Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005402
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/59185/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

YVONNE TACHIE-MENSAH
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Malik, Counsel instructed by Adukus Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Richards-Clarke dated 9 October 2025 dismissing the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds against the Secretary of State’s refusal of her application for leave to remain as a parent under Appendix FM which was given on 29 July 2024.
2. The appellant is a Ghanaian national born 2 April 1985 and the biological mother of a child referred to as ZA born in the UK on 21 February 2021. The child is of Ghanaian nationality, the father not being a British national. The appellant applied for leave to remain under the parent route and relied alternatively on GEN.3.2. and Article 8 ECHR.
3. The factual background is set out in detail by the First-tier Tribunal Judge but in short the appellant has a flawless immigration record, she entered the United Kingdom lawfully on 3 March 2018 and has remained here since. She is the sole carer of her son who was born here and has lived here since birth. The appellant’s relationship with the child’s father has broken down. Family proceedings a few years ago resulted in, I am told, an order for supervised access with the father, however he has refused to engage. There is therefore no contact between the father and the child.
4. There are four grounds of appeal. Put shortly, ground 1 is the failure to conduct a lawful assessment of the child’s best interests under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Ground 2 is that the judge misapplied GEN.3.2. and failed to assess the exceptional circumstances and unjustifiably harsh consequences of removal from the United Kingdom. Ground 3, that the judge failed to give anxious scrutiny and to engage with key evidence. Ground 4, that there was a flawed proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 24 November 2025.
5. Mr Malik has explained the factual background and has argued his case as best he can with the available evidence. In short, the main thrust of the argument is that the judge has failed to conduct a proper assessment of the impact upon the child of removal from the United Kingdom, be that through GEN.3.2. or any other legal provision.
6. The Secretary of State has referred me to the case of Azimi-Moayed & Ors (decisions affecting children; onward appeals) [2013] UKUT 197. That case details in a short headnote some of the key issues affecting children and it says as follows:
“Decisions affecting children
(1) The case law of the Upper Tribunal has identified the following principles to assist in the determination of appeals where children are affected by the appealed decisions:
i)        As a starting point it is in the best interests of children to be with both their parents and if both parents are being removed from the United Kingdom then the starting point suggests that so should dependent children who form part of their household unless there are reasons to the contrary.
ii)       It is generally in the interests of children to have both stability and continuity of social and educational provision and the benefit of growing up in the cultural norms of the society to which they belong.
iii)     Lengthy residence in a country other than the state of origin can lead to development of social cultural and educational ties that it would be inappropriate to disrupt, in the absence of compelling reason to the contrary. What amounts to lengthy residence is not clear cut but past and present policies have identified seven years as a relevant period.
iv)     Apart from the terms of published policies and rules, the Tribunal notes that seven years from age four is likely to be more significant to a child than the first seven years of life. Very young children are focussed on their parents rather than their peers and are adaptable.
v)       Short periods of residence, particularly ones without leave or the reasonable expectation of leave to enter or remain, while claims are promptly considered, are unlikely to give rise to private life deserving of respect in the absence of exceptional factors. In any event, protection of the economic well-being of society amply justifies removal in such cases”.
In my judgment the judge has assessed in sufficient detail all the matters required. Put shortly, the only factor of any note in this case is that removal to Ghana will mean that the child has little or no contact with the father going forward. This is unfortunately a situation that happens frequently in immigration proceedings and for policy reasons that there is a seven year period implemented within the Immigration Rules is indicative of the sort of time in the United Kingdom that might create more permanent ties.
7. The judge sets out their findings in relation to Appendix FM at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12. It is accepted by all parties that the appellant does not meet Appendix FM because the appellant’s son is not a British citizen and has not lived continuously in the United Kingdom for a period of seven years. The exceptional circumstances set out in GEN.3.2. of the Immigration Rules are also analysed. At paragraph 12 the judge says:
“I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances here such that the refusal gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. I say this for the following reasons. First, the appellant was aged around 33 when she arrived in the United Kingdom and was previously employed in Ghana. Given this, I do not accept that the appellant would be unable to secure employment on return to Ghana or that this employment would not be adequately paid to support the appellant and her son. Second, the appellant lived with her parents in Ghana in their family home and I do not accept that she and her son would be unable to live with her parents in the family home on return to Ghana. Nor do I accept that this accommodation would not be suitable for the appellant and her son. Third, the appellant’s son is now of school age, and I do not accept that the appellant’s mother and father would be unable to support the appellant with his care. Further the appellant does not bring forth evidence of support that she receives or needs to care for her son in the United Kingdom. Fourth, the evidence before me is such that the appellant’s son has no contact with his father. I am not persuaded that the appellant’s hope that this may change in the future amounts to an exceptional circumstance. Fifth, the appellant does not bring forth evidence of any health or emotional issues for her or the son or education difficulties for her son. I am therefore not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances such that the refusal gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences as is set out in GEN 3.2 Immigration Rules Appendix FM. I therefore dismiss the appeal under the Immigration Rules”.
The judge then goes on to look at integration under private life concluding that there are no very significant obstacles at paragraph 15.
8. In relation to Article 8 the judge correctly sets out the law and weighs the factors in a clear manner at paragraph 16 through 19. At paragraph 19 the judge deals briefly with the best interest of the appellant’s son:
“I am not satisfied that the refusal gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences, and I bring forth my findings above. I have found that the appellant does not meet the immigration rules. Looking at the circumstances as I find them, I find that the factors raised by the appellant do not outweigh the public interest. Further the appellant has not brought forth factors to support a conclusion that the decision here leads to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that refusal would not be proportionate: Agyarko V SSHD [2017] UKSC 11. I have taken account of the best interests of the appellant’s son as a primary consideration. I find the scales fall on the side of the public interest and the decision is proportionate. I further find that the decision does not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences and does not breach Article 8”.
9. In my judgment, albeit a very short exposition, there are no exceptionally harsh consequences in this case. It is unfortunately an ordinary consequence of not having leave to remain in the United Kingdom that migrants must leave and their children must go with them. There is nothing more the judge could have said. The only real issue is that the appellant and her son will have to leave the United Kingdom, the appellant’s son will not have contact with his father which is as explained by the judge something that has not occurred for a significant period of time. In those circumstances I find there is no error of law in the judge’s decision on any of the grounds put forward by the appellant and ably argued by Mr Malik. For all those reasons I dismiss the appeal.
10. Postscript: The appellant’s solicitors have been requested to provide a written explanation to me within fourteen days of the following matters: why the bundle was served today, why it was uploaded on the wrong platform, why no correspondence was made with the court between 7 January and today as to why the bundle was not available, and finally why wasted costs should not be awarded against the appellant’s solicitors. I make no criticism of the appellant in this case, however I require a written explanation from the solicitors by 3 February 2026.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 January 2026