Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005447

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53147/2024
LP/12825/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

RS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Karim, Counsel instructed by Lewis Nedas Law
For the Respondent: Ms S. Keerthi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 24 September 2025, which dismissed his appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 25 January 2024 refusing his asylum and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of India, born in May 1965. He claimed asylum on 6 December 2022. His claim was advanced on the basis that he would be at risk on return to India due to the Indian authorities imputing to him a political opinion, namely that he was involved in terrorism or associated with terrorists.
3. The Appellant’s account was that in 2016 he was working transporting goods by boat when he was intercepted by the police and weapons were discovered. He maintained that he was unaware that the goods were weapons. He asserted that he was detained and interrogated for a period of time, during which he was mistreated. He claimed that he was released only through the intervention of a Catholic priest who had political connections, after which he was hospitalised. He stated that the priest subsequently assisted him to leave India and travel to the United Kingdom, where he arrived in July 2019.
4. The Appellant further claimed that since his arrival in the United Kingdom, friends and neighbours in India had informed him that the police continued to look for him. He therefore maintained that he would be at risk of persecution on return due to his imputed political opinion.
5. In the alternative, the Appellant claimed entitlement to humanitarian protection. He also relied upon Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. In relation to Article 3, he relied upon his medical condition, including alleged heart problems. In relation to Article 8, he relied upon his private life in the United Kingdom and his relationship with his daughter and grandchildren, who are British citizens.
6. The Respondent refused the claim on 25 January 2024. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s nationality, identity and age, and accepted that a Convention reason was engaged in principle. However, the Respondent rejected the core account as not credible and did not accept that the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Indian authorities as claimed.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appeal was listed for a face-to-face hearing at Taylor House on 11 September 2025. The Appellant did not attend the hearing. An application for an adjournment had been made shortly before the hearing on medical grounds but had been refused. The Tribunal proceeded in the Appellant’s absence, having had it confirmed by the appellant’s daughter that the Appellant was content for the Tribunal to proceed in his absence and the Judge being satisfied that it was fair to do so.
8. The Judge considered the evidence in the consolidated bundle and the Appellant’s later bundle, including his witness statement and skeleton argument. The Judge treated the skeleton argument and grounds of appeal as the Appellant’s written submissions.
9. In relation to the asylum claim, the Judge found that the Appellant’s account contained material inconsistencies, including discrepancies as to when the alleged interception by police occurred and how long he was detained. The Judge also identified a lack of detail regarding the alleged terrorist organisation and individuals involved, and the circumstances of the Appellant’s release.
10. The Judge further found it not credible that the Appellant remained in India for several years after his release, before travelling to the United Kingdom on his own passport using a visitor visa. The Judge also found that the Appellant had delayed claiming asylum until after he was detained in the United Kingdom, which damaged his credibility.
11. Taking the evidence cumulatively, the Judge concluded that the Appellant had not established, on balance, that his account was reasonably likely to be true. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Indian authorities due to his imputed political activities in India, and his asylum appeal was dismissed.
12. The Judge went on to consider Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds, finding that the medical evidence did not demonstrate a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in health or a significant reduction in life expectancy upon return to India. The Article 3 claim was therefore dismissed.
13. Under Article 8 within the Immigration Rules, the Judge concluded that there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration. Outside the Immigration Rules, the Judge accepted that the Appellant had established a private life in the United Kingdom but found insufficient evidence of a subsisting family life with his adult daughter and grandchildren. Having considered section 117B of the 2002 Act and conducted a proportionality balancing exercise, the Judge concluded that the public interest in immigration control outweighed the factors relied upon by the Appellant.
14. The appeal was therefore dismissed on asylum and human rights grounds.
Grounds of appeal
15. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on four grounds, which can be summarised as follows:
(i) The Judge erred in law in refusing the application for an adjournment and proceeding in the Appellant’s absence.
(ii) The Judge misapplied the standard of proof by assessing credibility and risk on the balance of probabilities rather than applying the lower standard required in protection and Article 3 claims.
(iii) The Judge failed to take into account material evidence showing that the Appellant lived with his daughter, thereby undermining the Article 8 family life and proportionality assessment.
(iv) The Judge failed properly to apply the broad evaluative test in Kamara when assessing whether there were very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in India.
16. Permission to appeal was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 11 November 2025. However, following a renewed application, Upper Tribunal Judge Grey granted permission on 14 December 2025. In granting permission, Judge Grey observed that it was arguable that the Judge may have erred in failing to apply the lower standard of proof in respect of the Humanitarian Protection/Article 3 protection claim. Whilst not formally limiting the grant of permission, the Upper Tribunal indicated that the remaining grounds were not considered to have strong arguable merit.

Decision and reasons
17. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing before reaching my decision.
18. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
Ground 1
19. In Ground 1, the Appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in refusing the application for an adjournment, thereby rendering the proceedings procedurally unfair. It is argued that the Judge’s conclusion at [15], that no unfairness was occasioned, was irrational because proceeding in the Appellant’s absence deprived him of effective participation in his protection and human rights appeal. The Appellant further submits that the Judge adopted an unduly restrictive approach to the medical evidence by requiring express confirmation that he was unfit to attend, notwithstanding a diagnosis of suspected gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, which is said to be capable of affecting his ability to speak and give evidence. It is also argued that insufficient weight was given to the asserted additional unfairness arising from the withdrawal of his representative following refusal of the adjournment.
20. This ground is not made out. At paragraphs [10]–[15], the Judge provided detailed, careful and sustainable reasons for refusing the adjournment and proceeding with the hearing. The contemporaneous medical evidence did not state that the Appellant was unfit to attend. On the contrary, it recorded that he had been “extensively investigated for cardiac problems and has been given a clean bill of health as recent as one month ago.” The diagnosis of suspected gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, without more, did not establish an inability to attend or to give evidence. The Judge was plainly entitled to require clear and cogent evidence of unfitness, particularly against the background of the procedural history, which included a previous adjournment on medical grounds.
21. The Judge expressly directed herself to the overriding objective and considered the guidance in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC), correctly identifying that the central question was whether fairness required an adjournment. Importantly, the Appellant, through his daughter, confirmed that he was content for the hearing to proceed in his absence. The Judge was entitled to treat that confirmation as an informed and voluntary position. In the absence of medical evidence demonstrating an inability to participate, the conclusion that proceeding with the hearing did not give rise to procedural unfairness was one well within the range of reasonable responses open to the Tribunal.
22. Accordingly, Ground 1 discloses no material error of law and is dismissed.

Ground 2
23. Ground 2 contends that the First-tier Tribunal materially misapplied the standard of proof. Mr Karim submits that although the Judge directed herself at [20]–[21] in accordance with section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, the reasoning culminating at [34] demonstrates a flawed application of that framework. It is argued that the Judge impermissibly conflated the assessment of subjective fear with credibility, applying the civil standard of proof to matters which should have been assessed by reference to the lower “reasonable degree of likelihood” threshold. Relying in particular on paragraphs 16–17 of JCK, Mr Karim submits that section 32 requires a discrete assessment of whether an appellant in fact fears persecution, distinct from the broader credibility analysis. Further, it is contended that even if the civil standard applied to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility under the Refugee Convention, the Judge failed to undertake a separate assessment of the Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 claims, applying the lower “real risk” standard. That omission, it is said, amounts to a material error of law.
24. I do not accept the submission that the assessment of whether the Appellant “in fact” feared persecution could be conducted in isolation from an evaluation of the credibility of his account in this appeal. The question of whether the Appellant genuinely fears persecution necessarily required the Tribunal to examine the reliability of the factual narrative said to give rise to that fear. The Judge carried out a careful and detailed assessment of the Appellant’s account of events in India, identifying inconsistencies, omissions and matters undermining plausibility. Nothing in the reasoning suggests that the Judge misunderstood the structure of section 32 or applied an incorrect legal test to the Refugee Convention claim. The challenge, insofar as it concerns misapplication of the civil standard within the section 32 framework, is not made out.
25. The difficulty arises, however, in relation to the alternative protection grounds. At [5], the Judge expressly recorded that the Appellant advanced a claim for humanitarian protection in the alternative. Despite that, humanitarian protection was not subsequently identified as a distinct issue for determination, nor was it addressed in separate or express terms in the Judge’s analysis. A claim for humanitarian protection required the Judge to determine whether there were substantial grounds for believing that removal would expose the Appellant to a real risk of serious harm, including treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR, applying the lower “real risk” standard. It is not apparent from the decision that this discrete question was considered. Rather, the reasoning appears to have evaluated the Appellant’s account exclusively through the lens of the civil standard applicable to the first stage of the section 32 asylum assessment.
26. In circumstances where the credibility findings were made by reference to the balance of probabilities, and where no separate assessment applying the lower standard was undertaken in respect of humanitarian protection or Article 3 risk (save in relation to the distinct medical Article 3 claim), it cannot safely be concluded that the same outcome was inevitable. The absence of an identifiable analysis under the correct standard renders the error material. Accordingly, Ground 2 discloses a material error of law.
Ground 3
27. Ground 3 contends that the Judge failed to consider evidence said to demonstrate that the Appellant resided with his daughter in the United Kingdom. It is submitted that this evidence was material to the assessment of whether family life existed for the purposes of Article 8(1) ECHR.
28. That submission is not borne out by the decision. At [47], the Judge expressly accepted that the sponsor is the Appellant’s biological daughter. However, she went on to find that there was “little evidence” before the Tribunal as to the nature of the relationship. She specifically noted the absence of witness statements from the daughter or other family members and stated that she was unable to ascertain whether the family in fact lived together or what level of support, if any, was provided. On that basis, she did not accept that family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) had been established between the Appellant and his adult daughter.
29. The Judge further referred at [48] to the Appellant’s asylum interview, in which he stated that he was living in a shared house and did not mention residing with his daughter. The issue of residence was therefore directly considered. The conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a subsisting family life was one that was open to the Judge on the material available.
30. Ground 3 amounts, in substance, to a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge on the evidence. No material error of law is disclosed, and the ground is not made out.
Ground 4
31. Ground 4 contends that the Judge failed properly to apply the guidance in Kamara when assessing whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into India for the purposes of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi)/PL.5.1(b) of the Immigration Rules.
32. That submission is not made out. At [38]–[44], the Judge undertook a structured assessment of the relevant factors bearing on integration. She considered, in particular, the Appellant’s age, his linguistic ability, his cultural familiarity with India, his employment history, the length of his residence in India prior to coming to the United Kingdom, the comparatively short period of his absence, and the presence of family members remaining in India. Those are precisely the kinds of factors relevant to the evaluative exercise identified in Kamara, namely whether the individual would be enough of an insider to participate in life in the country of return.
33. The reasoning demonstrates that the Judge did not adopt an unduly narrow or mechanistic approach. Rather, she assessed whether there were practical, social or cultural barriers which would prevent reintegration, and concluded that none of the matters relied upon, whether individually or cumulatively, met the high threshold of “very significant obstacles”. That conclusion was one reasonably open to her on the evidence.
34. Ground 4 amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluative findings and identifies no misdirection in law. It is therefore not made out.
Conclusion
35. I find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law in respect of Ground 2, namely the failure to conduct a distinct and lawful assessment of the Appellant’s claim for Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 (protection grounds) applying the correct lower “real risk” standard of proof. The absence of a discrete assessment under the correct threshold means that the Tribunal did not lawfully determine whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of serious harm on return.
36. Given the nature of the error, a proper determination of the protection claim will require a full evaluative assessment of risk applying the correct standard. That exercise is fact-sensitive and requires findings to be made afresh. I therefore set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in its entirety and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a different Judge. No findings are preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a different judge.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 February 2026