Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005375
UI-2025-005376
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65621/2023
PA/65624/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

ZA
AN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State
for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Gayle, counsel instructed by Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants are the spouse and child of an employee of the Iraqi embassy in London. The first appellant was threatened and attacked during a visit to Iraq in April 2022. Their case is that the intention of the attackers was to warn her that there would be consequences if her husband did not assist the attackers’ associates in respect of matters connected with his work in the Embassy.
2. The appellants made protection claims which were refused by the respondent. The appellants appealed to the first-tier Tribunal (FtT) where their appeals were refused in a decision dated 23 September 2025. The FtT, amongst other findings, found that the threat to the appellants originated with people in the UK wishing to exert influence over the first appellant’s husband, that her sponsor is no longer in the employment of the Iraqi embassy in the UK, that the first appellant does not have a genuine subjective fear of returning to Iraq, and that she has a desire to enjoy the relative freedoms available in the UK and the continuation of the second appellant’s education in the UK.
3. The appellants were granted permission to appeal on two grounds:
a. That the FtT failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting a letter from a senior police officer, Lt Gen Hussein, which stated that the police would be unable to offer protection; and
b. That the FtT made a material error in the analysis of the first appellant’s evidence by making an adverse credibility finding on the first appellant’s husband’s failure to report an attempt at bribery. The appellants state that this failure would increase the risk to them and should have been treated accordingly.
4. I heard submissions from both parties. I reserved my decision. I apologise to the parties for the time it has taken me to issue this decision. I remind myself of the need to show respect for the findings of the FtT where the case was heard by a judge with extensive skills and knowledge in this specialist jurisdiction and who had presented to them the evidence and arguments to which I am now referred to as part of the submissions on appeal. My function is to consider any errors of law, and not preference of style or approach.
5. With regards to the first ground, the appellants submit that the FtT’s reasoning is confused. The FtT accepted that the letter was authentic, but finds that it is unreliable as to the truth of its contents [30]. The FtT failed to consider the country evidence which shows that there is police corruption which, say the appellants, supports the truthfulness of the contents of the letter.
6. I was not persuaded by the submission that the FtT finding amounts to a finding that the Iraqi federal authorities are seeking to mislead the British authorities. The FtT finding was about a specific police officer. That he is a senior officer does not mean that every letter he writes is the word of the Iraqi state.
7. The appellants submit that the FtT’s finding is confusing in that it finds the letter is a genuine document, but has unreliable contents. I do not agree. It is perfectly clear that the FtT’s finding is that the letter is genuine in that it was produced by the person the appellants claim it is, but that it is unreliable in that the person writing it is not giving an account that the FtT is content is reliable. The FtT does not have to accept that the contents of a document are reliable just because the document is genuine, and is entitled to take a nuanced view of the evidence in the way that it does in this determination. This conclusion of the FtT is consistent with the country evidence the appellants point to on appeal to me and is sufficiently reasoned.
8. The country evidence quoted in the appellants’ grounds for appeal points to a high level of corruption in state protection institutions. I find this is consistent with the FtT’s finding that the letter had been written by a senior police officer at the request of the first appellant’s husband. It does not assist the appellants’ submissions.
9. On the second ground, the appellants point to the fact that the respondent has accepted the bribery attempt took place and says that that FtT errs in finding this as undermining and failing to appreciate that the first appellant’s husband feared that reporting the attempted bribery could cause problems both in Iraq and the UK. The appellants may argue that this in fact supports their case as it points to a fear of risk, but the FtT has plainly not been persuaded by this and is entitled to take that view in my judgment.
10. There was a pattern of behaviour against the appellants and the husband which the FtT does not take sufficient account of, say the appellants. There have been approaches to the appellants and husband since, but the FtT finds that there has been no subsequent threat. The respondent submits on this point that these were approaches, not threats, and so the FtT finding that there have been no subsequent threats is sound. I find the respondent’s submission here to be persuasive.
11. The appellants state that the FtT was wrong to find that the husband can move around freely in Iraq, because the evidence is that he relies on protection and he cannot go to see his father. This submission ignores the finding that the husband has travelled to the UK on 5 or 6 occasions, staying for around a week at a time. I find that the FtT was entitled to take this evidence, along with the other evidence of him moving between the compound and the Foreign Ministry Building in Iraq, and come to the conclusion that he is likely safe in moving within Iraq.
12. I judge that the FtT does not err at [28] by failing to recognise that it would be easier to carry out an attack in Iraq. The FtT makes a reasoned conclusion that the lack of any concern about their safety in the UK indicates that those who approached the husband in 2022 no longer have any interest in him – whether in the UK or Iraq.
13. At [33] the FtT assesses that the evidence of a driver, which is in terms favourable to the appellants’ case, is ‘such an outlier’ in what it says (in comparison to other evidence in the case) so as to be unreliable, and lacks independence from the husband. I do not find that this is unreasonable – the FtT gives reasons and comes to a conclusion on the evidence in the context of the case as a whole which I judge were open to the FtT to come to.
14. I agree with the appellants’ submission that it is insufficient for a determination to state simply that the Tribunal has engaged with all of the evidence. However, it is appropriate for the FtT to state this alongside showing that they have analysed the evidence and giving sufficient reasons for coming to the conclusion that they do. I am satisfied that the FtT considered the evidence in the round. I assess that the FtT has not erred in this respect.
15. I find that the FtT has not erred in law.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is refused.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 23 September 2025 stands.

D Cotton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 May 2026