Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005372

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62187/2023
LH/05234/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

MMR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hingora, counsel representing Woolfe & Co.
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a national of Pakistan who seeks protection in the United Kingdom. The appellant’s case is that he is at risk of persecution as a result of his political opinions (and in particular membership of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front or “JKLF”, a Kashmiri separatist group). Alternatively, he seeks humanitarian protection.

2. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim on 2 October 2023. The appellant appealed, and that appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry in a decision promulgated on 18 September 2025. In short, the FTTJ accepted that the appellant was wanted by the Pakistani authorities as claimed, and that he was a member of the JKLF [23], but considered that he would be prosecuted under the law for his alleged involvement in a violent demonstration and that such prosecution would not amount to persecution. The appellant now appeals that decision.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready on 20 November 2025. I indicated at the hearing that there was in my view an error of law as identified by FTTJ Mulready. I set out below the reasons for that conclusion and the appropriate next steps.

Matters in issue before the FTT

4. It is worth setting out the matters that were recorded as being in issue between the parties at first instance [6-7].

5. The Secretary of State accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality and, importantly, that if his account were true he could not seek effective state protection or internally relocate. The matters remaining in dispute were:
a. Whether or not he was a member of the JKLF;
b. Whether he had come to the attention of the authorities and a First Information Report dated 28 February 2018 had been issued against him;
c. Whether he would face a risk on return.

6. As noted above the FTTJ found for the appellant on the question of JKLF membership [23] and on the question of whether the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities [25][35-36]. It was however the FTTJ’s view that the interest in him would be “restricted to the police in his local area” [37] and that he fears “prosecution rather than persecution” [36]. He was not wanted for any “political reason or because of his association with the JKLF” [38]. Significantly, the FTTJ found as follows [37]:

“It was not submitted on the appellant's behalf, neither was the tribunal directed to any country evidence to support the argument that any prosecution he will face on return would amount to persecution because he is a member of the JKLF.”

Grounds of appeal

7. The grounds of appeal are, as the FTTJ granting permission noted, very lengthy indeed and only marginally shorter than the determination itself. This however is because the grounds include a lengthy extract from the expert report relied on, which the appellant says was not adequately considered by the FTT.

8. There is in truth a single ground which may be summarised as follows:

a. Ground 1: The FTTJ’s findings that the appellant would not face a risk on return were perverse having regard to: (i) her other findings; and (ii) the evidence before her. In particular, the FTT failed to consider and/or give reasons for departing from the conclusions in the expert report of Mr Khan.

9. The concluding paragraph of the grounds puts the case succinctly:

“A has set out the extracts from the expert report to indicate that there was extensively researched and sourced country evidence in front of the [FTTJ] to indicate that a person wanted by the state for being disruptive on a JKLF protest in 2018 would face a real risk of persecution. If the [FTTJ] disagreed with the expert’s opinion then she should have provided cogent reasons for doing so. The evidence indicates that A will likely be harmed and/or detained in conditions that breach Article 3. It also indicates that the Respondent’s own CPIN report indicates that there is no internal flight alternative.”

10. Granting permission, FTTJ Mulready noted that:

“Whilst the judge identified credibility issues with the Appellant’s evidence, the expert’s evidence was that even on just the accepted facts, the Appellant would be at risk on return. It is arguable that the judge did not provide sufficient reasons for not accepting the expert’s evidence on this point.”

11. There was no Rule 24 response or skeleton argument submitted by the respondent. I should also record that there was a wholesale and very regrettable failure on the part of the appellant’s representatives to comply with the directions of the tribunal to file and serve a bundle on time, for which Mr Hingora apologised.

The hearing

12. Mr Hingora relied on the grounds of appeal and did not seek to make detailed submissions on them, comprehensive as they were (and drafted by counsel who appeared at the original hearing).

13. Ms Khan for the respondent relied on the FTTJ’s findings in respect of the appellant’s membership of the JKLF. She asserted that the FTTJ was entitled to find that the appellant, if returned, would face prosecution rather than persecution. I put to her that on the face of the evidence of the expert, a person identified as having been involved with the JKLF would in fact for that reason alone be subject to ill-treatment, and that a person arrested at a JKLF demonstration would appear to fall into that category. I asked her how the expert evidence before the FTT could be squared with the conclusion quoted at [6] above.

14. Ms Khan maintained that the appellant would be prosecuted for what was in effect a public order offence on return and that this would not amount to persecution. She noted that his credibility had not been accepted on the extent of his involvement with the JKLF. She noted that the FTTJ had found that because the appellant was able to leave the country easily it could not be the case that interest in him was national. The FTTJ had found that the appellant had not had a key role in the JKLF but was just a member. She maintained that the FTTJ had reasonably found that the appellant’s political activity had not put him at risk.

15. Ms Khan relied on the case of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, in particular paragraphs 2(iii) and 2(iv), in support of the proposition that it should not be presumed that the FTTJ had overlooked the evidence of the expert. This was particularly so since she referred in terms to the evidence of the expert at e.g. [25] when considering whether the documents relied on were genuine. I asked her if she could point to any indication in the determination that what the expert said about risk on return to JKLF members had been considered. She could not; however she relied on the decision in MS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 941 where it was held at paragraph 61 that a judge is not required to accept the conclusions of a country expert.

16. Ms Khan also asked whether the question of the appellant’s prosecution amounting to persecution had been raised by the appellant, relying on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC).

17. Ms Khan submitted that the appellant’s account of being at risk could safely be dismissed on the basis of the credibility findings of the FTTJ which showed that the Pakistani authorities were not interested in him. I put to her that the FTTJ in fact found in terms that the Pakistani authorities were interested in him. She maintained that the other credibility findings justified the appeal being dismissed.

Decision and reasons

18. Despite Ms Khan’s spirited submissions I have no hesitation in finding that the determination contained a clear error of law.

19. On the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s findings: (i) the appellant is a member of the JKLF; (ii) the appellant is wanted by the Pakistani authorities (at least in his home area); (iii) the reason that he is wanted is that he was prominently involved in a JKLF demonstration that turned violent; (iv) an FIR has been made against him as a result.

20. On the expert’s evidence: (i) JKLF members are not generally safe in Pakistan if identified [27]; (ii) a person in respect of whom an FIR has been registered such as that claimed by the appellant will be at risk upon return from the Pakistani authorities [24]; (iii) conditions in prison on return for a person arrested on such a basis may also amount to ill-treatment [30]; (iv) the appellant would not be able to internally relocate [37-38].

21. Ms Khan relied on MS(Zimbabwe) in support of the proposition set out at paragraph 61 of that judgment to the effect that the FTTJ was not required to accept the expert’s view on these issues. Plainly she is correct. However that judgment also provides at paragraph 62 as follows:

“The UT was entitled, and obliged, to ask itself whether those conclusions were rational conclusions, and whether, and if so, to what extent, they were supported by the material cited in the Report.”

22. While the FTTJ carefully considered the expert’s view on the validity of the various documents and plainly reached conclusions open to her, nowhere did she engage with what the expert report said in respect of risk on return as required by MS(Pakistan). That was particularly necessary in circumstances where: (i) the respondent had accepted in terms that if the appellant’s account were true he would be at risk on return, and could not internally relocate; and (ii) the respondent had not suggested (at least in the decision-letter or review) that the appellant being wanted for involvement in a violent political demonstration would be divorced entirely from its political context by the Pakistani authorities, and so amount to prosecution rather than persecution. That latter conclusion would in my view have required considerably more reasoning to be a lawful conclusion than is afforded in the determination.

23. The impression that the FTTJ overlooked this part at least of the expert evidence is reinforced by her statement that she was not directed “to any country evidence to support the argument that any prosecution he will face on return would amount to persecution because he is a member of the JKLF”. The expert evidence does appear on its face to support precisely that conclusion, and indeed separately the conclusion that he would face conditions that would breach Article 3 ECHR if imprisoned. Neither was considered by the FTTJ, who indeed expressly relied on the absence of such evidence.

24. I do not accept that Ms Khan’s submission (on the basis of the FTTJ’s conclusions), to the effect that the Pakistani authorities would not consider or identify the fact that the appellant was at a political rally when the alleged offence was committed, provides an answer to this. The FTTJ could not rationally have reached that conclusion without at least engaging with the expert evidence on the Pakistani authorities’ attitude to the JKLF.

25. Nor can I accept that Lata has any application here. The respondent never suggested, so far as I can see, that the interest in the appellant could be characterised as prosecution rather than persecution. This was an idea the FTTJ appeared to have reached alone. In those circumstances there can be no criticism of either party for not having responded to it. In any event, the appellant’s case that he was at risk of persecution because of his JKLF involvement was squarely before the tribunal on any view.

26. Nor can it be said that the appeal may be dismissed on the basis of the other credibility findings. That submission is in my view hopeless. As noted by the FTTJ granting permission, “…the expert’s evidence was that even on just the accepted facts, the Appellant would be at risk on return”. In those circumstances the other credibility findings cannot be determinative.

27. It follows that the appeal must be allowed.

28. A more complex question is to what extent the FTTJ’s other findings may be preserved. None were challenged. Ms Khan’s position was that consequently the matter should be retained in the Upper Tribunal on the basis that there is relatively little further decision-making required. She described the remaining question as a “narrow point of law”. Mr Hingora submitted on the contrary that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with certain findings preserved. He relied on Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) noting that the appellant should not be deprived of the two-stage appeal process.

29. In my view there is significant fact-finding required in this case. There has in substance been no consideration of: (i) the risk on return to JKLF members; (ii) the level of JKLF involvement required to trigger such risk. I also note that there appears to be no country guidance on point. There is also some force in what Mr Hingora says about the effect of the deprivation of the two-stage right of appeal, though that alone would not on these facts justify the matter being remitted.

30. I have concluded that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with the findings detailed below preserved. For the avoidance of doubt I have not preserved the findings in respect of the reliability of the documents referred to at [22], on which the FTTJ considered she could not safely rely (though she came short of concluding they were not genuine). It will be a matter for the appellant whether he seeks to adduce further evidence to clarify the contradictions the FTTJ identified.

Preserved findings

31. The following findings are preserved (by reference to the relevant paragraphs of the determination of FTTJ Young-Harry):
a. The appellant is a member of the JKLF though he was not actively involved and did not hold the position of Vice Chairman of his local group [23];
b. The police have initiated criminal proceedings against the appellant as a result of the demonstration in February 2018 [25];
c. The appellant did not come to the attention of the authorities before 2018 [34];
d. At the demonstration in February 2018 the appellant attended with other JKLF members and it became violent [35];
e. At the demonstration in February 2018 the appellant was at the front of a crowd of people, was disruptive and was throwing stones at the police [35];
f. The authorities have not been regularly visiting the appellant’s home or searching for him since his departure [39];
g. The decision to remove the appellant would not breach Article 8 ECHR [45].

32. The findings detailed above shall stand as the starting point for the redetermination absent further evidence being adduced.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry did involve the making of an error of law. Save as detailed at [31] above it is set aside. The decision shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing in light of those preserved findings.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 January 2026