Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005296

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57024/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

PRINCE-DIAMOND OKON ETIM
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Olatokun of Counsel instructed R.O.C.K. Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms , Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a Nigerian national born on 25 March 2014, was granted permission to appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrley. The judge’s decision, given on the papers and promulgated on 29 August 2025, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s earlier decision dated 19 April 2024. That decision refused the appellant’s application to join his mother in the United Kingdom. The application was made under the immigration rules, specifically appendix FM, and also relied upon Article 8 rights concerning respect for private and family life.
2. The appellant is a Nigerian citizen currently residing in Nigeria with his grandmother. The application for entry clearance was refused by the judge on suitability grounds, specifically referencing provisions S–EC and EC–C 11(c) of the immigration rules.
3. The refusal was based on suitability grounds due to the criminal history of the appellant's sponsor's partner. Notably, the sponsor’s partner was convicted in the Crown Court on 25 December 1973 for offences including assault, ill-treatment, and abandonment of a child. The conviction resulted in the imposition of a suspended prison sentence.
4. The respondent concluded that the sponsor's partner posed a risk to the appellant. Therefore, it was determined that it would not be in the appellant’s best interests to allow him to be in proximity to the sponsor's partner.
5. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 21 August 2025. However, in a decision promulgated on 29 August 2025the judge Farrelly dismissed the appeal.
6. On 17 November 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Dainty granted the appellant permission to appeal. The permission was granted on the grounds that the initial decision may have been flawed in its consideration of proportionality. Specifically, it was considered arguable that a proper balancing exercise was not conducted in the original decision as required. This lack of a balancing approach in assessing the proportionality of the decision formed the basis for allowing the appeal to proceed.
7. I heard submissions from both. These are recorded in the record of proceedings and are not rehearsed here except where necessary to do so.
8. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Findings – Error of Law
9. Judge Farley assessed the appeal solely on the basis of the documents that were submitted. As there was no oral hearing, the evidence was not tested or explored through face-to-face questioning. The judge acknowledged that the material available to him for determining the appeal was highly limited. His findings were therefore necessarily confined to the information contained within the papers and what could reasonably be inferred from them. Judge Farley also expressed regret that there was no representative from the Home Office present to assist in clarifying any matters. Ultimately, he emphasised that his decision could only be made on the basis of the evidence that had been provided to him.
10. In the decision it was stated that according to the appellant, he cannot continue to live in Nigeria because his grandmother is that she lives alone with him. His grandmother is a civil servant and her position in her office demands are to be travelling from time to time for work seminars, workshops to other cities. During this time he is left alone at home to cater for himself. His school closes at 2 PM and he has to stay home alone. Staying home at his age is very risky and scary and he cannot sleep at night when his grandmother is not around because of the fear of so many dangers being exposed to the high level insecurity in Nigeria. He now wants to join his mother in the United Kingdom. The argument advanced was that the sponsor is now divorced from Mr Paulo and therefore the respondent’s concerns are no longer valid.
11. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
12. In Razgar Lord Bingham gave the following guidance:
“In considering whether a challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision to remove a person must clearly fail, the reviewing court must, as it seems to me, consider how an appeal would be likely to fare before an adjudicator, as the tribunal responsible for deciding the appeal if there were an appeal. This means that the reviewing court must ask itself essentially the questions which would have to be answered by an adjudicator. In a case where removal is resisted in reliance on Article 8, these questions are likely to be:
(1) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
13. In paragraphs 45 and 46 of Gurung & Ors, R (on the application of) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 8 the Court of Appeal said: “45. Ultimately, the question whether an individual enjoys family life is one of fact and depends on a careful consideration of all the relevant facts of the particular case.
14. The determination of whether Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged in this appeal is inherently fact-sensitive. The judge emphasised that, based on the evidence presented, there is only limited information to suggest that a family life exists between the appellant and his sponsor. This conclusion is largely influenced by the fact that the appellant and the sponsor have been living separately for an extended period.
15. Furthermore, the judge noted the absence of any evidence indicating ongoing contact or communication between the appellant and the sponsor during their time apart. The judge also highlighted the lack of information regarding any visits that may have taken place between the two, which further undermines the assertion of a continuing family life as envisaged under Article 8(1).
16. The judge, having carefully considered the evidence presented, was required to address the first question set out in Razgar, namely whether the proposed removal would interfere with the appellant’s right to respect for his family life. On the basis of the limited evidence available, the judge concluded that this question must be answered in the negative.
17. Specifically, the judge found that the appellant had not demonstrated the existence of a family life with his sponsor in the United Kingdom. This finding was supported by the fact that counsel at the hearing did not dispute that the appellant and the sponsor have never enjoyed a family life together in the United Kingdom.
18. The judge determined that family life between the appellant and the sponsor had not been established. This finding is crucial, as any assessment regarding interference with family life under Article 8 requires clear evidence demonstrating the existence of such a relationship. In the absence of sufficient proof indicating an ongoing family life, the judge was justified in placing significant weight on the lack of evidence and the specific circumstances surrounding the appellant.
19. The separation and disruption of the appellant’s family unit were not caused by any actions of the respondent. Instead, it was the sponsor who made the decision to leave the appellant in the care of his grandmother. Following this, the sponsor travelled to the United Kingdom, where she established a new family life with her ex-husband. During her time in the United Kingdom, she also had a child with her ex-husband. This sequence of events underscores that the sponsor initiated the breakup by relocating and forming a separate family unit apart from the appellant, who remained with his grandmother.
20. Leave to appeal was granted on the basis that the appellant had not undertaken a proportionality exercise in relation to the decision. However, as the judge had already determined that there was no family life between the appellant and the sponsor, the first step of the Razgar framework was not satisfied. In these circumstances, there was no obligation for the judge to carry out a proportionality assessment, since the threshold requirement under Article 8 was not met. The absence of a family life meant that further consideration of proportionality was unnecessary and not required by the legal framework applied in this case.
21. Although the judge concluded that there was no family life established between the appellant and the sponsor, he proceeded to consider the matter further in the event that his initial conclusion was incorrect. In this alternative analysis, the judge evaluated the proportionality of the respondent’s decision in light of the circumstances that had been proven during the proceedings.
22. Having regard to the evidence presented and the factual background of the case, the judge determined that, even if it were accepted that a family life existed between the appellant and the sponsor, the respondent’s decision would nevertheless be proportionate. This assessment was made as a precautionary measure and served as an alternative finding to the primary determination that no family life was established between the appellant and the sponsor.
23. The judge turned to the obligations arising under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. This statutory provision places a duty on the decision-maker to ensure that they are properly informed of the circumstances of any child affected by the exercise of immigration or related functions. Compliance with section 55 requires a thorough and careful examination of all relevant information and factors pertaining to the child's situation.
24. In this case, the judge found that the information made available was significantly lacking. The evidential picture was incomplete, and this was further compounded by the fact that the sponsor could not be questioned, as the case was determined on the papers at the sponsor’s request. Accordingly, the judge was left to assess the matter with only limited and inadequate information regarding the appellant's circumstances.
25. The judge carefully considered the best interests of the appellant in reaching his decision. He concluded that the appellant’s welfare would be best served by remaining in the care of his natural parent, provided that environment is safe and secure. The judge emphasised that relocating the appellant to the United Kingdom without the necessary safeguards in place could not be regarded as being in the appellant’s best interests. This view was based on the importance of ensuring the appellant’s safety and stability above all else, particularly in light of the incomplete information available regarding his circumstances. The judge’s focus remained on protecting the appellant from any potential risks and ensuring that any future arrangements prioritise his wellbeing and security.
26. The judge correctly determined that there were insufficient safeguarding provisions in place for the appellant. This finding was firmly rooted in the evidence available during the proceedings. In particular, the judge took into account the circumstances surrounding the sponsor’s ex-husband, with whom she had a child.
27. It was relevant to note that, although the sponsor and her ex-husband were now divorced, the ex-husband would nonetheless have some form of ongoing relationship with the child who lived with the sponsor. The judge was entitled to assess whether such an environment would be suitable and safe for the appellant’s welfare. Given that the ex-husband had a conviction for child neglect, assault, ill-treatment, and abandonment of a child. The judge was justified in concluding that the presence of the ex-husband in the appellant’s potential living environment posed a significant risk.
28. On the evidence before him, the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that it would not be in the appellant’s best interests to be placed in circumstances where there was a risk of exposure to an individual previously convicted of child neglect, regardless of the current marital status between the sponsor and her ex-husband.
29. The judge’s conclusion was reached after careful consideration of all the evidence presented during the proceedings. He examined the factual background, including the circumstances of the appellant’s care and the sponsor’s decision to relocate and establish a separate family life in the United Kingdom. The judge took into account the absence of sufficient safeguarding measures for the appellant and the risks associated with the sponsor’s ex-husband, who had a conviction for child neglect.
30. Furthermore, the judge evaluated the best interests of the appellant, focusing on the importance of safety and stability. He determined that, based on the incomplete information available and the potential risks identified, relocating the appellant would not serve his welfare. The judge’s findings were firmly rooted in the evidence, and his assessment of the suitability of the living arrangements was justified.
31. On the evidence before him, the judge’s conclusion was free from any material error. His decision reflected a thorough and balanced analysis of all relevant factors, ensuring that the appellant’s wellbeing and security remained the primary consideration throughout the proceedings.
Conclusion
32. I therefore conclude that the judge’s decision is not vitiated by a material error of law. It shall therefore stand.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Suretachana

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26th January 2026