Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005324

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60775/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

SM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr West, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant made a claim for asylum on 25 February 2022. This was refused by the respondent on 2 October 2023. The appellant appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. In a decision dated 12 October 2025 the Judge of the First-tier tribunal rejected the appeal on all grounds.

2. On 22 October 2025 the appellant’s representatives made an application for permission to appeal. On 18 November 2025 Judge Dainty granted permission on grounds 1-5 and refused permission on ground six. The pertinent parts of the FPTA are as follows:

3. Ground 1 is arguable - paras 32 and 33 are difficult to reconcile and understand. At first the judge says she will not place weight on the bills because it was not put to the witnesses that they were not married but then it appears that the judge does so anyway. Ground 2 is arguable. It is not clear whether the Appellant made a clear submission that there were strong grounds as to durable change in line with SG Iraq [2012] EWCA Civ 940, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 41. It is open to the judge not to follow a country guidance if such durable change can be established by very strong and clear evidence but it is arguably not clear that the judge appreciated this based on para 28 where it appears that the position taken is that SA has some relevance unless there has been a subsequent UT determination and SG Iraq is not considered (assuming that case or the test arising out of it is what was being argued before her – a transcript may be required to establish the same). Grounds 3 and 4 are arguable as those matters are absent from the decision. Ground 5 is equally arguable in terms of findings and reasons for findings on the Appellant’s partner’s evidence and whether it is accepted – it is arguable that is absent or not clearly/fully reasoned.

3. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:

a. ground one - the judge unlawfully speculated as to whether the appellant and his partner are in fact married;
b. ground two - the judge followed SA (Divorced women - illegitimate child) Bangladesh CG [2011] UKUT 00254 a country guidance case, but did not grapple with social and political changes since the fall of the Awami league and gave inadequate reasons for not following relevant parts of the December 2024 CPIN and January 2024 CPIN Women: Gender Based Violence;
c. ground three - the judge failed to engage with and make findings on the best interests of the minor child;
d. ground four - the judge failed to engage with or make findings on very significant obstacles;
e. ground five - the judge made no or insufficient credibility findings on the appellant’s partners evidence and her concerns about return.

Decision

Background

4. Given the submissions made, I consider that it is important to set out some background to the appeal. This can be summarised as follows:

a. there is a lone appellant in this case and he is a man, his partner and child do not have linked appeals to this case;
b. the appellant entered the United Kingdom on a visit Visa in 2010 and overstayed;
c. he had made a previous application for asylum that was refused. The appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier Tribunal who rejected his claim for asylum based on his political activities in a decision dated 24 May 2021 case reference HU/05317/2020;
d. His asylum claim was based on two heads of risk: one is risk on return because of his involvement in the Bangladesh National party; and two is risks arising to him and his family because of their unmarried status and the fact that he and his partner have chosen to have a child outside of marriage;
e. The Judge found the appellant, his partner and child would return as a family unit and there was no challenge to this.

Ground one

5. Mr West’s submissions relied on paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Determination. Mr West accepted that at paragraph 32 the Determination adopted the correct approach, Mr West specifically referred to “for the purposes of this appeal I shall not place weight on that evidence as it was not specifically put in cross examination, nor did I notice at the time of the hearing, so I did not seek clarification.” as setting out the correct approach.

6. Mr West stated that paragraph 33 was irreconcilable with paragraph 32 and did not make sense. When I asked him on what basis he made those submissions he referred to the following wording in the middle of paragraph 33: “taking those potential inconsistencies together with the persistent attempts by the appellant to circumvent immigration control; first by overstaying his visit Visa in 2011 and then by making a claim to be an asylum seeker a decade later which was rejected on two separate occasions on the basis of lack of credibility; it is possible this account is a device to remain in the UK”. Mr West omitted mention of the remainder of that sentence which continued “however I should add that these are only observations, my findings are set out above.”

7. Ms Khan submitted that at para 32 and para 33 the Judge clearly set out that, when the decision was read as a whole, the matters Mr West referred to were observations and not material.

8. It is important to consider the Determination as a whole; taking parts of a sentence out of the Determination without its wider context never mind the entirety of its sentence can give a misleading impression of what has, in fact, been written. I do not agree that paragraphs 32 and 33 are irreconcilable. I find that they are compatible and say the same thing; which is that the Judge made observations on the matters set out in paragraph 32 and 33 but that is all they were, they were not her findings and she did not take account of them in coming to the findings that she set out at paragraph 24 to 31 which precede paragraphs 32 to 33.

9. Mr West developed his argument further and submitted that this amounted to unfairness because the partner had not been given the opportunity to address that evidence. The effect was to render the credibility assessment flawed. I asked Mr West where was the credibility assessment in the Determination which he said was flawed. He did not directly answer this question, he said that as regards materiality the appellant only had to show that the outcome could or might have been different and the issue about whether or not the appellant and his partner are unmarried is central to the issue about the societal ostracism they would face as a couple with a child out of wedlock. When asked again he referred to para 24 to 33 generally. He later said that credibility was central. I asked Mr West if he was submitting that the Judge had carried out an assessment of the risk on return on the basis that the appellant and his partner were married. He referred to paragraph 24 and said that the issue of the nature of the relationship was not accepted by the Judge. I again asked Mr West to identify where in the Determination the Judge carried out the risk on return assessment on the basis that the appellant and his partner were married and he submitted that it was difficult to divorce paragraphs 32 and 33 from the findings at paragraph 24 to 26.

10. At paragraph 30 the Judge sets out her findings on risk on return on the basis that the appellant his partner are unmarried. Paragraph 30 sets out the following:

30. In any event, the position for women without a male supporter is irrelevant to the appellant’s claim as he is not a woman and is not returning as a single or unmarried mother. Furthermore, whilst this claim is not about the risk to Mrs Toma directly, I find she and the child would both not be at risk of discrimination because they have the appellant. They are at liberty to live wherever they like, and she would not be perceived as a single, divorced or unmarried woman, the child can register for school just on his mother’s details if the couple prefer to remain unmarried. In fact, no one need know whether they were or are married. It is hard to see how the CPIN supports the appellant’s case.

11. I find that Mr West’s submission must fail. The Judge clearly set out that paragraph 33 contained observations only and did not form part of her findings which were set out elsewhere. The Judge also assessed risk on return on the basis that the appellant and partner were unmarried as can be seen from the words “if the couple prefer to remain unmarried”. This ground fails and there is no material error of law.

Ground 2

12. Mr West accepted that Ground 2 posed some difficulties in relation to its second limb which was the submission that there was objective evidence to demonstrate that the situation in Bangladesh had become more conservative in the new political environment. He accepted that he was in difficulties in this respect because it was not clear if submissions had been made about durable change to the situation in Bangladesh.

13. As Mr West conceded that the appellant could not establish that submissions had been made that there had been durable change to the situation of unmarried mothers in a relationship akin to marriage, I find that no error of law can be made out in this regard. In any event I find, given the objective information relied on, that Mr West would have had difficulties in identifying objective evidence that would have established such change.

14. Mr West submitted that the first limb of this ground was that the First-tier Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the “CPIN Bangladesh: Women fearing Gender based violence January 2024” (the “CPIN”). His submission was that the judge misconstrued the objective evidence as regards the situation pertaining to unmarried relationships and having children out of wedlock. He made reference to the CPIN, paragraphs 10.1.1 to 10.1.2 and paragraph 8.3.8. He submitted that the CPIN needed to be considered in light of the document at page 140-143 of the bundle which is an online report dated 6 January 2020 from the Daily Sun. The author of the report is “The writer is an Apprentice Lawyer, Dhaka Judge Court, Bangladesh.” Mr West submitted that the references in the CPIN “that to have a child out of wedlock is socially unacceptable” [10.1.2] and “to have a child outside of marriage would be unacceptable to family and society” [8.3.8] must be read in light of the Daily Sun report which sets out “illegitimate children are regarded as a taboo issue in our society” and that the CPIN and the Daily Sun report establish that being in an unmarried relationship is viewed as a sin as is having an illegitimate child. That the judge erred in framing the assessment of societal ostracism through the prism of women and that the discrimination (this is the word used by Mr West) of unmarried parents applied to men as equally as it did to women.

15. As I set out above the CPIN is titled “Bangladesh: women fearing gender based violence”. The executive summary on page 4 starts with the following “the status of women in Bangladesh has improved over the past 20 years…”. The third paragraph starts “women form a particular social group in Bangladesh”. The fourth paragraph starts “sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls”. The fifth paragraph starts “constitution, domestic legislation and policies aimed at protecting women remain largely unimplemented”. The seventh paragraph sets out “in general, the state is able but unwilling, to provide effective protection to women.” I identified this to Mr West at the hearing and I asked on what basis the CPIN provided any support for the claim that the father of an illegitimate child suffered difficulties in Bangladesh. I asked Mr West to identify where in the pages in the bundle of the CPIN and the parts to which he referred me to were the words “man” or “father” used. He was not able to identify a single use of those words in either the executive summary, p139 or sections 8.3.8 and 10.1.1-10.1.2. Mr West said that section 8.3.8 of the CPIN could not reasonably be read to refer to women only and that this was supported by the Daily Sun article.

16. I said to Mr West that I had read the Daily Sun article. The only mention of father was in the following section “a child without any recognition from the biological father finds its place in dustbins”. Again, Mr West was not able to identify any other use of the word father in that report.

17. I asked Mr West if he was submitting that fathers of illegitimate children in Bangladesh face the same societal issues as mothers of illegitimate children. He said that he did. I asked what he relied on and he said the sections of the CPIN and the Daily Sun. I reject that submission.

18. I reject the submission that the judge was incorrect to view the CPIN through the prism of women and that it referred to the situation of women only. I find that the CPIN is concerned with the situation of women in Bangladesh, it is set out in its title, it is set out in its executive summary and it pervades the sections to which I was referred. It is wholly centred and concerned with women. The Daily Sun report also focuses women it sets out that “when an unmarried mother conceives a child the whole community turns barbaric towards her”. The Daily Sun does not identify any negative issues in respect of unmarried fathers.

19. The written grounds set out that the Judge did not give adequate reasons why sections 8.3.8 and 8.3.9 of the CPIN were wrong. I find that this argument is without merit because of the clearly reasoned findings of the judge at paragraph 30 which sets out “in any event, the position of women without a male support is irrelevant to the appellant’s claim as he is not a woman and is not returning as a single or unmarried mother. Furthermore, whilst this claim is not about the risk to [the appellant’s partner] directly, I find she and the child would both not be at risk of discrimination because they have the appellant.” The appellant quite simply failed to establish that his partner and child would be at risk of discrimination or worse when they would be returning as a family unit so that the partner would not be perceived as a “single, divorced or unmarried woman” and “in fact, no one need know whether they were or are married.”. It is for the appellant to establish his case and discharge the burden of proof on him. It is evident from the First-tier Tribunal decision that he failed to do that and in this hearing the appellant has failed to establish that the Judge did not explain her reasoning, did not take into account evidence before her, misinterpreted or misapplied evidence before her. The appellant has failed to identify objective evidence (which would is capable of establishing that the child would face sufficient discrimination or difficulties in the circumstances in which he would return) that the Judge did not consider or misinterpreted. This entire ground was wholly lacking in merit.

20. There is no error of law.

Ground three

21. This ground submits that the Judge failed to engage with or make findings on the best interests of the minor child.

22. It is not disputed that there is no reference to section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 in the Determination.

23. Mr West submitted that the Judge failed to make an assessment as to whether or not the appellant satisfied the immigration rules, in light of this failure the article 8 ECHR assessment outside the rules is flawed.

24. Ms Khan submitted that pursuant to CAO v SSHD [2024] UKSC 32 the duty under section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 falls on the Secretary of State and if the First-tier Tribunal does not apply it in its own decision-making, it has not failed to comply with the law in its own decision-making.

25. At paragraph 30 to 31 the Judge considered whether or not the child would be at risk and found that the child was not at risk. The Judge was entitled to consider the best interests of the child under the article 8 ECHR assessment.

26. I consider that the following paras of CAO v SSHD [2024] UKC 32 are relevant:

“61. A court or tribunal can be expected to understand, and if necessary inform itself, about the content and implications of its obligation to comply with article 8 in a case involving a child. That is not necessarily the case in relation to civil servants and others working in the large bureaucratic organisations covered by section 11 of the Children Act 2004 and section 55. Section 55 is directed at ensuring that the welfare and best interests of a child are kept in mind by civil servants of various descriptions who are the decision-makers within the scope of section 55(2). That may be done in two ways: (i) by the Secretary of State making arrangements under section 55(1), which do not necessarily have to include the giving of guidance (an example would be making arrangements for the training of officials to try to ensure that they take these matters into consideration); and (ii) by the Secretary of State giving guidance in relation to these matters, so as to engage the obligation under section 55(3) of persons within the scope of subsection (2) to have regard to that guidance when exercising relevant functions. The Secretary of State has issued the Guidance in order to engage such obligations under section 55(3).

62. Section 55(1) and (3) do not, according to their terms, apply to the FTT. There is no basis on which the FTT can be said to be subject to the duties set out in them. Section 55(1) imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements in relation to matters in which the FTT has no role to play. Section 55(3) imposes a duty on the Secretary of State and various officials in relation to functions exercised by them, not on the FTT in relation to its functions.

63. Since the FTT is obliged by article 8 and section 6 of the HRA to treat the best interests of a child who is affected by its decision as a primary consideration, its decision-making will in practical terms cover the matters to which section 55 is directed. But that is very different from saying that the FTT is itself subject to any duty under section 55(1) or (3). The FTT may validly consider how those exercising immigration functions have addressed the best interests of the child utilising the Guidance when assessing the evidence adduced before it. However, there is no need for the FTT to be subject to the duties in section 55 in order to ensure that its decision-making is properly directed to consideration of the best interests of the child.”

27. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following:

“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved”

28. And paragraphs 8 and 9 which set out the following:

“8. Judges and members in the First-tier Tribunal should expect that the Upper Tribunal will approach its own decisions on appeal in accordance with the well settled principle that appellate tribunals exercise appropriate restraint when considering a challenge to a decision based on the adequacy of reasons. As the Court of Appeal has emphasised, a realistic and reasonably benevolent approach will be taken such that decisions under appeal will be read fairly and not hypercritically.

9. As an expert tribunal, the First-tier Tribunal will generally be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities within the jurisdiction being exercised, and to be applying those cases without the need to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from the language of the decision that they have failed to do so. The Upper Tribunal will not readily assume that a tribunal has misdirected itself merely because every step in its reasoning is not fully set out in its decision. Thus, a challenge based on the adequacy of reasons should only succeed when the appellate body cannot understand the Tribunal’s thought process in making material findings.”

29. I find that the above make clear that it is not arguable that there is an error of law by the Judge not referring to section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.

30. The written grounds submit that the Judge did not engage with or make findings on the best interests of the child and how that might be impacted by the child being born out of wedlock and this was an error of law.

31. At paragraph 30 the Judge sets out, that the position for women without a male support is irrelevant because the appellant is not a woman. It also sets out that “though this claim is not about the risk to [the appellant’s partner] directly, I find she and the child would both not be at risk of discrimination because they have the appellant. They are at liberty to live wherever they like, and she would not be perceived as a single, divorced or unmarried woman, the child can register for school just on his mother’s details if the couple prefer to remain unmarried.”

32. Paragraph 31 goes on to state “there is no evidence that the appellant, [his partner] or child would be at risk of persecution or serious harm in general or in their specific circumstances. This entire head of claim is rejected as without sufficient evidential basis.” Paragraph 31 refers explicitly to the protection claim rather than article 8 ECHR.

33. At paragraph 34 under the heading article 8 ECHR family/private life the Judge sets out “with regards to the human rights claim, the appellant does not meet the rules and there were no exceptional circumstances”.

34. At paragraph 35 under the heading article 8 ECHR family/private life the judge sets out “[the appellant’s partner] is a Bangladeshi national and so is his child.”

35. At paragraph 36 the judge sets out “there are no factors that would suggest to me that the return of the appellant, with or without [his partner] would be disproportionate interference in his private and family life and he would, I find, be able to return there with relative ease and continue family life.”

36. I considered that the appellant’s submission is, in part, that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons. I reject this submission. I have set out the SPT’s Practice Direction above and it is clear from the paragraphs I have quoted that the judge gave full consideration to the relevant issues. The tribunal’s thought process is clear from the Determination. The Practice Direction also notes the need for proportionality in written reasons and in this case it is obvious that the appellant’s case was weak, the Determination sets out that the appellant failed to identify objective evidence to support the claim that there would be discrimination and related issues in relation to the child and, in this appeal, the appellant has still failed to identify objective evidence that could establish his claim which the Judge erroneously failed to take into account. As I have set out above the CPIN and Daily Sun report do not establish what the appellant must to succeed in his case. The burden of proof is on the appellant and it is for him to provide the evidence to support his claims which he did not do in the First-tier Tribunal.

37. Further, even if there was an error of law, it would not be material. This is because if the assessment of the best interests had been set out step-by-step in the Determination, the Judge would inevitably have concluded the very young child’s best interests were to remain with its parents and to return as a family unit to their country of nationality.

38. The other limb of this ground is that the Judge erroneously failed to apply SA and in particular head note (4) which sets out “the mother of an illegitimate child may face social prejudice and discrimination if the circumstances and the fact of her having had an illegitimate child become known but she is not likely to be at real risk of serious harm in urban centres by risk that alone”. This is the only objective evidence that the appellant has identified in his submission as evidence that the judge failed to consider which supported the claim that it was not in the child’s best interests to return to Bangladesh. However, the Judge did consider SA. At paragraph 28 the Judge sets out that she “raised this authority with the representatives” and at paragraph 30 sets out why it does not help the appellant and that is because “the position for women without a male supporter is irrelevant to the appellant’s claim”. Therefore, any error would not be material because the appellant has failed to identify objective evidence that supports his position that the child, returning as a family unit with two unmarried parents, would face such discrimination and difficulties that it would amount to a breach of their article 8 ECHR rights.

39. I find there is no error of law.

Ground four

40. Mr West submissions on ground four were similar to those in relation to ground three. This is, in essence, a submission that inadequate reasons were given. I reject this submission and I find that adequate reasons were given. There is no evidence before me that the appellant submitted a detailed case in relation to very significant obstacles that the judge was required to address point by point. Further, the Judge’s reasons were adequate and proportionate and in compliance with the SPT’s Practice Direction which I have quoted above. The Judge found that there would not be discrimination and there is no evidence that the Judge failed to consider matters that she should have. Further, any error would not be material given that the Judge found that the appellant and his unmarried partner and child would be returning as a family unit and they would not face discrimination or difficulties, because the partner was not returning as a lone female and it is not suggested that the child would not be treated by the appellant as his child.

41. In response to Ms Khan submission, Mr West relied on AA Morroco 2025 EWCA Civ 144 paras 79 and 83-84 and submitted that the Judge erred in “cherry picking” her findings from the asylum section and using these in her article 8 assessment.

42. AA Morroco sets out:

79. “One of the problems with the decision of the FTT is that it failed to deal with each claim separately in a logical sequence, setting out for each matter the relevant legal tests and the tribunals' findings of fact and then applying those tests to those findings. The fact that some of the evidence was relevant to more than one of AA's claims did not alter the need for the FTT to ensure that the relevant legal tests for each claim were applied separately.
80. Unfortunately, the FTT's decision jumps from one subject to another without a clear, coherent, and comprehensive legal structure for determining each claim. In this way, the FTT improperly elided issues under AA's claims which called for separate treatment.
81. For example, in [17] Judge Davey said that, while he was considering "the claim" through the prism of the Immigration Rules (he appears only to have had in mind para.276ADE(1)(vi)), he would consider whether "those difficulties" (referring to "very significant obstacles") would be likely to constitute a breach of Art.3 and/or Art.8.
82. This approach continued in [18], where the judge referred once again to looking at "all the evidence in the round", before touching momentarily on the refugee claim, then moving on to AA's support network for the purposes of Art.3 and, in the same breath, Art.8.
83. The analysis in [23] to [43] above demonstrates why the evidence in this case and its application to the relevant legal tests could not lawfully be considered in the round, failing to distinguish between the different protections and rights. The FTT had to apply different legal tests in relation to AA's different claims (even where relevant facts overlapped), including different standards of proof, a shifting burden of proof, absolute rights and qualified rights, which are the subject of a proportionality test.
84. What was required was a series of proper determinations of each claim in a logical sequence, for example, asylum, humanitarian protection, Art.3 health issues and non-health issues, and para.276ADE(1)(vi) (followed by residual Art.8 points outside the rules, if any). That was clear from the previous decision in the UT of Judge Smith.”

43. The Determination does not fall into the same errors identified in AA (Morocco). It sets out a clear, coherent and comprehensive legal structure for determining each claim. The different standards of proof are set out, headings are used to separate out the claims and findings are reached on the separate claims. I do not consider that AA (Morrocco) sets out a prescription as to how Determinations should be presented. I once again refer to the SPT’s Practice Direction and find that the Judge’s decision was in compliance with that and that the Determination was sufficient and proportionate.

44. I find there is no error of law.

Ground five

45. The grounds submit that there does not appear to be sufficient credibility findings in respect of the appellant’s partners evidence and her subjective concerns. I asked Mr West what it was said the Judge should have set out in the Determination given the SPT’s Practice Direction which clearly sets out Determinations are not required to recite evidence. Mr West said he would leave his submission as it was.

46. I find there is no error of law. I find that the Appellant’s submission that the judge was required to make credibility findings and failed to do so is incorrect. The judge was required to make an assessment of the situation that the appellant and his family would face in Bangladesh, having concluded that they would return as a family unit and his partner would not return as a lone female and so not in the situation set out in SA. This factual matrix was not disputed. The judge carried out this assessment and her reasons are adequate.

47. There is no error of law.

Notice of Decision

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 12 October 2025 did not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Judge Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 January 2026