Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005550
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58789/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

RB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Chowdhury, Legal Representative

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), dated 11 September 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 10 October 2023, refusing her asylum and human rights claim.
2. When refusing the protection and human rights claims, the respondent accepted the core components of the factual background to the appellant’s asylum claim, set out on the fourth page of the refusal decision, but did not accept that the appellant had been in receipt of threats or was the victim of two politically motivated false court cases in her country. The judge dismissed the appeal in part on credibility grounds, but also found that even if her ex-husband was motivated to harm her, the appellant could internally relocate or seek state protection. The Article 8 appeal was also dismissed.
3. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on the following grounds:
i) Ground 1 – it was argued that the judge failed to take into account a vulnerable witness direction and guidance in relation to such a direction, in that the judge had granted an application at the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness, in light of her age, health conditions and other features of the case. Having done so, nowhere in the decision did the judge mention the direction having been made, or have regard to the possible impact the appellant’s vulnerability might have on her evidence and the credibility assessment.
ii) Ground 2 – it was argued that the judge erred in the assessment of evidence and credibility, by failing to properly have regard to the accepted aspects of the factual matrix and their impact on the assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s subjective fear of harm, and on the weight to be attached to the documentary evidence, in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 principles. There were insufficient reasons given for the finding that the documents were not reliable. The judge also relied on issues such as delays in court proceedings as being implausible, but did not have regard to the CPIN which showed such delays were consistent with the situation in the appellant’s home country.
iii) Ground 3 – it was argued that the judge made irrational findings, in that there was medical evidence in the bundle of the appellant’s health conditions, but the judge made no mention of them, and the only reference to her health issues was that the appellant ‘has never been diagnosed with mouth cancer’. The appellant’s health was a relevant consideration with regard to whether there were very significant obstacles to her reintegration, as part of the human rights appeal. There was also a failure to have regard to background information when assessing risk on return.
iv) Ground 4 - it was argued that the judge materially erred in not applying the approach in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, in that when making a credibility assessment, the judge failed to have regard to the respondent’s concession that large parts of the factual matrix were accepted, or that no inconsistencies in the claim had been identified. That was particularly important in light of the appellant’s accepted vulnerability and medical conditions.
4. Permission to appeal was granted on Ground 1, on the basis that it was arguable that the judge failed to take account of the appellant’s status as a vulnerable witness, and to reference the appellant’s claimed vulnerability, or the assessment of the impact of that vulnerability, anywhere in the decision. Permission was also granted on the remaining grounds, which reflected the arguable error in Ground 1.
5. The respondent provided a response under Rule 24, in which it was conceded that the failure to refer to the vulnerable witness direction and its potential relevance to the credibility assessment was an error of law, although there was insufficient evidence before the judge to establish what conditions affected the appellant’s ability to give evidence and in what way they had affected her evidence. However, despite that concession, the respondent’s position was that it was not a material error, because the credibility points relied on by the judge would not have been impacted by the appellant’s vulnerability. It was asserted that the remainder of the appellant’s grounds amounted to disagreement with the outcome of the appeal and there was no medical evidence before the FtT.
THE HEARING
6. Ms Lecointe maintained the respondent’s concession with regard to Ground 1, and reiterated that the respondent did not accept that the error was material, since the appellant’s vulnerability would not be capable of addressing the adverse credibility points relied on by the judge. I asked Mr Chowdhury if he was able to direct me to any adverse credibility points that would be explained by the appellant’s vulnerability and the judge’s failure to reference the direction, but he was unable to do so. However, he made submissions in relation to all grounds.
7. I reserved my decision, which I now give.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Ground 1
8. The respondent accepts both that a vulnerable witness direction was made at the FtT hearing by the judge, and that it is an error of law for the judge to fail to mention that in the decision, or to have regard to its possible relevance to the assessment of the evidence. While there was criticism in the Rule 24 response of the lack of medical evidence to establish the appellant’s vulnerability, the appellant had provided an account of historic domestic abuse, which in itself might be capable of impacting her evidence to the extent she should be treated as a vulnerable witness. That account was accepted by the respondent. The appellant was also in her late sixties, and had produced medical evidence, according to the bundle index at least, [at 141-296] which referenced treatment in 2020 for medical conditions including ovarian and uterine cancer. The judge referred to medical evidence [at 44 to 45] in the decision. As set out in the Joint Presidential guidance, the appellant’s cultural and social background might also have been relevant to the decision to treat her as a vulnerable witness, in accordance with country information and authority (January 2024 CPIN “Women fearing gender based violence” and SA (Divorced woman- illegitimate child) Bangladesh CG [2011] UKUT 254 (IAC)).
9. I accept there is no reference to a vulnerable witness direction being made at the hearing in the FtT decision. I accept too that nowhere in the assessment of the appellant’s credibility is it referenced that the appellant was a vulnerable witness and that this might be capable of impacting her evidence at interview or at hearing, and so was relevant to the credibility assessment, which is contrary to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant guidance (paragraphs 14 and 15) and the Practice Direction for the First Tier and Upper Tribunal on Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses. I accept that this is an error of law, as was conceded by the respondent.
10. I find the error is not material, however, as when assessing credibility, the judge did not rely on the points raised in the refusal letter about possible inconsistencies or areas in which the account was said to lack detail, in relation to which the vulnerability might be a relevant factor within the credibility assessment. The judge relied only on credibility issues that might be said to relate more to plausibility or consistency with the situation in the country [at 33 and 36], which related ultimately to passage of time and were not capable of being explained or affected by any vulnerability or its impact on the appellant’s ability to give evidence.
11. I therefore find there is an error of law in relation to Ground 1, but it is not material, and so is not capable of undermining the decision.
Ground 2
12. It is not contentious that the respondent accepted the factual matrix asserted by the appellant, save for her claim to have received threats, or to have had two politically motivated cases pursued against her.
13. The judge appropriately directed themselves to the relevance of credibility ‘indicators’ at the start of the section of the decision under the heading ‘Findings’. However, when listing those which were relevant, the judge referred to ‘internal consistency’, but did not refer to having found any internal inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence. However, no findings were made about that. This is perhaps not a central part of the credibility assessment, but the judge then, appropriately, had regard to areas of the claim where the respondent accepted the appellant had given a credible account, but set out only some of those concessions [at 32]. The judge recorded that the respondent accepted the appellant’s political affiliations in her own country and in this country with an opposition party, but did not mention that the respondent accepted that her husband was affiliated with the ruling party or any potential implications of that concession on the assessment of credibility or of risk on return. Nor was it mentioned that the respondent accepted the appellant had given a credible account of domestic abuse in her marriage, or that she had become divorced from her husband in 2014. These matters were all relevant to the credibility assessment for a number of reasons, as follows:
i) The judge appropriately directed themselves to KS (Benefit of the Doubt) [2014] UKUT 00552 (IAC) but then did not have regard to what impact positive credibility concessions, plausibility and consistency of evidence, if any, had on the overall assessment of credibility;
ii) Past persecutory acts or harm may be relevant to the assessment of future harm;
iii) The judge had regard to timing of the claimed false prosecutions against the appellant as a central adverse credibility point, but did not consider whether they related to relevant dates in the factual chronology, such as the accepted facts of when the marriage came to an end and when divorce was finalised.
14. In relation to why the timing of the purported false prosecution cases being initiated was not credible, the judge only said ‘in my opinion…this aspect of the Appellant’s claim lacks credibility’ but did not provide any reasons to support that finding, despite this being one of the only two core credibility points relied on by the respondent.
15. The second core credibility point related to the substantial delay between the appellant leaving her country and the progression of the false cases through the courts, and the advocate providing the court documents subsequent to the refusal. The appellant says the judge failed to have regard to country information at the FtT hearing. This includes the November 2023 CPIN Actors of Protection (2.1.13, 8.1.3, 8.3.6) which cites ‘severe backlogs’ for court cases as being common, unless bribes are paid, and says that these delays are used deliberately by litigants to their advantage (8.3.5 and 8.3.6). When assessing whether a feature of the claim is credible, that assessment must be done through the lens or prism of the country information and in the context of legal, social and other norms in the country in which the events took place. The appellant says the judge did not have regard to country information which was supportive of her account, and says instead adverse credibility points were taken, which were not supported by that country information.
16. Finally, the appellant relies on the judge’s approach to the documents produced. I bear in mind that some documentation has been potentially accepted to be reliable, such as in relation to the appellant’s divorce and the political activities of the appellant and of her ex-husband. There was no reference to those issues in the assessment of whether the other documents were capable of attracting weight. It would be relevant too, when taking all the evidence in the round and applying the principles of Tanveer Ahmed, that the respondent had made positive credibility concessions in relation to aspects of the appellant’s claim. What impact those concessions have is a matter for the judge, but there is no reference to these issues having been considered anywhere that I can identify in the judge’s decision, when it was decided that ‘little weight’ should be attached to the documents. Again, there is an absence of explanation of reasons for those findings.
17. I find that cumulatively, the absence of reasons or specific mention of issues relevant to the credibility assessment, or consideration of the asserted factual matrix in the context of the country information, amounts to an error, which is material, because it concerns core elements of the issues that the judge was required to determine.
18. I have not gone on to consider the remaining grounds, as I have found a material error of law in the credibility assessment, which therefore means the findings and assessment of risk on return are also infected by that error and must be set aside in their entirety. However, the appellant also asserts that any assessment of whether internal relocation is reasonable, would also require consideration of all of the factors raised, including those said to relate to vulnerability.
Remaking
19. I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and further considered in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I am mindful that there are still issues relevant to credibility to be determined, which may require oral evidence. Further, the assessment of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation may be affected by any change in country situation owing to the recent elections in Bangladesh. Bearing in mind too the relevance of the two stage appellate process, I have decided to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. Neither party had a preference as to the venue for re-making.
Notice of Decision
20. The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of errors of law. Accordingly, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 11 September 2025 is set aside, with no findings of fact preserved. The appeal is allowed but only to the extent that it will be heard afresh by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal.

H Graves
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 March 2026