Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005367
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/00876/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

JAMAR KIRKLAND KNOLE
(nO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts, Counsel instructed by Global Immigration Solutions.
For the Respondent: Ms Newton a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 27 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Jamaica, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bowen (“the Judge”) who had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds connected to deportation.
2. I have to decide whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I decide that there is an error of law in the Judge’s decision then I shall either order that the decision be remade either here at the Upper Tribunal or I shall remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal. If I do not find there to be a material error of law in the Judge’s decision then the Appellant’s appeal will remain dismissed.
Background
3. The Appellant was aged 36 at the time of the hearing before the Judge whereas he was aged 6 when he had arrived in the United Kingdom. The Judge noted that the Appellant had therefore been in the UK lawfully for more than 20 years and the Judge also noted that the Appellant has a British partner, British partner and numerous other relatives (some who are British) including his parents, siblings and nephews and nieces.
4. At paragraph 22 (i) to (xiii) the Judge listed the Appellant’s criminal convictions and offending history. The Appellant’s offending commenced when he was aged 12 with relatively minor initial offences. However, a sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed on 23 April 2021 including for an offence of possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence. At paragraph 23 the Judge noted the Crown Court judge’s sentencing remarks which had said, “You do represent having involved yourself in this level of seriousness of organised criminality, involving the most lethal of firearms and ammunition. You do meet the criteria for dangerousness. An extended sentence is merited: it is demanded”.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence by way of a decision dated 17 November 2025. When granting permission the learned judge said,
“Regarding ground 2, I am persuaded that it is arguable that the judge materially erred in law at paragraph 82 by assessing the effect of deportation on the Appellant’s partner against a notional comparator of “the usual emotional reaction to being separated from a loved one due to deportation”, which is arguably an approach that was disapproved of by the Supreme Court HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22. 3. The other grounds appear weaker. Regarding grounds 1.1 and 1.2, I note the judge had regard to the alternative possibility that there were no such relatives (paragraph 69 “Even if that were not the case...”).
4. Regarding ground 1.3, considering that growing up in an ethnically Jamaican household in the UK would provide familiarity with the cultural and societal norms of Jamaica may be considered a matter of common sense that does not arguably require further particulars or evidence, and appears was based on an assertion made by the Respondent that the Appellant did not refute.
5. Regarding ground 1.4, it may be considered rational and reasonable to infer from the Appellant’s claim that money found on his person when he was arrested had been given to him by his brother that at least one other sibling would be able to offer material financial support during the period of transition.
6. Regarding ground 3, it may again appear reasonable to refer back to the consideration of the identified relevant factors when addressing the statutory exceptions rather than repeating the same in the section addressing the Maslov/Uner principles.
7. I will however grant permission without restriction”.
The Hearing Before Me
6. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal are lengthy. They were also set out within a skeleton argument from Mr Hodgetts. He had amplified those grounds and his skeleton argument in his oral submission before me. Mr Hodgetts had first set out those parts of the Appellant’s case which were said not to be in dispute. I refer to a summary of the grounds and the submissions.
7. In respect of Ground 1 it was contended that there were irrational findings as to whether there were very significant obstacles to integration in Jamaica and it was contended that there was insufficient reasoning. Here for example, it was contended that the Appellant had spent some 29 years in the UK and that the Appellant’s UK family had said that there was no family to return to in Jamaica. The Appellant stated that “It was one thing to treat” the Appellant’s mother’s and sister’s evidence with caution but another to dismiss their evidence without reasoned credibility findings. It was further submitted that there was irrational and insufficient reasoning in respect of purported familiarity with Jamaican culture and societal norms. It was said that it was irrational to assume that the £1100 cash that the Appellant had on him when arrested by the police and which the Appellant had said his brother had lent him should not have led to a finding that the Appellant had a current source of income or support.
8. In respect of Ground 2 it was contended that the rationality of the assessment of the Appellant’s partner would not be over and above the normal reaction to separation was wrong. It was submitted that the Judge’s decision that deportation would not be unduly harsh on CSK were irrational findings when read alongside the Judge’s other findings, such as the relationship had substantially pre-dated the deportation notice, that the Appellant played an important role in the children’s lives, the partner and the children were closely attached to the Appellant, there had been a diagnosis of autism, there were care fees, there would be psychological effects on the separation and there would be limited prospects of visits to Jamacia.
9. In respect of Ground 3 it was contended that there was an error of assessment as to whether there were compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 and whether deportation constituted a disproportionate interference with JK’s private and family life. It was submitted that whilst the Judge referred to the correct case law, but not Supreme Court authority. A holistic assessment was required in accordance with Sanambar v SSHD [2021] UKSC 30. Additionally, Maslov v Austria (Application no. 1638/03, GC, 23 June 2008) and Üner v Netherlands (Application no. 46410/99, 2006), stated that “very serious reasons” are required to justify expulsion. The Appellant’s argument was that the Judge had failed to demonstrate that this principle was properly considered. 31. At paragraph 94 the Judge had stated that he would not address the Maslov/Üner factors as they were “apparent” from the determination.
10. Further, it was contended that the Judge had ailed to assess key factors such as the time which had elapsed since the Appellant’s offending his exemplary time in custody, proportionality principles which required special protection for settled migrants who had arrived as children and a comparative analysis of JK’s social, cultural and family ties in the UK and Jamaica.
11. Mr Hodgetts had urged me to consider that apart from visiting Jamaica for the funeral of a close friend, the Appellant had not been there since having left aged 6. He referred me to paragraph 82 of the Judge’s decision that,
“…evidence such as medical evidence before me. Taking account of all the evidence, I accept that CSK will find it hard if the Appellant is deported and will face some difficulties. She will clearly understandably not enjoy being separated from the Appellant.
There is, however, limited persuasive evidence before me that the effect on her will be one over and above the usual emotional reaction to being separated from a loved one due to deportation”.
12. Mr Hodgetts said that HA (Iraq) applied not just to children, but to partners too.
13. In her submissions Ms Newton opposed the appeal. Asked why there was no Rule 24 response from the Secretary of State, Ms Newton said she did not know having ‘picked up the case yesterday’. I can only remind Ms Newton that Rule 24 Responses should be provided by the Secretary of State, not least because it assists the Upper Tribunal Judge dealing with the matter to know what the Respondent’s stance to the appeal will be.
14. Ms Newton referred to paragraphs 81 to 83 of the Judge’s decision. The Judge had set out the difficulties of being alone parent. There was no medical evidence in respect of the difficulties alleged, be they mental or physical. The mother had coped with being a single parent whilst the Appellant was in prison and she could get additional help from services. The Judge had set out at paragraph 83 why the very compelling test had not been met. Ms Newton also took me through the Appellant’s skeleton argument and submitted that there was no error in the Judge’s decision.
15. I heard from Mr Hodgetts in reply whereby he submitted in summary that there was no evidence of the use of the notional comparator. In respect of the lack of medical evidence, here there was a single parent with autism and so perhaps there was no need to get evidence of mental health assistance. Mr Hodgetts said here was the exceptional long lawful residence in the UK since the Appellant was aged 6. The Appellant’s children the other children were referred to. I was urged to allow the appeal.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
16. The legal test to be met by an Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
17. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular I note the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
The FTT Judge’s Decision
18. The Judge’s decision in this case therefore requires careful consideration. I refer to some parts of it, but it needs to be read as a whole.
19. This was a multi-faceted case with complicated family and children relationships. At paragraph 33(i) to (vi) the Judge summarised the Indepenent Social Worker’s reports. This included the practical and financial difficulties that the deportation of the Appellant would bring upon the Appellant and CSK. The Judge concluded that he was only able to give limited weight to the report because of omissions and shortcomings in respect if it. The Judge was unarguably correct to come to that conclusion, noting for how long the Appellant had been ‘out’ of the children’s lives and that in any event, CSK had two previous children well before the Appellant and she had then been a single mother. Nonetheless, the Judge noted the Appellant’s important role in respect of the children and CSK. The ASD diagnosis was set out in some detail at paragraph 36 (i) to (ii). Much of the other evidence, also included in the large bundle before me, was clearly summarised in the Judge’s decision thereafter.
20. At paragraph 43(i) to (viii) considered the Appellant’s rehabilitation in some detail, including with reference to the OASy’s report. The Judge noted at paragraph 45 that the Appellant even now was disputing the nature of his involvement with the index offence. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s family also believe that the Appellant is innocent. The Judge came to an unarguably lawful conclusion at paragraph 49 referring to the Appellant’s refusal to offence his role in the offence and that a full understanding of the offending triggers is thereby not possible.
21. At paragraphs 50 to 53 the Judge considered the Appellant’s cultural and social links to the UK. Here, again, the Judge referred to the Appellant having been lawfully resident in the UK since aged 6.
22. At paragraphs 54 to 58 the Judge considered the Appellant’s social and cultural connections with Jamaica. Once again, the Judge referred to the Appellant having left Jamaica when aged 6. The Judge noted at paragraph 56 the Judge referred to the Appellant accepting in cross examination that his upbringing in the UK was essentially in a Jamaican household. The Judge noted the ’surprising lack of documentation’ at paragraph 58 of his decision in respect of the Appellant’s extended family. This was a lawful and reasonable finding. The Judge was perfectly entitled to find that there would beno support network available to the Appellant on return. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and from his witnesses/the written evidence.
23. As for the risk of being killed in Jamaica, the Judge dealt with this at length at paragraph 59 to 66. The Judge referred to both subjective and objective matters, including with reference to the CPIN for Jamaica.
24. At paragraph 67 to 71 the Judge considered at length the issue of very significant obstacles in respect of integration in Jamaica. Once again, the Appellant referred to the Appellant’s age of arrival in the UK. The Judge also went through various other matters. Ultimately the Judge identified that it would not be easy for the Appellant on return. The Judge said at paragraph 71,
“71. I fully recognise and accept that there would be real difficulties, hardships and upheaval if the Appellant were returned to Jamaica. I cannot be satisfied, however, that those difficulties would materially impact his ability to work in the country or otherwise integrate there. Even when viewing matters cumulatively, I am not satisfied that the hardships and upheaval he would face would amount to very significant obstacles.”
25. At paragraphs 72 to 85 the Judge considered at length the best interest of the children and of CSK.
26. Then at paragraph 86 the Judge dealt with very compelling circumstances referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hesham Ali.
27. At paragraph 90 (a) to (g) the Judge considered the balancing exercise and the positive factors towards the Appellant and contrasting them at paragraph 91 (a) to (d) the public interest.
28. In my judgment the Judge’s decision when read as a whole is a detailed one which unarguably correctly cited the law and then applied it. The Judge set out in some detail the factual matrix. He clearly had at the forefront of his mind the real focus of the grounds before me. That argument being that this Appellant had been lawfully in the UK since the age of 6. Whilst that was a very important factor, that of itself in this case was insufficient for the appeal to be allowed.
Further, Consideration and Analysis
29. In assessing the Judge’s decision, I remind myself of the legal principles in respect of deportation matters.
30. I remind myself of the legal principles in respect of Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides a ‘complete code’ and structure when assessing whether the interference with the private and family life a foreign criminal has established in the United Kingdom and whether their deportation is proportionate and therefore lawful applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Its purpose is to promote consistency, predictability and transparency in decision making and to reflect the Government’s and Parliament’s view of how as a matter of public policy, the balance between an individual’s right to a private and family life and the state’s right to remove foreign criminals, should be struck.
31. Section 117B (1-5) lists considerations which are relevant in all cases, whilst s117C lists the considerations applicable when the Appellant’s deportation as a “foreign criminal” is proposed. “Foreign criminals” are defined in s117D and include a person who is not British and has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least twelve months. The Appellant is in this category of being a foreign criminal and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of more than 4 years.
32. Section 117C relates specifically to foreign criminals. Section 117C (1) provides that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and s117C(2) says that the more serious the offence the greater the public interest. S117C (4) and (5) contain two Exceptions to the public interest in deportation which apply in the case of foreign criminals who have been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. The Exceptions do not apply to foreign criminals who like the appellant have received sentences of four years’ imprisonment or more for a single offence (“serious offenders”) though they remain relevant.
33. Section 117C(4) identifies that Exception 1 applies where the foreign criminal (a) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life, (b) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country to which it is proposed they be deported. Section 117(6) identifies that for serious offenders “the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2” – the “very compelling circumstances test.”
34. Guidance on the application of the very compelling circumstances test for serious offenders is provided in part 4 of the judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22; The judgment identifies that the test requires a full proportionality assessment, considering all factors that have been found to be relevant by the European Cout of Human Rights and weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee against the public interest in his deportation The assessment must recognise that “great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders but…it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words by a very strong claim indeed…The countervailing considerations must be very compelling to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State”.
35. Jackson LJ’s judgment in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662; deals with the high threshold in respect of Exceptions 1 and 2:
“30. In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8….
33. Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”
36. There can be no doubt that the Appellant is a person who received a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and so he is in the highest category in terms of his offending. On the other hand, he has been in the UK since aged 6. He also has a British partner and British children.
37. It is necessary to consider the balance sheet approach referred to by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) which I have set out above. I refer also to the judgment of Underhill LJ in Yalcin and to consider “what is the “something more” that brings the appellants case “over and above” the Exceptions” Yalcin involved an Appellant with a family, including children. At paragraph 53 Underhill LJ said,
“53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment, the decision-maker is required by section 117C (6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."
54. It might be thought to follow from the fact that the Exceptions are a "self-contained" short-cut they have no role to play where a full proportionality assessment is required, and that accordingly in the present case the FTT was right to make no reference to them. But the complicating factor is the requirement in section 117C (6) that the public interest requires deportation unless "there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". The effect of those words was considered in NA (Pakistan). I need to consider with some care what the Court said in that case.”
38. Underhill LJ explained further that,
“57. NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C (6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") , it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case", or – as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 – because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors – perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) – to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.
58. There is nothing at all surprising about this, at least in the case of a serious offender. Even if the over-and-above requirement were not explicit, it is in my view inherent in the structure of section 117C that a serious offender will need to meet a higher threshold than a medium offender in order to satisfy the test in subsection (6).”
39. Finally, Underhill LJ made clear in respect of the task of the judge making the decision as follows:
“62. As for (ii), it is also logically inherent in such a case that the tribunal will have found the "something more" which is necessary to satisfy the higher threshold under subsection (6): see para. 57 above. I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is.”
40. The approach in Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, paragraphs 72-75 has been approved in a number of the leading cases, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Hesham Ali at paragraph 26: ‘… In, the court added that the age of the person concerned can play a role when applying some of these criteria … Some of the factors listed in these cases relate to the strength of the public interest in deportation: that is to say, the extent to which the deportation of the person concerned will promote the legitimate aim pursued. Others relate to the strength of the countervailing interests in private and family life. They are not exhaustive…’
41. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14 at paragraph 59 observed that: "… not all [settled] migrants, no matter how long they have been residing in the country from which they are to be expelled, necessarily enjoy 'family life' there within the meaning of article 8. However, as article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of 'private life' within the meaning of article 8."
42. On the public interest side is the serious offending by the Appellant which had led to the 10 year sentence of imprisonment. I note the Appellant’s stance that he had been in effect just ‘caught up in criminal matters’. If the Appellant’s case is that he is ‘not really guilty’ of the offences with which he was charged then clearly such an approach by him is fanciful. He has been convicted in the Crown Court and that conviction remains.
43. It is also fanciful in my judgment to conduct that the FTT Judge had failed to undertake a required individualised assessment of the partner’s holistic circumstances, when assessing whether deportation would be unduly harsh on her. I have set out the Judge’s decision at some length. The Judge clearly took into account the loss of emotional and practical support in caring for two children (one with Autism Spectrum Disorder). For example, at paragraph 82 the Judge referred to the Appellant’s partner’s now adult child. The partner’s mental health and the long-term consequences of permanent separation were clearly noted by the Judge at paragraphs 81 and 82. The Judged noted that there was no medical evidence in any event. The Judge said, “The ISW report highlights the difficulties in being a lone parent and the long term impact this can have on emotional wellbeing. I have expressed my concerns above as to the limitations in that report. Whilst it references “a huge dip in her mood since the imprisonment”, there is no medical evidence before me setting out the extent of any physical or mental health difficulties that have been experienced by CSK during this period. I remind myself that permanent separation should not be equated with temporary separation, when assessing whether permanent separation is unduly harsh (Mawande Sicwebu [2023] EWCA Civ 550 refers). In that respect it is important to note that CMK and L (who were part of the immediate family unit living together) are still only 8 and 13 and that both they and CSK would face a considerable period of time as a de facto single parent family”
44. The Judge noted the dependency of the family, compounded by the loss of their principal source of stability because the Judge said, “…that CSK will find it hard if the Appellant is deported and will face some difficulties. She will clearly understandably not enjoy being separated from the Appellant. There is, however, limited persuasive evidence before me that the effect on her will be one over and above the usual emotional reaction to being separated from a loved one due to deportation. Even allowing for the fact that her mother passed away in 2018, I consider that there is similarly limited persuasive evidence that she would not be able to cope with being a single parent, just as she had done before meeting the Appellant and as she has done during this admittedly temporary period of separation. She has shown admirable fortitude and tenacity in getting her children the educational support they need. The Appellant’s close family would remain in the UK, her eldest child T is now an adult herself and would be a potential further source of support.]
45. Whilst the relationship with CSK predated the Appellant’s custodial sentence and deportation notice, as the Judge noted at paragraphs 91 and 92 the seriousness of the offence could not be ignored. It is fanciful to suggest that because the Appellant had a relationship with a British partner then that should have trumped the deportation notice. In any event, the Judge was well aware of the effect on the partner and when the relationship commenced.
46. In respect of the Appellant’s important role in the lives of CMK, L, T, and ZK before his imprisonment the Judge clearly had this firmly in mind and took it into account when stating, “I am not satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for ZK to remain in the UK without the Appellant, in circumstances where he has not lived in a family unit with the Appellant and his primary care needs are met by his mother with whom he lives. Whilst I do take account of the type of activities ZK says they used to carry out when the Appellant saw him, contact could, in my view, continue via modern means of communication. 85. I do, however, find that that it would be unduly harsh for CMK and L to remain in the UK without the Appellant. I say this for the following reasons:- i) Both children have a close relationship with the Appellant, who is CMK’s biological father and who is regarded by L as being her father…”
47. Similarly, the Judge took into account that L’s biological father plays no role in her life, and CMK has no other father figure. The Judge also found that CSK faces caring for two children, one with significant additional needs, and has limited financial means and external support. The Judge accepted that separation from JK would have a detrimental emotional and psychological impact on the children in both the short and long term. The Judge accepted that there would be limited prospect of visits to Jamaica, and that indirect contact would not mitigate the impact. Ultimately however, the Judge made the decision that was reached. It was a lawful decision and one which was unarguably open to the Judge.
48. The Judge also referred to the partner having family support with the Appellant’s own family and her own daughter. The factors did not meet the high test.
49. Additionally at paragraph 93 the Judge referred to relevant factors and then at paragraph 94 the Judge made reference to the principles and undertook the assessment and balanced those exceptions at paragraphs 90 to 92.
50. I deal with paragraph 34 of the Appellant’s skeleton argument: “It is submitted that the weight to be placed on JK’s private end family life ties to the UK is thus not adequately or rationally considered. It is insufficient to simply place this in the scales without assessment of the relative importance of almost lifelong residence and integration.”. In my judgement the Judge was unarguably entitled to consider the evidence as a whole and to state at paragraph 56 of the decision that,
“Whilst I find his personal recollection of Jamaica would be limited, I do not accept he would have no knowledge of societal norms. Despite leaving at such a young age, I find he would have some familiarity with the culture and societal norms from both his own upbringing in this country – in what he accepted in cross-examination was essentially a Jamaican household - and has had ongoing involvement with his mother and other relatives who have spent substantially longer in Jamaica.
51. Additionally, the Judge said at paragraph 58,
“I bear in mind that the Appellant’s sister and mother are obviously understandably anxious for the Appellant to remain in the UK and what they have told me about the family must be treated with caution. Given that the burden is on the Appellant, I find that there is a surprising lack of documentation to evidence that the Appellant’s extended family have, as is claimed, all left Jamaica. There are no statements from these family members or wider documentary evidence of their presence in the above countries. The sole documentary evidence in support, are the Appellant’s mother’s tickets, which show that she travelled to Canada to visit her father when the Appellant’s case had originally been due to be heard last November. I find that the claims of no extended family in the country of return have been inadequately evidenced. I consider that this is not akin to the Appellant being asked to prove a negative. Whilst I accept that there might not be documentation which would confirm that he had no family at all 18 Appeal Number: HU/00876/2024 18 left in Jamaica, it would clearly have been open to him to provide easily obtainable evidence demonstrating family members living in other countries. Whilst I do accept that there may well be an absence of close friends or close family in Jamaica, I cannot be satisfied that no support network at all would be available to him in the event of return. Risk of being killed in Jamaica”.
52. It was open to the judge to make these findings. The findings were reasonable and not perverse or irrational. The decision has to be read as a whole.
53. When conducting the balancing exercise, the Judge clearly noted the number of significant factors militating against deportation. Weight was a matter for the Judge.
54. The comparative assessment of the Appellant’s life in the UK and Jamaica was assessed, including that the Appellant was aged 6 on arrival on a lawful basis. The Judge was entitled to take into account the lack of offences against the background of no clear admission of guilt after the imprisonment. In any event, the sentence of 10 years imprisonment was recent.
55. The Judge noted the CPIN and related matters in terms of the background evidence of Jamaica.
56. Whilst there was some limited reduction in terms of the public interest when noting the background to the Appellant, even though it has been repeated to me several times, the Appellant being aged 6 but now 36 at the date of the FTT hearing was not some trump card which ought to have led to the appeal succeeding. It was a weighty factor and the Judge clearly considered it.
57. The Judge clearly noted the submissions in respect of the claimed very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Jamaica. The Judge did not accept the Appellant satisfied the necessary tests despite the detailed history. The loss for the UK family was a very heavy one. The Judge properly and lawfully considered the same, including the effect on the partner and the children.
58. The Judge noted that it will not be as easy for the Appellant in Jamaica and not easy for the UK family here. The Judge was well aware of such matters and lawfully considered them. The Judge’s balancing exercise was conducted lawfully. It was not necessary for Judge to set out everything about the case. Indeed, it would be unrealistic to expect a first instance judge to do so. As was said by Underhill LJ,
“It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two.”
59. The Judge was well aware of all relevant factors. The Judge was well aware of the law and applied it correctly. Despite Mr Hodgetts’ careful written and oral submissions, I am unable to agree with him. His submissions in reality amount to an attempt to re-argue the case.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the Appellants’ appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed his appeal on all grounds remains.
I do not make an anonymity order.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 March 2026