Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005527
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54002/2004

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

26th May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

FRANCIS CHUKWUWEIKE BOI-UKEME
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter instructed by Portway Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Nigeria born on 12th June 1987, appeals against the decision of FtT Judge ER Bennett (the judge) who, on 10th October 2025, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal to grant him leave to remain on the basis of his family life with his partner Ms Tammy Watson born on 29th December 1978 and her daughter A on born 18th March 2008.
Grounds of appeal
Ground (i)
2. The judge misinterpreted and misapplied the definition of partner under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules.
3. The judge erred in law in finding that the appellant did not meet the definition of a ‘partner’ under paragraph GEN 1.2 of Appendix FM . The judge incorrectly concluded at [32]–[33] that the two-year period of relationship must be established prior to the date of the application rather than the date of the hearing or decision. The correct approach was as clarified in Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 and R (Sabir) v SSHD EWHC 1479. The ‘genuine and subsisting’ nature of a relationship should be assessed at the date of the decision or hearing. The judge unlawfully adopted a rigid approach and failed to consider the ongoing nature and durability of the relationship.
Ground (ii)
4. The judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant’s and partner’s evidence.
5. The judge accepted the relationship was genuine but discounted the evidence of the appellant and his partner on the basis of ‘pushing the evidence beyond what might be reasonably explainable’ [30]. Such reasoning lacked adequate analysis and failed to identify what aspects were found exaggerated or implausible. The judge failed to consider the corroborative evidence (letters statements and oral evidence) in the round contrary to Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11.
Ground (iii)
6. There was an error in the assessment of ‘insurmountable obstacles’ under EX.1(b) of Appendix FM. The judge misdirected himself by concluding there were no insurmountable obstacles to the appellant and his partner continuing family life in Nigeria [35]–[36]. Again, the judge failed to apply Agyarko such that insurmountable obstacles meant ‘very significant’ difficulties which could not be overcome. The judge applied an overly stringent and literal interpretation in dismissing credible evidence of Ms Watson’s mental health vulnerabilities and family ties in the UK without appropriate consideration. The judge failed to consider the best interests of the daughter born on 18th March 2008 (eighteen in 2 weeks time) under s55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
Ground (iv)
7. There was inadequate consideration of the child’s best interests under GEN 3.2 -3.3 and Article 8. The judge accepted the child was a relevant child but failed to conduct a structured ‘best interests’ analysis in accordance with ZH (Tanzania) UKSC 4 and MA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 705. The conclusion that it would not be ‘unduly harsh’ for the daughter to remain in the UK while the appellant returned to Nigeria [42] demonstrated a failure to treat her best interests as a primary consideration. The judge gave disproportionate weight to the public interest in immigration control.
Ground (v)
8. There was a flawed analysis under article 8 and the proportionality assessment. The judge accepted the genuineness of the family life and was required to conduct the five stage Razgar [2004] UKHL 27 test but failed to balance the appellant’s and the child’s rights. The judge failed to consider that the respondent accepted the relationship, and the interference was significant and required greater justification. The conclusion that family life could be managed remotely was inconsistent with the accepted existence of family life.

Ground (vi)
9. There was a failure to consider the relevant and material evidence such as the letter from the daughter expressing her attachment to the appellant and her wish the family should remain together.
10. The impact of separation on the partner’s mental health was merely dismissed without medical evidence being sought. The judge failed to acknowledge the practical difficulties and costs associated with relocation and reintegration into Nigeria. The judge did not consider the practical difficulties and costs associated with relocation and reintegration into Nigeria.
Permission to appeal
11. Permission to appeal was refused at First instance but granted by UTJ Blundell as follows:
‘2. ‘It is arguable, in particular, that the judge failed to confront whether it was reasonable to expect Ms Watson to leave her teenage daughter in the United Kingdom and relocate to Nigeria. I am also concerned that the judge might have mis-stated the test in the final sentences of [36](b) and (c) of the decision. Arguably, the question was not whether “the impact on their family life would be insurmountable” but whether there were insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of that family life in Nigeria. Grounds three, four and five are therefore arguable.
3. I consider the remaining grounds to be decidedly less persuasive. Unlike Judge Dhanji, who refused permission at first instance, I consider the judge’s construction of the Immigration Rules to have been correct. Gen 1.2 states that a partner includes an unmarried partner “where the couple have been in a relationship similar to marriage or civil partnership for at least 2 years before the date of application.” The “date of application” is a term of art, which is specifically defined in paragraph 6 of the Rules. It cannot mean the date of the hearing, and the appellant and Ms Watson had not on any view been in a relationship for two years by the date of application.
4. The judge gave sustainable and intelligible reasons for concluding that the appellant and Ms Watson had exaggerated some aspects of their evidence. He gave the example of Ms Watson’s daughter, [A], having submitted a document in which the appellant was named as her emergency point of contact for college, which the judge considered to be unlikely in light of the fact that she lives with her father.
5. As for ground six, I do not consider it to be arguable that the judge left out of account the matters identified at [23] of the grounds. The judge was well aware of A’’s wishes and did not need to refer specifically to her letter. The judge was not arguably required to seek medical evidence in connection with Ms Watson’s mental health; that was for the appellant to adduce. And the judge was evidently well aware of the financial difficulty which relocation to Nigeria would present.
6. I make no direction excluding argument on grounds 1, 2 and 6 but the appellant’s representatives will wish to reflect on the above before seeking to advance argument on those grounds. ’
Submissions
12. In relation to ground (i) Mr Slatter accepted that as to the definition of relationship, the applicant technically did not meet the Immigration Rules as the definition of partner under Appendix FM had changed on 31st January 2024. The application had been made on 5th February 2024. The respondent’s refusal decision was made on 26th March 2024.
13. Mr Slatter submitted that in relation to overall consideration under GEN 3.2 and 3.3 the fact that the relationship was accepted to exist at the date of the hearing should have been taken into account. The judge had applied the wrong definitions and tests when considering ‘insurmountable obstacles’. The test was not ‘unduly harsh’ which related to deportation. Under EX.1.(b) the test was very significant difficulties, and the judge had not considered ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’. The judge did not address the issue of the insurmountable obstacles in relation to the appellant’s daughter who was a minor and with whom the partner shared a family life. The partner was still in a relationship with her daughter. The approach to GEN 3.2 was thus flawed. The best interests of the relevant child had not been properly addressed. It was not suggested by the respondent that the daughter should live in Nigeria. The judge did not explain why the best interests of the daughter was not for the mother to remain and the partner in the UK. Mr Slatter abandoned ground (ii).
14. Mr Simpson pointed out that even at the date of the hearing the applicant did not meet the Immigration Rules. The judge properly made that finding. The judge was plainly not persuaded that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences on relocation.
15. In relation to grounds (ii) and (iii) the judge had set out the relevant test and the decision at [36](a) was simply a question of phrasing. The judge had not misapplied the relevant test which was stringent and not met. Aside from the oral evidence and witness statements of the appellant and his partner, there was no documentary evidence in relation to medical evidence, and the judge referenced the health issue at [35-36].
16. The daughter was considered by the judge and at [35] her interests were addressed. The judge referenced EX.1 but also made clear that the best interests of the child were considered in detail further on in the determination. The judge did not overlook evidence nor give too little weight to the evidence.
17. Ground (iv) was linked to the best interests argument and it was noted that the daughter did not give evidence.
18. The judge was aware of all the issues in relation to ground (v) but these did not outweigh the public interest. This application was merely a disagreement with the outcome.
Conclusions
19. The Supreme Court explained in Agyarko at [48]
‘As has been explained, the Rules are not a summary of the European court's case law, but a statement of the Secretary of State's policy. That policy is qualified by the scope allowed for leave to remain to be granted outside the Rules. If the applicant or his or her partner would face very significant difficulties in continuing their family life together outside the UK, which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship, then the "insurmountable obstacles" test will be met, and leave will be granted under the Rules. If that test is not met, but the refusal of the application would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, such that refusal would not be proportionate, then leave will be granted outside the Rules on the basis that there are "exceptional circumstances". In the absence of either "insurmountable obstacles" or "exceptional circumstances" as defined, however, it is not apparent why it should be incompatible with article 8 for leave to be refused.’
And at [57]
‘The critical issue will generally be whether, giving due weight to the strength of the public interest in the removal of the person in the case before it, the article 8 claim is sufficiently strong to outweigh it. In general, in cases concerned with precarious family life, a very strong or compelling claim is required to outweigh the public interest in immigration control.’
20. In terms of ground (i) the judge correctly observed that the applicant could not meet the definition of ‘partner’ under the Immigration Rules. For the purposes of Appendix FM ‘partner’ is defined, as the judge set out at [19] onwards, as follows:
GEN.1.2. For the purposes of this Appendix “partner” means the applicant’s-
(i) spouse; or
(ii) civil partner; or
(iii) fiancé(e) or proposed civil partner; or
(iv) unmarried partner, where the couple have been in a relationship similar to marriage or civil partnership for at least 2 years before the date of application.
21. This clearly does not reference the date of the hearing nor decision but the date of application. The applicant could not meet this requirement. As the judge remarked, even on the appellant’s own evidence the relationship did not commence until January 2023, and the application was made in February 2024. The appellant and partner had been in a relationship for only one year.
22. Indeed, as Mr Slatter accepted, the appellant could not meet this immigration rule.
23. The judge also specifically set out the definition of EX.1 and EX.2 of Appendix FM, at [22] and the relevant paragraph GEN 3.2, at [23], and I do not find he misdirected himself in their application.
24. EX.1 states as follows;
‘EX.1. This paragraph applies if
…
(b) the applicant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, settled in the UK, or in the UK with protection status, in the UK with limited leave under Appendix EU in accordance with paragraph GEN.1.3.(d), or in the UK with limited leave as a worker or business person under Appendix ECAA Extension of Stay in accordance with paragraph GEN.1.3.(e), or in the UK with permission as a Stateless person, and there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK.
EX.2. For the purposes of paragraph EX.1.(b) “insurmountable obstacles” means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner.’ [my underlining]
25. EX.1 and EX.2 clearly reference a ‘partner’, the definition of which the applicant could not fulfil.
26. Under GEN 3.2 where an applicant does not otherwise meet the requirements of Appendix FM or Part 9 of the Rules the decision maker must consider on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of leave to remain a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR because
‘such a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant their partner, a relevant child or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from that information would be affected by a decision to refuse the application’.
27. The judge identified GEN 3.3 at [24] and which details that in considering an application for leave to remain where GEN 3.2 applies ‘the decision maker must take into account, as a primary consideration, the best interests of any relevant child’.
28. The judge also noted that in GEN 3.1 and GEN 3.2 ‘relevant child’ means a person
(a) who is under the age of 18 years at the date of the application: and
(b) it is evidence from the information provided by the applicant would be affected by a decision to refuse the application’.
29. At [28] the judge identified that A was a relevant child and went on in the decision, as I reference below, not only to consider the best interests of the partner’s daughter but to accept that the appellant had a genuine relationship with the mother, [44]. The judge at [45] appreciated the point being made by the appellant that had he applied for leave at the date of the hearing he would meet all of the criteria and coupled with all the hardships his appeal should be allowed.
30. The judge, however, did take into account the facts as at the date of the hearing and plainly balanced the factors into the assessment under Article 8 ‘outside the Immigration Rules’ as at the date of the hearing. As noted in Butt v Secretary of State [2025] EWCA Civ 189 at [5]
‘Alam decides that the only case in which the reasoning in Chikwamba is potentially relevant now is if the Secretary of State expressly refuses leave to remain solely on the narrow procedural ground that the applicant must leave the United Kingdom to apply for entry clearance; and even then, it is necessary for the F-tT to make an overall assessment of the strength of the applicant's article 8 case.’
31. As to ground (ii), I note this was abandoned in submissions but answering this ground briefly does give context to the rest of the grounds and the decision itself. As the Court of Appeal said at [18] of Herrera v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 412, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors. The judge noted at [30] that the respondent did not contest the genuine nature of the relationship with the partner but the judge made clear at the outset that he found some aspects of the appellant’s and his partner’s evidence ‘less credible’ and to be ‘beyond what might be reasonably explainable’.
32. Indeed, the judge gave sound reasons for his treatment of the evidence. At [14] the judge found as follows:
‘In her oral evidence, Ms. Watson gave lots of reasons why it would be challenging for her and A to travel to Nigeria. She expressed gratitude to the appellant for how he had helped her emerge from what she described as a toxic relationship, and was worried as to how she would manage if he had to go back to Nigeria. She explained how [A] had named the appellant as a sole emergency contact on her College ‘emergency contact’ form but, in my view, had no adequate explanation as to why that would be, given [A] lived with her father who she chose to live with on her parents’ separation and, on her own oral evidence, had a good relationship with him (her father).
The judge gave an example at [30] of why he considered the evidence less credible. A next of kin sheet produced in the evidence and given for the daughter only showed the appellant and not the father with whom the daughter actually lived and with whom she had a good relationship; the appellant did not have parental relationship. That conclusion on the evidence provided was reasonably open to the judge and sound reasons and proper analysis were given for the assessment of the weight of the evidence. From a reading of the decision the judge addressed all the relevant evidence. (The witness statement of the partner in fact asserted she had sole custody although this dated from March 2024.)
33. At [36] the judge stated that he specifically considered the circumstances in the round.
34. In response to grounds (iii) and (iv) which somewhat overlap, the judge proceeded to consider the application of EX.1` and properly found at [32] that the appellant did not meet the definition of ‘partner’ as the two year duration had to be made by the date of application. As such the appellant could not meet the Immigration Rules and in this regard EX.1 did not apply.
35. Even so, and in the alternative and although not obliged to do so under EX.1, from [34] the judge went on the consider the concept of ‘insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK.’ As can be seen from, above that was the correct test under EX.1 and indicates that the judge, rather than applying an overly stringent test, considered the test as if EX.1 applied. The test, as set out in the grounds, was that found in GEN 3.2 and Agyarko and ‘of any unjustifiably harsh consequences’. The judge did not lose sight of that but proceeded to weigh the evidence accordingly.
36. Additionally, the judge at [34] expressed the test in relation to the obstacles to the appellant or the partner continuing their family life outside the United Kingdom. The judge had already directed himself appropriately as to unjustifiably harsh consequences at [22]; if anything, a less stringent test was applied by the judge and to the advantage of the appellant.
37. As recorded at [35] the judge noted the obstacles put forward by the partner, including her mental health, as follows:
‘Ms. Watson’s evidence, in essence, was that for her to move to Nigeria would represent a massive and untested leap into the unknown. She had no links to that country, she had no idea how to start going about building a life there from scratch, and she had [A] to think about who was 17, and whose father lived in the UK, with whom she spent the majority of her time. She expressed concern about being separated from the appellant if they were continuing their relationship across continents, given her more fragile mental health and the assistance he had offered to her. Likewise, the appellant expressed concern for Ms. Watson and [A] were they to move to Nigeria, the family’s ability to fund an out of country application for leave to enter were he to have to return, and downplayed his present ties to Nigeria.’
38. Thus, the judge had already started to weave into the determination the interests of the daughter. Again at [36] the judge applied the test of ‘insurmountable obstacles’. I am not persuaded that the judge was importing the test connected to deportation, particularly bearing in mind the previous correct legal self-directions. The judge had identified that the daughter lived with her father and not with the appellant and his partner, and found at [36(b)]
‘b. Whilst I accept that Ms. Watson would have to start from scratch, her own evidence was that she has moved countries a number of times in her life, from being born in Barbados, to moving to the USA, to moving to the Bailiwick of Jersey, and then to the UK. Whilst she fairly makes the point that all these countries had similarities to make such transitions easier for her in a way that Nigeria would not, she is undoubtedly an impressive and resourceful woman who would be capable of adapting, particularly given the support of the appellant, her partner. She would not be ‘in it’ alone. Whilst Ms. Watson referenced her mental health, there was no evidence before me to suggest that she would be so impacted by the appellant’s having to return to Nigeria, or her having to go there, that the impact on their family life would be insurmountable.
c. Further, in the event that Ms. Watson took the view that she should remain in the UK, there is no reason why family life could not continue remotely until such time as the appellant made an appropriate application for leave to enter. An Entry Clearance Officer may well take note of the fact that the respondent did not challenge, in this appeal, the fact that the parties had been in a genuine relationship since January 2023, and that all the appropriate financial requirements of the immigration rules had been met. It may well be therefore, that the timeframe in which the appellant and Ms. Watson might be apart, would be less than in other circumstances. Again, I have considered her mental health, and there is no evidence to suggest that it would be so adversely impacted that an insurmountable obstacle would be created to her and the appellant’s family life.
d. Whilst the appellant sought to address this by expressing concerns about costs of any out of country application for leave to enter, I am unable to take that evidence at face value. It was not corroborated with any supporting evidence, there was no elaboration of this in either his or Ms. Watson’s oral evidence.
For the avoidance of doubt, I do not leave [A] out of this analysis, as her best interests must be my primary consideration. I consider this appeal with reference to her in more detail below.’ [my underlining]
39. The judge thus found the partner ‘an impressive and resourceful woman’ who had lived in several countries being born in Barbados, living in the USA and Bailiwick of Jersey. Moreover, the judge reasonably found he was presented with no independent medical evidence of the mental health difficulties of the appellant and although he noted these, the judge was entitled to attach less weight to them.
40. Overall, the judge stated that ‘ there was no evidence before me to suggest that she would be so impacted by the appellant’s having to return to Nigeria or her having to go there, that the impact on their family life would be insurmountable’. Although this description was criticised, I find that this was merely shorthand by the judge for the relevant test of ‘insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of that family life in Nigeria’. The criticism is merely semantic. The judge clearly had in mind, having accepted the relationship was genuine, the requirement that the relationship was to be continued.
41. It was also open to the judge to take into account at this stage that the appellant might go abroad and make an entry clearance application. That was a realistic option, and no challenge was made to that point at [36(d). The judge pointed out that there had been a finding as to the genuineness of the relationship, they could meet the financial requirements and rejected the concern that the appellant could not afford to make an out of country application for leave to enter on the basis that there was no corroboration or elaboration of that concern raised by the appellant.
42. In terms of the best interests of the child the judge also recorded at [36] and early on in his determination that he did not leave out the daughter from the analysis
‘as her best interests must be my primary consideration. I consider this appeal with reference to her in more detail below’.
43. Mr Slatter criticised the judge’s approach of shifting the ‘best interests’ analysis to a later stage which he thought impermissible but there is no traction in this criticism. There is no legal absolute requirement to adopt a particular strait jacket for assessing best interests and it is clear that the judge had the child’s best interests in mind throughout.
44. The judge found that the appellant did not meet the definition of a subsisting ‘parental relationship’ with his partner’s daughter and that was not challenged.
45. The judge found at [39] that the daughter did not live with the appellant, nor indeed the partner.
46. The judge then addressed GEN 3.2 – 3.3 of Appendix FM finding the daughter to be a relevant child. The judge did not find that there was a parental relationship with the appellant and A to fulfil EX.1(a). That was not challenged.
47. The reference at [41] was to the impact of the three options, the appellant going alone to Nigeria, the partner going with him and the daughter accompanying them. The use of the term ‘unduly harsh’ at [41] in that instance does not denote, when reading the context of the decision as a whole and in the context of [42], the importation of a deportation definition or test overall. It was an attempt to encapsulate the effect on the child when considering her best interests. Critically, the judge stated at [42]
‘there is no evidence before me to suggest that either outcome would be harmful to her from a welfare perspective’.
48. The judge found that the daughter lived with her biological father for most of the time [42]. Although Mr Slatter submitted that the daughter lived with her mother at weekends there was simply no evidence of this even from the witness statement of the mother or in the letter of the daughter. Critically, the judge then found at [42] in relation to the daughter
‘A lives with her father for most of the time. Her relationship with the appellant or her mother, if she chose to go to Nigeria, would not be so impacted as to render the situation unconscionable for her, particularly where the appellant has a route to apply for leave to enter from Nigeria. If she chose to remain here, she would either remain living with her father and spending time with her mother, or remaining living with her father and spending time with her mother less, if she moved to Nigeria. There is no evidence before me to suggest that either outcome would be harmful to her from a welfare perspective. Equally, if she chose to move to Nigeria, the appellant has links there, her mother would most likely be with her, and there was no evidence to suggest that she could not adjust or continue her education and life there. Her links to the UK would be maintained through her relationship with her father.’
49. That is correct. There was simply a dearth of evidence save for the assertions of the appellant and his partner as to the effect on the child. There was no social worker report, no school report, no doctor’s report and no information from the child’s biological father. Nor did the daughter who was 17 at the time, attend court to give evidence.
50. The reference to ‘unconscionable’ might have been better expressed but in the circumstances does not undermine the findings as a whole and which are clear.
51. As noted, the proportionality assessment is a balancing exercise. In my view the judge was well aware of the relationship between the mother and child, was aware of the age of the daughter and that she lived with her biological father. The judge clearly considered the best interests of the child, considered the various scenarios in relation to the daughter’s best interests (which are not a trump card) and simply found on the facts of this case that when conducting a balancing exercise, the public interest outweighed the interests of the appellant and moreover the appellant and partner had a choice as to how to proceed.
52. Ground (v) The analysis under article 8 was sound. The judge clearly balanced the family life rights of the appellant, partner and child in a proportionality assessment and the judge gave sound reasoning in the circumstances to conclude that one of the alternatives was that family life could be managed remotely.
53. Although Mr Slatter asserted that the judge did not consider ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’ this was specifically identified by the judge as part of GEN 3.2-3.3, and I do not accept that the judge failed to address this overall. The points made at [45] demonstrated that the relevant factors were incorporated; the immigration rules not being satisfied, (and this included a reference to unjustifiably harsh consequences), there being a route to achieving leave to enter, that there was limited weight to family life with the partner acquired whilst the appellant’s immigration status was uncertain, and that the circumstances were ‘manageable’ even in relation to the daughter’s best interests. The judge applied s 117B of Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
54. Having noted that there was family life in existence and notwithstanding the best interests of the child A, at [45] the judge spelled out the factors which weighed against the appellant, and which explained that the public interest in immigration control would prevail.
55. Ground (vi). There was no failure to consider material evidence. As to the daughter’s letter, the judge confirmed that he considered the relevant evidence, and it was noted that the daughter did not attend the hearing to give evidence. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at 2(iii) confirms that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. There was no witness statement from the daughter merely a brief eight-line letter.
56. As to the partner’s mental health, as identified above, this was factored in and notably the judge identified the lack of medical evidence. The costs of relocation cannot arguably be a very significant obstacle to relocation and in any event were appreciated by the judge as self-evident and recorded in the evidence at [13] and [14]. Moreover, at [36] the judge found that the appellant had family in Nigeria and could find work in Nigeria, there being no evidence that it would be difficult to do so. The judge was fully aware of the practical difficulties of relocation which can be seen from [36]. As noted above the judge specifically identified that no evidence was produced in relation to the claimed medical evidence. Kaur, R (on the application of the Secretary of State) [2018] EWCA Civ 1423 at [56-57] emphasises that bare assertions are insufficient.
57. Overall and on a careful reading of the decision which was detailed and thorough, I find no material errors of law.

Notice of Decision
I find no material error of law in the FtT decision and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26th May 2026