Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005366
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65008/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

EOAB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmed of Counsel, instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mrs R Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 5 December 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.

2. The essence of the appellant’s claim was that his two proposals of marriage to a local clan leader and/or senior Peshmerga commander had been rejected resulting in a fear of violence from the woman’s father and his own father. The respondent had not accepted the truth of the appellant’s account and neither did the judge.

3. In grounds of appeal, in respect of which permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal, the following errors of law are asserted. The judge applied too high a standard of proof to the issue of documentation. The judge inappropriately held against the appellant his failure to mention a risk from his girlfriend’s father in his screening interview, and gave inadequate reasons for finding the later mention of such a threat as ‘improvisatory’. The judge failed to make a finding on whether the appellant had lost his phone on which there had been all of his photographs of him with his girlfriend. The judge failed to consider the credibility of the appellant’s explanation for why he had not mentioned in his earlier witness statement his girlfriend’s father’s role with the Peshmerga. The judge had erred in considering the plausibility of the appellant’s account.

4. The respondent submitted a rule 24 response. She conceded that ground one disclosed a material error of law, and submitted that the matter could be retained in the Upper Tribunal to reconsider the issue of whether the appellant was at risk on return because he did not have a CSID or INID. Otherwise, the respondent submitted that the grounds disclosed no error, or alternatively no material error, of law.

5. The representatives made oral submissions with reference where necessary to a combined appeal bundle. Whilst I refer below only to such matters as is necessary to understand my decision, I took all of the evidence to which I was referred and all the submissions into account in their entirety.

Consideration

Ground One

6. The parties agree that the judge applied too high a standard of proof to the question of documentation. That is a proper concession by the respondent. It is a matter which goes to whether the appellant would suffer Article 15(c) conditions and/or Article 3 mistreatment on return such that the appeal should have been allowed on humanitarian protection grounds and/or Article 3 grounds. The standard of proof should have been the lower standard; however, the judge at [23] refers repeatedly to making findings on the balance of probabilities and/or a finding being ‘more likely than not’.

Ground Two

7. It is not in issue that the appellant failed to mention in his screening interview any threat from his girlfriend’s family. Instead, when asked, ‘Why have you come to the UK?’, the appellant replied, ‘My father wanted to kill me, that’s why I came.’ In his subsequent asylum questionnaire, in reply to the questions, ‘What do you fear will happen if you return?’ and ‘what do you fear in your country?’, the appellant said, respectively:

‘I fear for my life if I return to Iraqis I will be captured and toured and eventually killed by Ako Habas Agha and his tribe (Ako) for having a relationship with her daughter I have been accused of disgracing him and defaming his reputation as well as I fear of PUK as Ako is one of the main PUK top leader in Raparin area I have also been threatened by my father for having a sexual relationship outside marriage and putting his and my family’s lives at risk because of that’

‘I fear Ako Habbas Agha and Ako tribe, PUK, and my father as well as the men whom the girl I had a relationship meant to marry, as well as the authorities for the allegation and accusation Ako made against me ‘

8. The grounds assert that it is unfair to rely on discrepancies between a screening interview and subsequent evidence, referring without proper citation to a case named ‘JA (Afghanistan)’. Assuming that to be an intended reference to JA (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 450, that is not at all what the Court of Appeal said. Instead, at [24] the court observed that careful consideration needs to be give to the weight that can properly be given to answers given by appellants in interviews.

9. The respondent relies on YL ( Rely on SEF ) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 at [19]. However, that paragraph in full says:

‘When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a 'screening interview' (called, perhaps rather confusingly a "Statement of Evidence Form – SEF Screening–). The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant's case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated.’

10. A number of important points can be made about the discrepancy in this case. First, what the appellant said in his screening interview was not contradicted by what he subsequently said; at worst it suggested a failure previously to give the full account. Second, he has given a consistent account since his asylum questionnaire dated 25 August 2023. Third, the appellant was not challenged in his asylum interview about the discrepancy. Neither is the point taken in the refusal decision.

11. All that said, the appellant was asked in cross-examination about the discrepancy and gave an answer which, in fairness, the judge was entitled to reject. Whilst I have my concerns about the weight placed by the judge on the discrepancy, for the reasons given in paragraph 13 above, ultimately, I am satisfied that it was open to the judge to find that it damaged the appellant’s credibility.

12. If this was the only issue with the judge’s approach to credibility, I would have found there to be no material error of law. However, there remain two further challenges.

Ground Three

13. At [15]-[16], the judge considers the absence of evidence of the appellant’s relationship with his girlfriend:

‘15. In relation to his claimed relationship with Nawzhin, the Appellant states that two marriage proposals were made to her on behalf of the Appellant. The Appellant gave evidence that he communicated with Nawzhin by way of WhatsApp and Snapchat whilst in Iraq and that he would meet with Nawzhin, at times, at the house of his sister and also that they would go to the park and to a mountain area together. When, on cross-examination, the Appellant was asked why he had not provided any photographs of him with Nawzhin or any communications with her, the Appellant stated that he had lost his mobile phone which had photos of them on it and that he had deleted his Snapchat account in the UK for fear that his whereabouts could be traced through it.

16. The Appellant is, of course, not under any obligation at all to provide corroborating evidence in support of his protection claim. That said, I do find it surprising that the Appellant has not been able to provide any photos or communications at all of his relationship with Nawzhin, particularly when Nawzhin was a person who the Appellant wished to marry.’

14. Any reasonable reader is left in considerable doubt as to whether, having reminded himself of the lack of obligation to provide corroborative evidence, the judge has left out of his credibility assessment, the absence of photographs of and electronic communications with the girlfriend, or whether the judge’s ‘surprise’ reflected negatively in that assessment. The fact that the judge felt moved to mention his surprise suggests the latter. However, even then the judge makes no finding on whether the appellant’s explanation is accepted. Either way, the judge has, I find, failed to make a finding on an issue material to his decision and so has erred in law.

Ground Four

15. At [18], the judge finds that the appellant has embellished his account by asserting in his witness statement dated 2 October 2025 that the two men who attacked him on 4 September 2020 were members of the Ako tribe wearing Peshmerga clothes. He found that the assertion was ‘entirely distinct and inconsistent with the answer which the appellant gave is his asylum interview.’

16. In his analysis at [17], the judge says:

‘In relation to the claimed attack by two men upon the Appellant on 4.9.2020, in his asylum interview the Appellant was asked (at question 92): “Do you know who these men were”? The Appellant answered: “No I did not know them but I thought they belonged to the father of the girl because her father had threatened my father otherwise I didn’t have other people”. In the asylum interview, the Appellant made no mention that the claimed attackers were Peshmerga or dressed as Peshmerga. In his witness statement of 2.10.2025, however, the Appellant states in amending his earlier witness statement: “Also I meant say that I was approached by two members of Ako tribe wearing peshmerga clothes in the same paragraph and this was not noted down properly”.’

17. However, the judge has clearly overlooked the detail already given by the appellant in the answer immediately preceding in his asylum interview. When asked what had happened on 4 September 2020, the appellant said:

‘Like normal other days like every day I shut my shop wanted to go home a pick up vehicle stopped next to me two men got out of the car they were in Peshmerga uniform they tried to kidnap me but I resisted I shouted people came to help but at the end they stab me on the arm and left’

18. In short, the appellant had mentioned that his attackers had been dressed in Peshmerga uniform. It was not rationally open to the judge to conclude that the appellant had given in his October 2025 witness statement and account entirely distinct and inconsistent with what he had said in his asylum interview. This error further undermines the judge’s overall credibility assessment.

Ground Five

19. At [22], the judge finds it incredible that his family would be supportive of two marriage proposals but that his father would then subsequently threatened to kill him. The judge gives a further reason for rejecting this aspect of the appellant’s account: that it was ‘not supported by the CPIN referred to earlier’.

20. That is clearly a reference to an extract from the CPIN, ‘Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence’, published in July 2024, quoted at [21]:

‘In general, a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not at risk of serious harm from his own family. This is because a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not perceived to have stained his own honour.’

21. However, the judge’s analysis appears to overlook the appellant’s full account, which was that after rejection of the proposals, his sexual relationship with the girlfriend was discovered which caused her family to assault his own family. He has further overlooked paragraph 11.7.4 of the same CPIN which says:

‘11.7.4 The DIS and LandInfo honour related conflict report citing various sources, stated:

“Men who engage in extramarital relationship are not perceived as staining the family honour. A man in this situation can often easily escape the conflict. Nevertheless, men are still under pressure to get married and there are cases of killings. When a man is killed in an honour conflict, it has to do with revenge or a consequence of a blood feud rather than the honour of the family. Normally in these cases, both families agree to the killing. The sources did not know of any cases where only the man in such a couple got killed and not the woman.”’

22. In HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [28]-[30], Neuberger LJ said:

‘28. Further, in many asylum cases, some, even most, of the appellant's story may seem inherently unlikely but that does not mean that it is untrue. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence (where there is any).

29. Inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience. Indeed, it is likely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly unfamiliar. The point is well made in Hathaway on Law of Refugee Status (1991) at page 81:

"In assessing the general human rights information, decision-makers must constantly be on guard to avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own perceptions of reasonability."

30. Inherent improbability in the context of asylum cases was discussed at some length by Lord Brodie in Awala –v- Secretary of State [2005] CSOH 73. At paragraph 22, he pointed out that it was "not proper to reject an applicant's account merely on the basis that it is not credible or not plausible. To say that an applicant's account is not credible is to state a conclusion" (emphasis added). At paragraph 24, he said that rejection of a story on grounds of implausibility must be done "on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation". He went on to emphasise, as did Pill LJ in Ghaisari, the entitlement of the fact-finder to rely "on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is not plausible". However, he accepted that "there will be cases where actions which may appear implausible if judged by…Scottish standards, might be plausible when considered within the context of the applicant's social and cultural background".’

23. All in all, I again am satisfied that the judge fell into error by considering what would be plausible from his own point of view rather than in the context of Iraq, without taking into account the full account and in light of the available background evidence.

24. In light of the errors I have found above, the judge’s credibility assessment cannot stand, and no findings of fact can be preserved. Consequentially, I set the decision aside and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a different judge.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a different judge with no findings of fact preserved.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 March 2026