Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005449
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51998/2021
IA/05221/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Appellant
and

GM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs R. Arif, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms S. Lucas, Counsel instructed by Turpin Miller LLP

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 13 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the Secretary of State’s appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 25 September 2025 (“the decision”). For ease of reference I shall refer to the parties as they were before the FTT, so GM is the appellant and the Secretary of State is the respondent.

2. The appeal has a long-running history. On 30 June 2022 the respondent decided to revoke the appellant’s refugee status (derived from his father) following his conviction for aggravated burglary on 23 June 2016 for which he was later sentenced to 12 years detention in a young offenders’ institution (reduced to 9 years on appeal). Accordingly, he was subject to automatic deportation and a decision was made to deport him and the deportation order was signed on 19 February 2021. The respondent decided that returning him to Zimbabwe would not put the appellant at real risk of persecution or Article 3 treatment on return or amount to a disproportionate breach of his Article 8 rights. The appellant appealed that decision to the FTT and on 28 May 2024 FTT Judge Phull dismissed his appeal. However, that decision was itself appealed to the Upper Tribunal and by way of a decision dated 3 December 2024 Upper Tribunal Judge (“UTJ”) Pinder allowed the appellant’s appeal and remitted it to the FTT for consideration before a different judge. It is common ground that Judge Phull’s decision on the respondent’s decision taken pursuant to section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) was preserved which meant that by the time the appeal was re-heard by FTT, the appellant’s appeal on protection and humanitarian grounds fell to be dismissed.

3. In the new FTT decision, the judge allowed the appellant’s appeal on the basis that he was at real risk of arousing suspicion upon initial questioning at Harare airport thereby exposing him to a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. The FTT allowed his appeal accordingly. As a result of that decision, the FTT did not continue to consider the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds.

4. The critical paragraph summarising the reasons for allowing the appeal is [24] which says:

“Taking into account the evidence as a whole, for the reasons given below, I am satisfied it is reasonably likely that the Appellant will be identified as a person of interest. I am satisfied that the combination of risk factors, most significantly, his length of residence in the UK, his previous refugee status, and his familial connection to the MDC, distinguish him from a simple failed asylum seeker. In my judgment it is overwhelmingly likely that those risk factors will become apparent during the initial stage of questioning. Questioning is embarked upon with the aim of identifying those who are thought to be enemies of the regime with the main focus being on those who are perceived to be politically active in support of the opposition but with anyone perceived to be a threat to, or critic of, the regime attracting interest also (paragraph 264 HS). In my judgment, basic questions about the Appellant’s reasons for being in the UK will be asked and the Appellant’s responses will reveal his risk factors. The Appellant cannot be expected to lie (paragraph 271 HS). I accept the evidence of the country expert, Hazel Cameron, that those factors place the Appellant at risk. The risk at the point of the return is dealt with at paragraphs A-C of the summary and paragraph 28 of the December 2023 report and at paragraphs 24 and 70 of the August 2025 report”.

5. The respondent challenges the FTT decision on two grounds with the permission of UTJ Hoffman. Those grounds are:

Ground 1: the FTT failed to give adequate reasons for concluding that the appellant would be suspected of having an adverse political profile, particularly in light of her finding that he, in fact, had no personal political profile (see [25(b)] of the FTT decision). Headnote (1) of HS (returning asylum seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKAIT 94 contradict factors on which the expert relied (summarised at [25(b)]) to opine the appellant would be at risk on return and the judge failed to engage with how the familial links to the MDC would put the appellant at risk. The FTT did not identify where on the spectrum of risk the appellant’s suspected political profile may fall having regard to [43] and [51] of SM and Others (MDC – internal flight – risk categories) Zimbabwe CG [2005] UKIAT 00100, [264] and [266] of HS. In short, something more that a ‘suspected political profile’ was required such as an adverse military or criminal profile (HS), or a political profile considered adverse to the regime in Zimbabwe (AA (Risk for involuntary returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2006] UKAIT 00061).

Ground 2: the FTT, in relying on the expert evidence of Hazel Cameron about the so-called ‘Patriot Act’, de facto departed from the established Zimbabwe Country Guidance, namely that failed asylum seekers will not generally be at risk for that fact alone without identifying cogent evidence giving very strong grounds for doing so contrary to SG (Iraq) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940 and SSHD v PG [2015] EWCA Civ 133.

6. In the appellant’s Rule 24 response dated, he opposed the grounds on the following basis (in summary):

Ground 1: the respondent has addressed the wrong question. The FTT did not have to explain why it found the appellant to be suspected of having a political profile even though he has none, because what the FTT actually had to do, following HS [264] was decide whether “the initial questioning of the appellant will arouse any suspicion or result in any adverse interest”, which the FTT did find for a combination of reasons all of which were adequately stated.

Ground 2: the relevant country guidance is HS (reaffirmed in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) in which it was held that a person identified as a failed asylum seeker on return to Harare airport would not face a real risk of being subjected to serious harm on that account alone. But, the FTT did not find the appellant to be at risk for that reason because the FTT was fully aware the appellant was not a failed asylum seeker but, in fact, a person whose previous refugee leave had been revoked. There is a difference (PS (Cessation principles) Zimbabwe [2021] UKUT 00283 (IAC) applies). In fact, the FTT found him to be at risk for a combination of risk factors which distinguished him from a failed asylum seeker and did not rely solely on expert opinion but formed its own, taking into account the evidence as a whole. The respondent has cherry-picked extracts from the expert report on which the FTT placed no reliance. Accordingly, the FTT directed themselves to the country guidance in HS throughout and reached a decision open to it on the whole of the evidence.

7. At the hearing before me, both advocates relied on the above positions. Ms Arif did not supplement those in oral submissions although she replied briefly to the additional oral submissions Ms Lucas made.. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give together with my reasons for it.

The Legal Framework

8. Section 11 and 12 of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 sets out the scope of the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction. An appeal can only be brought on a point of law and a decision can be set aside if there is an error on a point of law. In reality, a decision is only set aside if the error is a material one.

9. It is now well-established that appellate courts should exercise judicial restraint when considering decisions of the lower courts, particularly where the challenge is to the decision of a specialist tribunal such as the FTT (IAC) (see for example paragraph 26 of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201).

10. At [47] of SG (Iraq) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940 Burnton LJ said:

“decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so.”

Country Guidance Cases in Zimbabwe

11. There are a number of country guidance cases about different issues which feature in protection cases about Zimbabwe. It is helpful to set out some of them as they relate to the issues which were before the FTT in the present appeal.

12. The relevant summary country guidance in SM says at [51]:

“a) There does continue to be a real risk of persecution for those who are or are perceived to be politically active in opposition to and for this reason of serious adverse interest to the present regime. This can potentially include the categories identified in paragraph 431 but none of these factors by itself is determinative. Each case must be looked at on its own individual facts. Some categories are more likely to be at risk than others such as MDC activists and campaigners rather than supporters but we do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional cases those with very limited political involvement could in their particular circumstances find themselves at real risk.

b) The risk to political opponents is increased both before and immediately after elections but this fact is of limited importance and is only likely to have any material bearing in borderline cases.
…
.
e) The current atmosphere of hostility to the return of failed asylum seekers does not of itself put at risk those who would otherwise not be at real risk but does serve to reinforce the fact that asylum claims must be considered with care and where there is any uncertainty, any doubts must be resolved in the applicant’s favour.
…
i) There is no general risk for failed asylum seekers of a breach of article 3 as a result of the current hostility towards such returnees.”

13. The headnote of AA says:

“A failed asylum seeker returned involuntarily to Zimbabwe does not face on return a real risk of being subjected to persecution or serious ill-treatment on that account alone.

SM and Others (MDC – internal flight- risk categories) CG [2005] UKIAT 00100 is reaffirmed. Two further risk categories are identified: those whose military history discloses issues that will lead to further investigation by the security services upon return to Harare Airport and those in respect of whom there are outstanding and unresolved criminal issues.

A deportee from the United Kingdom who, having been subjected to the first stage interview at the airport, is allowed to pass through the airport is likely to be the subject
of some monitoring in his home area by the local police or the CIO but the evidence does not indicate a real risk of persecutory ill-treatment for those who are being monitored solely because of their return from the United Kingdom.

The general country conditions are extremely difficult but those difficulties will not generally be sufficiently severe to enable an appellant to rely upon article 3 to resist removal”

14. The headnote in HS says (as relevant)

“1. Failed asylum seekers do not, as such, face a risk of being subjected, on return to Zimbabwe, to persecution or serious ill-treatment. That will be the case whether the return is voluntary or involuntary, escorted or not.

2. The findings in respect of risk categories in SM and Others (MDC – Internal flight –risk categories) Zimbabwe CG [2005] UKIAT 00100, as adopted, affirmed and supplemented in AA (Risk for involuntary returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2006] UKAIT 00061 are adopted and reaffirmed. The Tribunal identifies one further risk category, being those seen to be active in association with human rights or civil society organisations where evidence suggests that the particular organisation has been identified by the authorities as a critic or opponent of the Zimbabwean regime.

3. The process of screening returning passengers is an intelligence led process and the CIO will generally have identified from the passenger manifest in advance, based upon such intelligence, those passengers in whom there is any possible interest. The fact of having made an asylum claim abroad is not something that in itself will give rise to adverse interest on return.

4. The Tribunal adopts and reaffirms the findings in AA in respect of the general absence of real risk associated with any monitoring of returnees that might take place after such persons have passed through the airport and returned to their home area or re-established themselves in a new area.

5. Country conditions have continued to deteriorate but are not generally such as to bring about an infringement of Convention rights for returnees or to require the grant of humanitarian protection.”

15. Also of relevance to the appeal before me are paragraphs [260], [264] and [266] of HS which say as follows:

“260. We have examined carefully those issues about which the Court of Appeal expressed concern. We have more extensive and up to date background and expert evidence as well as the benefit of hearing further evidence from W5 and W6 and receiving detailed submissions from counsel. We have explained why, as a result, we see no reason to take a different view of the evidence as a whole from that taken by the Tribunal in AA(2). Indeed that is the view we reach ourselves on the basis of all the evidence now available. We have explained why the evidence of W5 and W6 does not support the proposition that violence is used during the initial interview that will take place at the airport. The evidence before us reinforces the finding that there is a two stage process at the airport and that anyone identified during the initial questioning that takes place at the airport as being of interest will be taken for interrogation. At that second stage there is a real risk of serious harm, but not before.

264. The CIO has taken over responsibility for the operation of immigration control at Harare airport and immigration officers are being replaced by CIO officers. We accept also that one of the purposes of the CIO in monitoring arrivals at the airport is to identify those who are thought to be, for whatever reason, enemies of the regime. The aim is to detect those of interest because of an adverse military or criminal profile. The main focus of the operation to identify those who may be of adverse interest remains those who are perceived to be politically active in support of the opposition. But anyone perceived to be a threat to or a critic of the regime will attract interest also.

266. Large numbers of passengers pass through the airport. The CIO continues to recognise that it cannot question everyone; and so there is a screening process to identify those who might merit closer examination. We see no reason to suppose that the heightened role of the CIO would change this. There are now additional demands upon the CIO as it is responsible for monitoring all passengers passing through the airport, both on arrival and departure. We have set out the evidence that indicates in whom the CIO has an interest. This will be those in respect of whom there is any reason to suspect an adverse political, criminal or military profile of the type identified in AA(2). In addition, those perceived to be associated with what have come to be identified as civil society organisations may attract adverse interest as critics of the regime.”

16. The country guidance in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC) says (as relevant):

“(3) … The EM Country Guidance is, accordingly, re-stated as follows (with the change underlined in paragraph (5) below):

(1) As a general matter, there is significantly less politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, compared with the situation considered by the AIT in RN. In particular, the evidence does not show that, as a general matter, the return of a failed asylum seeker from the United Kingdom, having no significant MDC profile, would result in that person facing a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to the ZANU-PF.
…”

Discussion

17. Given the overlap between Grounds 1 and 2, I deal with them together in my discussion and I set out my conclusions separately below.

18. The FTT set out, in some detail, the issues it had to consider following what appeared to be a careful preliminary and issue-focused discussion at the beginning of the hearing. I set out those parts relevant to the issues I am to decide.

“ 12. It is agreed that the Article 3 claim proceeds on 2 bases;

(a) Risk of harm arising out of the Appellant’s perceived political opinion.
(i) Risk on arrival at the airport.
(ii)Risk once in home area.
(b) Risk of harm arising out of the circumstances/position of vulnerability in which the Appellant will find himself on return.

13. Mr Evans accepts that what is said at paragraph 14 of Miss Lucas’ ASA in respect of the country guidance cases is accurate2.

14. …

15. In respect of 12(a)(i) above, in accordance with the county guidance case HS3, it is agreed that;

(a) The Appellant will face initial questioning on arrival at the airport in Zimbabwe.
(b) If such questioning attracts adverse interest he will be interrogated/detained offsite.
(c) If interrogated/detained offsite the Appellant is at risk of ill treatment.

The issue between the parties is whether the initial questioning of the Appellant will arouse any suspicion or result in any adverse interest.

16. In respect of 12(a)(ii) above, in accordance with the country guidance case of CM, the issues are;

(a) Whether the Appellant could return to his home area (Highfield, Harare). The Respondent’s position is that, absent a significant MDC profile, he can do so.
(b) Whether the Appellant could relocate.

17. In respect of 12(b) the Respondent does not accept the Appellant will find himself in such circumstances so as to give rise to a breach of Article 3. It is not accepted that he will have no family support, it is not accepted that he will not be able to secure employment, it is not accepted that he requires medical treatment/will not be able to access the same.

…

20. The Appellant relies on the report of Dr Preston, Chartered and Registered Consultant Clinical Psychologist, dated 19th March 2023 together with the country expert reports of Hazel Cameron dated 14th December 2023 and 24th August 2025. Mr Evans confirms that he takes no issue with the expertise of either expert. He confirmed that the diagnoses in respect of the Appellant’s cognitive functioning are accepted. The diagnosis in respect of clinically significant symptoms of PTSD and their impact is not accepted. The conclusions of Hazel Cameron are not accepted. Mr Evans relies on the CPIN. He accepts that the CPIN does not deal with questioning/the situation on arrival at the airport.”

19. When one reads the above issues, in combination with the relevant paragraph of the ASA to which the FTT referred, and in light of the references to country guidance as set out throughout [24] of the FTT’s decision, I am in no doubt that the FTT was acutely aware of the breadth and content of the Zimbabwe CG cases and risk profiles on return, notwithstanding that they were not expressly set out in the decision.

20. Furthermore, it is clear (and accepted) that the judge did not find the appellant to have a personal political profile, but would be perceived as having one [25(b)]. This is the subject of the challenge in Ground 1 and that includes, in part, a challenge to the reasoning the judge gave at [25(b)] which says:

“I acknowledge that the Appellant himself has no political profile. That is acknowledged by Hazel Cameron at paragraph 27 of the December 2023 report. She does not base her assessment of the risk to the Appellant on the fact that he has a significant MDC profile. Her assessment is based on the fact that the Appellant has failed in his bid for asylum/had his refugee status revoked, that he will be returning on a deportation flight, his long residence in the UK together with his history of familial links to the MDC (paragraph 24 of the 2025 report and paragraph 28 of the 2023 report). What is significant is whether or not the Appellant will be suspected of having a political profile (paragraph 250 AA, at paragraph 282 of HS). I acknowledge that it is not determinative and that each case must be considered on its own facts. However, family members of MDC members/supporters/activists fall within the risk categories identified in SM (paragraphs 51 and 43) and affirmed in HS (paragraph 2 headnote).”

21. The primary challenge to this paragraph is at paragraph 9.3 of the Grounds which says:

“The factors relied upon by Hazel Cameron and summarised at paragraph [25(b)] do not, without more, support or justify the judge's conclusion that he has a political profile. The first paragraph of the judicial head note in HS [returning asylum seekers] Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKAIT 94 provides that failed asylum seekers do not, as such, face a risk of being subjected to persecution or serious ill- treatment on return. The Panel was clear that this was the case whether a person returned voluntarily, involuntarily, escorted, or otherwise. The facts identified by Ms Cameron can all be disposed of within this point.”

22. Ms Lucas’ submission was that nowhere in the FTT’s decision (either here or otherwise) did the FTT say that the appellant will rouse suspicion at the airport because he is a failed asylum seeker. In fact, the FTT made plain that there were factors about his case which “distinguish him from a simple failed asylum seeker” [24]. Ms Lucas also argued that the findings the FTT made were not discordant with extant country guidance (and that the respondent did not identify any part of it which was).

23. At the hearing before me, and in reply to Ms Lucas’ submission only, Ms Arif retracted somewhat from the written grounds, submitting that it is not the respondent’s case that the FTT expressly found the appellant at risk as a failed asylum seeker or that she mistakenly treated him as such but, rather, that the reasoning she adopted did not distinguish him from such a person.

24. In my judgment, it is plain from [24] that the FTT did not make the finding that the respondent originally claimed it made, whether expressly or by implication, ie. that the appellant was at risk on the sole ground of being a failed asylum seeker. Rather, quite the opposite. The judge made it plain that the appellant could be distinguished from that cohort [24]. I accept the written grounds mischaracterise the FTT’s decision about that and I do not find that rescued by Ms Arif’s oral submissions.

25. Returning to paragraph 9.3 of the written grounds, it is difficult to see how the phrase “The facts identified by Ms Cameron can all be disposed of within this point” can be accepted given that the ‘facts identified’ go beyond the appellant being a failed asylum seeker (and of course, he is not a failed asylum seeker).

26. By paragraph 10 of the Grounds, the respondent accepts that the Panel in SM requires each case to be looked at on its individual facts – a factor the FTT also recognised [25(b)]. The grounds also refer to [51(b)] of SM (see [12] above) but without any further explanation. It is not clear whether the respondent was suggesting that there was no such heightened risk due to elections at the date of the decision before the FTT and this was a factor the FTT should have taken into consideration. Certainly no reference is made to background material to that effect and Ms Arif made no submissions on this point.

27. By paragraph 11 of the Grounds, the respondent relies on [264] and [266] of HS to support the submission in paragraph 10 that the FTT should have explained where the appellant fell on the suspected political profile. I have set out those paragraphs at [15] above. It is worth remembering what the disputed issue was and what it was not (see [15] of the FTT decision). It was accepted that the appellant will face initial questioning. The issue is whether that questioning will arouse any suspicion or result in any adverse interest.

28. In both those paragraphs of HS, whilst commenting upon the extent of the operation for CIO officers at the airport, the Panel also made reference to the types of person who are likely to be perceived as a threat. Paragraph [264] says that those with an adverse military or criminal profile, those who are perceived to be politically active in support of the opposition and ‘anyone’ perceived to be a threat/critic of the regime will attract interest, and at [266] “those in respect of whom there is any reason to suspect an adverse political, criminal or military profile of the type identified in AA(2)” are mentioned. I have italicised certain phrases to emphasise the low threshold that the Panel in HS applied to the risk of being considered a threat.

29. To understand the “type identified in AA(2)”, it is necessary to work backwards. AA(2) reaffirmed the risk factors in SM and added some others (see [13] above). SM set out the general risk profile in the headnote (see [12] above) but then referred back to [43] which, given its importance, I set out in full:

“In his submissions Mr Huffer argued that those suspected or perceived of being associated with the opposition have included activists, campaigners, officials and election polling agents, MDC candidates for local and national government, MDC members, former MDC members, MDC supporters, those who voted or believed to have voted for the MDC and those belonging to the MDC, families of the foregoing, employees of the foregoing, those whose actions have given rise to suspicion of support for the opposition such as attending an MDC rally or wearing a T-shirt, attending a demonstration, teachers and other professionals, refusal to attend a ZANU-PF rally or chant a ZANU-PF slogan or not having a ZANU-PF membership card. The Tribunal accept that these categories illustrate those who might be at risk but each case must depend upon its own circumstances. In a number of cases the Tribunal has drawn a distinction between low level and high level political activities. The situation in Zimbabwe is arbitrary and unpredictable and in these circumstances such a distinction is not determinative. The phrase "low level activities" is sometimes used as a way of describing someone whose background and profile is such that it is thought that he would not be of interest to the authorities but someone whose political activities may have been at a low level may have become of interest to the authorities. The current position taken by the Tribunal that each case must be decided on its individual facts should be continued. This approach has been endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Mhute [2003] EWCA Civ 1029 and Ndlovu [2004] EWCA Civ 1567. The factors identified by Mr Huffer are relevant to the assessment of risk but cannot be regarded as by themselves determinative in any particular appeal” (my emphasis).

30. I have underlined the section above to illustrate that the Panel in SM did not appear to endorse the type of approach which the respondent advocates in this appeal, namely the ‘level’ of risk or the ‘profile’ of risk. I accept this is nuanced and it is not everyone who touches on any of the risk profiles who will be at risk. But no doubt the way in which the Panel expressed itself in SM reflects the caution to be exercised in protection cases when faced with trying to predict the response of an unpredictable regime, recognising the low threshold to be applied in such cases. No doubt that is also the reason why an individualised approach is required. I also find that approach to be mirrored at [264] and [266] of HS (see [28] above.

31. Ms Lucas argued there is a qualitative difference between a failed asylum seeker and someone whose refugee status has been revoked. Furthermore, she relied on [42] of SM to show that “returnees are regarded with contempt and suspicion on return” and it is that which exposes them to being scrutinised by the authorities on return. It is clear from [43] of SM that the FTT’s finding about the appellant’s familial connection with the MDC is an SM-type risk factor. Although at paragraph 9.4 of the grounds, the respondent submitted that the FTT did not explain how that ‘arguably historic’ political position would put him at risk now, this argument was not developed either in the written grounds or in oral submissions.

32. In my judgment, it is clear from [24] and [25] of its decision that the FTT did carry out an individualised assessment and found there to be a number of disparate factors which would reveal themselves through questioning at the airport. I pause here to note that the reasons the FTT gave at [24] that the appellant cannot be expected to lie is not challenged and is, of itself consistent with the HS as the FTT noted at [24]. Furthermore, what the FTT said at [25(e)] is not the subject of express onward challenge either. There, the FTT relied on the medical evidence as to how the appellant would cope under questioning by the authorities and concluded he would present as “evasive and untruthful”. Neither does the respondent expressly challenge the reasons the FTT gave for distinguishing the appellant’s position from other family members [25(c) and (d)].

33. As for Ms Cameron’s report, it is worth remembering that the respondent accepted that her own CPIN does not directly deal with the risk to the appellant at the airport ([25(f)]).

34. Within her challenge in Ground 2, the written grounds refer to references in the Ms Cameron’s report (pages 207/210/270/279 of the FTT hearing bundle). The respondent refers to Ms Cameron’s references to the “Patriotic Act” in Zimbabwe which she said “created a real risk that returnees from the United Kingdom, particularly those with asylum histories, could be accused of “wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe” on account of statements made abroad” resulting in adverse treatment. The respondent submits that this “appears to invite a substantial leap whereby all failed asylum seekers may be at risk under the Patriotic Act” and is accordingly an invitation to the judge to depart from CG, which the judge effectively adopted by accepting the expert report. The grounds note that there are ways in which some of Ms Cameron’s report departs from the position in the country guidance cases such as those who have sought asylum abroad are particularly vulnerable to suspicion of disloyalty ([25] of the 2025 report) which is said to be at odds with [275] of HS.

35. The FTT made specific reference at [24]-[25] to the specific parts of Ms Cameron’s report on which it relied to identify factors which put the appellant at risk on return. In short, those sections of Ms Cameron’s report refer, inter alia, to the cumulative factors of “The Appellant’s long residence in the UK, his documented asylum claim, and a family history linked to the MDC” (see for example [24] of Ms Cameron’s 2025 report at page 210 of the FTT bundle and page 345 of the UT bundle). At [25] of that report Ms Cameron emphasised that those factors would be “viewed cumulatively by the authorities should they come to the attention of the state security forces on his return”. I contrast that with what Ms Cameron also said at [24] as follows:

“Against the backdrop of escalating abductions and mass arrests of critics between 2023 and 2025, it is plausible that returnees with a public asylum footprint are treated as suspect and may be subject to interrogation and detention on arrival or shortly thereafter”.

36. I accept that the above view is a departure from the position in the country guidance cases that failed asylum seekers are not, based on that factor alone, likely to be viewed by the authorities in a way which gives rise to persecution or an Article 3 breach.

37. On the face of it, that was not the conclusion Ms Cameron reached in the appellant’s case (as [25] of her report illustrates). Whilst I was not taken to [70] of Ms Cameron’s 2025 report, I note that one of her conclusions in the appellant’s case says as follows:

“Zimbabwe’s Patriotic Act remains in force, albeit under judicial challenge, and continues to be applied within a wider framework of political repression. Human rights organisations have documented arbitrary detention, torture, and persecution of critics and returnees throughout 2024–2025. In my professional opinion, the Appellant’s family history of political opposition through his father’s MDC involvement, combined with his own asylum history abroad, would place him at a credible risk of interrogation, harassment, and detention if returned”.

38. This gives the impression that her opinions are formed as a result of the current political situation (including the implementation of the ‘Patriotic Act’) about which the respondent says the FTT did not consider the need for strong evidence to depart from the current country guidance. However, I return to what I have set out above about the approach the Panel took at [43] of SM and its comments at [51(b)]. In my judgment, when read together, these paragraphs allow for the evolution of the ‘unpredictable’ and ‘arbitrary’ approach of the Zimbabwe government and for an assessment of risk to be considered accordingly (and in light of the risk profiles identified therein and as supplemented by the further country guidance cases). By this I mean, that the country guidance already establishes the ‘unpredictable’ and ‘arbitrary’ approach of the Zimbabwean authorities and sets out the approach to be taken and what factors may give rise to risk.

Conclusions on the Grounds of Appeal

39. The FTT was careful in its assessment about the risk the appellant faced of being identified as a person of interest at the initial questioning stage. This was the sole issue which was before it to determine. As is clear from the sections of the decision which I have set out (those being the ones under challenge), the FTT cross-referenced the relevant parts of the country guidance. In my judgment, this is illustrative of the FTT keeping firmly in mind what the country guidance says about who might be at risk at that stage of the returns process. Whilst Ms Cameron has gone further than that in her report, the FTT has not. The FTT did not fall into the trap of adopting all that Ms Cameron said. The FTT did not say that being a failed asylum seeker (or more accurately as someone who has had their refugee status revoked) is sufficient on its own to mean the appellant is at risk at the initial questioning stage. Neither did the FTT say in terms that the familial connection alone is enough. Instead, the FTT did exactly what was asked of it and carried out an individualised assessment. In so doing, the FTT preferred some of the evidence that Ms Cameron gave, primarily because the respondent offered none on the particular issue about which the FTT had to decide. But the evidence was that those various risk factors, cumulatively, put the appellant at risk of being treated with adverse interest at the initial questioning stage. In my judgment, the FTT’s findings, when read as a whole and in light of the country guidance, properly read, does not represent a departure, actual or de facto, from the totality of the country guidance on Zimbabwe. Accordingly, I do not find the judge was required to consider the established authorities on what is required in order to depart from country guidance (Ground 2). Furthermore, for the above reasons, when [24] and [25] of the FTT’s decision are read together, the FTT set out adequate and sustainable reasons for finding that the appellant would be the subject of adverse interest at the initial questioning stage (Ground 1).

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain any errors on points of law.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

SJ Rastogi

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 June 2026