Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005404
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64265/2023
LH/00349/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

NN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms N. Nnamani, Counsel instructed by Bestway Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 24 September 2025, which dismissed her appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 30 November 2023 refusing her protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria. She entered the United Kingdom on 23 December 2006 as a visitor and subsequently overstayed. She claimed asylum on 11 April 2019.
3. The Appellant claims to have been a member of MASSOB (Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra) whilst in Nigeria and that, since residing in the United Kingdom, she has become involved with IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra). She asserts that, as a consequence of her political activities, she would be at risk of persecution by the Nigerian authorities on return.
4. The Appellant’s appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was pursued primarily on the basis of her sur place political activities in the United Kingdom, including having attended meetings and demonstrations, distributed leaflets, and participated in rallies. She contends that IPOB has been proscribed in Nigeria and that her activities in the UK would place her at risk of persecution or serious harm on return, whether due to her actual or imputed political opinion.
5. In the alternative, the Appellant relied upon humanitarian protection and Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. In relation to Article 3, she relied in part upon her medical conditions, including Type 2 diabetes, hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis. In relation to Article 8, she relied upon her long residence in the United Kingdom since 2006, her private life established here, and her asserted lack of meaningful support or accommodation in Nigeria.
6. The Respondent refused the protection and human rights claim on 30 November 2023. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s nationality and identity but rejected the core elements of her account as not credible. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant’s activities with MASSOB or IPOB would bring her to the adverse attention of the Nigerian authorities. The Respondent further concluded that she did not meet the requirements for humanitarian protection or leave to remain on Article 8 grounds.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal Judge on 22 September 2025 in the Virtual Region (Manchester). The Appellant attended and gave oral evidence, as did three supporting witnesses. Both parties were legally represented.
8. The Judge accepted that the Appellant had undertaken some sur place activity with IPOB and that she had attended demonstrations and meetings. However, he found that she had played at most a low-level role, and had not held any leadership position. The Judge found that her activities would not have brought her to the attention of the Nigerian authorities and would not place her at risk on return.
9. Accordingly, the Judge concluded that the Appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and did not face a real risk of serious harm on return to Nigeria. The asylum and humanitarian protection claims were therefore dismissed.
10. The Judge went on to consider Article 8 ECHR. He found that the Appellant had been in the United Kingdom since 2006 but had no children or partner in the UK and retained ties to Nigeria, including family. Applying the framework in Razgar and having regard to section 117B of the 2002 Act, the Judge concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances and that removal would be proportionate.
11. The appeal was therefore dismissed on all grounds.
Grounds of appeal
12. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on two grounds, which can be summarised as follows:
(i) The Judge, having accepted the credibility of the Appellant’s witnesses and her involvement in IPOB activities, erred by inadequately explaining why her proselytising activities were rejected and by failing properly to justify the conclusion that her so-called low-level activism would not attract adverse attention, particularly in light of evidence that ordinary activists may be more vulnerable than leaders.
(ii) The Judge erred in law by failing properly to apply the principles in HJ (Iran) when assessing the risk arising from the Appellant’s sur place political activities, in particular by failing to consider whether she would continue to support IPOB on return to Nigeria and, if not, whether that would be due to a well-founded fear of persecution.
13. In granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt observed that, although the grounds lacked focus, it was arguable that Ground 2 identified an error of law in the asserted failure to apply the principles of HJ (Iran). Judge Bulpitt considered it arguable that the Judge was required to consider whether the Appellant would support IPOB from within Nigeria and, if not, why not.
Decision and reasons
14. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing before reaching my decision.
15. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
16. In Ground 1, Ms Nnamani contends that the First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in his assessment of the Appellant’s sur place political activities and failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting material aspects of her evidence. She argues that, having accepted the credibility of the Appellant’s supporting witnesses and that she engaged in IPOB activities in the United Kingdom, the Judge failed properly to explain why her account of evangelising and campaigning for IPOB was not accepted. The Appellant further submits that the Judge inadequately reasoned his conclusion that her “low-level” activism would not attract adverse attention, particularly in light of witness evidence that ordinary activists may be more vulnerable to persecution than leaders. It is contended that this failure to resolve a material issue in the evidence amounts to an error of law.
17. The Judge expressly accepted that the Appellant had undertaken some sur place activity and that the supporting witnesses were credible in confirming her attendance at demonstrations and meetings. However, he was entitled to distinguish between acceptance of participation and acceptance of the extent or significance of that participation. The finding that the Appellant had not played a leadership role and had not given speeches was open to the Judge on the evidence, particularly in light of the documentary material and the absence of specific corroboration that she had addressed demonstrations publicly.
18. Further, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellant’s activities were low-level and that such activities would not, without more, place her at real risk on return. The Tribunal is not required to accept that every supporter or attendee at demonstrations faces persecution. Rather, it must conduct an evaluative assessment of risk in light of the objective evidence. The Judge considered the relevant country material and concluded that the Appellant had not demonstrated that her profile would bring her to the adverse attention of the Nigerian authorities. That conclusion was one properly open to him and discloses no material error of law.
19. However, in relation to Ground 2, I am satisfied that the Appellant has identified a material error of law. The First-tier Tribunal expressed reservations about the authenticity and timing of the Appellant’s sur place activity and found that her role was at most low-level. However, the Judge did not make a clear and reasoned finding that the Appellant’s support for IPOB was not genuinely held, nor did he conclude that her political activities were fabricated. On the contrary, he accepted that she had undertaken some public sur place activity over a period of years. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was required to undertake the structured inquiry mandated by HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 when assessing the forward-looking risk on return.
20. In particular, the Judge was required to determine whether the Appellant’s political opinion and support for IPOB are genuinely held, whether she would in fact continue to manifest that support if returned to Nigeria, and if she would not do so, whether that would be because of a well-founded fear of persecution. That forward-looking assessment is not apparent from the determination. The reasoning addresses the level of her past activity and the likelihood of adverse attention arising from it, but does not engage with the question of how she would conduct herself in Nigeria or whether any suppression of her political expression would itself be attributable to fear of harm. In circumstances where IPOB is a proscribed organisation and where the Appellant’s activities were accepted to have been public, that omission constitutes a misdirection in law.
21. The error is material. Had the Judge concluded that the Appellant would continue openly to support IPOB in Nigeria, the assessment of risk on return may have been materially different. Equally, if she would refrain from doing so only because of a well-founded fear of persecution, the protection claim would require careful reconsideration in light of the principles in HJ (Iran). The absence of findings on these central issues means that the necessary evaluative assessment of future risk was not undertaken. The decision cannot therefore stand.
22. Having regard to paragraph 7.2(b) of the Practice Statement, the appropriate course is to set aside the decision and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a different Judge. No findings are preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a different judge.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 February 2026