Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005474
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58375/2024
LP/13339/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARIA

Between

EL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Bobb of Aylish Alexander Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) granted an anonymity order in this appeal and no party before me requested that it be set aside. In the circumstances, I have taken into account the starting point for consideration of anonymity orders is the principle of open justice and find that in this case because the appellant claims a risk of persecution on return to Albania, the obligations of the United Kingdom (UK) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice and an anonymity order is appropriate.
Background
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the Judge who dismissed the appellant’s protection claim in a decision dated 23 June 2025.
3. I have not set out the details of the appellant’s protection claim in full as the parties are fully aware of the details. In summary, the appellant a national of Albania claimed he would be at risk on return to Albania as he feared he would be tortured or killed by the people who trafficked him because he escaped by setting fire and thereby causing damage to the place where he had been detained.
4. The respondent accepted:
a. the appellant’s nationality and identity,
b. the appellant had been held by traffickers for three months and forced to work with drugs, guns and ammunition, and
c. the appellant had escaped by causing a fire.
5. The respondent did not accept the appellant was at real risk of harm on return to Albania.
6. The Judge agreed with the respondent and dismissed the appeal.
7. Permission to appeal was sought on five grounds and was granted by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on all grounds.
8. In summary, the grounds seeking permission contend the Judge erred as follows:

Ground 1: by going behind concessions made by the respondent in the reason for refusal letter which accepted the appellant had been held for three months and forced to work with drugs, guns and ammunition and escaped by causing a fire,
Ground 2: in the approach to findings of fact,
Ground 3: in making a material mistake of fact as to whether the appellant had met MH (one of his alleged traffickers) in January 2019,
Ground 4: by making several findings of fact based on speculation,
Ground 5: in giving limited weight to the country expert report of Professor Tolaj.
The Hearing
9. A face-to-face hearing took place at Field House. The appellant was represented by Mr Bobb who had drafted the grounds seeking permission. The respondent was represented by Mr Parvar a senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
10. The appellant had filed and served a Composite Bundle and an Addendum Composite Bundle. Mr Parvar confirmed he had not seen the Addendum Composite Bundle prior to the hearing. I afforded Mr Parvar an opportunity to consider that material after which he confirmed he was content to proceed with the hearing.
11. I heard oral submissions from both representatives. Mr Bobb relied upon Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5 and elaborated on them. He did not pursue Ground 2 as a freestanding ground of challenge but submitted it provided relevant background.
12. Mr Parvar confirmed that although there was no Rule 24 response, the respondent opposed the appellant’s application for permission.
13. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Findings and reasons
14. I remind myself of the many authorities including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4], on the approach an appellate court or tribunal should take when considering findings of fact reached by a first instance judge.
15. An appellate tribunal must avoid the temptation of “island-hopping” and instead must look at the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
16. Accordingly, I have exercised that restraint and considered the decision of the Judge holistically.
Ground 1:
17. The Judge recorded at [5] that, notwithstanding a negative NRM “reasonable grounds” decision, the respondent accepted in the refusal letter that the appellant had been held by traffickers for three months, forced to work with drugs, guns and ammunition, and that he escaped by causing a fire.
18. The respondent did not withdraw that concession. The agreed issues in dispute are set out at [8] and were confined to: (a) real risk of serious harm on return; (b) internal relocation and/or sufficiency of protection to the Horvath standards; and (c) whether delay in claiming asylum damaged the appellant’s credibility.
19. It is against that background that the Judge’s finding at [15(a)] that she does not accept that the appellant was forced to work for either MH or ES, or a gang operated by them or on their behalf should properly be read. It is not a rejection of the respondent’s concession that the appellant was trafficked and forced to work, rather it is a finding directed to the identity of the traffickers and whether the traffickers were connected to MH/ES.
20. At [15 (a)(i)] the Judge explained why she accepted the respondent’s submission that, on the appellant’s own documentary evidence, the chronology was problematic. The translated article in the appellant’s bundle stated (in summary) that MH was arrested on 12 September 2018 and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and completed his sentence in July 2019, leading the Judge to accept that the appellant could not have met MH in January 2019, if MH was in custody at the time.
21. The appellant’s Ground 1 argues that the Judge thereby went behind the respondent’s concession. Reliance was placed on Kalidas (agreed facts – best practice) [2012] UKUT 00327 (at [35]) for the proposition that a judge should not go behind factual concessions absent exceptional circumstances.
22. However, Kalidas is not engaged on the facts of this case. The concession recorded at [5] is generic as to trafficking and forced labour, and does not concede the identity of the traffickers, their affiliation to MH/ES, or the circumstances and consequences said to generate continuing risk on return. The Judge expressly anchored her findings at [15] to the existence of the concession while still making findings about the appellant’s risk from traffickers.
23. Nor does the material show the Judge revisited the concession without notice in a way that amounts to procedural unfairness. The Judge noted the respondent’s review was undertaken without the appellant’s evidence because of the appellant’s non- compliance with directions, meaning the hearing was the first occasion on which the appellant’s bundle and oral evidence were fully tested. In that context, it was plainly foreseeable that credibility and the detail of the account, particularly attribution to well-known figures would be examined.
24. Further, the fairness complaint based on descending into the arena is not made out on the face of the Judge’s reasoning. The Judge’s questions (as later summarised in the decision) were directed to clarifying internal inconsistencies on matters that were central to risk, namely, the mechanism of escape and the extent of any consequent loss said to motivate reprisals and whether the appellant would identify or reliably attribute the traffickers to MH/ES. Those were issues falling squarely within the agreed questions.
25. The principles in Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 (at [29]) support a conclusion of fairness where the point is obviously relevant to credibility and the parties have had an opportunity to address it.
26. The appellant further submits that the findings at [16] and [18] are contradictory and render it unclear whether the Judge accepted trafficking at all. That submission overstates what the Judge said.
27. At [16] the Judge stated in terms “I do not go behind the Respondent’s acceptance that the Appellant set a fire but… I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence as to the circumstances or the consequences thereof.” This is not a withdrawal of the concession, it is a rejection of the appellant’s embellished or inconsistent detail concerning how the fire was started, what damage was done and what consequences followed. These are matters that the Judge found inconsistent at [15(b)] –[15(d)].
28. Similarly, at [18] the Judge stated she was not going behind the respondent’s concessions but found that “the circumstances of the Appellant’s detention by the traffickers and his subsequent escape are not as he has claimed”. Read fairly, [18] is a global conclusion drawn from the preceding credibility analysis. The appellant’s detention, forced work and escape by fire all remain accepted, however, the Judge did not accept the appellant’s detailed account including attribution to MH/ES, the circumstances of his escape and the asserted consequences such as the scale of loss.
29. In short, the Judge did not purport to re- determine whether the appellant was trafficked at all. She accepted the concession but made a lawful finding that the appellant had not shown (to the relevant standard) that those responsible were MH/ES or that the circumstances and consequences were as asserted. These findings directly informed the assessment of ongoing risk, relocation, sufficiency of protection and credibility under section 8.
30. Accordingly, the premise of Ground 1, that the Judge went behind the respondent’s concession does not withstand analysis. Properly read, the determination shows the Judge accepted the concession but made permissible and material findings on attribution, detail, and future risk based on the evidence before her.
31. Ground 1 is therefore not made out.
32. Ground 2: This ground was not pursued as noted above.
Ground 3:
33. This ground asserts the Judge erred in making a material mistake of fact as to whether the appellant had met MH (one of his alleged traffickers) in January 2019. The ground contends the Judge wrongly accepted the respondent’s submission that the appellant could not have met MH in January 2019 because MH was in custody.
34. The grounds acknowledge that the online article relied on in the appellant’s evidence was incomplete, omitting words said to show that it was arguable that MH may not have been imprisoned in January 2019. The ground further contends the Judge should have approached the documentary evidence on the basis that there was no evidence before the Tribunal as to the mechanics of imprisonment or pre- trail detention in Albania, nor as to the operation of MH’s own sentence. The grounds submit that in the absence of such evidence, the Judge should have taken into account the possibility that MH may not have been in continuous custody for example because of remand arrangements, bail, electronic monitoring, release on licence or other features of sentencing practice.
35. At [15(a)(i)], the Judge explained the evidential basis on which she accepted the respondent’s submission regarding MH’s custody. The Judge expressly recorded that the appellant’s bundle contained online articles, and made the following important observation about their quality:
“The translator is not named and in places it is unclear where one article starts and another ends.”
36. The Judge then recorded that the article stated MH was arrested in September 2018, sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and “completed his sentence in July 2019”, and on this basis accepted the respondent‘s submission that the appellant could not have met MH in January 2019 because MH was in custody at the time.
37. Ground 3 is explicitly premised upon an asserted omission in the appellant's own bundle. The ground itself accepts that this was not the Judge’s fault and attributes the omission to the appellant’s representatives. In those circumstances, the Judge cannot be criticised in law for failing to consider wording that was not in evidence before her. An error of law appeal does not proceed on the basis that a judge must speculate whether a party's documentary evidence is incomplete and then investigate further. The Tribunal decides the case on the evidence that is adduced and properly before it. This conclusion is reinforced by the Judge’s own careful handling of the document. The Judge did not treat it as definitive or complete. On the contrary, the Judge flagged express concerns about the translation and whether the version in the version in evidence was complete.
38. The Judge’s remarks demonstrate that the Judge approached the material with appropriate caution. Those findings answer the suggestion that she should have challenged the documentary evidence as she did so by identifying its shortcomings on the face of the evidence and nonetheless reached a reasoned conclusion based on what it said.
39. Ground 3 also asserts that with the “full article” it becomes arguable that MH may not have been imprisoned in January 2019 and raises possibilities concerning remand, bail, early release, licence, tagging etc.
40. Those matters concern the operation of Albanian criminal procedure and sentencing law and are not a matter that the Judge could infer or take judicial notice of. It is an area of foreign law and practice, and the burden is on the appellant to prove that the Albanian sentencing practice would mean MH was likely to be at liberty in January 2019.
41. Although counsel is said to have made submissions about the Albanian practice and referred to an Albanian government website, no documentary evidence was produced at the First-tier Tribunal hearing and importantly no such evidence has been produced at the error of law stage in support of Ground 3. In those circumstances, the Judge cannot be faulted for declining to embark on speculation about the operation of Albanian sentencing.
42. In any event, the restored text does not establish a clear contrary fact that MH was not in custody in January 2019. At best it makes it arguable that custody may not have persisted continuously until sentencing. Moreover, the Judge’s conclusion at [15(a)(i)] was part of a broader credibility assessment. The Judge did not reject the appellant’s account solely on the MH custody point, the Judge made additional findings at [15 (a)(ii) and 15 (a)(iii)] and then extensive adverse credibility findings concerning the escape narrative, the fire, and the asserted consequences at [15(b)-15(d)], and the account of his journey to the UK at [17]. These findings fed into her overall assessment at [18] and her conclusions on risk, relocation and sufficiency of protection.
43. Ground 3 does not disclose any material error of law.
Ground 4:
44. The grounds assert the Judge made several speculative findings in particular, the Judge’s reasoning at [15(a)(iii)], [15(b)(v)], [15(c)] and [15(d)].
45. The task of the appellate tribunal is not to decide whether it would have reached the same findings as the First-tier Tribunal. The question is whether the Judge’s findings were not open to her on the evidence, were irrational or were reached by an unlawful approach. A credibility assessment often involves evaluation of internal consistency and plausibility against what the appellant has said at different stages.
46. The grounds argue that the Judge speculated when accepting the respondent’s submission at [15(a)(iii)] that it was internally inconsistent that the appellant was not killed by MH just because he was a violent man.
47. I do not accept that criticism as the Judge’s reasoning was directed to what the appellant himself had said in his account. In his asylum interview, the appellant said he tried to escape previously and was beaten repeatedly over three days, in his witness statement, he described being threatened with a gun and death if he did not work.
48. Properly understood this was not a speculative finding but a credibility evaluation grounded in the appellant’s own evidence. The Judge was entitled to find there was an internal tension in the appellant’s account.
49. The grounds contend the Judge speculated at [15(b)(v)] by suggesting there would have been an explosion and then treating the appellant’s explanation as a change of story.
50. Read fairly, the Judge set out the progression of the appellant’s evidence about how the fire was started. In his asylum interview it was only when he was asked whether it was possible there had not been much damage that he said he used gasoline to start the fire [15 (b)(ii)]. In his oral evidence the appellant expanded his account by stating that he pulled out a can containing “…20 litres of petrol” and set that on fire and in cross examination he stated that he poured petrol all over the cocaine and the rest of the drugs [15(b)(iii)]. The Judge then asked about the appellant, how he escaped as the Judge observes that she “…would have imagined there would have been some kind of explosion …”. The appellant’s response that he did not pour all 20 litres over the drugs; it might have been 18 litres or less is recorded as a further modification of his evidence.
51. In those circumstances the Judge’s reasoning was not speculative but based on the evolution of the appellant’s oral evidence and the inconsistency with prior accounts. The Judge’s questions about the explosion were legitimate probing and her conclusion that the appellant’s account shifted was an evaluation open to her on the evidence.
52. The grounds assert the Judge speculated at [15(c)] finding that the drugs would have been unharmed. This criticism is not made out. The Judge at [15(c)] drew together what the appellant had said about the location of the drugs (plants) being on the ground floor and upstairs room and the location of the fire described as either in a tunnel or a self- contained room in the basement and inferred from this that the drugs would not have been harmed. The Judge evaluated whether the claimed extent of damage followed from the account given. This is not speculation, but a valid inference drawn from the account.
53. The grounds criticise the Judge’s treatment of the varying estimates given by the appellant as to the financial loss caused by the fire finding that the appellant was speculating. The Judge at [15(d)] records the different figures provided by the appellant at different stages in the asylum process. The Judge notes that the appellant expressly stated at the asylum interview that he had “no idea the extent of the damage” which the Judge finds to be the most accurate answer.
54. Accordingly, the Judge did not treat the valuation as a precise matter, she accepted the inherently speculative nature of the figures. The Judge was nonetheless entitled to regard the appellant’s changing and escalating estimates as bearing on the reliability of the consequences of the fire. The approach cannot fairly be described as speculation; it was a reasoned assessment of the appellant’s shifting evidence acknowledging its speculative nature and identifying which answer was most likely to be accurate.
55. Taking together the criticisms asserted in Ground 4, these amount to a disagreement with the Judge’s findings. The Judge’s conclusions were each anchored in the appellant's own accounts, including internal inconsistencies and development in oral evidence and the reasoning was open to the Judge.
56. Ground 4 is therefore not made out.
Ground 5:
57. This is a challenge to the limited weight given to Dr Tolaj’s expert report on the grounds of perversity. The grounds assert that the Judge’s decision to attach limited weight to the report was based on mere typographical errors and the report being “generic”.
58. The Judge at [19] to [22] gives multiple cumulative reasons going to the reliability of the report, including the non-compliance with the Senior President’s Practice Direction, the absence of a letter of instructions, lack of clarity over the role of the named consultant, whether all materials had been considered, and the report’s generic nature with no attempt to analyse the appellant’s return prospects.
59. Moreover, the Judge did not reject the expert report but accepted some of its general analysis about organised crime challenges, showing she did not approach the report with a closed mind. A perversity challenge faces a high threshold. The Judge’s criticisms of the report go beyond the typographical errors.
60. Overall, there is a clear difficulty with the materiality as the Judge at [24] made an express alternative finding that even is she were wrong on elements of her adverse findings it was six years since the appellant left Albania and he could internally relocate on return. That unchallenged alternative finding is capable of disposing of the protection claim independently of the weight attached to the expert report.
61. Accordingly, Ground 5 is not made out.

Notice of Decision
62. For the reasons set out above none of the grounds disclose a material error of law in the decision of the Judge. The decision stands and the appeal is dismissed.

N Haria
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 April 2026