Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005361
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62500/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

FJ (BANGLADESH)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Lee, instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. FJ appeals, with permission granted by the Upper Tribunal, against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) promulgated on 8 September 2025, dismissing her appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 19 April 2024 refusing her protection and human rights claims.
2. At the error of law hearing on 26 May 2026 at Field House, the Appellant was represented by Mr Lee, and the Respondent by Ms Nolan. I had a composite electronic bundle of 722 pages (“CB”).
The Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s case, as advanced to the Respondent and then to the First-tier Tribunal, was that she was an active and comparatively senior member of a political organisation for female students in Bangladesh, namely the Bangladesh Islami Chatrisangstha (“BIC”), which is linked to Jamaat-e-Islami (“JeI”). She claimed that she held a significant role within that organisation over a number of years, described as a secretary or general secretary, and that her political activities brought her to the adverse attention of individuals associated with the Awami League. She further asserted that her personal circumstances heightened that risk. In particular, she claimed to have rebuffed the advances of a leader of the local Awami League whom I shall refer to as “T”; and to have entered into a relationship and marriage with a separate man. Her case was that, once her secret marriage became known, she faced hostility and threats of serious harm from T, which included incidents affecting her father’s shop and legal action said to have been initiated against her father after her departure from Bangladesh. She also says that, after she came to the UK with her husband, their relationship broke down and he left her after committing adultery. She claimed she additionally fears her husband’s family, who are themselves said to be influential and powerful leaders of the Awami League.
4. In support of her claim she submitted, inter alia, a letter said to be from the BIC, newspaper reports, and references to criminal cases said to have been brought in Bangladesh. She also served evidence said to be from Facebook. She contended that, in light of her profile and these events, she faced a real risk of persecution on return and would not be able to obtain effective protection from the authorities, nor reasonably relocate within Bangladesh. She also submitted in support of her appeal country information evidence and also an expert report from Mr Md Solaiman Tushar on Bangladesh dated 25 September 2024.
The refusal letter and the Respondent’s position before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The Respondent’s position, as set out in the refusal letter and advanced before the First‑tier Tribunal, was that whilst some aspects of the Appellant’s account were accepted, the core of her claim was not credible. It was accepted that the Appellant was a supporter of the BIC. However, the Respondent did not accept that she held a significant or influential role within it, nor that she was of adverse interest to T, or that her husband’s family were influential and powerful members of the Awami League, or that her circumstances gave rise to any real risk on return. The refusal letter relied inter alia on what were said to be inconsistencies and a lack of detail in the Appellant’s account. Reliance was placed on her failure to mention political involvement at an earlier stage as well as other alleged credibility issues.
6. In relation to the supporting evidence, the Respondent’s position in the review was that the documents could not be relied upon to corroborate the claim. It was said that the documentation post‑dated her departure from Bangladesh, and fell within a general context in which false documentation can be obtained. The Respondent maintained that the evidence did not establish either the Appellant’s claimed political profile or any consequent risk, and that she would not face persecution on return.
The FTJ’s decision
7. The judge made adverse findings as to the core of the Appellant’s account. The judge attached significance to the fact that the Appellant had not mentioned her own political involvement in her “preliminary questionnaire” (at paragraph 21). The judge also considered that the Appellant had been unable to give sufficient detail about aspects of the organisation, including the party flag. In addition, the judge regarded there as being an inconsistency between the Appellant’s account of her role and duration of office, and the contents of the letter relied on from the organisation (at paragraph 22). The judge further found aspects of the Appellant’s account of her marriage and the consequences flowing from it to be implausible. In particular, the judge did not accept the claim that the marriage could successfully have been kept secret from T for the period asserted if the Appellant and her husband’s family held the political positions claimed (at paragraph 27). The judge also took the view that it was implausible that the husband’s family would have approved the marriage if the Appellant had in fact held the senior role in a rival political organisation which she alleged (at paragraph 26).
8. As to the documentary evidence, the judge considered the material relied upon by the Appellant, (at paragraphs 22-25), including the BIC letter and other documents said to support her claim, but did not accept that the documents reliably corroborated the core account. The judge took into account the inconsistency between the Appellant’s own evidence and the contents of the letter, the fact that the documents were dated after the Appellant’s departure from Bangladesh, and the background evidence concerning the availability of false documents in that country. The judge concluded that the documents had been obtained to bolster the asylum claim (at paragraph 24). The judge also addressed the Appellant’s social media evidence, making findings in relation to the Appellant’s failure to comply with the guidance in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC).
9. In relation to future risk, the judge said she considered both the expert evidence and the country material, including the December 2024 CPIN, but said she gave more weight to the CPIN on the basis that it was more up to date. Although the judge noted that some officials associated with the Awami League remained in place, the judge also said she took account of the political changes which had occurred in Bangladesh after August 2024. Having done so, the judge said she was not satisfied that the Appellant had established a present risk of persecution on return. The judge further concluded that there was sufficiency of protection.
The grounds of appeal and submissions before me
10. The Appellant advanced three grounds of appeal in respect of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. In Ground A, it was said that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s credibility and finding inconsistencies. It was argued that the judge gave inadequate consideration to the Appellant’s claimed role as general secretary, and placed excessive weight on matters said to be minor discrepancies. It was also contended that the judge was wrong to treat the distinction between general secretary and assistant secretary as undermining the claim, and that there was inadequate reasoning for the finding that the Appellant only said that the marriage had been secret when she was pressed in interview about why T would not otherwise have been aware of it.
11. In Ground B, the Appellant challenges the judge’s treatment of the documentary evidence. It was said that the judge failed to give sufficient weight to core documents, including the reference letter from the BIC concerning the Appellant’s role. The grounds further contended that the judge failed properly to apply the principles in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, failed to consider the documents in the round, and instead approached them from a pre-existing view that the Appellant was not credible. In particular, complaint was made of the judge’s treatment of the newspaper reports and other material, and of the finding that the documents had been obtained to bolster the claim. It was also said that the judge failed to take account of the Appellant’s case that the criminal cases concerning her father were brought only after she had left Bangladesh and after her marriage had come to light.
12. In Ground C, FJ challenges the judge’s approach to the country evidence and to future risk. It was said that the judge unfairly failed to take into account the expert report because of the date of its preparation, gave insufficient reasons for preferring the December 2024 CPIN, and failed to assess the evidence in the light of the continuing influence of Awami League-aligned figures within the police and judiciary notwithstanding the change in government. The grounds also contended that the judge considered the risk factors in isolation rather than cumulatively, failed adequately to assess the durability and reach of the interim government, and failed to consider certain passages of the CPIN, identified in the grounds as paragraphs 4.1.5, 13.3.1, 13.3.4 and 13.3.5. On that basis, it was argued that the findings on risk and sufficiency of protection were speculative, premature and inadequately reasoned.
13. The grant of permission on all grounds by the Upper Tribunal stated that it was arguable that inadequate reasoning had been given for rejecting the account of interest from a particular named individual, (which I infer means from T, who was referenced at paragraph 3 of the decision of the judge, given the other claimed adverse interest was from FJ’s parents-in-law, and from the Awami League in general, rather than a lone person).
14. Before me, Mr Lee submitted that each ground amounted, in substance, to a challenge to the judge’s credibility findings. He submitted that the Respondent’s starting point, adopted by the judge, had been that the Appellant had some involvement with the relevant student organisation, but not that she was an influential member or of adverse interest to T, and not that her husband’s family were influential members of the Awami League. He submitted that the two main reasons relied on below were internal inconsistencies and lack of detail, but argued that the judge had erred in drawing adverse credibility findings from the Appellant’s failure to mention matters earlier, particularly given the need for caution recognised in the jurisprudence when considering the nature and limitations of the screening interview. Mr Lee developed that submission by reference to the reasoning at paragraphs 20 and 21 of the decision. He argued that, once the judge had accepted, as had the Respondent, that the Appellant had been involved with the organisation, the adverse conclusions drawn from any earlier omission of her political role and from her account of the party flag were unsustainable. He submitted that the Appellant had in fact given an explanation about the flag, namely that it changed over time, and that it was wrong to draw an adverse inference from the absence of supporting evidence when her account was, he submitted, a plausible one. He also submitted that the issue concerning the Appellant’s role as secretary, arising from paragraph 22, appeared not to have been fairly put to her.
15. As to the documentary evidence, Mr Lee submitted that the judge had “put the cart before the horse” arguing that, at paragraphs 23 and 24, the judge had first decided that the Appellant’s credibility was undermined and had then used that conclusion as the basis for rejecting the documentary material, including the newspaper reports and FIR-related evidence. He submitted that the judge’s statement that the documents had been obtained to bolster the asylum claim amounted, in substance, to a finding that they were false, without an adequate evidential foundation and without a rounded assessment of the evidence as a whole. He accepted that the judge was entitled to take into account the dates of the documents and the CPIN material, but said there was nothing suspicious in the dates given FJ’s case and submitted that the documents had not been analysed in the round as required.
16. Finally, Mr Lee submitted that the judge’s conclusions on country conditions and sufficiency of protection could not stand. He argued that the judge had given insufficient reasons at paragraph 34 for dismissing or discounting the expert report and for placing greater weight on the CPIN. He submitted that the judge had failed to engage with the continuing “hangover” of Awami League influence within state institutions despite the change in regime. He argued that the credibility findings were not sustainable when the reasoning was examined closely, and that the conclusions on present risk and protection were likewise unsustainable. He further submitted, and Ms Nolan agreed, that if I were to find a material error of law in the credibility assessment, the appropriate course would be to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
17. Ms Nolan argued that Ground A disclosed no material error of law because the First-tier Tribunal had been entitled to rely on the matters identified. She submitted that the judge must have meant the screening interview at paragraph 21 rather than the preliminary information questionnaire and the judge was entitled to regard the failure to mention political involvement as a serious omission. She further submitted that the finding at paragraph 22, concerning the inconsistency between the Appellant’s account and the BIC letter, was a finding properly open to the judge when assessing credibility. As to the Appellant’s marriage and claimed risk, Ms Nolan submitted that the judge had been entitled to find the account implausible. She relied in particular on the judge’s conclusion that it was not credible that the Appellant’s in-laws would have agreed to her marriage to their son if she had truly held the senior role in a rival political organisation which she claimed, and on the judge’s rejection of the Appellant’s account that the marriage had remained secret and unknown to T. She submitted that there was nothing in the judge’s treatment of those matters which disclosed legal error. In relation to Ground B, Ms Nolan submitted that the judge had correctly approached the documentary evidence in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed. She argued that the judge had considered the documents at paragraphs 22 and 23 and reached conclusions at paragraph 24, including the finding that the material had been obtained to bolster the claim that were reasonable in the light of the credibility concerns and the discrepancies identified. As to ground C, Ms Nolan submitted that the complaint about the judge’s treatment of the expert report and the CPIN was, in substance, no more than a disagreement with the weight given to the evidence. She argued that weight was a matter for the judge, that it was not necessary for the judge to refer to every section of the CPIN, and that the findings were legally sustainable.
18. I reserved my decision on error of law.
Legal principles
19. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects that and what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Analysis
20. Having regard to all relevant arguments, and applying the above principles, I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law.
21. In my judgment the key difficulty lies in the judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s claimed political involvement. The judge proceeded, at paragraph 21, on the basis that the Appellant had failed to mention her own political involvement in her “preliminary questionnaire”, and at paragraph 24 on the basis that she had not mentioned her own political involvement until her substantive interview. However, that was wrong. The Appellant did in fact refer to her political involvement in the PIQ, (see page 554 of the consolidated bundle), and that document is dated 6 January 2023, over a year before the substantive interview. In my judgment, that error is not peripheral, and cannot be isolated off. It bore directly on the judge’s credibility assessment and was also expressly carried forward into the assessment of the documentary evidence.
22. That point is most directly relevant to Ground A, which challenges the judge’s adverse credibility findings, and to Ground B, which challenges the treatment of the documentary evidence. Mr Lee in his submissions relied in particular on the judge’s reasoning at paragraphs 20 to 24, submitting that the adverse conclusions drawn from the alleged omission of political involvement were unsound, and that the judge then used that mistaken premise as part of the basis for rejecting the supporting documentation. In my judgment that submission is well founded. The asserted omission was used as a reason to doubt the Appellant’s credibility in general. It was then deployed again at paragraph 24 when the judge rejected the documentary evidence and concluded that the documents had been obtained to bolster the claim. Once it is recognised that the Appellant had in fact mentioned her political involvement earlier than the judge stated, an important plank of the judge’s reasoning falls away.
23. I am not persuaded by Ms Nolan’s submission that the error at paragraph 21 can be dismissed as a mere slip and really the judge meant to refer to the screening interview. The Appellant expressly sought to resile from the screening interview answer on this issue, as appears at page 561 of the consolidated bundle. Also, that submission does not explain the judge’s wording at paragraph 24, where she again proceeded on the basis that the Appellant had not mentioned her political involvement until the substantive interview. Read fairly, the judge made a factual error as to the chronology and content of the Appellant’s account, and that mistake formed part of the reasoning by which she undermined both credibility and the documentary evidence.
24. Further, if Ms Nolan were right that at paragraph 21 the judge was in truth referring only to the screening interview, the difficulty would remain that the judge did not engage with the Appellant’s express attempt to resile from that answer at page 561 of the consolidated bundle, nor with the explanation there given. In those circumstances, the judge was required to address what weight could fairly be placed on the screening interview record on that point at all. That was particularly so given Mr Lee’s submission, founded on the well-established jurisprudence, that caution is required before drawing adverse inferences from apparent discrepancies between a screening interview and later evidence. As Moore-Bick LJ observed in JA (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 450, the written record of an interview may carry an appearance of certainty which the spoken exchange itself may not justify, and there is obvious scope for error or misunderstanding, especially where interpretation, vulnerability, or the circumstances of the interview may affect accuracy. In my judgment, if the judge was relying on the screening interview answer, she was required to grapple with the Appellant’s explanation for it and to assess that issue with the requisite caution. Her failure to do so further undermines the safety of the adverse credibility finding.
25. I have not overlooked the judge’s other credibility concerns, but I do not consider them severable from the mistaken premise about political disclosure. I accept that, when viewed individually, a number of the judge’s other concerns may have been matters that were reasonably open to her. I also accept that an appellate tribunal should be slow to interfere merely because it might have reached a different factual assessment. However, that is not this case. Here, one of the key reasons relied upon by the judge to undermine the Appellant’s credibility was simply wrong, and it was woven into the credibility reasoning and then into the treatment of the corroborative material. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that the credibility findings can safely stand. I am unable to say that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had that mistake not been made. The Respondent had accepted that the Appellant was a supporter of the BIC, though not that she held a significant role or was of adverse interest to the relevant actors. The disputed issue was therefore not whether the Appellant had any political involvement at all, but the extent and significance of that involvement and the consequences said to flow from it. A mistaken finding that she had failed to mention even her own political activity at an earlier stage was capable of colouring the judge’s assessment of those very issues.
26. The same error materially affects Ground B. The judge’s rejection of the documentary evidence at paragraph 24 was not founded solely on the dates of the documents or on general concerns about documentary reliability in Bangladesh. It also rested on the supposed failure by the Appellant to mention her political involvement until the substantive interview. Since that premise was wrong, I am not satisfied that the judge’s conclusion that the documents had been obtained to bolster the claim can safely be preserved, because the documentary assessment was tainted by the same factual mistake that infected the credibility assessment.
27. I have also considered the complaint concerning paragraph 22 of the judge’s decision, namely whether it was fair to hold against the Appellant an asserted inconsistency between her account and the organisational letter if the point was not put to her in cross-examination. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in MR (Pakistan) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 473 makes clear that there is no rigid rule. The question is one of overall fairness. Prior notice of the opposing case may be sufficient, and a failure expressly to put a point in cross-examination does not, without more, compel a finding of procedural unfairness. The court also emphasised that the tribunal must still decide the case on the evidence as a whole. In light of that guidance, I do not consider it necessary, or appropriate, to decide whether the matter identified at paragraph 22 would by itself have disclosed a material procedural error. The point has some force, and it adds to my concern about the safety of the reasoning. However, given the flexibility of the fairness test explained in MR (Pakistan), I do not base my decision on that issue. The appeal succeeds because of the mistaken factual premise concerning the PIQ and the consequential contamination of the credibility and documentary findings.
28. That conclusion in turn has consequences for Ground C and materiality. The judge’s assessment of risk, sufficiency of protection and the country evidence cannot be divorced from her adverse view of the Appellant’s account, and nor can the issue of internal relocation.
29. If the Appellant’s credibility is to be reconsidered, then the assessment of the significance of the expert report and the CPIN must also be reconsidered. The December 2024 CPIN states that all claims must be considered on an individual basis, that persons fearing the state are unlikely to obtain protection, and that the question whether authorities are likely to view a person adversely depends upon their particular profile, activities and past treatment. The expert report from Mr Tushar, was capable of being material to that fact-sensitive assessment. The report described continuing instability and unrest in Bangladesh following the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024, asserted that Awami League actors remained capable of retaliatory violence against BNP and Jamaat figures, stated that election timing remained uncertain, and said that only certain cases connected with the July to August 2024 student movement had been withdrawn, with earlier criminal and political cases not generally withdrawn. The report also identified practical and legal difficulties for those facing criminal proceedings while abroad. If the Appellant’s core account and supporting documentation are to be reassessed, those matters may bear materially on the risk and protection analysis. I do not suggest that the First-tier Tribunal was bound to accept the expert’s opinions, nor that the CPIN could not properly be given significant weight. Weight is generally a matter for the first instance judge. However because the underlying credibility findings are unsafe, I cannot be satisfied that the judge’s subsequent conclusions on present risk, sufficiency of protection and the comparative significance of the expert report and CPIN would necessarily have been the same.
30. If the Appellant were found to be credible, and if the documents relied upon were accepted as reliable, I consider a judge could conclude that she faces a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return, notwithstanding the fall of the Awami League in August 2024. Mr Tushar’s report described Bangladesh after August 2024 as marked by continuing instability, weak law and order, diminished confidence in police protection, continuing activity by Awami League actors seeking revenge, and a state apparatus in which parts of the police, judiciary and civil service remained influenced by appointees of the former regime. It also identified targeted reprisals against political opponents and others perceived to be connected with the events that led to Sheikh Hasina’s fall, together with the continued operation of criminal processes against persons abroad and the practical inability of those deemed absconders to defend such cases effectively. The CPIN, which I acknowledge is more contemporaneous than Mr Tushar’s report, could rationally be read as not establishing that regime change had sufficiently mitigated the risk, for FJ. There is rational scope for factual findings from the CPIN which record that there was significant post-August instability, that revenge attacks and politically motivated violence continued, that many Awami League members and affiliates went into hiding, that attacks were reported against Awami League supporters and persons perceived to be aligned with them, that the legal process remained capable of abuse for the settling of scores, and that the effectiveness of protection continued to be undermined by corruption, poor infrastructure and the legacy of politicised law enforcement. The CPIN also makes clear that risk remains fact-sensitive and depends upon the individual’s profile, activities and past treatment. The wider country information evidence in the consolidated bundle in my judgment is also capable of supporting that analysis, referring to continuing unrest, retaliatory violence, some evidence of persistence of Awami League influence at local level, weaknesses in witness protection and law enforcement, and ongoing allegations of arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, torture and extra-judicial violence.
31. The findings at paragraphs 38 and 39 on internal relocation cannot safely stand either, because they too depended, in part, on (i) rejecting the Appellant’s evidence about her mental health difficulties on account of there being no independent medical evidence to corroborate it, and (ii) the finding that practical support from her family remained available in her home area. Yet both these matters are closely linked to the credibility assessment which, for the reasons I have given, is unsafe. The Appellant’s case was that she had experienced significant personal upheaval and continuing fear arising from the claimed political hostility towards her, the alleged conduct of T, the breakdown of her marriage after arrival in the United Kingdom, and her asserted fear of her husband’s politically connected family. Whether those matters had in fact affected her mental health, and if so to what extent that would bear upon the reasonableness of relocation, required an assessment of her evidence on a correct footing and in the round. And the availability of family protection or support could not properly be treated as a stable or neutral factor without revisiting the Appellant’s case that her family in Bangladesh had themselves been affected by events said to arise from her circumstances, including incidents involving her father’s shop and legal action said to have been brought against her father after her departure. If the Appellant’s account and the supporting documents are to be reconsidered, then the practical question whether her family could safely support or protect her in her home area, or realistically facilitate relocation elsewhere in Bangladesh, must also be reconsidered. In those circumstances, the conclusions on internal relocation, being materially dependent on findings which are no longer safe, must likewise be set aside and remade afresh.
32. In those circumstances, if this Appellant were ultimately accepted to have held a significant role in a JeI-linked student organisation, to have come to adverse attention from T and from politically connected in-laws, and to have supporting documents which genuinely evidenced continuing complaint or hostile interest in her, a tribunal could find that the mere change of government did not remove the risk, because the relevant danger might still arise from entrenched local networks, rogue or partisan actors, retaliatory violence, or the misuse of criminal and state processes in circumstances where effective protection could not safely be assumed; and where it could conclude that internal relocation to try to escape any threat from non-state actors was not reasonable.
33. In conclusion, therefore, I am satisfied that the decision is vitiated by a material error of law. The error goes to the core findings on credibility and to the treatment of the supporting documents. Those findings in turn informed the judge’s conclusions on future risk and sufficiency of protection, and internal relocation. I cannot properly preserve any of the adverse findings.
Disposal
34. I canvassed disposal with the parties at the hearing. In my judgment, this is not a case where I can simply re-make the decision for myself, without hearing evidence, because there must be significant fact finding undertaken regarding the credibility of FJ’s account as well as a careful evaluation of risk in accordance with Mr Tushar’s report and the country information evidence and any relevant jurisprudence. Applying the principles in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements having regard to the history of this case, and the nature and extent of the findings to be made. The parties agreed at the hearing that in this eventuality the matter must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because there remains significant fact finding which must be made. I also consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. Because of the nature of the errors of law set out above, and mindful of what was said by the then President, Lane J, in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), I have concluded that none of the credibility findings can be safely and fairly preserved.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appeal, is set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved.
The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, to be heard afresh by a different judge.
Because this appeal concerns an international protection claim, and publication of the Appellant’s identity could undermine the effective discharge by the United Kingdom of its obligations under the Refugee Convention, I am satisfied that the normative principle of open justice is outweighed and that the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal should be maintained.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29.5.26