Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005279
First-tier Tribunal: PA/61839/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS

Between

M M
(Anonymity decision made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP link on 19 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 10 September 2025 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Bangladesh claimed, in summary, that having come to the United Kingdom as a student he was at risk on return to Bangladesh due to his past membership of the student wing of the Bangladesh Islamic Chatrra Shabir Party and his continuing membership of the Nirapod Bangladesh Chaai as a result would face persecution from the Awami League.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ficklin in a remote oral hearing on 22 August 2025. The Judge found that the Awami League, no longer being in power, was not powerful enough to persecute low level activists such as the Appellant and as such he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of serious harm on a return to Iran or that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The Appellant was refused permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready but on renewal Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato granted permission to appeal on 28 November 2025 in the following terms:
Grounds 1, 2 & 3
I am not satisfied that these grounds are arguable. Firstly, the grounds arguably misstate the legal test for the assessment of subjective fears in the context of a claim made after the Nationality and Borders Act came into force. Secondly, the judge was more than entitled in law to rely on the stark inconsistencies in the appellant’s various and seemingly ever-changing accounts. The notion that the judge adopted an unlawful approach to the supporting documents cannot be reconciled with the careful treatment of this evidence in accordance with the relevant legal principles. The judge was unarguably entitled to place substantial weight on the profound political changes on the ground in Bangladesh to conclude that the appellant was not at risk on an objective assessment.
Ground 4
While I share the concerns of the FTT judge who refused permission about the vanishingly small chance of making good a Article 8 private claim now that the protection claim has fallen away, I disagree that the wholesale failure to assess this ground of appeal at all is not a material error of law. The parties should come to the error of law hearing prepared to deal with an immediate remaking on the Article 8 case. I grant permission exclusively in relation to the Article 8 ground of appeal.
The hearing
5. Prior to the hearing on 6 March 2026 the Appellant’s legal representatives, Lawmatic Solicitors, confirmed that they no longer represented the Appellant. The Appellant’s contact details were confirmed to the Tribunal and a CVP link was provided to the Appellant to enable him to attend the hearing. Nevertheless there was no appearance by the Appellant and there was no record of the Appellant contacting the Tribunal. A telephone call was made by the Tribunal to the number on record for the Appellant but without any response. This appeal was not called until 11:30am. In the absence of any appearance by the Appellant and there being no application to adjourn I resolved to proceed.
6. Mr Parvar relied on the rule 24 response and did not address me further. I confirmed that it was my decision that the failure of the First-tier Tribunal give reasons for dismissing the appeal on Article 8 grounds amounted to an error of law but that the error was not material as neither the Appeal Skeleton Argument nor the Appellant’s witness statement raised any grounds capable of establishing that the Appellant had a protected family or private life in the United Kingdom. I reserved my written decision.
Findings – Error of Law
7. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismisses the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds. The body of the decision makes no reference to private life, family life or Article 8 and as such the decision to dismiss on Article 8 grounds is unreasoned. This is a material error of law.
8. However, I am entirely satisfied that this error was not material to the decision. The Appellant’s witness statement dated 16 April 2025 is lengthy amounting to some 37 paragraphs. It makes no mention of family life or private life or indeed anything at all that could be considered as a reference to any Article 8 grounds. There were no other witness statements before the First-tier Tribunal. The Appeal Skeleton Argument (ASA) refers to Article 8 (at paragraph 2) as an alternative ground of appeal but otherwise makes no mention of any Article 8 grounds other than at paragraph 23 where it is submitted
“…that there would be “very significant obstacles” in him integrating his life in Bangladesh due to his vulnerability because of the current situation in Bangladesh and in the alternative he submits that it would be disproportionate interference into his private life if he is removed from the United Kingdom.”
Despite this submission nothing further was put forward in either the Appellant’s statement or the ASA to demonstrate that the Appellant had a protected private life in the United Kingdom or if he had to give any reasons, his protection claim having been dismissed, why there would be any significant obstacles to him “integrating his life in Bangladesh”. As such there was nothing at all put forward on the Appellant’s behalf to suggest that there was any prospect of success in his Article 8 appeal. In essence it was not pursued before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained an error of law but that error was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on all grounds is upheld.

Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

20 March 2026