Rules, the FtT found that there was no evidence that his removal would be disproportionate or have unjustifiably harsh consequences. If he wanted to reside with his partner in the UK, he could return to Honduras and apply for entry clearance. His private life had been established at a time when his legal status in the UK was precarious, and there was no evidence to suggest that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration.
The Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision
8. The Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision is included as annex below. In summary, in addition to his fear of Mara 18 because of having refused to work for them, the appellant had also expressed a fear of persecution because he would be returning to Honduras after a long period of residence abroad and would be perceived to have money. He would therefore be targeted for extortion. The FtT had overlooked this issue, both with regard to his protection claim and with regard to whether his removal would have unjustifiably harsh consequences and therefore be a disproportionate interference with his article 8 rights. The FtT granted the appellant permission to appeal for this reason, and the respondent did not oppose the appeal. The appellant was refused permission to appeal against the FtT’s adverse credibility findings and its rejection of his account of his interactions with Mara 18.
9. In light of the respondent’s concession and the limited grant of permission, the Upper Tribunal set aside the FtT decision with regard to the appellant’s fear arising out his status as a returnee but preserved the adverse credibility findings.
The hearing
10. At the hearing before me, I had:
(i) the appellant’s composite bundle of 223 pages, filed on 10 March 2026. This contained all of the evidence that was before the FtT, plus photographs of the appellant’s marriage proposal to his partner, three photos of the couple together, four photos of the partner wearing her engagement ring, a letter from the respondent dated 2 January 2026 inviting the couple to marriage interviews on 13 January 2026, and an updated schedule of country evidence;
(ii) The respondent’s current CPIN, Honduras: Gangs, Version 2.0 (February 2026); and
(iii) The respondent’s previous CPIN, Honduras: Gangs, Version 1.0 (November 2023), accessed via a link in the 2026 CPIN.
11. In the course of the hearing, the questions before me were identified as:
(i) Does the appellant fear serious harm for reasons of being a returnee?
(ii) If so, do returnees constitute a Particular Social Group (PSG) in Honduras?
(iii) Does the appellant have the characteristic of having an imputed political opinion as a “gang resister”, or would he have that characteristic if he refused gangs’ extortion demands?
(iv) Would the appellant be able to relocate to lower crime areas avoid harm from the gangs?
(v) Did the generalised risk of violence in Honduras constitute a very significant obstacle to the appellant’s reintegration?
(vi) Did the appellant and his partner meet the definition of partner under Appendix FM, given that the Rules no longer required two years’ cohabitation?
(vii) If so, were there insurmountable obstacles to their family life continuing in Honduras?
(viii) Would the appellant’s removal be a disproportionate interference with the article 8 rights of him or his partner?
12. The respondent accepted that:
(i) There would not be sufficient state protection against any risk from gangs; and
(ii) The appellant’s relationship with his partner is genuine and subsisting.
13. Ms Jahaverian urged me to read the FtT decision as containing a finding that the appellant did have a political opinion, namely his opposition to Mara 18, and to take that as a preserved finding in this appeal. I disagreed and gave my reasons. The finding at [42] is made in accordance with the last sentence of JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) at [13], which directs judges to determine whether, “taken at its highest, there is a Convention reason.” It is not a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant actually has the characteristic of having a political opinion. This much is clear from the comment that follows immediately: “However, […] there are several credibility matters in the Appellant’s evidence.”
14. I therefore took as preserved findings that the power of the gangs in Honduras is such that opposition to them would constitute a political opinion, but that the appellant does not himself hold such an opinion.
15. I heard oral evidence from the appellant and his partner. Neither had prepared a new witness statement for this appeal, but Mr Simpson did not object to Ms Jahaverian leading their evidence on updates since the FtT hearing, in line with the new documentary evidence in the bundle.
16. The appellant gave evidence in Spanish, with the assistance of an interpreter. I was satisfied that he and the interpreter understood each other. He adopted the statement he had made for his FtT appeal. He confirmed that he was from Danlí, in the province of El Paraíso. The province is on the border with Nicaragua and Danlí is around two hours by car from Tegucigalpa. There would be no opportunities for him on return to Honduras because he has been away for nine years and knows “practically no one.” He and his partner had become engaged to marry on 10 November 2025, and he communicated with her parents and brothers. He had never relied on public funds in the UK. He feared that he could have problems with gangs on return because he would be returning from Europe and they would think he had money. He would face extortion and threats. If he was approached the gangs, he would flee “due to fear”.
17. On cross-examination, the appellant repeated that he feared extortion or surveillance by gangs “for the simple fact of coming from a European country”. They would “think I am arriving with money”. He also worried about how he would settle back in and about the lack of opportunities. He would not be able to find work in Honduras because he has been out of the country for so long.
18. Mr Simpson put it to him that in his earlier statements, he had not expressed a fear of gangs in “the cities around Danlí”, but only in the most dangerous neighbourhoods in the capital. He denied this, explaining that he had mentioned paying money to enter those neighbourhoods merely by way of example. Mr Simpson put it to him that based on his witness statement and the country evidence, there were some areas “with little to no reported extortion”, where the appellant could safely relocate. He disputed this, saying that the gangs have become much more professional and therefore much harder to detect and avoid.
19. The appellant confirmed that he is still in contact with his mother and siblings in Honduras on a daily basis. His family would support him and his partner if they returned to Honduras, but she has her life and work in the UK. Nor could his family provide her with security. She would be particularly at risk as a foreigner. He had not told her about his immigration status until the time of his first asylum interview, out of fear about how she would react. She supported him unconditionally since he told her. They had not made any plans about what to do if his claim was refused, other than “to continue fighting” to form a family and be together.
20. I then asked the appellant why he believed that people returning from abroad were targeted in Honduras. He said this was based on what he reads in the news and hears from his family.
21. The appellant’s partner gave evidence in English. She adopted the brief letter she had written for the FtT appeal. She said she had lived in the UK for eight years and was a teacher. From 2021 until two years ago, she had been a Key Stage 1 (primary school teacher) but for the past two years, since finishing her post-graduate degree, she had taught Modern Foreign Languages (Spanish and French) in Key Stages 3-5 (secondary school). She and the appellant had given notice of intent to marry in early November 2025, hoping to get married on 22 December. However, the respondent had first sent them a request to submit evidence of the genuineness of their relationship with a deadline that pre-dated the delivery of the letter. Then on 2 January 2026, the respondent had invited them to marriage interviews on 13 January 2026. This was the same day as the appellant’s FtT hearing, and their lawyer had contacted the respondent to explain that they could not attend. They had heard nothing further from the respondent, and she had then contacted the local authority to enquire what they should do. The local authority told them that they had to begin the process of giving notice over again from the beginning. They had a new appointment to give notice scheduled for 1 April 2026. They planned to marry first in the UK and then again in her grandfather’s village in Spain, because her grandfather is disabled and cannot travel to the UK. She sees her future in the UK, with her continuing her teaching, the appellant finding a job, and having children soon. They both speak to their families by video call every weekend, and she is aware that the appellant speaks to his family every day.
22. On cross-examination, the partner confirmed that the appellant had first told her about his immigration status after his first asylum interview. She had understood that he might have to return to Honduras. The “worst case scenario” was “getting married and bringing him back somehow”. They had considered his applying for a visa from Honduras, but that would not be possible because of “the issues he has in his country”. She has developed strong connections in the UK and her life is here. She also has a strong connection with the appellant’s family, but she could not live in Honduras because of “what is happening there”. In response to a questions from me, she clarified that she would not be able to walk safely in the street or go to work without paying someone to protect her. She would be targeted as a foreigner, because she would be perceived as someone with access to money. She believes this because of documentaries she has watched and because of what her partner has told her.
23. At the end of the oral evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives. I have taken them into account in making my decision and will refer to any relevant matters below.
Legal framework
24. Because the appellant claimed asylum in 2023, his asylum claim must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) This provides at section 32(2) that there are two questions I must determine to the standard of the balance of the probabilities:
“(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
“(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.”
25. Sections 32(3)-(5) provide that if I decide both of those questions in the appellant’s favour, I must then go on to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted, and whether he would not be protected against persecution (as defined in section 31 of NABA) and would not be able to relocate internally (as defined at section 35).
26. Nothing in the statute explicitly raises the standard of proof for all aspects of the appellant’s claim to that of the balance of the probabilities. The standard of proof is only raised from the established standard of “a reasonable degree of likelihood” for the two issues of whether the appellant has a Convention characteristic and whether they fear persecution. Which material facts of the appellant’s account will need to be assessed at the higher standard will depend on the nature of the appellant’s claim. See: JCK (s.32 at [13]-[18]. As is clear from the plain language of the statute, however, there is no aspect of the appellant’s claim that I am required to “take at its highest” at any stage, contrary to what is suggested in JCK at [13].
27. The appellant maintains that “returnees from abroad” are a Particular Social Group (“PSG”) in Honduras. Section 33 of NABA provides:
“(2) A group forms a particular social group for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention only if it meets both of the following conditions.
“(3) The first condition is that members of the group share—
“(a) an innate characteristic,
“(b) a common background that cannot be changed, or
“(c) a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.
“(4) The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”
28. Section 33 of NABA is silent as to what standard of proof applies to the determination of whether the conditions for the existence of a PSG are met. However, as section 32(2)(a) refers not simply to “the characteristic the appellant claims to have” but expressly to “a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of […] membership of a particular social group”. In other words, whether the characteristic is one covered by the Convention is an element of what must be decided in accordance with section 33(2). I consider that the standard of the balance of the probabilities applies here as well. See: JCK at [14].
29. The respondent accepts that the harm the appellant says he fears rises to the level of persecution. Nor is it in dispute that it would constitute unlawful killing or inhuman and degrading treatment, such that it would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for the respondent to remove him to Honduras if his fears are well founded. The standard of proof for all aspects of the appellant’s article 2 and article 3 claims is that of a reasonable likelihood.
30. With regard to the appellant’s article 8 claim, the appellant bears the burden of proving the facts on which he relies to the standard of the balance of the probabilities, and the burden of proving that article 8 is engaged. If article 8 is engaged, the burden is on the respondent to establish that the proposed interference with article 8 is proportionate.
Discussion
31. As set out above, the facts on which the appellant relies have to be found to different standards of proof for different aspects of his claim. I will proceed first by making my findings of fact to those standards and then applying the respective legal frameworks.
32. It is not in dispute that the appellant will return to Honduras after an absence from the country of around nine years, during which he has been living in the UK. He therefore has a characteristic that could cause him to fear persecution, namely that he is a returnee from Europe.
33. Whether that characteristic is one that could cause him to fear persecution for a Refugee Convention reason depends on whether returnees in general or returnees from Europe are a PSG in Honduras. I find that it is more likely than not that being a returnee is a background that cannot be changed. It is a fact about the appellant’s past, and the past cannot be rewritten. Whether returnees are perceived as distinct by the rest of society is a question that can only be decided with reference to the country evidence, as discussed in more detail below.
34. For the reasons set out above, I consider that it is a preserved finding of the FtT that the appellant does not have a political opinion in opposition to the gangs.
The country evidence
35. In addition to the respondent’s CPINs, the country evidence before me included a country schedule prepared by the appellant, containing excerpts from 41 different sources in no apparent order. The schedule contained links to the underlying documents, but these did not work (as was discussed at the hearing before me). The underlying documents were not provided in any form. Fourteen of the 41 sources could not be accessed, either because they were behind paywalls or because searching for the source in various ways returned no results. I making my decision, I have taken into account all of the evidence that was accessible to me.
The social perception of returnees
36. None of the country evidence is directly concerned with the question of whether returnees are perceived by the rest of society as a distinct group. I consider it relevant, however, that the government, international organisations and NGOs all discuss the needs of “returnees” as a group.
37. Pursuant to the Law for the Protection of Honduran Migrants and their Families of 2013, a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of the Returned Migrant Assistance Office, Returned Migrant Assistance Centres and Municipal Returnee Assistance Units. There are three Returned Migrants Assistance Centres in the country. Returnees are registered, given a medical checkup and provided with small amounts of food and drink and limited assistance with onward travel. Their “protection needs” are also assessed at a screening interview, and they may be referred to further services if protection needs are identified. Returnees usually leave the assistance centres after about an hour, but a small number of international organisations, local NGOs and churches run initiatives to follow-up with them thereafter. As discussed in more detail below, moreover, various international organisations, local NGOs and experts have all studied and expressed opinions about the percentage of “returnees” who have protection needs and what those protection needs are.
38. I consider that the provision of immediate practical assistance on arrival does not indicate that returnees are viewed as distinct. Individuals who have just completed what is often a coerced journey are likely to have immediate practical needs and endeavouring to meet those needs does not imply that they are perceived to have anything in common. I find that the efforts to assess and quantify their protection needs, however, does reflect a belief that there is something distinct about returnees, such that it makes sense to describe them as a group. I therefore consider that the laws governing returnees, the reception system and the multiple reports considering the protection needs of “returnees” as a group provides some limited evidence that they are viewed as a distinct group.
39. It is well-established that a PSG cannot be defined by the persecution its members suffer, but that the persecution can be evidence that the group is perceived as distinct: Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah, R v. [1999] UKHL 20 (per Lord Steyn: “while persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of a particular social group in society.”) I therefore turn to the question of whether returnees are at risk of serious harm.
The risk to returnees
40. In their submissions, both parties relied on the section of the respondent’s 2023 CPIN on the risk to “Returning Migrants”. I consider that it is appropriate to rely on the evidence in this section in spite of a new CPIN having been published in February 2026. This is because the respondent does not provide any update on the risk to returnees in the 2026 CPIN that undermines the evidence cited in 2023. She simply does not address the subject. It is a matter for the respondent to decide what risk factors she provides her decision-makers with information about in accordance with Para. 339JA of the Immigration Rules, but I do not take her current silence on the issue as evidence that the reports relied on in 2023 are out of date. It is relevant here that there is nothing in the respondent’s 2026 CPIN that suggests that the power or violence of the gangs in Honduras has diminished significantly since 2023. For example, it is the respondent’s assessment that although the number of recorded homicides has decreased, the number of disappearances has increased, as have extortion and levels of violence in rural areas (2026 CPIN [3.1.8-3.1.10]. This is borne out by the country evidence at [10.1.11]-[10.1.15]. The geographical scope of the gangs is also increasing (2026 CPIN [5.1.2]; for the underlying country evidence see: [8.4.3]-[8.4.4])). In the country evidence section of the CPIN, sources describe the power of the gangs as “entrenched” ([8.2.4]) and give estimates for the number of gang members as ranging from 5,000-40,000 ([8.3.2]-[8.3.4]). In its Protection Brief Honduras from September 2024 (cited in the 2026 CPIN), UNHCR described violence in Honduras as “escalating” and the threats posed by organised crime groups (“OCGs”) as “intensified”.
41. The “Returning Migrants” section of 2023 CPIN contains excerpts from three reputable, expert sources: UNCHR, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (“IDMC”) and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD). I consider each in turn.
42. In June 2023, UNHCR reported that it was working with returnees in three Returned Migrants Assistance Centres “to identify and refer cases of returnees in need of protection, which on average account [sic] to 5% of the total returned population”. It is not possible to derive from this information what percentage of returnees are at risk simply because they are returnees. This is partly because UNHCR does not define here what “in need of protection” means, such that this can only be inferred from the types of services to which the people identified were referred. These included “third country solution’s programmes” and internal relocation, the first of which suggests risks of harm throughout the country and the second a risk of harm only in the local area. The services also included “psycho-social assistance”, which suggests more a need for support in recovering from the consequences of previous harm rather than protection from future harm. Moreover, the 5% figure is clearly a rough estimate. The underlying report sets out that in the three months covered it covered, there had been 11,552 people returned to these three centres, while UNHCR had a total staff of only 107 people. In its September 2024 Protection Brief Honduras, UNHCR estimated that 9% of returnees had “protection needs” and expressed its concerns about “protection and revictimization risks”.
43. I find that these reports indicate that an estimated 5-9% of returnees have protection needs, but they are of little assistance in deciding whether those needs arise out of the sole fact of being returnees, rather than out of a pre-existing risk or physical or psychological vulnerabilities (which the appellant does not say he has).
44. In March 2019 the IDMC published a report entitled A Web of Violence: Crime, corruption and displacement in Honduras. This states that “[b]etween 4 and 10 per cent of deportees were identified as having protection needs in 2016 and 2017, but the true figure may be higher.” It explains that the identification of returnees in need of protection is impeded by the short time they spend at the centres, lack of privacy and security, inexperienced staff, and screening interviews that focus on basic biographical and socio-economic information.
45. Some portion of the at least 4-10% of returnees identified by IDMC as in need of protection are likely to people who were already at risk when they fled Honduras. Indeed, much of this section of the report is expressly concerned with people at “ongoing risk” for the same reasons that they had fled the country. The findings of the FtT mean that the appellant does not fall into this category. However, the IDMC also expressed the opinion that:
“Return to Honduras may also present new risks. Gangs may target returnees and deportees for extortion because they believe them to have financial resources, and this may lead to further displacement.”
46. The evidence for this opinion is a UNHCR guidance note from 2016, a 2016 report from a Honduran NGO, a 2018 information bulletin from the Honduran Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las personas desplazadas por violencia (CIPPDV) (a commission made up of representatives of the government, civil society, and international organisations), and articles in the Republic in 2014 and the New Yorker in 2018. Given the range of sources and their apparent reliability, I find that I should put some weight on IDMC’s opinion that returnees may be targeted for extortion simply because, as returnees, they are considered to have access to money.
47. The ACCORD report, similarly, discusses the risks to returnees arising both out of the same factors that forced them to flee in the first place and out of the perception that they are “returning from the United States with money”. It says that for the latter reason, they may “become immediate targets for extortion”. Multiple sources are cited for the conclusion that “killings of returnees are not exceptional events.” An expert consulted by ACCORD in December 2022 expressed the opinion that “the risks upon return to Honduras are probably the highest for males, aged 15 to 39”, a group to which the appellant belongs. Of course, returnees in general and men between 15 and 39 will include both those who are returning to face pre-existing risks (which the FtT found that the appellant would not be) and those facing new risks on return. However, the same expert did identify “long-term residence in the US” as a specific reason “why persons are killed after their deportation.”
48. I find that the ACCORD report provides further support for there being some risk to returnees from the US simply because they are perceived to have access to money. I can identify no meaningful distinction between returnees from the US and returnees from Europe in this regard. Europe, like the US, is significantly wealthier than Honduras.
49. In addition to the respondent’s 2023 CPIN, the appellant relies on UNHCR’s 2016 Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Honduras. This records UNHCR’s view that “Deportees and returning migrants who bring resources from overseas, or who are perceived to do so, are also reported to be an identifiable target for extortion by the gangs.” I put considerable weight on this view, as one directly within UNHCR’s expertise. See AAA (Syria) & Ors, R (on the application of) v SSHD [2023] UKSC 42 at [65]-[68]. Mr Simpson drew my attention to the age of these guidelines, but they are still published on UNHCR’s refworld website and were endorsed by UNHCR in 2022 in its Views on Asylum Claims from Individuals Fleeing Violence by Gangs and Other Organized Criminal Groups in Central America and Mexico at footnote 95, which was cited by the respondent in her 2026 CPIN.
Findings
50. Having considered this evidence, I make the following findings.
51. I find on the balance of the probabilities that returnees are perceived as distinct by Honduran society. This is because as a group they are the subject of specific laws governing their treatment and provided with specialised services and studied by international organisations, NGOs, and experts, who seek to assess their protection needs. In addition, there is evidence from several reliable sources that they are at some risk of extortion because they are perceived to have access to money. This is evidence that there is a social perception about returnees.
52. Ms Jahaverian submitted that I should revisit the FtT’s finding about actual or imputed political opinion because the appellant would refuse to pay the gang’s extortion demands and should be considered a “gang resister”.
53. In terms of the appellant’s actual beliefs, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that it is more likely than not that the appellant has a political belief in opposition to the gangs. He does not express such a belief in his statement, and when Ms Jahaverian attempted to lead evidence that might bring him to express one, he said only that he would not pay the gangs because he would not have the money to do so.
54. Nor was Ms Jahaverian able to take me to any country evidence that suggested that those who flee rather than paying extortion demands are perceived as opponents of the gangs. Having reviewed the country evidence before me, I am not satisfied that it this is more likely than not to be the case. As set out in more detail in the following section, extortion is a significant problem throughout Honduras. It is described in multiple sources as a cause of widespread internal displacement, because thousands of people who cannot pay have fled their home areas, just as the appellant says he would do. Various organisations, including UNHCR, offer services to internally displaced persons and report on their work in doing so. Nowhere in the evidence before me, however, did I find any reference to those who flee rather than pay as being perceived as “gang resisters”.
55. I therefore am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the appellant has the characteristic of having an actual or imputed opinion as gang resister.
56. I find on the balance of the probabilities that the appellant does fear serious harm in the form of unlawful killing or serious violence for reasons of his status as a returnee. In making this finding, I have taken into account the FtT’s preserved adverse credibility findings. However, it is trite that credibility is not a seamless robe, and that an asylum-seeker may be telling the truth about some aspects of their claim and lying about others. In his evidence before me, the appellant made no effort to exaggerate, admitting, for example, that he speaks to his family every day and that they have a good relationship with his partner, and declining to suggest that his refusal to pay gangs’ extortion demands would be motivated by anything other than an inability to pay. Nor did I find his credibility undermined by his insistence that he would struggle to find employment on return. The country evidence contains extended discussions of the difficulties returnees and internally displaced people face in finding new livelihoods. I also take into account that the appellant says that his fear of extortion for this reason is based on what he has heard from his family and read in the news, and having read a limited selection of expert and new reports on this issue, it is reasonable that a person facing return would have developed such a fear.
57. For these reasons, I find that the answer to the questions posed at section 32(2) of NABA is yes.
Risk on return
58. I find that there is a real risk that the appellant would be at risk of persecution as a returnee in his home area. I recognise that the country evidence gives estimates for the percentage of returnees with “protection needs” of between 5 and 10%, and that among those 5-10% there will be returnees who are at risk for reasons that do not apply here (an ongoing pre-flight threat, gender, sexual identity, etc.). These percentages estimates could therefore be taken as suggesting that the risk of harm to the appellant falls below the notional standard of a one in ten chance first set out in the case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421 (1987). However, I also take into account that the estimates are nothing more than that, that there are multiple reasons that protection needs are not accurately identified (see [44] above), and that among the 90-95%, there will many returnees who do not share the particular risk factors that the appellant does have because they will not be men of his age and will not be returning from a wealthy country in which they spent a considerable period of time. Nor will they have family members remaining in that country and capable of sending them remittances, as the appellant does. For these reasons, a mathematical calculation of risk would be an artificial exercise.
59. As noted above, I put particular weight on the UNHCR Guidelines. I also find the ACCORD report helpful in reconfirming the risk identified in those guidelines, as well as identifying specific additional risk factors, such as the appellant’s age. Finally, I note the reports that those who engage in extortion gather intelligence on potential targets, including on whether they receive remittances from abroad (ACCORD at p. 18-19). It is reasonably likely that if intelligence were gathered about the appellant in his home area, it would become known that he had lived in the UK for nine years and was engaged to a woman from Spain. Whether or not she was sending remittances (and she has not been asked about this), the perception that she could if necessary would be reasonably likely to arise.
60. I also consider that the appellant’s home area would constitute another risk factor. In the UNHCR’s Protection Brief: Honduras from September 2024, Danlí was identified as one of 58 municipalities “facing the [sic] higher impacts of violence”. It had the fourth highest number of complaints of internal forced displacement in the country in 2024, and the main cause of that displacement was gang violence (2026 CPIN [13.1.11]). ACCORD identified it in 2022 as the district with the fifth highest numbers of homicides.
61. Mr Simpson relied heavily on a table found in the 2026 CPIN, which shows the results of a telephone survey conducted by the polling firm Le Vote for the Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa in 2024 and reported by the Instituto de la Justicia in their 2025 report, Seguridad y Justicia 2025. He pointed to the fact that only 5.7% of the respondents in the province of El Paraíso had replied to the survey to confirm that they had been victims of extortion in the previous year and submitted that this showed that the risk to the appellant in his home area was small.
62. I find, however, that the underlying report does not support this conclusion. Nothing in the report explains who was selected for the telephone survey, or what the response rate was. The report also points out that the number of police complaints about extortion reflected not the actual incidence of extortion but the number of victims who were willing to file a complaint, and that experts believed that this number was falling due to the impunity of the gangs and a lack of confidence in the judicial system. ACCORD, similarly, gives a range of reasons that extortion is significantly underreported. Given the voluminous evidence of the violence and vindictiveness of the gangs and their deep penetration into society, I consider it reasonably likely that fear of gangs and will have affected responses to a telephone survey. I conclude that it would be wrong to treat the figures recorded in this survey as indicating anything more than general trends. They cannot be treated as precise assessments of risk. Moreover, the appellant is from Danlí, which is specifically identified as an area where there is a heightened risk of gang violence and extortion by UNHCR and ACCORD. That the risk may be lower in other parts of El Paraíso would only be relevant to the question of internal relocation.
63. For these reasons, I find that the appellant would be at real risk of persecution in his home area.
64. It is the respondent’s position that a person living in an area controlled by MS-13 or Mara 18 who resists their extortion demands is “likely to face persecution or serious harm” in that area (2026 CPIN at [3.1.3]). Having read the country evidence describing the multiple agents of extortion in Honduras, I consider that there is a real risk that a person refusing extortion demands from more minor gangs would also face persecution or serious harm.
65. In her original refusal letter, the respondent accepted that if the material facts of the appellant’s claim were made out, neither state protection nor internal relocation would be available. At the hearing before me, Mr Simpson modified that position. The respondent continued to accept that state protection was not available against gang violence, but her position as to the safety of internal relocation had changed in light of the narrower basis of the appellant’s asylum claim.
66. I considered that it was fair to allow the respondent to modify her position in this way, because the original concession had been based on the appellant’s account of having been individually targeted for forced recruitment. At [14.1.1]-14.1.4], the respondent’s 2026 CPIN records that gangs are able to track down individuals throughout the country and may do so if they “believe that someone is guilty of betrayal or enmity or they have another serious grievance”. However, gang threats range from “Don’t come around here again” – which suggests a person will not be tracked – to “green light, which means the gang will kill an individual or their family member no matter where they are, and regardless of how much time has elapsed”. It is consistent with this evidence to take the position that if the appellant’s original claim had been accepted, internal relocation would not have been safe because Mara 18 would have had a serious grievance against him. It is also reasonable, based on this evidence, for the respondent to take the position that if he relocates in order to avoid paying extortion, this will not cause sufficiently serious offence to motivate a gang to track him throughout the country.
67. Having read the country evidence with care, I agree with the respondent that if the appellant were to relocate to avoid extortion, this would not motivate a gang based in his local area to track him elsewhere in the country. As noted above, much of the country evidence on extortion describes it as a major driver of internal displacement. It also describes the needs of the internally displaced primarily in terms of psycho-social support and access to new livelihoods. I am not aware of any evidence that those who are internally displaced by extortion are at ongoing risk from their former extorters. Moreover, this would be contrary to the many sources that describe extortion as linked to control over a particular territory.
68. However, this does not resolve the issue of whether internal relocation would be safe. It is necessary to consider whether the appellant would be at risk of extortion in a new area of Honduras, because he would again be perceived as a returnee. I consider that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be perceived as a returnee in an area of relocation, essentially for the same reasons that he would be at risk in his home area. It might take longer for gangs to discover that he was a returnee from Europe with a Spanish partner, but given their penetration into many areas of daily life and the evidence that they gather intelligence on their targets, I consider that there would be a real risk that they would do so.
69. In his submissions, Mr Simpson also relied on the finding of the 2024 telephone survey with regard to internal relocation. He pointed to the fact that there were two provinces (Valle and Ocotepeque) where the percentage of respondents reporting that they had been victims of extortion in the past year was 0%.
70. For the reasons set out above at [62], I prefer the country evidence that presents a broad, evaluative assessment of the risk of extortion in various areas of the country to the findings of this one survey.
71. Paragraphs [10.2.6]-[10.2.13] of the 2026 CPIN contain excerpts from various reports that give a broader picture of the extent of extortion in Honduras. They describe it as “one of the central security problems associated with organized criminality in Honduras” and the trigger for “more violent crimes such as threats, kidnappings, and homicides”, as well as a cause of forced displacement. While extortion had recently decreased in some locations, it had increased in others. In areas where Barrio 18 and MS-13 had stepped back from extortion, other criminal structures “came to collect in their place”. In 2022, Human Rights Watch described gangs as extorting residents “throughout the country”. The US Congressional Research Service reported that extortion was estimated to have increased overall by as much as 14% between 2022 and 2024. The Global Organised Crime Index 2025 is cited as reporting that Honduras has “one of the most entrenched extortion markets in Central America ... Nearly all sectors of society are affected.”
72. The appellant has also adduced a number of reports by the think tank InSight Crime, and I put weight on these reports because they are nuanced and clearly separate factual findings from the think tank’s own analysis, as well as because Insight Crime is treated as a reliable source in the respondent’s CPIN and by ACCORD. In October 2022, InSight Crime described Honduras as “in the midst of an extortion crisis” and in December 2023, it reported that crime had “continued unabated” in spite of a year-long state or emergency and that violence and extortion had become more widespread geographically.
73. In considering the risk of extortion in other areas, I also take into account the suggestion in the ACCORD report that “access to financial resources affords one the opportunity to situate himself or herself […] in more secure areas.” The appellant would be returning without financial resources of his own, and not having lived or worked in Honduras for nine years. The country evidence describes the considerable difficulties that Honduras faces in reintegrating the large numbers of returnees and internally displaced persons economically. I find that this makes his fear of struggling to reintegrate economically himself plausible. If the appellant did receive support from his partner in the UK, this itself would be a risk factor. I therefore conclude that there is a real risk that that appellant would not have access to the financial resources necessary to relocate to a safer area.
Conclusion on the appellant’s Refugee Convention claim
74. For the reasons given above, I find that the answer to all of the questions set out at Section 32 of NABA is yes, and that the appellant is therefore at real risk of persecution in Honduras.
Conclusion on the appellant’s article 2 and article 3 claim
75. For essentially the same reasons, I find that the appellant’s article 2 and 3 claims are made out.
The appellant’s article 8 claims
76. It is accepted that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner. I do not find that they meet the definition of partners under Appendix FM, however. I accept that the Rules no longer require a couple to show that they have been living together for two years in order to meet the requirement of having been in a “relationship akin to marriage” for that period. However, the appellant and his partner have not said anywhere in their evidence that they have considered themselves to be in a relationship akin to marriage for two years. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that their commitment to each other was not akin to that of married couples because they did not decide to cohabit until July 2024 and did not become engaged to marry until November 2025.
77. For the sake of completeness, and because I am aware that the couple intend to marry imminently, I find that if they were married, there would have been insurmountable obstacles to them continuing their married life together in Honduras. These obstacles would arise out of the high levels of violence in Honduras, combined with particular risks to the appellant’s partner.
78. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, “Maras, gangs and organised crime are a permanent threat to a large part of the population and are a real obstacle for leading a normal life and even moving freely through the territory.”: 2026 CPIN [19.1.7] The head of the NRC described the country as facing “war-like levels of violence” in a visit to the country in 2023.
79. Multiple sources also consistently refer to gangs infiltrating schools in order to recruit pupils and subjecting staff to extortion schemes: 2026 CPIN [10.2.10] Teachers “who represent an alternative source of authority or resist or oppose the gangs and their recruitment of local youths, or even just give gang members bad grades, have reportedly been threatened and killed by the gangs”. In its Eligibility Guidelines, UNHCR included “teachers and educators working in public schools and educational institutions” as potentially in need of international protection. Teachers were also listed as victims of extortion by ACCORD. This would mean that the appellant’s partner would face significant hardship in pursuing her career in Honduras.
80. Multiple sources also report that women are at risk of sexual abuse by gang members (see, e.g. Human Rights Watch reports from 2020-2022, ACCORD, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines). Some of this sexual abuse is targeted at women who are members or associates of the gangs, who live in gang-controlled neighbourhoods, or whose relatives have defied the gangs. I am not satisfied on the balance of the probabilities that these additional risk factors would arise in the case of the appellant’s partner. Nonetheless, there are enough reports that speak of risks of sexual violence and femicide more broadly that I find that woman are at significant risk of gender-based violence in Honduras. In its Eligibility Guidelines, UNHCR expresses the opinion that
“Discrimination and violence against women and girls is reported to be widespread and systematic in Honduras by members of gangs and other organized criminal groups, the security services and other individuals.”
The country has the highest rate of femicide in Latin America (HRW, 2021; UNCHR Eligibility Guidelines; ACCORD).
81. This climate of discrimination and violence would increase the hardships that the appellant’s partner would face.
82. Finally, I infer from the evidence of the risk of extortion for returnees from wealthy countries that citizens of such countries are also at risk of extortion. The standard of proof for the appellant’s article 8 claim is the balance of the probabilities, and my findings above about the actual risk to returnees was made to the standard of a real risk. However, I find on the basis of the country evidence and the partner’s oral evidence that it is more likely than not that the appellant’s partner would experience a genuine subjective fear of crime and extortion, and that this would have a significant adverse impact on her personal and professional life.
83. However, as the couple are not yet partners, they cannot meet the requirements of Appendix FM.
84. In considering the appellant’s article 8 claim outside the rules, I find that the appellant’s relationship with his partner constitutes family life. They have cohabited since July 2024, are engaged to marry and intended to marry in December 2025.
85. Removing the appellant to Honduras would be a significant interference with their family life. Not only is it normal for married couples to live together, but the appellant’s partner expressed a desire to have children together soon, something that would become much more difficult if they lived apart.
86. Because I have found that the appellant is a refugee and there is nothing to suggest that he is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention, the appellant meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of limited leave to remain. This resolves the public interest balance in his favour.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026

ANNEX
Error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005275
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/68389/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
15th January 2026
…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FARRELLY

Between

Mr EFP
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Javaherian, instructed by Marveloaks Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

DECISION AND REASONS ON THE ERROR OF LAW ISSUES

Introduction
1. The preference is for open justice but given the nature of this protection claim and the absence of any argument to the contrary I have decided to maintain the anonymity direction made in the First tier Tribunal.
2. The appellant is a national of Honduras, born in 1988. He flew to the United Kingdom on the 16th of May 2017, arriving on the 17th. He gained entry on foot of a six months visit visa. He subsequently overstayed.
3. He later made an application under the EU settlement scheme on the basis of his relationship with a Spanish national. This was refused on the 4th of September 2023.
4. He then applied for asylum on the 22nd of October 2023. The claim was governed by the Naba provisions. It was refused on the 4th of July 2024. His claim was that he worked for Coca-Cola. He said that members of a gang, called Gang 18, thought that his employment would be a good cover to transport drugs. When he refused to help he said he was assaulted on two occasions. He said he reported the matter to the police but they did not pursue it. He then decided to leave his job and then later ,his home country. He claims if returned he is at risk from the gang.
5. His protection claim was refused on the 4th of July 2024. The respondent did not find the claim engaged the Refugee Convention . In any event, the respondent did not believe the claim was true. Various inconsistencies were noted. The respondent referred to his delay in claiming protection and the Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 considerations.
The First tier Tribunal
6. His appeal was heard by First tier Tribunal Judge Latta and following a hearing on the 16th of September 2025 was dismissed. He was represented then, as he is now, by Ms Javaherian. It was agreed the judge should also consider the question of family life and his relationship with a Spanish national. Her evidence was that the relationship began in December 2023 and they cohabited since July 2024.
7. It was argued that the refugee convention was engaged on the basis there was collusion between gangs and State and so a refusal to help a gang amounted to political opposition to the gang. It was also argued he formed part of a particular social group.
8. First tier Tribunal Judge Latta was prepared to accept that the gang was connected to the politics in Honduras and concluded the appellant by his actions could be considered as showing an imputed political opinion which would cause him to fear persecution. However, the Judge referred to credibility issues and found the date given in a police report submitted was a major inconsistency as the appellant was not in the country at the time and concluded this undermine the reliance that could be placed upon it. First tier Tribunal Judge Latta also found it was not credible if the gang were as powerful as claimed that he would approach the authorities for protection. Furthermore, if they were as powerful as claimed then the judge did not find it credible that they would need the appellant's assistance, particularly after he left his employment. The judge then referred to the delay from when he arrived on the 17th of May 2017 and the claim in October 2023, an EUSS application having been made on the 4th of September 2023.
9. First tier Tribunal Judge Latta concluded that the appellant had not given a credible account and failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on return.
10. The judge accepted that his relationship with his partner was genuine and subsisting but the requirements of the immigration rules were not met. Whilst there may be family life the judge concluded it would not be disproportionate to remove him.
The permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. Permission to appeal was granted by First tier Tribunal Judge Beach. The judge accepted an argument that he could be at risk as a returned migrant and this had not been considered. The judge also felt that this was relevant in relation to Article 8 and unjustifiably harsh consequences.
12. Paragraph 19 of the application for permission to appeal refers to the skeleton argument of the 10th of June 2025 and that migrants returning from abroad could be targeted by Gang 18 because there are presumed to have money. The application states that the judge failed to make any findings as to whether he would be at risk as a returning migrant.
The error of law
13. The respondent provided a rule 24 response dated the 20th of September 2025 to the tribunal office. The response was that the respondent was not opposing the appellant’s appeal ( presumably in relation to the error of law issue only). It was pointed out that permission to appeal had been granted only on grounds 2(i-ii)of the application. The response submitted that the negative credibility findings should be preserved.
14. The argument advanced was that the appellant would be at risk as a returning migrant and this had not been considered by the judge. The failure to consider this argument meant the judge had failed to consider one of the reasons advanced why the appellant would be at risk on return. Furthermore, the failure to consider this argument meant it was not considered when assessing the Article 8 claim and the issue of unjustifiable harsh consequences.
15. An application for an adjournment of the substantive issue was made by the appellant’s representative which was not opposed by the presenting officer. This was on the basis the appellant’s representative had not received the rule 24 response until this morning. Mr Ojo confirmed there was no record of the respondent sending a copy of the rule 24 response to the appellant’s representative. She had prepared on the basis the issue for today was whether a material error of law could be established. A rule 24 response had been uploaded onto the CCE file system on the 20th of November 2024 and was addressed to the Tribunal Office but she advised she did not have access to the CCE system. She said that her instructing solicitors had earlier contacted the respondent about the rule 24 response without success.
16. The appellant’s representatives had also requested a Spanish interpreter but this had been refused by a legal officer on the 22nd of December 2025.This was on the basis the hearing for today was an error of law hearing and if this were found it would be open to the appellant’s representative to then seek to adjourn the remaking hearing until an interpreter was available.
17. There was no interpreter arranged for today's hearing and the appellant's representative indicated that he and his partner had a limited command of English and the presenting officer indicated he had questions he wanted to ask them. The presenting officer suggested that to proceed now could be a procedural irregularity. Consequently, it was not possible to reach a conclusion on the appeal.
18. On the basis of the respondent’s concession in the rule 24 I find there has been a material error of law in the decision as set out at grounds 2(i-ii) of the application. I would preserve the other adverse credibility findings. No argument was advanced that the scope of the rehearing should be widened.
Decision
The decision of First tier Tribunal Judge Latta materially errs in law and is set aside. The adverse credibility findings in relation to the protection claim and the finding that the appellant and his partner are in a genuine and subsisting relationship is preserved.

FJ Farrelly Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13th January 2026