Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005277
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04090/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

BH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda, Counsel instructed by Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Iran, of Kurdish ethnicity. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) against a decision of the respondent to refuse his asylum claim. In a decision dated 16 September 2025 the FtT Judge (FtTJ) dismissed that appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that he was the owner of a tea house near the border with Iraq, behind which was a storage area where travellers and kolbars were allowed to store goods and belongings in return for payment. The appellant claims that his tea house was raided by the authorities and illegal items, including political documents and drugs, were found. He left Iran and fears he will be persecuted by the authorities if returned. He also claims that he will be at risk because he has participated in anti-government protests in the UK and posted anti-regime material on Facebook.

Grounds of Appeal

3. The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal before the Upper Tribunal.

4. The first is that the FtTJ failed to provide adequate reasons for his findings at [55] to [69], in relation to whether the appellant’s account of events in Iran was credible.

5. The second is that the FtTJ failed to properly apply the country guidance. In particular, that the FtTJ found the appellant had expressed a general sympathy with the Kurdish cause, but had not shown an interest of any significance or at a higher level than that likely to be shown by many Kurds who live in Iran. The appellant argues that is sufficient to put him at risk on return if he were to declare his political opinion to the authorities, and that it is not necessary for him to show a significant or higher level of interest.

Discussion and Findings

6. In relation to the first ground, Ms Sepulveda took me through a number of findings made by the FtTJ which she submitted were inadequately reasoned. Specifically, findings in relation to:

a. the account of the raid on the tea house and the appellant’s subsequent adverse interest to the authorities and risk on return, at [55] to [69];
b. the appellant’s account of the description of his storage space being vague at [57], which the FtTJ found undermined his credibility, at [59];
c. the detail provided about the people who had stored goods at the appellant’s tea house and the failure of the FtTJ to adequately consider the appellant’s witness statement in this regard, at [60];
d. the appellant’s lack of an explanation about why he had taken a serious and obvious risk in storing packages at his tea house and why he had not encountered any previous problems with the authorities, at [60];
e. the plausibility of the appellant’s account about not returning to his tea house following the raid and his subsequent actions and decisions, at [62] to [63];
f. the detail provided about the appellant’s engagement with a named individual and the failure of the FtTJ to acknowledge the content of the appellant’s witness statement in this regard, at [64] to [65].

7. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the FtTJ appeared to have made a number of assumptions about aspects of the appellant’s account without setting out adequate reasoning for the findings reached. She said that the appellant is entitled to understand the basis upon which the decision had been made and argued that the FtTJ’s was deficient in this regard.

8. Mr Tan adopted the Rule 24 Response which had been filed. He submitted that on a plain reading of the FtTJ’s decision it is clear that the appellant’s account was not accepted for a raft of reasons and those reasons were set out over a number of paragraphs. He pointed to the well understood principle that when considering an appeal based on inadequate reasons judicial restraint should be exercised to not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because every step in its reasoning is not set out in detail.

9. Mr Tan took me to [57], where the FtTJ found that the appellant’s account of the tea house was vague. He said that is to be taken in the context of [9], where it is clear that the evidence provided by the appellant was limited, and [35] where the FtTJ confirmed he had carefully considered all of the documentary evidence and everything that was said at the hearing, as well as any factual, evidential and legal issues raised by the parties, whether specifically referred to or not. He noted that the FtTJ concluded the account was vague after hearing the appellant give oral evidence and the evidence being tested under cross-examination.

10. In relation to [58], Mr Tan noted the inconsistency with the evidence given about the man in the tea house and whether he took money for the storage of the goods or was only responsible for counting the money, and that no explanation was given by the appellant for that. He noted that the appellant did not address the question of why he would take the risks set out at [60], arguing it was open to the FtTJ to reject this aspect of the claim particularly in the context of the appellant being a Kurd engaging in the claimed activities close to the border. Further, that it was reasonable for the FtTJ to consider it unusual that the appellant had not encountered any previous issues with the authorities and for that to be part of the credibility assessment. In relation to [61], that the FtTJ explained he found it not credible that kolbars would stop part way through their journeys and leave their contraband, increasing the risk of discovery, and that the appellant did not provide any explanation for that. At [64], that despite questions about the raid the appellant did not mention the named individual at his asylum interview, Mr Tan said was another reason for the FtTJ to find the account lacked credibility. Mr Tan submitted that the appellant’s case amounted to mere disagreement with the FtTJ’s findings and was not an error of law.

11. The ability of the appellant to explain his own account in a clear and consistent way, including under cross-examination, will plainly be an important part of how the FtTJ assesses credibility. The FtTJ had the benefit of hearing evidence at the hearing directly from the appellant. The FtTJ began the assessment of the appellant’s evidence at [55], noting that if it is accepted that the appellant’s account of the raid on his tea house is credible then he is likely to have come to the attention of the authorities and be at risk on return. Over the following 14 paragraphs, the FtTJ explains for each point in turn why he does not find the account of the raid credible.

12. Mr Tan pointed to a number of those areas in his submissions, which I have highlighted above. I will not repeat them, however in summary the FtTJ found that parts of the account given by the appellant were vague, at [57]; that parts were inconsistent, at [58]; that parts lacked sufficient detail, at [59] to [61]; and that parts were either objectively not plausible or lacked an explanation from the appellant, [62] to [66]. While Ms Sepulveda is correct that a party is entitled to understand the basis upon which their case has been decided, the appellant can clearly understand from the FtTJ’s decision the reasons why the account was found to not be credible. I find that the FtTJ has given adequate reasons for his decision.

13. In light of the above, I do not uphold the first ground of appeal.

14. In relation to the country guidance issue argued under the second ground, Ms Sepulveda submitted that in applying HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), as a sympathiser of the Kurdish cause and someone who has expressed an interest in the Kurdish cause, the appellant was likely to be at risk if he was to declare his political opinion to the authorities. She submitted that it is not necessary for the appellant to show a significant, or higher level of interest to be at risk.

15. Mr Tan noted that the FtTJ had set out all relevant country guidance at [38] to [51] and that the appellant had raised no issues with that summary. He noted that the appellant had not raised any challenge to the findings about his historical political activity at [71] to [72], his sur place activity at [74] to [76], or to the findings at [77] to [83] and [90] that his activities do not reflect a genuinely held political view. Mr Tan relied on OM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1585 as authority that the FtTJ had correctly applied the country guidance and submitted that the appellant is seeking to stretch an observation by the FtTJ that the appellant has some sympathy for the Kurdish cause, into a genuinely held political belief.

16. The FtTJ found at [77]:

“From the Appellant’s evidence, I find that he has not expressed any strong political views as the reason for his attendance at these demonstrations other than a general sympathy with the Kurdish cause. He confirmed that, other than the demonstrations and posting on Facebook, that he has not undertaken any other political activity in the UK such as join or become a supporter of a group supporting the Kurdish cause. He does not claim to have received any threats or adverse contact as a result of attending the demonstrations or posting on Facebook.”

17. At [97]:

“[…] the Appellant will […] not have to lie if asked if he is opposed to the government, because the authorities will be aware that most, if not all Kurds, are opposed to a certain extent. At its highest, the Appellant has shown an interest in the Kurdish cause, but nothing of any significance or at a higher level than that likely to be shown by many Kurds who live in Iran or who are returned there.”

18. The FtTJ found that, at its highest, the appellant had an interest in, and sympathy for, the Kurdish cause. The FtTJ further found at [82], that looking at the evidence in the round he was not satisfied that attending demonstrations and posting on Facebook showed any real commitment to the Kurdish cause or that those activities reflect the appellant’s genuine political beliefs, particularly when no such beliefs were held before he arrived in the UK.

19. While being of Kurdish ethnicity is a risk factor that must be taken into account, it is to be considered alongside other risk factors. The FtTJ found that the asylum claim was not made out, that the sur place activities were limited and that, in any event, they did not represent a genuinely held political view. In line with OM, the appellant would have no reason to declare these matters to the authorities if questioned and would therefore not be at risk of harm on return. I find that the FtTJ has correctly applied the country guidance.

20. In light of the above, I do not uphold the second ground of appeal

21. I find that the grounds of appeal fail to show that the FtTJ erred in law for the reasons argued by the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

N Hills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 9 March 2026