Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005481
UI-2025-005482
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52387/2024
PA/59569/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27/05/2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

Between

‘BS’ and ‘GS’ (Albania)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OR STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K McCarthy, instructed by the Anti-Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The reason for this is that the appellants’ claim relates to fear of persecution in their country of origin.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. At the end of the hearing today, I gave the parties my full oral reasons, which these written reasons reflect. As noted above, I have made anonymity directions, which were initially made by the First Tier Tribunal. This is not only because the first appellant, ‘BS,’ has claimed asylum and part of her fear was found to be genuine, albeit mitigated by an ability to relocate internally and with sufficiency of protection, but also because ‘GS,’ her young son, is a minor. Where I refer to the ‘appellant’ alone, this is to ‘BS’, the mother.
The background
2. The impugned decision followed a hearing at Hatton Cross on 10 February 2025, chaired by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt, sitting as a First Tier Tribunal Judge. I do no more than summarise his reasons, which I have considered in full and they are as follows.
3. The first appellant was, at that stage, aged 30 and is, along with her son, a citizen of Albania. She had entered the UK covertly, but had made contact with the respondent, having entered the UK, and claimed asylum. A referral was also additionally made to a single competent authority that she might be the victim of modern slavery. Both of those matters were considered. In the meantime, on 1 December 2022, she gave birth to the second appellant. The father of the second appellant has not been identified. The second appellant subsequently made an asylum claim in line with his mother on 17 February 2023.
4. On 9 December 2022, the single competent authority found that the first appellant had been the victim of modern slavery, and she was granted discretionary leave on that basis, which expired on 16 June 2024.
5. However, on 26 October 2023, the respondent issued decisions refusing the protection and human rights claims made by the two appellants.
6. Judge Bulpitt noted, at para [4] of his decision, that the second appellant's claims could only succeed if those of his mother succeeded. The Judge considered the first appellant's claim, following an initial screening interview and a substantive asylum interview and summarised those at paras [7] to [9]. She had feared her father, who said he would kill her if she did not marry his friend's son. She also feared those who had forced her into prostitution after she left Albania to escape her father and whilst she was staying with a friend in Germany; and also those who would seek to re-traffic her because of her vulnerability in Albania.
7. In considering her human rights claim at para [8], the Judge referred to the following factors: her status as a single mother; having been the victim of trafficking; suffering poor mental health; that she would be returning with no familial support; and her claim of very significant obstacles to reintegration in Albania, so that she met the Immigration Rules based on her right to respect for her private life. Alternatively, both appellants were in ill-health and the public interest meant that removal would be in breach of their Article 8 rights.
8. The Judge went on to consider the respondent’s review. Importantly in this case, the respondent had accepted that the appellant was the victim of violence from her father who tried to force her into marriage whilst she was in Albania, that as a result she left Albania and, whilst in Germany, was trafficked by criminals who forced her into prostitution. However, the respondent disputed that she faced a real risk of persecution or ill treatment on her return to Albania. The appellant would have the benefit of sufficiency of protection to protect her both from her father; the man he wanted her to marry; and from criminals who wished to exploit her in Albania. The respondent argued that there was no evidence that the criminals who had forced her into prostitution in Germany had any connection with Albania.
9. The respondent also argued that the appellants would be able to relocate within Albania without it being unduly harsh. On this particular point, as the appellant has focused in her appeal before me on relocation to Tirana, I observe that in the respondent's refusal letter at para [40], that the respondent had not limited its analysis to relocation to Tirana, said to be only 30 minutes by driving from the appellant's home village, but also Vlorë, a substantially greater difference, and also Elbasan. For reasons I come on to explain, the Judge did not limit his analysis to the availability of sufficiency of protection and availability of internal location to Tirana.
10. The Judge went on to consider the evidence and at para [15], importantly, noted that the respondent did not dispute facts about the appellant's experiences in Germany. The Judge directed himself to the law at pars [17] to [24], including in relation to Section 117B of the Nationality and Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (para [23]).
11. The Judge went on to make the following findings at para [25] onwards, which once again, I do no more than summarise.
The Judge’s findings
12. First, the Judge noted at para [26] that the appellant had suffered domestic violence from her father; she had fled Germany as a result; and that the previous use of violence by her father was a strong indicator of future risk of violence from him. That was increased by the fact that the appellant was now a single parent who defied her father in the past. I accept Ms Keerthy’s submission that, although not referring to it expressly, the Judge applied Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules (where a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm).
13. Nevertheless, the Judge went on to consider whether, absent contact from her family since she left Albania almost five years ago, she might still be at risk. The Judge concluded that even absent contact, it was at least reasonably likely that she would suffer persecution or ill treatment from her father if she were to return to her home area. That was because (para [26]), the passage of time was unlikely to have negated the cause of her father's past ill treatment of her, and there was an increased risk because of her disobeying him.
14. At para [27], the Judge did not, however, accept the evidence concerning the person whom she was going to be forced to marry. At para [28], the Judge concluded that the appellant had a well-founded fear of ill treatment by her father in the limited geographic location, but not from the man whom he wanted her to marry.
15. The Judge went on to analyse risk in relation to two further separate groups of perpetrators. The first was of the criminals who had forced the appellant into prostitution in Germany and, without reciting all of those facts, the Judge found that the perpetrators in Germany did not appear to be German, did not appear to have any connection to Albania, or were part of a cross-border organised crime group, (in respect of which there is no appeal before me). Second, the Judge went on to consider the continuing risk of criminal gangs within Albania who might seek to re-traffic her. In that regard, the Judge considered and applied in detail the well-known country guidance authority of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC), and accepted that there was a realistic possibility of the appellant being re-trafficked by criminals in Albania who had not previously been involved in exploiting her, given the continuing threat posed by the father that led her to being vulnerable in the first place, the presence of an illegitimate child and the lack of an immediate support network.
16. Having found, therefore, relevant risks from the father in the specific geographic location and from criminal gangs in Albania as a result of vulnerability, having an illegitimate child, and no support network, the Judge went on to consider whether internal relocation in Albania would mitigate that risk and whether there was sufficiency of state protection. The Judge reiterated again, at paras [38] and [39], that the appellant would be returning as a lone parent, and that returning in close proximity to her father would present a risk which was not mitigated.
17. However, at para [40] and in reasoning which is central to the challenge in this appeal, the Judge found that the appellant would not be at risk from her father if she returned to a different area of Albania. There was nothing in the judge's view to suggest that the appellant's father, the man she was supposed to marry, or any other family member had shown any interest in tracing her. Instead, the evidence suggested that the appellant was able to live freely when she was away from her father. There was no basis to find that the appellant's father or any family member would seek to find her in future.
18. The appellant had alleged at para [13] of her second witness statement, that the Albanian authorities were corrupt, that her data would be sold and that her family would be on the ‘look out’ for her. He regarded that as a bare assertion, with no evidence that the family were on the look out, that they had any contact or influence over corrupt officials, and he noted in her own interview that she accepted that her family did not have such contacts or influence. The guidance in TD and AD related to complicity between local police and traffickers being a barrier but did not indicate that corrupt officials would find details about victims and then seek to sell them on.
19. At para [41], the Judge considered, in the alternative, the risk of word-of-mouth identification and tracing. While he recognising that Albania was a relatively small country, it was still a country of 2.7 million people with various large conurbations and diverse populations. In circumstances where the evidence indicated no interest in locating her and no contacts or influence to trace her, the Judge concluded that there would not be a realistic possibility of her presence in Albania becoming known to her father. One of the key issues in the Judge's mind was whether, if she were to relocate, it would be unduly harsh and even on relocating, whether there would be sufficiency of protection. The Judge went on to consider the remainder of the headnotes (d) to (f) in TD and AD including, (because it was important in the appeal before me), the appellant’s subjective fear of being found by her family; her vulnerability due her mental illness and psychological scarring; and societal stigma and isolation.
20. The Judge referred to applying that guidance explicitly in para [44]. The Judge explained why, in the subsequent paragraphs, the appellant would be able to access shelters in Albania. He explained at para [47] that the appellant would be able to obtain at least short-term protection in the form of safe accommodation, food, and assistance.
21. The Judge then also went on to consider the support for single mothers discussed in the Country Policy Information Note Albania: Human Trafficking February 2023 (Trafficking CPIN) at para [48] and concluded at para [49] that the appellant would be able to be willing and able to utilise that support. Once again, I mention this in the context of the appellant’s ground that the Judge had failed to consider or explain or attach a particular weight to the appellant's subjective fear, such that she would be desperate to leave Albania and thereby place herself of being re-trafficked.
22. At para [49], the Judge expressly referred to factors such as the appellant reporting symptoms of PTSD and taking sertraline, but also having a high level of education up to master's level, her maturity and her track record of cooperating with those seeking to assist her and her willingness to use services available to victims of trafficking, including courses of psychological report.
23. The Judge concluded at para [50] that in the longer term, the appellant would be able to re-establish herself in a different area of Albania, notwithstanding her PTSD; and the consequential mitigation of risk from the criminal gangs who had previously trafficked her. He noted again her educational qualifications to master's level, and that when she had entered the UK, she had wished to become a teacher. He noted her evidence that she would need to complete practical training before she could work as a teacher, but rejected her claim, made only in re-examination, (so not in either of her statements or supported by any corroborative evidence) that training would last two years and would be unpaid.
24. The Judge considered, at para [51], the appellant’s characteristics as a single mother, suffering symptoms of PTSD, low mood, but also her education, maturity, and resilience. Finally, at para [52], he considered the support that the appellant was provided by a friend in the UK, who had been very generous in providing accommodation rent-free and bill-free and he found it inconceivable that the friend would do nothing to assist the appellant, were she to return to Albania.
25. For the above reasons, although the Judge had identified the risks set out, the Judge was satisfied that the appellant would be able to mitigate that risk by relocating and that there was, for the same reason, sufficiency of protection.
26. With regard to very significant obstacles to integration, the Judge set out his conclusions at para [54] based on these same findings and also added that the fact that the appellant had spent time in the UK, including an ability to learn and speak some English, would be unquestionably of value to her in re-establishing herself in Albania.
27. The Judge also considered the minor second appellant's interests as part of analysing the impact of his removal on his family and private life with his mother, at para [55]. The Judge analysed the competing factors in a balance sheet assessment, by reference to section 117B of the 2002 Act, at paras [57] to [63]. The Judge considered, in that context, the second appellant's medical condition, (what was described without belittling it in any way as ‘droopy eyelids’) and the day surgery necessary to correct it.
28. At paras [59] and [60], the Judge explored the availability of medical treatment in Albania and the ability to obtain it privately and, whilst it was in the second appellant’s best interests to remain in the UK so he could continue to receive care, and that was a primary consideration, the Judge did not accept that the second appellant would be unable to get the treatment he needed in Albania.
29. I mentioned the final point because in the context of internal relocation, Ms McCarthy referred to the appellant's evidence having been directed to the availability of medical treatment in Tirana, although she was unable to confirm whether enquiries had been made as to the availability of medical treatment in the other locations.
The appeal before me
30. The appellants initially submitted grounds of permission to appeal which were considered by Judge Bulpitt himself but then renewed to this Tribunal. I considered those grounds and granted permission on all four grounds, so that there is no limitation in their scope. I regarded the grounds as (just) arguable and do not recite the reasons why.
31. I now summarise the grounds by reference not only to the original grounds but also because they refer to Judge Bulpitt's refusal of permission, elements of additional reliance in the renewed grounds.
Ground (1)
32. Ground (1) is expressed as a failure to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant's father was not interested in tracing her, although I accept Ms Keerthy's submission this is, in reality, a perversity challenge.
33. What the appellant says is that it is perverse to conclude that, although the appellant would have a well-founded fear of persecution if she referred to her hometown, that risk was limited to the home locale, because the appellant's father, having ill-treated her before, would have no motivation in seeking to find her. The grounds reiterate the accepted facts, namely that the appellant had been compelled by her father to agree to marry a man of his choice whom she did not wish to marry; that she had had to obtain permission to leave Albania, purporting to do so for a short period; that she had defied her father which the Judge had accepted would only increase the risk; and that she had not contacted her father or any other family members since 2020.
34. Her evidence, even if the Judge did not accept it, was that her family would be on the lookout for her. The appellant says that it is no answer to say that there was no evidence of this, in circumstances where it could not be realistic to expect her to adduce such evidence, such as contacting her father for proof of this. What more, Ms McCarthy asks, could the appellant have done to satisfy the Judge?
Ground (2)
35. In relation to ground (2), the Judge had similarly failed to consider evidence when considering the reasonableness of internal relation relating to Tirana. The appellant relied on BF (Tirana - gay men) (Albania) [2019] UKUT 00093 (IAC) in particular regarding someone’s whereabouts becoming known (para [181]). The Judge had not considered the risk of tracing in Tirana, if the appellant’s father were motivated to find her. This error undermined the Judge’s analysis of the extent to which internal relocation would mitigate risks to the appellant. In simple terms, the appellant’s status as a sole mother with mental health problems, was likely to attract gossip and the family home was a mere 30 minutes away from Tirana.
36. I did explore with Ms McCarthy the fact of the alternative location not being limited to Tirana, by reference to the well-known authority of MB (Internal relocation – burden of proof) Albania [2019] UKUT 00392 (IAC), with the burden of proof remaining on the appellant. Ms McCarthy explained that the Tribunal hearing below had focused upon Tirana.
Ground (3)
37. Regarding ground (3), the Judge was said to have failed to consider, when assessing the sufficiency of state protection, the medical evidence on PTSD; failed to give reasons for rejecting her contention that she would need to work for a couple of years to qualify as a teacher; and failed to consider the stigma of being an unmarried mother, having been trafficked for sexual exploitation, isolated, and her fear of hardship. In doing so, the Judge had failed to properly apply headnote (f) of TD and AD. The Judge ignored the risk that the appellant would have a strong motivation to try to leave Albania, thereby risking being retrafficked.
Ground (4)
38. Ground (4) was that the Judge had failed to consider the minor second appellant’s best interests in relation to stigma, isolation and that of his mother, and the very significant obstacles to both of their integrations in Albania.
The respondent's Rule 24 response and defence generally
39. Ground (1) was an irrationality challenge, which was not sustainable. The Judge was entitled to assess the appellant's claim that the family would be on the ‘lookout’ for her, and to conclude that this was speculative, when the evidence pointed the other way. That was distinct from requiring corroborative evidence, where the appellant was able to live freely when she was away from her father.
40. Moreover, any suggestion that corrupt officials would disclose her data, if she were to try to seek evidence of whether her father had reported her missing to the police, was not raised either in the appellant’s interviews or in the skeleton argument. There was no good reason why the appellant could not contact Albanian police to confirm whether she had been reported missing by her family, which was relevant to whether they were on the ‘lookout’ for her.
41. In relation to ground (2), the Judge was entitled to conclude that absent any evidence of her being discovered on her return, in the event of internal relocation, there was a sufficiency of protection.
42. In relation to ground (3), the Judge had specifically considered the appellant's mental health, including treatment such as sertraline, at para [49]. Moreover, the Judge had explained why he rejected as speculative the contention that the appellant would need to complete two years of unpaid training, to qualify as a teacher. The Judge was entitled to place weight on the absence of corroborative evidence, if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it (see para [86] of MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216).
43. The Judge had considered the appellant's fear, and her access to protection. By analogy to para [30] of J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629, the same analysis applied to the risk of re-trafficking in trying to leave Albania.
44. In relation to ground (4), this did not appear to take issue with the Judge's balancing exercise, including his recognition that the appellant's son's best interests were to retain access to treatment at Great Ormond Street Hospital .
45. Without discourtesy to the parties, I do not reiterate their oral submissions which were developed upon the grounds that I have outlined and I turn to each ground in turn.
Conclusion in relation to ground (1)
46. I am satisfied that, for the reasons argued by the respondent, the Judge was not perverse in finding that the appellant’s family would not be alerted to, and were not motivated to search for her, on her return to Albania. As BF (Tirana - gay men), at para [181] makes clear, the motivation to search will depend in part on whether the alleged persecutor is aware of the fact of a person's return. The answer to the question of what more the appellant could or should have done in relation to evidence is answered in part by the fact that there was no evidence of the appellant being reported missing to the police in Albania. I do not accept Ms McCarthy's submission that if a friend of the appellant were to have made such contact with the police, it would have inevitably followed that the appellant being a mother and intending to return would have thereby been disclosed by the police to her family. As Ms McCarthy accepted before me, the appellant’s claim had not focussed on conspiracy between the police and the appellant’s persecutors, but on so-called ‘word of mouth.’
47. I also do not accept the contention that it was not open to the Judge to conclude that, notwithstanding the elements of her case that had succeeded, namely that she had a well-founded fear of persecution from her father and also the risk of re-trafficking by others, that internal relocation and sufficiency of protection would mitigate those two risks, in what was a nuanced assessment by the Judge. In relation to a central part of the challenge on ground (1), that it was perverse to conclude that the risks which arose up in the village would not arise a mere 30 minutes' drive away in Tirana, this ignored the other two locations identified by the respondent. The judgment cannot be ready fairly as being limited to Tirana. Moreover, the Judge’s analysis not only related to temporary shelters but the ongoing ability of the appellant to re-establish herself. All of that was open to the Judge to find on the evidence before him.
48. There was no error of law on ground (1).
Conclusion in relation to ground (2)
49. In relation to ground (2) and the alleged failure to consider relevant evidence of the viability of internal relocation, I have already addressed the application of BF (Tirana - gay men) and the issues of motivation and so-called ‘word of mouth’. What is suggested is that as an unmarried mother suffering mental health problems, word of mouth would inevitably result in her being identified and that the Judge had failed to consider this. The difficulty with this challenge is that the Judge has expressly considered that very point, namely that she is a single mother and has mental health difficulties, in the context of identified areas of internal relocation, which were not limited to Tirana. The grounds did not engage with the alternative locations of Vlorë and Elbasan, which had been referred to in the respondent’s decisions.
50. There was no error of law on ground (2).
Conclusion in relation to ground (3)
51. In relation to ground (3) and the claim that the Judge failed to consider relevant evidence in relation to re-trafficking and the limitations of state protection, contrary to the grounds the Judge expressly considered the condition of PTSD. Whilst I note Ms McCarthy's submission that the Judge appeared to lessen that by stating that the PTSD was a referral rather than a diagnosis, it is clear from the Judge's repeated references to PTSD that he attached significant weight to that factor but also the appellant's willingness to engage with relevant practitioners to address her condition.
52. Moreover, the Judge's reasons for rejecting the claim that the appellant would have to work for two years unpaid, to qualify as a teacher, were sufficient. The Judge noted that this was only raised in re-examination, and I accept the respondent's submission that it had been open to the appellant to have raised this far earlier, with relevant evidence on the point.
53. The Judge also expressly considered the question of stigma towards the appellant as an unmarried mother, having been trafficked and away from family members, in the context of not only the short-term protection but also her ability to re-establish herself. This was in the context of the high level of the appellant's professional qualifications, the likely support that she would receive from her friend in the UK, and her proficiency, to an extent, in English. All of those factors were open to the Judge to consider in the balanced assessment, which included consideration of the appellant’s PTSD.
54. There was no error of law on ground (3).
Conclusion in relation to ground (4)
55. In relation to ground (4), (a failure to consider relevant evidence, and factors such as stigma), for the same reasons in ground (3), I am satisfied that the Judge considered and explained in the analysis of very significant obstacles to integration and the balancing exercise more generally for Article 8 purposes, the relevant evidence, in relation to the appellant’s ability to return and reintegrate, as well as that of her son. The Judge went as far as concluding that the best interest of the minor appellant may lie in having access to Great Ormond Street Hospital but nevertheless considered that there was availability of treatment in Albania. It is difficult for me in the context of this appeal to comment further Ms McCarthy’s submission that such treatment related only to hospital sites in Tirana, where there have been no submissions on the availability of medical treatment in the other two cities identified as potential sites for internal relocation. In that context, I am not satisfied that this submission adds anything to the analysis.
56. In conclusion, whilst I had been satisfied that the original grounds had been arguable, , based on an arguable conflation of international tracing versus tracing on internal relocation, and second, in relation to subjective fear as posing an obstacle on integration, having explored those issues further with the representatives, I am satisfied that the Judge did not err in law.
57. For the avoidance of doubt, I have considered each of grounds (1) to (4) separately, in the sense that even if I were wrong and the Judge’s analysis of risk being mitigated by internal relocation was flawed, I am still satisfied that the Judge was entitled to conclude that there was sufficiency of protection, on both a temporary and a long term basis.
Notice of decision
58. The Judge did not err in law. His decision is upheld. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

J Keith

Principal Resident Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th May 2026