Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005540
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50821/2024
LP/11926/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

A K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Khan, solicitor, Kings Law Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 15 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his wife and children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his wife and children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity
1. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. As the appeal is an asylum claim and the appellant’s claim was made under the Family Asylum Process, I consider that the interests of the appellant and his family as asylum claimants in keeping the details of their claim confidential outweigh the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant and his wife and children are citizens of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, and also citizens of Dominica. They arrived in the UK on 18 January 2021 and claimed asylum on 14 February 2021. The essence of the appellant’s claim to the respondent (as taken from the appellant’s main skeleton argument at the hearing before the FTTJ) was that he had discovered that the pharmacy company where he worked, which belonged to a very important member of the KDP political bureau (the appellant set out the man’s role; I conceal it for anonymity purposes), was involved in the sale and distribution of expired medicine. He was indirectly threatened, when reporting the activities to his superior, and when he tried to expose them through his driver, his driver was arrested by security forces. The appellant and his family say they fled as a result.
3. The family’s asylum and human rights claim was refused on 31 December 2023. The family appealed, but by decision promulgated on 10 September 2025 their appeal was dismissed. The appellant now appeals with permission granted by the Upper Tribunal.
Grounds, and analysis of the grounds
4. I consider the grounds as they were developed at the hearing by Mr Khan and Mrs Arif and incorporate the submissions made to me and the rule 24 response.
Ground 1
5. It is said that the FTTJ repeatedly relied on speculative plausibility findings and failed to apply the correct reasonable degree of likelihood standard, such as at [41] – [42] about the appellant planning to come to the UK, and at [44] requiring direct proof of a causal link for the brother’s disappearance.
6. This ground was not developed further in submissions on behalf of the appellant. I consider there is nothing in this ground. I agree with Mrs Arif that the FTTJ correctly directed herself including the reasonable degree of likelihood test [30] and explicitly reminded herself with reference to authority that just because a matter was implausible did not mean that it was not true [36] and [37]. I note that at some points (for example [38]) the FTTJ expressly rejected the plausibility points made by the respondent and accepted that some aspects of the appellant’s account were plausible [50]. At the end of [42] the FTTJ gave clear reasons why she did not find the appellant’s explanation about why he asked his driver to report 4 days before the family was due to flee, credible. This was not speculation, but a reasoned finding (see also my conclusions about this finding at ground 10). The FTTJ was not, at [44], requiring direct proof of a causal link for the appellant’s brother’s disappearance, rather finding that the appellant was simply claiming that his brother’s disappearance showed he was in danger. Another aspect of the point the FTTJ makes at [41] is challenged in ground 3, but the paragraph overall is not speculation but based on a conclusion open to her that the appellant could have left Iraq to claim asylum using his Iraqi passport.
Grounds 2 and 7
7. I consider these together, as ground 2 refers to misunderstanding the trading structure and political links and ground 7 refers to misunderstanding the facts relating to company ownership.
8. The FTTJ’s non-acceptance (at [39]) of the appellant’s explanation, finding that the Kurdish government were complicit, is challenged in ground 2. It is said that the FTTJ mischaracterised the appellant’s evidence and failed to engage with paragraph 7 of the appellant’s witness statement, to the effect that the local company was part of government in the sense that it was owned by M (his full name was given), a member of the KDP political bureau. It is said in the grounds that the FTTJ wrongly dismissed the political link, but that did not mean the actual government body had been aware of the company’s illegal activities.
9. Examining paragraph 7 of the appellant’s witness statement made in response to the reasons for refusal letter, that paragraph does not refer to ownership of the company. I asked Mr Khan about this, and he agreed that paragraph did not. He said there was indirect evidence. Paragraph 7 however explains that the fear was that if the main branch in Baghdad knew that the Erbil branch was involved in illegal activities then they would take action against them. The paragraph continues “it is true that they were part of the local government and they do not fear of them, but they are trading due to their courage and backing. That is why Dr D… was not concerned about the government finding out about these activities”. The paragraph concludes by explaining M’s role in the KDP executive committee.
10. As the rule 24 response states, paragraph 7 does not explain a distinction between the company having political links, but the government not being aware of its illegal activities. Indeed the sentences in italics I have quoted above suggest that the important people in the company were not concerned about the government finding out, which indicates, as the FTTJ found, that the Kurdish government would have backed the company. Again, as the rule 24 response suggests, if there was a distinction to be made it was not actually explained to the FTTJ, and I observe, has never been properly explained. The findings the FTTJ made at [39] were, I conclude open to her and not in error of law.
11. Ground 7 avers that the FTTJ misunderstood about company ownership. It is said in the grounds that the appellant never claimed that the Jordanian parent company directly owned the Kurdistan branch “rather his consistent evidence was that the local company in Erbil, associated with M…was not a branch of the Jordanian parent company but acted as its representative in Kurdistan. The Erbil company traded with and was answerable to the Baghdad branch, which itself maintained links with the Jordanian main office in Amman. The appellant’s case was….that M’s influence derived from his political position within the KDP and his role in the Erbil company not from any ownership or direct control of the Jordanian parent company”. Mr Khan submitted that it was simply the Kurdistan branch which M owned (he referred me to [28] of the appellant’s witness statement in response to the reasons for refusal letter).
12. The FTTJ understood that the appellant’s case was that the company in Erbil answered to the Baghdad branch and through them to the main company in Jordan (see middle of [50], beginning of [51] and second sentence of [52]) and that Dr D was scared of Baghdad and the main branch finding out about illegal activities (see the quote at the end of [50]). Her point was that there was no evidence that M owned the company in Jordan or Baghdad, indeed there was no evidence to indicate that M had any links to the company.
13. In the appellant’s screening interview, he said that his life was in danger from the owner of the company as he had authority and power within the government. He named the person he feared as M…. In the first witness statement prepared for his asylum claim he stated that he worked for S… Pharmacy, a local branch of the S... S... group in Erbil (para 7). That statement does not mention a company or a parent company’s presence in Baghdad or Jordan. It says simply “the company I worked for belonged to M…” and set out M’s high position in the KDP political bureau [25]. In asylum interview (question 32) the appellant said “this company has too much power the government is part of this company and it belongs to M….”. He stressed that M was a prominent person in the government (question 33).
14. In the appellant’s witness statement prepared in response to the refusal letter (paragraph 7), the appellant referred to the Erbil company as being a sub-branch of the Baghdad company and the main branch being in Jordan and Dr D… being scared of Baghdad and the main branch finding out about their activities. The words used were “S… S… Company main branch is in Amman-Jordan and have other branches in Baghdad. Our Erbil branch was a sub-branch of Baghdad and traded with them not directly with the main branch in Amman Jordan.” In paragraph 15 he referred to M being the owner of the company and again at paragraph 18. It is only at paragraph 28 (in response to the comments in the refusal letter about sufficient protection in Iraq) that he referred to M being the owner of the S…S…branch in Kurdistan as opposed to simply “the owner of the company”.
15. I note the main skeleton argument before the FTTJ said the company that the appellant worked for belonged to M.
16. The FTTJ did not misunderstand “the facts”. The witness statement referred to “branches” of a company. Branches of a company are local offices which act as an extension of the main business. They are part of the main business, so the ownership is the same. The statement in the grounds “the appellant never claimed that the Jordanian parent company directly owned or managed the Kurdistan branch” does not make sense therefore. A company directly owns its branches; that is what branch means. If what is meant is that the offices in the different areas were separate companies then if as is said, the Jordanian company is a “parent company” by definition it has a controlling interest in the subsidiary companies it parents and so would “own” the Erbil company. If what was meant was something completely different, for example that the companies in Erbil and Baghdad were completely separate companies simply having a trading arrangement as the agents or representatives of the Jordanian company, that the Baghdad company were the agents for the Jordanian company in Iraq and the Baghdad company used a sub-agent in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, namely the appellant’s company, that was not what was said anywhere I can trace before the hint in the grounds, and the FTTJ did not misunderstand a clear consistent case put by the appellant. I also observe, as Mrs Arif said in submissions, the FTTJ was entitled not to be satisfied of the position on the appellant’s unsupported evidence. No supporting evidence at all was produced about the company, not even that it existed (as the FTTJ said at the end of [52] and the beginning of [53]) and it would have been very easy to produce some evidence other than the appellant’s word.
17. Grounds 2 and 7 are not made out.
Ground 3
18. There is some force in that part of ground 3 which refers to the appellant not being able to fly without a visa. The FTTJ was wrong to say that it made no difference whether the appellant had a visa because if he was going to claim asylum he would not need a visa. If a country required a visa for entry, the appellant would simply not have been allowed by the relevant airline to board a plane (this point was recognised in the decision letter). However, the FTTJ also found that the appellant already had an Iraqi passport, so that if he were really in fear “he would have left and taken his chances”. That conclusion was open to her.
Ground 4
19. It is said that the appellant’s evidence was that immediate departure when Dominican passports were received was impossible due to lockdowns in the KRG and international restrictions and it was difficult to obtain COVID tests, a test was taken on 16 January and the results were received only on 17 January; flight options were also limited.
20. This asserted evidence was simply not in the appellant’s witness statement. The witness statement in response to the refusal letter at paragraph 12 explains why the appellant waited until January 2021 to leave Iraq. Nowhere is there any mention of COVID restrictions or COVID tests. It is clear that evidence of a date of taking a COVID test was not before the FTTJ as it is said it was enclosed with the grounds of appeal (it was not so far as I can trace). The FTTJ cannot possibly be criticised for not taking into account evidence which was not before her. Mr Khan submitted to me that it was obvious that there were COVID restrictions. I consider it was for the appellant to produce evidence of what the precise COVID restrictions were at the time and how they impacted him. Ground 4 is not made out.
Ground 5
21. The first part of ground 5 avers that the FTTJ failed to engage with the appellant’s wider evidence of ongoing fear of reprisals and that threats may be implicit rather than explicit. The FTTJ’s point was that the appellant had not mentioned those threats in his first statement or any of his interviews. That was a finding clearly open to her and not an error of law.
22. The second part of ground 5 avers that the FTTJ dismissed video evidence, transcripts and Facebook material for not being in the expected format.
23. Firstly, it is difficult to see how the FTTJ could place weight on that material when there was no updated witness statement exhibiting it and the FTTJ’s note of the oral evidence of the appellant does not indicate that reference was made to it. It is not suggested that the November 2024 Practice Statement had been complied with. Screenshots and the like do not prove themselves. The FTTJ was entitled to give the material no weight; I observe she did not disagree with the contention that there were counterfeit drugs in Kurdistan [48], rather her comment was that the material produced was generic and not specific to the appellant.
24. Secondly, the FTTJ was entitled to comment that the Facebook material did not comply with the format as set out in XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23. That case explains that production of a small part of a Facebook account such as photocopied photographs are likely to be of very limited evidential value as are purported printouts from such an account.
25. Thirdly, the appellant’s supplementary skeleton argument refers to the “statement and expert opinion” of Dr Baram. The document referred to seems to be neither a statement nor an expert report but the translation of (probably) video screenshots which appear elsewhere in the evidence – I say probably because the translator’s certificate refers to the “mentioned video” but I cannot see that he identifies the video beyond that. The FTTJ was entitled to make the comments she did at [48] about this evidence. It is not simply about “format”. To treat someone as an expert there needs to be proper evidence of his background and qualifications and of course an expert report must contain the matters set out in the Practice Direction as the FTTJ noted.
26. The third part of ground 5 avers that the FTTJ ignored the appellant’s case that as secretary of the Erbil Health Syndicate he raised concerns about counterfeit medicines and healthcare rights and that she drew an adverse inference from failure to mention his role until a late stage in proceedings. The FTTJ was perfectly entitled to make adverse comments on the fact the appellant had made no mention of his role within the Erbil Health Syndicate in any of his interviews or in his witness statements even though he was specifically asked in interview if there was any other reason why he could not return to Iraq. I note that whilst the supplementary skeleton argument says that the appellant’s work involved publicly raising concerns over the proliferation of counterfeit drugs, there is no witness statement which says so and the appellant’s letter to his representatives (included in the supplementary material) explaining the functions of the Erbil Health syndicate does not say that this was or is part of the syndicate’s functions, which were said to be advocating for the rights of healthcare employees particularly in advancing their scientific and professional careers and securing financial and labour rights and retirement benefits for them. It is not said that the appellant explained this additional aspect of his case in any detail in oral evidence or that he explained in oral evidence why this became an additional aspect of his case at such a late stage. There is nothing in the FTTJ’s summary of oral evidence to suggest that he did.
27. Ground 5 fails therefore.
Ground 6
28. The FTTJ did not dismiss the appellant’s claim because he had not sought help from the police. She commented at [43] that she did not see how the appellant could claim that the authorities had not shown him any protection in the past. Her conclusion at [54] about protection being available from the police was not based on the appellant not seeking help from them in the past.
29. The FTTJ did not conclude that if the appellant were at risk from M he would obtain sufficiency of protection in Iraq. She was not satisfied that the appellant had made out his case about risk. Her alternative conclusion was on the basis he was at risk from an individual only. It is said that she disregarded the unchallenged evidence of M’s role and the wider country evidence of corruption and party-business infiltration but, as I have referred to above, the FTTJ commented that there simply was no supporting evidence at all about the company, not even that it actually existed [53]. Moreover, M’s role was not unchallenged; the respondent was clear in the decision letter that it was not accepted that the appellant was afraid of M and not accepted that the company the appellant worked for was linked with the authorities. The FTTJ did not err in concluding as she did. The ground is not made out.
Ground 8
30. It was not speculation to find the appellant could redocument via his wife’s parents. It was not redocumentation as such, it was sending documents to the appellant in the UK. The FTTJ was entitled to place little weight on an undated letter from the appellant’s father-in-law with no evidence of provenance. Ground 8 fails.
Ground 9
31. As the respondent recognised in the rule 24 response, this ground was critical. It was critical because the appellant and his family were citizens of Dominica and so even if the FTTJ were in material error in respect of risk in Iraq, to succeed in his claim for asylum the appellant would have to show he had a well-founded fear in Dominica from which he could not obtain the protection of the state. The grounds refer to whether Dominica could be seen as a safe third country, but that is simply not right. Dominica is not a “third country” from the appellant’s perspective; it is a country of which the appellant and his family are citizens and Article 1A (2) of the Refugee Convention means that the appellant does not qualify as a refugee if he can avail himself of the protection of any of his countries of nationality, if he has more than one. The FTTJ also did not treat the fact the appellant had never visited Dominica as undermining his claim, rather she commented, perfectly correctly, that it was not an answer to say that he could not go to Dominica because he had never been there; he had never been to the UK.
32. The appellant, as the FTTJ noted, had produced no evidence that the company had offices in Dominica [55]. Even if he had, I observe that the skeleton arguments did not address the issue of sufficiency of protection in Dominica (which was raised clearly in the respondent’s review). The appellant’s witness statement said that the people involved with the company all held Dominican passports and had agents operating there but it does not follow from that the appellant could not obtain protection from the authorities in Dominica. Mr Khan submitted that the appellant could be easily traced to Dominica but that is not to the point. Even if the appellant had a well-founded fear in Iraq because those he feared were connected with the authorities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, it would not follow that they had any power or influence over the authorities in Dominica. The burden is on the appellant even though it is to the lower standard to show he would not obtain protection from the authorities in Dominica. He has simply produced nothing to show the same.
33. The appellant would not be entitled to humanitarian protection either unless he would not obtain sufficiency of protection from the authorities in Dominica. At the relevant time, the immigration rules referred to a person availing themself of the protection of their “country of return”. The Qualification Directive slightly differently referred to “country of origin” but the definition in that Directive indicates that for those who have a nationality it means the country or countries of nationality, rather than the usual English meaning of the word. The respondent in the decision letter considered return to both countries.
34. Ground 9 fails.
Ground 10
35. The FTTJ is said to have speculated, but she did not ignore the appellant’s explanation. She considered the appellant’s explanation but did not accept it. She was entitled so to do and made no error of law. It is said that there was no evidence that the appellant knew the government was aware of the illegal activities; I have already considered this point in the context of ground 2 above (see paragraphs 8 – 10 above); the finding the FTTJ came to was open to her. Ground 10 fails.
Ground 11
36. The grounds aver errors in the Article 8 assessment. Mr Khan emphasised in submissions the stage the children had reached in their education and that their best interests needed to be considered bearing in mind that they had been in the UK for 4 years at the date of the decision.
37. The FTTJ’s consideration of Article 8 ECHR and the best interests of the children was entirely proper and Ground 11 discloses no error. If parents have no right to remain it is usually in the best interests of their children to go with them and the FTTJ referred to authority to that effect. The FTTJ referred to “the requisite 7 years” but that was shorthand for the statutory provisions relating to qualifying children. She clearly did not treat 7 years as determinative as had she done so, there would have been no need to consider the other factors she did. She explained her finding about critical stages of education and her findings were perfectly open to her. As she said, the oldest two children (who at the date of the hearing were 16 and 14 respectively) would be familiar with education in Iraq. It is said that they are now “rooted” in English schooling and English language, but English is not their first language, the older child would have been in education in Iraq for longer than the UK, the second child for around the same length of time and the youngest child is still very young and adaptable. On the FTTJ’s findings about lack of risk in Iraq and on the evidence before her about the children, a conclusion that the family should remain on Article 8 grounds would have been perverse.

Conclusion
38. It will be seen from the above that I have concluded that the only error averred in the grounds which is made out is that part of ground 3 where the FTTJ concluded that it would have made no difference whether the appellant had a visa. However, as I have observed above, she also concluded that with an Iraqi passport the appellant would have been able to leave the country and so if he were really in fear, as she put it left and “taken his chances”.
39. There were a number of adverse credibility findings against the appellant. The part of the decision in error is one small conclusion. The decision did not rest on that error. The error in part of ground 3 could not possibly have made a difference to the FTTJ’s conclusion and it is not material.
40. In any event, so far as international protection is concerned, I agree with the respondent that any error (and for clarity I mean even if I am wrong and the FTTJ made the errors as set out in the grounds relating to international protection) could not be material to the international protection claim. Any rational tribunal would be bound to reject the appellant’s international protection claim on the evidence before them as there was simply nothing to indicate that the authorities in Dominica would not offer sufficiency of protection to the appellant and his family as citizens of that country.
41. For completeness’ sake, I note that the FTTJ did not make alternative findings about the best interests of the children if they were to go to Dominica rather than to return to Iraq. Accordingly, if contrary to my findings, the FTTJ had made a material error of law in respect of risk on return to Iraq, the Article 8 findings would not have been able to stand. As I have explained, however that is not my conclusion.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal does not involve the making of a material error of law and stands.
The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 August 2026