Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005336
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66513/2023
IA/00881/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NAIK KC

Between

TAM THUY THI TRAN
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Damir Duheric
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal Judge Agnew (the Judge) who dismissed her Article 8 ECHR appeal under the immigration rules in a determination dated 8 September 2025. Judge Agnew dismissed the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds, finding that there were no insurmountable obstacles to her then 73 year old British husband of 6 years relocating to Vietnam with her and that her removal would be a proportionate measure.
Issues
2. The issues in this appeal are whether the Judge materially erred in law in reaching that decision on Article 8 ECHR as to whether there were insurmountable obstacles to the family life continuing in Vietnam and/or whether the decision was proportionate under the immigration rules.
Grounds of appeal
3. The grounds of appeal submitted that the Judge had erred in law in relation to her findings as to (a) Whether there are insurmountable obstacles to the couple continuing their family life in Vietnam; and/or (b) whether the Article 8 rights of the appellant and his spouse would suffer a disproportionate interference were she to be required to leave the UK.
4. The grounds which run to 25 paragraphs without numbered headings submitted in summary:
(i) that the Judge had erred in law in that she made a perverse and irrational findings in relation to the medical evidence at paragraph 25 of the determination. There the Judge had concluded that there was an absence of up-to-date medical evidence which was to be expected in an appeal based primarily on the appellant's husband's health condition. She noted “There are continuous developments with medication and surgical procedures. Some people do surprise their doctors by their conditions improving, or be the usual maybe to deteriorate” (paragraphs 5, 6, 7)
(ii) the Judge had failed to consider the medical evidence before her. The Judge was referred to the additional bundle of evidence which contained medical evidence including, amongst other, the findings of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) in 2019, which considered in detail of the appellant’s husband’s disability benefits with regard to the sponsor’s entitlement to Personal Independence Payments (PIP). It was argued that those findings are very specific and detailed as to the exact medical and everyday problems and difficulties the appellant’s husband had at the time when the Upper Tribunal made its findings around 2019, which had not changed. The Judge did not properly consider these findings on the basis that there was no new or recent medical evidence before her as she noted at paragraph 25. The Judge failed to have regard to those findings made in 2019 by the Upper Tribunal (paragraphs 8, 9).
(iii) The Judge failed to have regard to the medical letter by the appellant’s husband’s consultant orthopaedic surgeon of the 19th of December 2019, where in his conclusion, he said “As far as I can see he will have to accept the marked reduction in his ability to perform any activities of daily living, we will have to do this on a very slow and drawn out basis. With increasing age. that is quite likely to continue to steadily deteriorate over time”. Hence, the grounds submitted that although the medical evidence was not up to date, that in the case of degenerative diseases, this type of evidence was still strong and valid and the Judge failed to properly consider it (paragraphs 9, 10).
(iv) The Judge’s findings at paragraph 32 that “Mr Weeks does need some care in his daily living, although not to the extent claimed., that is, I find he could manage without his wife, but with some help from others in relation to his personal care.....” directly contradict the findings made by the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) that determined Mr Weeks’ disability entitlement to PIP as indicated above (paragraph 17).
(v) The Judge’s finding that Mr Weeks could afford healthcare in Vietnam fails to address the key point which is his disability and extensive health and medical issues present insurmountable obstacles to him and the appellant having their family life in Vietnam more broadly and it was wrong to focus on the narrow issue about affordability (paragraph 18-20).
(vi) The Judge failed to evaluate the public interest arguments as to proportionality in relation to the negative effects of Mr Weeks having to close his businesses creating local unemployment and the additional costs of the health service and the provision of care that he would require should the appellant be sent back to Vietnam (paragraphs 21 and 22).
Permission to Appeal
5. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on the 8th of December 2025. The judge indicated that initially he had been minded to conclude that the Judge’s decision was a thorough one and that she was entitled, in light of the lack of up-to-date evidence, to find the sponsor’s objections to relocating to Vietnam did not cross the high threshold in paragraph EX2 of the immigration rules. However, he was satisfied that there is an arguable error of law in the Judge’s decision in that she might have failed to come to grips with the decisions of the Social Entitlement Chamber which were adduced on the 26th of August 2025 in advance of the hearing on the 3rd of September 2025.
6. This material contained the decisions made in relation to the Personal Independence Payment litigation in respect of the sponsor. He concluded that the judge arguably failed to analyse that material and to consider its import before her. In the circumstances in which another tribunal had concluded in 2020 that the sponsor was entitled to the daily living component at the enhanced rate and that it was inappropriate to fix a term that conclusion was of arguably greater significance in 2025 than the Judge was prepared to accept.
7. UTJ Blundell also noted that the Appellant’s solicitors would need to consider the directions issued with the utmost care and that several items of evidence which were not before the Judge had been supplied in support of the permission application. However, there had been no application under Rule 152A. He concluded that it was very difficult to see how any of that more recent medical evidence could possibly bear on the question of whether Judge Agnew erred in law. He made further directions about the quality of the bundle.
Background
8. The appellant is a Vietnamese national (DOB 10 January 1985). The appellant entered the UK of the visitor with a visa giving her permission to remain for six months until the 21st of June 2016. She met Mr Weeks online and they began a relationship. She claimed asylum on the 9th of September 2019 and having obtained permission from the respondent, the couple married on the 18th of October 2019, some 6 years ago. The appellant sought to remain in the UK on the basis of her fear of traffickers, but also in particular in relation to her relationship with her husband, Mr Weeks, a British citizen born on the 13th of December 1951, whom it is claimed, because of his health conditions, could not manage his day-to-day living without her. At the outset of the appeal before the Judge, the appellant’s representative indicated that she was not pursuing the asylum aspect of her claim. Hence the appeal continued solely on the basis of her human rights claim. It was accepted with regard to Article 8 that the appellant has an established private and family life in the UK and that the respondent’s decision was made in accordance with the law and made in pursuance of a legitimate aim.
9. The respondent had accepted in the decision letter that the couple had a genuine and subsisting relationship, she rejected the claim that there will be insurmountable obstacles for them to continue your family life outside the UK. Whilst it was acknowledged that her partner has lived in the United Kingdom permanently and is in employment here, she concluded that this does not mean that they couple were unable to continue their relationship outside of the United Kingdom, although this may cause a degree of hardship for the British partner. She concluded that therefore, it was open to Mr Weeks to return with the appellant, where she could enjoy her rights as a citizen of Vietnam, returning to a country with which she is familiar and therefore could support him whilst they adapt to life there. Although it was claimed that her partner is a British Citizen and is permanently living and working in the UK would not be able to integrate into Vietnam and it may be very difficult for him to uproot and relocate, the respondent concluded that a significant degree of hardship or inconvenience does not amount to an insurmountable obstacle. She further stated that the appellant had submitted evidence confirming that Mr Weeks is currently employed and found that the qualifications and work experience they have gained in the UK will assist them in finding employment in Vietnam. She concluded that whilst the couple may experience a material change in quality of life in Vietnam, such as the type of accommodation you would live in, or a reduction in their income, this does not amount to an insurmountable obstacle.
Submissions
10. Mr Duheric submitted that the error of law does all revolve around the PIP determinations of the First-tier Tribunals (FTTs) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) dated 2017, 2019 and 2020.
11. The order and relevant determinations are at page 128 of the composite bundle and were before the Judge. The FTT determination was set aside by the UT on 29.08.19 (at pages 121-125). This expressly deals with the appellant’s husband's health. The FTT made findings that Mr Weeks was entitled to daily living component at the enhanced rate and mobility at standard rate. The UT appeal was to resolve the issue of the mobility component in relation to the enhanced rate. The UT subsequently set aside the decision and in that decision it was stated that the UT were unable to remake the decision because of the evidence that was before them (para 5, page 128). Hence at the UT remitted this for a fresh hearing, which took place on 6.2.20 and those findings are at page 130. The daily living component was found to be at the enhanced rate and the Tribunal concluded that it was inappropriate to fix a term, i.e. that it should be indefinite and allowed the appeal on both components at the enhanced rate from 2016. At page 93 there was a letter from the NHS stated the 19.12.19 which noted a marked reduction in his ability to perform ordinary tasks. It noted his deterioration. The FTT conclusion was that Mr Weeks is entitled to PIP indefinitely and there was up to date evidence as noted before the FTT at that time.
12. Mr Duheric submitted that the Judge had this evidence before her but she did not take it into consideration when assessing Mr Weeks’s health and ability to move to Vietnam in relation to whether there were insurmountable obstacles to him doing so. The Judge failed to look at the whole picture and in particular that Mr Weeks has been determined by the social security tribunal to be in need of PIP on account of his health. He has documents further corroborating this if a fresh hearing is directed. Mr Weeks is now 74 and since the hearings in 2019 his health has gone further downhill.
13. For the respondent Ms Mckenzie submitted that the grounds are opposed. There was no rule 24 filed by the respondent. The Judge had made a detailed assessment of the evidence before her and that she had reached reasoned conclusions which should be upheld. At page 126 in the 2020 FtT determination of PIP entitlement this concerned the circumstances of the appellant’s partner the time of the appeal before the FTT at that time. She noted that PIP payments are subject to review and submitted that the appellant is wrong to say that PIP payments do not only relate to the circumstances at the time of the award. The Judge was right at paragraph 25 and that she was entitled to find that up to date medical evidence was required in order to determine the appeal. Any review by the FtT was based purely on the situation at the time, here 2020 as to Mr Weeks’ needs.
14. Here the before the Judge focus was Article 8 and hence the need for current information at the date of the appeal before the FtT was important. Paragraph 24 showed that the evidence was 5 years old and did not reach the threshold required and it was not unreasonable for the Judge to require it.
15. Ms McKenzie referred to the principles set down by the Tribunal in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) and the duty on the parties to actually assist the Tribunal: Headnote (1):
The parties are under a duty to provide the First-tier Tribunal with relevant information as to the circumstances of the case, and this necessitates constructive engagement with the First-tier Tribunal to permit it to lawfully and properly exercise its role. The parties are therefore required to engage in the process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, being mindful of their obligations to the First-tier Tribunal.
16. Ms McKenzie observed that the skeleton argument filed in this appeal was focused on protection and Article 3 which claim was only abandoned at the outset of the appeal at the hearing on the day. Article 8 was not addressed in detail in the skeleton argument, nor was the relevant evidence highlighted there. Although I note that the Respondent’s review dated 3.5.24 did address Article 8 both as to insurmountable obstacles and disproportionate breach at some length from paragraphs 24 to 47. She also referred to TC (PS compliance - “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC) and the relevant principles set out therein:
1.       Practice Statement No 1 of 2022 (‘the PS’) emphasises the requirement on the part of both parties in the FTT to identify the issues in dispute and to focus on addressing the evidence and law relevant to those issues in a particularised yet concise manner. .
3.       The identification of ‘the principal important controversial issues’ will lead to the kind of focussed and effective FTT decision required, addressing those matters, and only those matters, which need to be decided and concentrating on the material bearing upon those issues. The procedural architecture in the FTT, including the PS under the reformed process, is specifically designed to enable these principal important controversial issues to be identified and for the parties’ preparation, as well as the hearing to focus upon them.
4.       FTT decisions should begin by setting out the issues in dispute. This is clearly the proper approach to appeals under the online reform procedure where at each major stage there is a requirement to condense the parties’ positions in a clear, coherent and concise ‘issues-based’ manner.
5. …This means that the judge should consider whether a point relied upon within the grounds of appeal was raised for consideration as an issue in the appeal.
17. Ms McKenzie further submitted in reliance on Lata Headnote (8) : A party that fails to identify an issue before the First-tier Tribunal is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal. She also noted that in the decision letter (at page 188) the Respondent had concluded that there were no compassionate circumstances outside of the immigration rules on an exceptional basis and she further referred to the GP letter at page 278 in relation to Mrs Weeks dated 7.2.20 as to her own fears of never seeing her family in Vietnam again which was making her anxious at that time.
18. In Reply Mr Duheric referred me to paragraph 7 of the grounds of appeal and the evidence that he had submitted to the Judge which was not confined to a single medical letter. He submitted an additional bundle of evidence of 64 pages which was lodged with the FTT on 26 August 2025 and the material from the UT and the FTT in respect of the PIP determinations was contained therein, along with the NHS letters from 2015, 2016 and 2019.
Analysis
19. In my judgment the Judge materially erred in law in the following ways such that her findings as to the conclusions she reached on Article 8 are not properly reasoned and cannot be relied on.
20. Although one can have some sympathy for the Judge in light of the fact that the skeleton argument was not primarily focussed on Article 8, nor did it contain a list of essential reading with reference to the supplementary bundle of materials, wherein the key documents now relied on were contained. However it is clear from the appellant’s skeleton argument which did address Article 8 and given the submissions made to the Judge at the hearing which only concerned Article 8, that Mr Weeks the appellant’s husband has serious health issues which would be a serious and significant obstacle for him moving to Vietnam with his wife the appellant. In my judgment the Judge failed to properly address the evidence supporting that claim, primarily with reference to the PIP determinations of the Social Entitlement chamber and their reasoning and findings based on the evidence before them, and in turn her reliance on the lack of further up to date medical evidence before her in dismissing the appellant’s claim.
21. As Mr. Weeks stated in his witness statement of 14th of February 2024 at page 80 of the bundle under the subheading
‘My health’
I retired from my full-time job in local government in 2000 on Granville health. I had heart problems on a double hip replacement. I receive personal independence payments (PIP) with both enhanced level for care and enhance level of ability this is without limit of time as a result of the second year tribunal judgement my health issues as shown on my certificate of entitlement. I have many serious health problems including very severe osteoarthritis diabetes deathless heart disease exceptionally high blood pressure, severe aortic stenosis et cetera in addition to those health issues, I have eyesight issues and I’m awaiting heart surgery for my aortic valve to be replaced. This is life-threatening eye touch a letter from my cardiothoracic surgeon. Flying is prohibited and I’m in need of confident care and help with mobility.
22. In addition to this it was submitted that he runs a successful business which would have the cease were he to move to Vietnam, although I note the Judge’s finding at paragraph 39 that according to his oral evidence this does not appear to be an obstacle for Mr Weeks any longer. His health (and his insofar as relied on his business) constitute insurmountable obstacles for the couple to have family life in Vietnam. (This was submitted in addition to the then claimed serious risk to both of their safety in Vietnam which was later abandoned). In paragraph 8 of the appellant’s initial witness statement and in her later 23.8.25 statement she addresses the other reasons concerning her husband‘s health and disabilities that would stop him travelling to and living in Vietnam. As noted in his initial statement and later statement he detailed his income including his PIP payment every month.
23. Hence that at the hearing before the Judge it was clear that the case was presented orally and in writing on the basis that Mr Weeks was entitled to and was receiving PIP on the basis of his various disabilities and he gave clear evidence in both his original witness statement dated 14 February 2024 and the later one dated 23 August 20205 to that effect. I further note that PIP is not a means tested benefit.
24. It was clear to the Judge that this was the primary issue relied on by the appellant. At the outset of her findings at paragraph 18 the Judge states:
“I begin with what was most emphasis in the evidence for the appellant and that is the health problems of Mr Weeks. In his statement of the 28th of August 2025 he says he is a registered disabled person claiming PIP at enhance level for both care and mobility. He stated
PIP was granted on the enduring basis due to many of my disorders being of a serious degenerating Nature such as heart disease, osteoarthritis osteoporosis type two diabetes total definition in the right ear 50% deafness in the left high blood pressure and heart failure.
Mr Weeks added in a subsequent paragraph that he has double incontinence as well as a mild cognitive impairment. He gets lost easily.
He stated he had a heart attack on the 30th of May 2025 and had an aortic heart valve replacement surgery. Mr Weeks stated that on the 5th of October 2025 he has a hospital investigation and treatment for bowel cancer”.
25. There had been an independent social entitlement tribunal assessment as to that entitlement and reliance on the conclusion of the medical evidence in 2019 that that this was not likely to change nor require reassessment. It is clear from paragraph 20 of the decision that the Judge was directed to the new 64 page bundle filed in August 2025 which contained both the further witness statements and the PIP determinations from the material FTT and UT in 2019 and 2020.
26. It was Mr Weeks’ evidence that he was still entitled to and was claiming and receiving PIP at the date of the hearing before the Judge (which was not disputed) and this was in part his reason for not having further up to date evidence as to his medical condition and needs before the Judge (at paragraph 23):
“It was emphasised by Mr. Weeks and Mr Duheric in his submissions at the Department of Work and Pensions will not periodically review his benefits due to the degenerative nature of his illnesses. Paragraph 24 when I asked why there wasn’t up-to-date medical evidence from the GP for Mr weeks and NHS letters Mr Duheric stated that the evidence provided was sufficient because it was clear from that he could only deteriorate.”
27. The Judge noted the respondent’s submission at paragraph 24 that the latest medical evidence was some five years old and that the documentation seemed to mainly to relate to support for Mr Weeks‘ efforts to obtain public funds for a disability which was originally refused and went to appeal. Whilst the latter is correct it does not undermine his claim to be classed as being disabled and to be in need of state support as a result. It was recorded that Mr Weeks said “the case went to and fro”. I note that this is consistent with the issues in the appeal as noted above that were finally resolved in his favour on remittal to the First-tier of the Social Entitlement Tribunal in 2020 after some years.
28. In light of the evidence before the Judge as to the relevance of the Tribunal PIP determinations and the submissions on that, the reasoning of the Judge was clearly flawed as to her findings as to this state of health despite Mr Weeks’ continuing receipt of PIP and the reasons for that entitlement at the date of the hearing. This was both as to her conclusions as to the lack of up to date medical evidence at paragraph 25, and her consequent findings as to there being no insurmountable obstacles to the couple living in Vietnam. In light of Mr Weeks’ being entitled as a British citizen to a non-means tested benefit on account of his disability, which he would not be able to receive in Vietnam, it was a material error of law on the part of the Judge to fail to properly direct herself to the relevance of this and to fail to take it into account in reaching her conclusions as to insurmountable obstacles and/or proportionality. Her finding at paragraph 41 that Mr Weeks could afford to pay for medical treatment in Vietnam, fails to address the prior question of the relevance of his entitlement to PIP by the state and the relevance of his disabilities in the determination of those questions, and in relation to proportionality in any event.
29. Hence in my judgment the Judge erred in relation to her assessment of whether the couple could live together in the Vietnam, and the assessment whether there were insurmountable obstacles to them doing so, by her failure to have proper regard to the fact Mr Weeks’ PIP entitlement since at least 2016 and the basis for it by 2020 and continuing at the date of the appeal before her in 2025. In turn this rendered flawed her assessment of whether per Agyarko in light of all the circumstances and in particular Mr Weeks’s health conditions, it was proportionate to require a 73 year old British man to relocate to Vietnam with his wife in order to enjoy family life with his wife of 6 years there or whether this outcome was unjustifiably harsh such that her removal was disproportionate.
30. Whilst the Judge did give other reasons for her conclusions that there were no insurmountable obstacles to Mr Weeks living in Vietnam with his wife, including at paragraphs 40 and 41 and his ability to pay for his necessary medical treatment there, in my judgment the error as to the relevance and substance of the PIP entitlement assessment, renders that assessment to be materially flawed. It is clear from her reasoning at paragraph 42 that when assessing whether Mr Weeks could travel to Vietnam and whether he was ‘Fit to fly’ her conclusion as to his travelling there from Scotland without flying were capable of being materially affected by the error I have found in relation to the evidence of his need for support arising from his disabilities as assessed for PIP by the Social Entitlement chamber. I further find that error led in part to her flawed conclusion at paragraph 25, that because of the possibility of medical conditions improving, that it was unreasonable for the appellant not to have produced further medical evidence before her to support her husband’s claimed level of ill-health, despite his continuing receipt of PIP.
31. For the reasons given above the Judge erred in law in her determination dismissing the appeal and this was a material error in all the circumstances.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. The errors identified above as to the Judge’s assessment of proportionality are clearly material to the determination of the Judge.
3. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by another Judge on the question of whether the requirements of the immigration rules for partners could be satisfied, under EX.1 including whether the couple could live in the Vietnam and any obstacles to them in doing so, and if not whether or not the decision to refuse the Appellant’s human rights claim was proportionate having regard to section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
4. The appellant served a rule 15(2A) notice seeking to introduce new and more up to date medical evidence that was not before the Judge and some of which post-dates the original hearing. There was no objection to this being admitted were there to be a re-making of the decision.
5. In light of my findings it is a matter for the Appellant whether she wishes to adduce any further medical or other evidence in relation to insurmountable obstacles of family life in Vietnam and/or proportionality at the remitted hearing.
Directions
1. The appeal is allowed on the basis of a material error of law.
2. The Article 8 appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard de novo with no findings of fact preserved.

S Naik KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 June 2026