Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005360

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62938/2023
LH/07285/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

RAMIZ ZENELI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Iqbal (counsel) instructed by Goodfellows Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 15 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant brings this appeal, with permission, against the 7 October 2025 decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilding.

Material Background

2. The Appellant is an Albanian national. He entered the United Kingdom illegally in 2016 and made an asylum application on 23 December 2016. This was withdrawn and the Appellant left the United Kingdom (on a date unknown). The Appellant returned to the United Kingdom, again illegally, on 15 January 2015 where he has remained.

3. In 2021 the Appellant met a Lithuanian national (“GC”), with whom he commenced a relationship. GC fell pregnant in around April 2022. The Appellant’s and GC’s relationship ended in around September 2022. The Appellant nevertheless continued to support GC throughout her pregnancy. Their son, “AA”, was born in January 2023. (I note that the Judge erroneously, and repeatedly, refers to “AA” as being the Appellant’s daughter. This error was not raised by counsel for the Appellant. It is, in any event, not material to the decision.) The Appellant was present at AA’s birth.

4. On 26 April 2023, the Appellant applied for permission to stay in the United Kingdom as a Family Member (Parent) on the basis of claimed family life with AA. The Secretary of State considered this application under the Immigration Rules and under Article 8 ECHR. She refused the Appellant’s application by decision of 19 October 2023.

5. The Appellant appealed against this refusal to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard at Taylor House on 23 June 2025. The Judge determined that the Appellant’s application did not fall within the Immigration Rules. He went on to consider the matter under Article 8 ECHR outside the Immigration Rules, and determined that, while the Appellant and AA enjoyed Article 8 ECHR family life, his removal was nevertheless proportionate. The Judge accordingly dismissed the appeal.

6. The Appellant sought permission to appeal against that decision. Permission was granted by First-tier Judge Adio on 19 November 2025.

The Appeal

7. The Appellant brings this appeal on the narrow basis that the Judge erred in his approach to Article 8 ECHR. The Appellant argues in particular that:
a. The Judge erred in “… placing disproportionate weight on immaterial considerations…” when carrying out the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise.
b. The “Appellant resides with his brother, who has three children, and that AA plays with his cousins, presumably at the brother's residence”. The Judge erred in “…minimising the significance of that involvement in the Article 8 proportionality assessment.”
c. The Judge erred “…by failing to give adequate weight to the best interests and welfare of the child. The Tribunal did not properly assess the unduly harsh consequences that the appellant's removal would have on the child and the family's ability to continue their private and family life in the UK.”

8. Mr Iqbal amplified these grounds in oral submissions before me, stressing in particular that (i) the Judge erred in his weighing of the “magnitude” as opposed to the “quality” of time that the Appellant spent with AA and (ii) if the Appellant were not permitted to remain in the United Kingdom, contact with AA would be limited, an outcome that would be “obviously disproportionate”.

Determination

9. I do not consider the Judge fell into error when considering Article 8 ECHR in this case.

10. In the context of his consideration of the Immigration Rules, the Judge took into account the Appellant’s evidence as to the nature of his relationship with GC and AA (§§8-12; 23).
a. The Judge rejected AA’s claim to visit AA “as often as he can” (§23) but accepted that the Appellant saw AA once a week and spent one day a weekend with him (§18).
b. The Judge expressly noted that the Appellant “…lives with his brother who has 3 children, and AA plays with his cousins” (§17).
c. The Judge noted the difficulty facing the Appellant in demonstrating an ongoing parental relationship given AA’s young age (§18) and that family arrangements “may become more flexible and less precise” following the breakup of the family unit (§22).
d. The nevertheless considered that the evidence suggested, at its highest, a “developing relationship” (§21).
e. The Judge took into account the fact that the Appellant claimed to have supported GC with £100/week (§17). He accepted that the Appellant provided some support but found the sums claimed to be “grossly inflated” (§25).

11. The Judge concluded that: “Taking all of the above together I find that the appellant has failed to show that he has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship and takes an active role in AA' s upbringing” (§26).

12. Having found that Appellant was not entitled to leave under the Immigration Rules, the Judge went on to address Article 8 ECHR outside the Immigration Rules.

13. The Judge found that the Appellant and AA enjoyed Article 8 family life (§33). He found that it was in AA’s best interests to remain living with her mother (§34). The Judge determined that the Appellant was not taking an active part in AA’s upbringing (§34). The Judge also took into account the Appellant’s poor immigration history and noted that his family and private life had been established while the Appellant was unlawfully in the United Kingdom (§35). The Judge noted that s.117B(1)-(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied (§35). The Judge found that the Appellant could continue contact with AA. He expressly noted that “virtual contact is not the same as face to face” but that the Appellant’s contact had been reasonably limited in any event. The Judge was of the view that the “…family relationship can be maintained by visits to either the UK or Albania, or indeed to other European countries, including Lithuania” (§37).

14. In my judgment the Appellant’s grounds for asserting that the Judge erred in his approach are without merit.

15. First, the extent of the Appellant’s involvement in AA’s life was plainly relevant to the Article 8 balancing exercise. The Judge was entitled to take account of the time AA and the Appellant spent together and the Appellant’s involvement in AA’s nursery care when assessing the extent of that involvement. These considerations were not immaterial and were properly taken into account by the Judge. The weight to be given to these factors is primarily a matter for the first-instance judge. Nothing in the Appellant’s grounds or oral submissions supports a finding that the Judge’s approach to these issues was irrational or otherwise contained an error of law.

16. Second, the Appellant argues that the Judge erred in “…minimising the significance…” of the fact that AA played with his cousins. In my judgment the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Judge erred in law in this way. The Judge expressly took this claim into account. The weight he chose to give it when coming to his conclusions as to the limited role that the Appellant played in AA’s life was a matter for the Judge. I consider that the Judge’s conclusions as to the Appellant’s involvement were properly reasoned and open to him.

17. Third, I do not accept that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to the best interests of AA. The Judge expressly considered AA’s best interests, the limitations of electronic communications, and possibilities for ongoing in-person contact and determined that the Appellant’s removal was nevertheless proportionate. The weight to be afforded to the various factors was a matter for the Judge at first instance. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate any error of law in the Judge’s approach.

18. Fourth, as to the submissions advanced before me I note the following in particular:
a. The Judge was plainly concerned with the difference between the quality and the magnitude of the time the Appellant spend with AA (see for example §§21-22) and, as set out repeatedly above, the weight to be afforded these various factors in the overall assessment was primarily a matter for the Judge and I have no reason to think he erred in his approach.
b. The Judge took into account the fact that AA would remain in the United Kingdon and it is both obvious and clear from the context that the Judge was aware that this would impact on contact time between AA and the Appellant. The Judge nevertheless decided that removal would be proportionate. That was a conclusion that was properly open to the Judge. That the Appellant disagrees with this conclusion is clear, but that does not support a submission that the Judge erred in law.

19. In conclusion, the Appellant has failed to identify any errors of law in the Judge’s determination. I according dismiss this appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 February 2026