Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005501
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59660/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 28th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

TA
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms. A. Sepulveda, Fountain Solicitors
For the respondent: Mrs. R. Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 14 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan (the “Judge”), dated 30 June 2025, in which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection claim. TA is a national of Pakistan who claimed asylum based on his sexuality.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi in a decision dated 31 December 2025 as follows:
“5. The numerous challenges to the FTT’s decision are in respect of the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility. It is long established that the judge hearing the evidence is best placed to assess credibility. In this decision, the judge made detailed findings about credibility with reasons and it was based on a number of factors. However, it is arguable that given the judge accepted that the appellant and his claimed partner lived together in a house with only one bed, the judge has not adequately reasoned why he did not find this to be a factor pointing to a finding that they were in an intimate relationship.
6. It may be that this is immaterial in light of the other adverse credibility findings but I find this element of the grounds sufficiently arguable that it justifies extending time for the application for permission to appeal and admitting it so that permission can be granted for the grounds to be further explored at the error of law hearing. Materiality can also be considered there.”
3. In her Rule 24 response the respondent opposed the appeal.
The hearing
4. The appellant attended the hearing. I heard oral submissions from both representatives. I reserved my decision.
Error of law
5. There is one ground of appeal, that the Judge “failed to consider the totality of the evidence when assessing the Appellant’s credibility, or in the alternative, that the Judge applied in practice a higher standard of proof than that applicable”. Ms. Sepulveda focused on the evidence of Mr. H in her submissions. As referred to in the grant of permission, the Judge accepted that the appellant and his claimed partner lived together. The evidence of Mr. H was that there was only one bed at the property, evidence which was unchallenged. Ms. Sepulveda submitted that the assessment of Mr. H’s evidence was inadequate. The Judge had not accepted the genuineness of his evidence, but had rejected it due to his overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Ms. Sepulveda submitted that the Judge had failed to consider the letters of support from Mr. H. The Judge appeared to find that Mr. H had been duped by the appellant, but in finding this, he had failed to take into account the evidence in the letters from Mr. H. In particular he had failed to take into account how long Mr. H had known the appellant, and how he had come to his belief that the appellant was gay. As the Judge had accepted that the appellant and AH lived together, the fact that there was only one bed at the property would suggest that they were in a relationship.
6. Mrs. Abdul-Karim submitted that the Judge had engaged with the evidence. In relation to Mr. H’s evidence in particular, he had heard oral evidence from him and had taken the letters into account. Weight was a matter for the Judge.
7. In response Ms. Sepulveda referred to [23] and [24] of the decision. She submitted that in the assessment of the reasons why the Judge considered that the appellant had taken advantage of Mr. H, there was no assessment of the letters Mr. H had provided in support of the appellant.
8. I have considered the Judge’s assessment of Mr. H’s evidence. At [13] the Judge states:
“It must be accepted that there is very little documentary evidence to establish that the appellant and AH are living in the same accommodation. Certainly, there is little or no official documentation. However, I am prepared to give the appellant benefit of the doubt bearing in mind the lower standard of proof. I take into account correspondence from the GP and the fact that Mr H has visited the accommodation and seen the appellant and AH. As such, I am prepared to accept that the appellant and AH reside at the same accommodation.”
9. The Judge has placed some reliance on the evidence of Mr. H in coming to his finding that that the appellant and AH live together. At [14] he refers again to the evidence of Mr. H:
“I appreciate that Mr H has visited the appellant and AH at their accommodation but again, that does not establish the appellant’s relationship with AH. I will deal with Mr H’s evidence further in this decision.”
10. While he states here that Mr. H has visited the appellant and AH at their accommodation, he makes no reference to Mr. H’s evidence that there was only one bed at the accommodation. At [23] and [24] he states:
“23. Mr H’s evidence is that he got the impression that the appellant and AH were not trying to prove that they are gay. From his observations they have a deep connection and complement each other. Mr H stated during his oral evidence that he noted the interaction between the two. Mr H stated that AH was more emotional while the appellant was the one who was calm and supportive. Mrs Abdul-Karim submitted that although Mr H sensed the appellant and AH had a relationship, it did not mean they had a romantic relationship. Mr Williams submitted that Mr H had visited the appellant’s accommodation and had seen only one bed. Mr Williams pointed out that Mr H had made it clear that he only attended a tribunal hearing if he felt confident that the relationship was genuine.
24. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mr H’s evidence. I accept that Mr H attended the hearing with the genuine intention to support the appellant’s claim. I intend no disrespect to Mr H, but in view of my adverse credibility findings above, I do find that in respect of this appellant, his assessment and his personal feelings are misplaced. Again, I stress that no disrespect is intended to Mr H but the appellant and AH have taken advantage of his goodwill and used him for their own intentions, i.e., to stay in the United Kingdom - there is good reason why I say this, which I explain below.”
11. As submitted by Ms. Sepulveda, there is no reference to Mr. H’s letters either in this consideration of the evidence, nor in the subsequent paragraphs where the Judge sets out his reasons for finding that the appellant has taken advantage of Mr. H. The Judge states that he has no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mr. H’s evidence. That evidence includes the fact that there is only one bed at the property at which the Judge has accepted that the appellant and Mr. H reside together.
12. I have considered the letters from Mr. H (pages 48 to 54 of the UT hearing bundle). The first is dated 22 April 2024, and the second 9 February 2025. Mr. H states that he a support worker and previous director of Journey LGBT+ Asylum Group. He states in his first letter that the appellant and AH have been regular attenders at meetings since November 2023. He states:
“It is the policy of the Journey group that we can only express support in letters when we know people well over a period of time and feel confident in the genuineness of their claim. The following summary of my knowledge of them is based on some very lengthy conversations with them as a couple.”
13. In his second letter he states that the appellant and a H have continued to attend meetings. He states that he has continued to have lengthy conversations with them over “a significant number of hours, most recently in their rented accommodation”. He states that this has continued to strengthen his belief in the genuineness of their relationship “and it will be recalled that is the policy of the Journey group that we can write a letter of support only when we know people well and believe they are genuine”. At the end of this letter he states: “I make these observations after a professional lifetime of working with a wide range of people and relationships”.
14. I find that the Judge has failed to take this evidence into account when coming to his finding that Mr. H’s “assessment and his personal feelings are misplaced” such that he gives no weight to Mr. H’s evidence. I find that the Judge has failed to give adequate reasons for this finding, given the totality of the evidence from Mr. H. I find that there is inadequate consideration of the context in which, and the length of time over which, Mr. H has known the appellant and AH, and the reasons why Mr. H believes that the appellant and AH are genuine. This is central to the Judge’s consideration of Mr. H’s unchallenged evidence that there was only one bed at the property.
15. I find that the Judge has erred in his assessment of the evidence of Mr. H. I find that there is no reference to Mr. H’s evidence that there was only one bed at the property, and no consideration of the implications of this. I find that this is material as Mr. H’s evidence went to the core of the appeal, and I find that his credibility findings are infected by this error.
16. Given that I have found that the Judge erred in his consideration of the evidence of Mr. H such that he did not take the totality of the evidence into account when coming to his findings, I find that the credibility findings cannot stand. I therefore do not need to consider the other elements of the grounds of appeal.
17. In considering whether this appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be remade I have taken into account the case of Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).  At headnote (1) and (2) it states:    
“(1)    The effect of Part 3 of the Practice Direction and paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement is that where, following the grant of permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal concludes that there has been an error of law then the general principle is that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. 
(2)    The exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) requires the careful consideration of the nature of the error of law and in particular whether the party has been deprived of a fair hearing or other opportunity for their case to be put, or whether the nature and extent of any necessary fact finding, requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.”      
18. I have carefully considered the exceptions in 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b).  Given that the Judge erred in his assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account, the appellant has effectively been denied a fair hearing.  It is therefore appropriate to remit this appeal to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.      

Notice of Decision
19. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of a material error of law and I set the decision aside.  No findings are preserved.  
20. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo. 
21. The appeal is not to be listed before Judge Chohan nor before Judge French.   
22. The appeal is to be heard at Birmingham.    

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 April 2026