Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005468
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61182/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

MK
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Swain of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mrs Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 13 October 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that he is at real risk of persecution from the current Pakistani authorities because of his and his family’s involvement with the now opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (the “PTI”).
3. The respondent, while accepting that the appellant was a member of the PTI, disputed that the appellant had a profile that put him at real risk on return to Pakistan from the state authorities.
4. The FFTJ found that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof that he was at real risk as claimed.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The appellant brings two grounds of appeal. In summary, these are:
(i) Firstly, the FTTJ erred materially in law when assessing the evidence in the appeal, which includes the judge requiring corroboration.
(ii) Secondly, the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to the country background evidence including locating and taking into account an out of date CPIN on Pakistan.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
6. In the first limb of Ground 1 the appellant argues that the FTTJ has misdirected herself in paragraph 35 of the decision when considering evidence produced, which indicated the appellant’s father did not appear on the notification of cabinet members of Tehsil Swabi in the District Swabi and that the appellant and his father were not noted in the cabinet of Insaf Student Federation of the same district.
7. The appellant submits that the FTTJ is wrong to weigh this against the appellant when there was no objective evidence to establish a claimed PTI executive member, such as the appellant’s father, would be a member of the cabinet in question and when the appellant never claimed that his father was a member of the Tehsil Swabi cabinet or that he and his father were part of the student cabinet. Accordingly, it is said that the FTTJ was wrong to find these matters as damaging the appellant’s credibility.
8. Yet I note that, neither in paragraph 35 nor elsewhere in the decision, does the FTTJ actually make an adverse credibility finding against the appellant, whether because of the cabinets lists evidence or indeed any other reason. In submissions the respondent acknowledged this was so.
9. Here I consider there is weight to the submission of the respondent that it was open to the FTTJ to assess documentary evidence before her and find the cabinet lists evidence added nothing further to the case of the appellant that he and his father had a profile attracting the adverse interest of the Pakistani authorities.
10. For this reason, I am not satisfied that FTTJ has made an error as argued in the first limb of Ground 1
11. That said, I consider the absence of any rejection of the appellant’s credibility in the FTTJ findings is significant when I turn to the argument made by Mr Swain under the second limb of Ground 1 that the FTTJ has erred by requiring corroboration from the appellant.
12. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at paragraph 86, it is well established that there is no requirement in law that an asylum appellant must adduce corroborative evidence.
13. For this second limb of Ground 1, the appellant focusses on findings made by the FTTJ in paragraph 36 of the decision which concern there being “no evidence” that the prominent PTI politicians relied upon by the appellant as his relatives are related to him as claimed. The FTTJ also comments about there being a lack of evidence in terms of family registration documentation about the claimed relationships. The findings made in paragraph 36 of the decision directly link to the conclusion in paragraph 44 relying on there being “no evidence” of the claimed relationships to the prominent party members.
14. The respondent submits that it was open to the Judge to take into account that documentary evidence, which was relatively easy for the appellant to obtain was not produced.
15. I accept that the principle relied upon by the respondent applies where a judge is determining whether credibility is damaged. However, it can be noted that these findings are not described by the FTTJ as relating to the determination of credibility.
16. Rather, the FTTJ makes these findings when assessing whether the accepted subjective fear of the appellant is well founded; the findings concern whether the appellant has produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate his case. The context for this is that there is no finding in the FTTJ’s decision rejecting the credibility, in part or whole, of the appellant himself. Consequently, I am not persuaded by the respondent’s submission.
17. It would have been open to the FTTJ to observe that there was no supporting evidence for the relationships claimed but I am satisfied that for the FTTJ to say simply there was no evidence about the claimed relationship is an error. This is because there was before the FTTJ the oral and written evidence of the appellant himself describing the relationships. The FTTJ has not addressed why the evidence of the appellant himself is not sufficient to demonstrate the claimed relationships. This is particularly so where there is no rejection of the credibility of the appellant.
18. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the FTTJ does fall into error by, in effect, requiring corroborative evidence from the appellant.
19. I am satisfied that this is an error in law present not just in paragraph 36 of the FTTJ’s decision but extending to the conclusion in paragraph 44.
20. I bear in mind that the appellant has not challenged in the grounds of appeal the finding of the FTTJ that sur place political activities in the UK do not put him at real risk. Nevertheless, it remains a part of the appellant’s case that the claimed relationships are a distinct factor contributing to his risk. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the error of the FTTJ is a material one.
21. I observe that the error arising from the FTTJ’s failure to take into account properly evidence from the appellant himself is compounded by the FTTJ failing to make any findings in her conclusion about the appellant’s account that his father and brother had been arrested in Pakistan by the authorities as recently as 2023; the appellant says his brother was tortured before his release but that his father remains missing; it is also part of his account, at least in interview, that the authorities were also making enquiries about him in Pakistan: see paragraph 10 of the skeleton argument and paragraphs 28 to 31 of the appellant’s witness statement before the FTT.
22. I can deal briefly with the appellant’s Ground 2.
23. The first limb complains about the FTTJ failing to give consideration to country background evidence about the Pakistani authorities targeting PTI which contributed to the judge’s findings on credibility. However, as the FTTJ makes no adverse credibility finding against the appellant, I am not persuaded this ground is made out.
24. The second limb of Ground 2 raises that the FTTJ erred in law by taking into account out of date CPIN material which she researched herself.
25. I consider it was an error for the FTTJ to track down by herself and read a copy of the out of date CPIN after the appeal hearing, without giving the parties the fair opportunity to make representations about this.
26. However, it can be seen from paragraph 41 that the outcome was that the FTTJ focussed on a caveat present in the out of date CPIN policy statement that “the level of risk (faced by low level members and activists of opposition parties in Pakistan) will depend on the particular profile of the person, the party they support and the area it operates in, their activities, the nature of the threat and how far it would extent.”
27. This is, in effect, precisely the holistic type of approach which the appellant submits, rightly in my view, should occur in his appeal. I have found under Ground 1 that the FTTJ did fall into error when assessing evidence within this framework but I consider the framework of taking a holistic approach is itself not wrong.
28. Accordingly, I am not satisfied a material error of law arises under Ground 2.
Remaking
29. I am satisfied that the material error of law identified under Ground 1 does require that the decision of the FTTJ be set aside.
30. The normal course of action is for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision even if it requires further findings of fact to be made on the evidence.
31. The respondent submits that the remaking is suitable for this Tribunal with the issues to be decided being relatively limited. The appellant asks for the appeal to be remitted for a fresh hearing.
32. This is a NABA appeal where the main issue between the parties appears to be whether the fear of the appellant is well founded. The leading authority of JCK [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) indicates credibility may be a consideration for the determination of this question under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. I note there are relevant credibility challenges raised by the appellant at paragraph 9 of the reasons for refusal letter. In these circumstances, I consider it is appropriate to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.

Notice of Decision
The decision dated 13 October 2025 contains a material error of law. I set aside that decision and direct that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any judge except for Judge Hawden-Beal.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 March 2026