Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005433
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01768/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

[A G]
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Umur, Cape Hill Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the finding of the First-tier Tribunal dated 26 September 2025. The appellant is a citizen of Yemen who made an application for entry clearance to the UK on 3 March 2022 under appendix FM to the immigration rules. The apparent relies on family life with her spouse (the sponsor).

2. The respondent had refused the application rate for entry clearance, disputing that the appellant met the financial requirements of the immigration rules, that there was adequate accommodation, that the appellant met the English language requirements of the immigration rules (including not proving that she is exempt from them). The respondent concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances resulting in an article 8 breach. Those reasons for refusal provided the issues for the First-tier Tribunal to address. The First-tier Tribunal found against the appellant on all issues.

Grounds of appeal

3. The appellant has permission to appeal under the following grounds:

a. First ground. There was an error in finding that the appellant did not meet the financial requirements;

b. Second ground. There was an error in finding that the appellant did not meet the English language require requirement exemption;

c. Third ground. There was an error in the First-tier Tribunal approach to exceptional circumstances (article 8).

4. The respondent opposes all grounds of the appeal and submits that the grounds of appeal amount to no more than a disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s findings.

Submissions

5. I read and heard submissions from both parties and reserved my determination.

6. In oral submissions, the appellant relied on the written grounds of appeal and elaborated on them. I note here some of those elaborations. The appellant confirmed that the documents referred to in paragraph 3b of the grounds of appeal were documents which were available to the First-tier Tribunal.

7. The appellant submits that these clearly showed the sponsor is severely disabled, with severe mobility issues and has to rely on walking sticks. The appellant submitted that it is disproportionate to require him to either travel to Egypt, if that is it all possible, or for him to try and relocate to Egypt. The appellant submitted that the First-tier Tribunal has failed to consider the extent of the sponsor’s disability and his medical problems.

8. The appellant submitted that the appellant and sponsor have to meet in Egypt because it is not possible for them to meet in Yemen, and as neither of them are Egyptian nationals neither have the right to abode in Egypt. The appellant is subject to Visa requirements and is leading a restricted life there. The appellant submitted that it is not reasonable for the First-tier Tribunal to suggest that they can meet in a country where neither of them can permanently live.

9. The appellant submitted that the First-tier Tribunal expected too much from the medical evidence in relation to the appellant. A letter from an Egyptian GP has been submitted and translated, and it was submitted that one should not expect a proper medical report from a foreign doctor.

10. The respondent submitted to that the appellant’s submissions are an attempted to re-argue the issues, that the appendant had not drawn my attention to the First-tier Tribunal on where the errors are said to be, but that the appellant has made sweeping submissions on what the First-tier Tribunal should have found.

11. The respondent submits that the First-tier Tribunal clearly had a grasp on what the evidence was and there is nothing irrational in the decision.

12. On the specific point of the medical evidence in relation to the sponsor, the respondent submits that the First-tier Tribunal dealt with that evidence appropriately, without cynicism, and simply finding that it is insufficient to prove that which the appellant relies on it for.

Assessment of the grounds of appeal

13. In relation to the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the First-tier Tribunal errs by finding no bank statements are provided, contrary to the ECO accepting they had been provided. I find that a proper reading of the First-tier Tribunal decision shows that [46] the First-tier Tribunal is doing nothing more in this respect than outlining what evidence was available to them, and noting what was not. The First-tier Tribunal has done no more than that.

14. On the submissions that it was an error not to be satisfied that the sponsor has been receiving housing benefit at the time of the appellant’s application, I find that the judge was entitled to come to that conclusion on the evidence. Even if it were not a justified finding, the First-tier Tribunal had made a reasonable conclusion in the alternative that the appellant has not proved there would be adequate accommodation within the meaning of the immigration rules for the appellant and her (then under 18-year-old) child.

15. The appellant asserts that there is an error in the First-tier Tribunal finding that the appellant had not provided evidence of rented accommodation. The appellant points to housing benefit decisions, personal independence payment and universal credit benefit evidence. In my judgement, there is a distinction between proving income, and proving the adequacy of the accommodation, which is what the First-tier Tribunal is considering when it refers to there being a lack of evidence in relation to the rented accommodation at [50]. There is no error in this respect. The First-tier Tribunal goes on to find that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the appellant can be adequately maintained in the UK without recourse to public funds. I’m satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal considered the evidence as a whole in coming to these conclusions, and has provided adequate reasons for the findings.

16. In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellant has submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in finding that the appendant did not meet the English language requirement exemption. The appellant submits that there were exceptional circumstances because the appellant lives in Egypt, and comes from Yemen where there is no visa Centre or course provider.

17. In oral submissions before me, Mr Umur submitted that the appellant has clearly not been able to obtain an English certificate despite living in Egypt for a number of years. I remind myself that my function is to consider whether there are errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal determination, but I note that if the First-tier Tribunal had equated a length of residence in Egypt with being evidence of her being unable to obtain an English certificate for any reason, this would have been a leap in logic not supported by the evidence.

18. I am not persuaded by the appellant’s submission that a tribunal should not expect a “proper medical report” from an overseas doctor, and that a letter from a foreign GP should be enough. Whilst a tribunal would be quite right to take into account the origin of each piece of evidence in judging how to approach it, there is no inherent reason to change the expectation of the quality of evidence, and a need properly to present expert evidence, just because a patient is overseas. I find that the First-Tier Tribunal plainly did keep in mind that the appellant was overseas.

19. Considering the evidence available to the First-tier Tribunal on the question of an English language test, and the quality and substance of the medical evidence in relation to the appellant, I judged that the conclusion that the appellant does not meet the English language requirements under the immigration rules is supported by the evidence and is appropriately reasoned.

20. On the third ground, the appellant submitted that the sponsor is disabled and the First-Tier Tribunal was wrong to conclude that he could travel to Egypt [63] and visit the appellant.

21. The appellant argues before me that evidence of the sponsor being entitled to PIP was before the First-tier Tribunal. This is correct, but the evidence from the department of Work and pensions informing of PIP payments does not go further than stating that there are payments. It does not explain the severity of the condition triggering entitlement to PIP, or how it might impact on his ability to travel.

22. The First-tier Tribunal outlines the evidence that was presented on this point. The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal included screenshots of medical letters which were not clear, in the view of the First-tier Tribunal. Having seen the evidence available to the First-tier Tribunal, I consider that the First-tier Tribunal was being generous in this description. At least one of the pages in evidence is close to wholly illegible. Evidence such as a list of medication, referred to in submissions before me, is of minimal probative value when there is no expert witness to explain what the medication is or what conclusions the First-tier Tribunal could draw from the list of medication. It is of no assistance for those representing the appellant to offer to explain what that medication is for. I declined the offer for this to be done, keeping in mind both that my function is not to rehear evidence, but to assess whether there is an error of law by the First-tier Tribunal, and also that the appellant’s representative would find themselves, at best, dangerously close to giving evidence in a case where they are providing advocacy and advice.

23. It was not unreasonable, in my judgement, for the First-tier Tribunal to conclude in light of all of the evidence that the sponsor could continue to visit as he had done in the past. The evidence does not support a finding that the sponsor’s previous behaviour could not continue in this respect. I do not find that the First-tier Tribunal has failed to consider the (limited) evidence on the sponsor’s or the appellant’s health.

24. The appellant submitted that the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider that there is a civil war in Yemen and a sponsor cannot be expected to live in Yemen. In my judgement this submission is misguided, the First-tier Tribunal did not find that the appellant can be expected to live in Yemen. There is no error in failing to consider evidence relevant to a conclusion that the first tear tribunal does not reach.

25. The appellant further submits that the requirement to renew visas for her to be in Egypt means that there was an error in concluding that the appellant and sponsor could have a meaningful family life in Egypt. In written submissions this was described as a yearly visa requirement. In oral submissions this was described as variously six monthly or three monthly. I am not persuaded that this requirement would negate the ability of a Tribunal to conclude that family life can continue in the form that it has been to date.

26. Having reviewed the First-tier Tribunal’s determination on this point, I find that the First-tier Tribunal considered the evidence relating to this, and found that the appellant had not proved that the current arrangements could not continue. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the country, to proceed on the basis that the appellant’s current arrangements could continue. The First-tier Tribunal has to make a decision on the evidence before them, and is entitled to draw common sense conclusions from that. The First-tier Tribunal has done so in this case, has given sufficient reasons, and applied the law correctly.

27. Taking the case in the round, and considering all of the submissions on behalf of the appellant, I find that there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is refused.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 28 September 2025 stands.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 May 2026