Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005415

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57751/2024
LP/05895/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

HVH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not present
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant is a Vietnamese national, who had his asylum claim refused by the respondent. He appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) and in a decision dated 11 August 2025 the FtT Judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. On 12 January 2026, the solicitors for the appellant notified the Upper Tribunal that they were no longer instructed to act on his behalf.
3. On the morning of the hearing the appellant wrote to the Upper Tribunal. He said that he no longer had legal representation, enclosed a composite electronic bundle and asked that the matter be decided on the papers. The bundle included a revised skeleton argument (“Revised Skeleton”).
4. At the hearing, I explained the situation to Mr Simpson and sought his views about how the respondent wished to proceed. He had not been sent the bundle, so I arranged for it to be sent to him and allowed him time to review it. We resumed the hearing and Mr Simpson confirmed that he was content to proceed if he was permitted to make oral representations.
5. Although the Standard Directions had not been followed, by admitting the electronic bundle the material on which the appellant sought to rely could be considered and Mr Simpson was prepared to accept the late provision of that material. The most expedient way for the respondent to respond to the material in that bundle, including the Revised Skeleton, was for Mr Simpson to make submissions at the hearing. Although the appellant would not have an opportunity to respond to those submissions or make further points, given he requested for the case to be determined on the papers I did not consider he would suffer prejudice from the hearing proceeding.
6. In the circumstances and mindful of the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, I concluded that it was appropriate to proceed with the hearing.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds of appeal advanced at the time of the application for permission set out four areas, while the Revised Skeleton focussed primarily on the second of those grounds. For the avoidance of doubt and given the appellant was not present for the hearing I have considered all of the grounds of appeal that were before me.
8. In summary, those are as follows:
a. Ground 1 - Failure to make findings on the correct issues. This related to the way the FtT Judge approached the appellant’s evidence about his engagement with the Brotherhood for Democracy, specifically whether he had claimed that he was a “member” or “supporter”.
b. Ground 2 - Failure to consider objective evidence, namely evidence from the “DFAT Country Information Report Vietnam” dated 19 February 2025 (“DFAT Report”) and Country Policy and Information Note “Vietnam: Opposition to the state” dated September 2025 (“CPIN”).
c. Ground 3 - Flawed credibility assessment, in that the FtT Judge erred in finding that the appellant did not provide a logical explanation why the Vietnamese authorities would have an interest in him.
d. Ground 4 - Failure to conduct a holistic assessment, in that the FtT Judge failed to properly consider the objective evidence, including the country background evidence.
Discussion and Analysis
9. I will deal with Ground 2 first. At [23] the FtT Judge discusses the account put forward by the appellant that while in South Korea he had attended a demonstration about a purported Chinese encroachment into Vietnamese territorial waters. The FtT Judge did not accept the appellant’s account. He said he could see no logical reason why the Vietnamese authorities would have a detrimental interest in the appellant if he was supporting Vietnamese rights over its territorial waters, and noted that the appellant could offer no logical explanation at the hearing.
10. In the Revised Skeleton, the appellant pointed to the DFAT Report and CPIN. He argued that the country evidence directly supports his account that participation in an anti-China protest would be likely to attract adverse attention from the Vietnamese authorities and create a real risk on return. Specifically, he submitted that the country evidence establishes that:
“a. The Vietnamese government suppresses protests on sensitive political topics, including anti-China demonstrations;
b. Protests are subject to close monitoring by police and security authorities;
c. Articles 109, 117 and 331 of the Vietnamese Penal Code are routinely used to criminalise expressions of dissent;
d. Official permission for protests on sensitive issues is rarely granted and participants face harassment, arrest and prosecution.”
11. The appellant argued that the FtT Judge’s conclusion that the Vietnamese authorities would have no logical reason to have an interest in him ignored this evidence and that the decision contained no adequate analysis of the evidence. He said the failure to engage with this evidence infected the overall credibility and risk assessment and is therefore material.
12. Mr Simpson argued on behalf of the respondent that there was no error. He said that the FtT Judge had not been taken to this evidence during the hearing and that, were I to find there had been an error, it was not material to the overall decision. He submitted that when the credibility assessment is taken in the round, even if the adverse findings reflected at [23] were discounted, the FtT Judge would have reached the same conclusion.
13. Credibility is plainly central to this case. The FtT Judge noted at [11] that at the FtT hearing, “[T]he parties agreed that the sole issue for consideration was the credibility of the claim. The respondent accepted that if the claim were credible the appeal would stand to be allowed.” The FtT Judge then proceeded to assess the credibility of the appellant’s claim in detail and made numerous adverse findings at [19-28].
14. It is not clear if the FtT Judge was taken to the parts of the country evidence raised by the appellant or what submissions were made on those points. The FtT Judge has, however, engaged with the issue. For example, at [23] he has questioned (i) if the Vietnamese authorities would have been monitoring a protest in South Korea, and (ii) if they were, would they have taken a detrimental interest in the appellant given the nature of those protests (i.e. apparently in support of Vietnamese state interests). Those are reasonable questions for the FtT Judge to ask even if the country evidence was taken into account. The appellant was invited to offer an explanation at the FtT hearing however none appears to have been provided.
15. In any event, I agree with Mr Simpson. Even if the appellant is right that the FtT Judge failed to take the points from the country evidence into account it would not have changed the overall decision. That paragraph is one of a number of paragraphs where the FtT Judge makes adverse findings and when the credibility assessment at [19-28] is looked at holistically the FtT Judge would have reached the same conclusion. It is not, therefore, material.
16. The FtT Judge further said at [29] that even if the activities of the appellant were undertaken cynically the question is then whether they have placed the appellant at risk. While each case must of course be assessed on its own circumstances, the appellant identified in the Revised Skeleton that the Executive Summary to the CPIN notes:
“Whilst there is some tolerance for protests, those who do so on political or sensitive subjects may be subject to intimidation by police or arrest, detention and subsequent release; however, in general this is not sufficiently serious, by its nature and/or repetition, to amount to persecution or serious harm.”
17. I find that the FtT Judge has not made a material error in relation to Ground 2. The FtT Judge has made clear and specific findings about the appellant’s credibility and even if he did not consider the specific aspects of the country evidence raised by the appellant in his grounds of appeal it would not have made a difference to the outcome. That is because it would not have changed the overall credibility assessment or the conclusions on risk of harm.
18. The remainder of the grounds of appeal are considerably weaker, however given the appellant did not attend the hearing, and for completeness, I will deal with them in turn.
19. In relation to Ground 1, the FtT Judge at [21] assessed the appellant’s evidence about his attendance at a church in Korea and engagement with the Brotherhood for Democracy. The discrepancy which the FtT Judge dealt with is around the appellant’s account of why he went there and his knowledge about the Brotherhood for Democracy being there. The distinction which the appellant seeks to draw between whether he claimed to have been a “supporter” or “member” is immaterial to the FtT Judge’s assessment.
20. In relation to Ground 3, I have set out my findings on the FtT Judge’s treatment of the country evidence. The FtT Judge is entitled to consider whether an account provided by an appellant is logical or not when assessing credibility.
21. In relation to Ground 4, little detail is provided as to what specifically the appellant takes issue with in relation to the credibility assessment. I have explained, however, that at [19–28] the FtT Judge holistically assessed the credibility of the appellant and I can see no flaws in the approach adopted.
22. I find that the grounds of appeal fail to show that the FtT Judge erred in law for the reasons argued by the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

N Hills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 26 January 2026