UI-2025-005551

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 01 Jul 2026
• Promulgation date: 13 Aug 2026
• Publication date: 02 Sep 2026
• Last updated on: 02 Sep 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005551
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52113/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

13th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

V T
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Wood, Legal Representative instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent : Mr M. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 1 July 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order:
1. The FtTJ made an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
2. This is the remaking of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. In accordance with section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, it follows the decision made by Upper Tribunal Lodato and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Frantzis (“ the Panel”) , issued on 29 April 2026 by which it was concluded that the FtTJ materially erred in law when dismissing the appellant’s appeal and that its decision should be set aside.
The background:
3. In terms of relevant background, the appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. The appellant entered the UK on 3 October 2019 and on 4 October 2019 made a claim for asylum. He completed a screening interview on 4 October 2019 and was interviewed on 13 April 2022. He claimed that he worked as a Kolbar smuggling alcohol into Iran in August 2016 and on the second time he did this he was encountered by the Pasdar (Islamic Revolutionary Guards) who shot at him. He was able to run away and hide for a time before leaving Iran on 20 August 2016. He travelled through and resided in a number of countries, including Turkey, Serbia, Bulgaria, Italy and France until he arrived in the UK in October 2019. He claimed that since arriving he attended demonstrations and had posted material on a Facebook account that was against the Iranian regime and he would be at risk on return to Iran because he smuggled alcohol and as a result of his sur place political activities in United Kingdom.
4. On 20 May 2022 the respondent refused his asylum and human rights claim. This led to a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal on 25 January 2023, in which his claim for asylum was dismissed. The appellant sought permission to appeal which was granted and on 18 March 2024 the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision and remitted it to the FtTJ to hear afresh.
5. This resulted in a hearing before a different FtTJ on 3 September 2025 who dismissed his appeal in a decision promulgated on 4 September 2025 having rejected his account of events in Iran and finding that he would not be at risk on return to Iran as a result of his claimed political activities. The appellant sought permission to appeal the part of the decision that related to his political activities in the UK.
6. It was this decision that was appealed before the UT Panel which led to their decision issued on 29 April 2026.
7. The error of law decision is set out in the annex to this remaking decision.
8. The reasons given for setting aside the decision which related to his sur place activity in the UK was that whilst the FtTJ appeared to have found that the appellant engaged in political activities disingenuously, the appellant had not had an opportunity to address that concern and when it had never been the subject of questioning during the hearing ( see paragraph 11 of the UT decision). That being the case, the panel found that an assessment of whether the appellant’s activities were motivated by a genuine political belief would be relevant in the assessment of whether he could be expected to delete his activity and thus relevant to risk on return.
9. The panel therefore set aside the decision on that aspect of the claim.
10. For the purposes of the remaking of the decision, the UT panel preserved the findings of fact made by FtTJ Forster at paragraph 11- 31 and also paragraph 39. Those findings of fact related to the rejection of the appellant’s claim as it related to event in Iran and the appellant’s motives for leaving Iran. The panel also found that there was no challenge to the findings made at paragraph 44 in respect of the appeal brought on article 8 grounds and were also preserved. I observe that for the purposes of this hearing, Article 8 was not raised.
The issues:
11. The adverse finding of facts which concern the appellant’s account of events in Iran are preserved findings for the remaking hearing as set out in the decision of the panel and as recorded above.
12. Thus, the issues identified for the hearing are as follows:
a. Whether the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom are motivated by a genuine political belief;
b. Whether the Appellant’s sur place activities have already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities;
c. Whether the Appellant can be expected to delete his Facebook account;
d. Whether the Appellant is at risk on return to Iran as a result of his sur place activities in the United Kingdom.
The evidence:
13. When seeking to clarify the material relied upon, it became apparent that a new bundle of evidence had been uploaded on the electronic file on behalf the appellant on 24 June 2026. This bundle had not been processed on the Ce File in view of the date it was uploaded. The previous bundle that had been uploaded for the hearing before the panel was available prior to the hearing. Steps were therefore taken for that bundle to be provided by the tribunal staff. Mr Wood helpfully indicated that the majority of the bundle related to the previous material that had been in the earlier bundle and identified the new evidence as an updated witness statement and two further screenshots relating to demonstrations. That material was provided separately to me and time was taken to read and absorb those new documents. Mr Wain confirmed that he had been served with the bundle prior to the hearing.
14. Mr Wood also raised a point that in the light of the decision in Lata [2023] UKUT 163  the respondent should have particularised her case in relation to the genuineness of his political opinion. Mr Wain submitted by response that the respondent was not required to set out cross examination in advance but that it was clear from the previous decisions and submissions made that they respondent did not accept his postings and attendance were carried out as a result of a genuine political activity and that this was a question of credibility.
15. I concluded that the requirements in Lata were addressed by the UT Panel who set out the issues to be determined in their decision. The litigation history sets out above that this is third time that the issue of the credibility of the appellant’s political activities have been raised and to be determined. In those circumstances the issue is clearly outlined. Mr Wood has not sought any prior direction before the remaking of the hearing and it is of note also that the appellant’s bundle was served late. There was no skeleton argument setting out any argument relating to this for the respondent to consider or reply to. Furthermore, Mr Wood would be entitled to ask any questions in re-examination that he thought appropriate from matters arising in cross-examination.
16. The appellant gave his evidence with the assistance of an interpreter in the Kurdish Sorani language. There were no problems identified with the interpretation and both the interpreter, and the appellant confirmed that they were able to understand each other.
17. In oral evidence the appellant confirmed the previous witness statements that had been filed for the previous proceedings dated 28 April 2022 (p705-707CB), 18 July 2022 (p242CB), 3 June 2024 (p241) and the recent witness statement dated 24 June 2026 (p28 CB) as his evidence in chief. There were no additional questions asked in chief. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent questioned the appellant about the relevant aspects of his claim. It is not necessary to set out the evidence as it is in the record of proceedings, and its salient aspects will be reviewed in the analysis of the evidence.
18. At the conclusion of the evidence each party had the opportunity to provide their closing submissions on the issues identified. Mr Wood had not prepared a skeleton argument for the hearing but relied upon the previous skeleton argument dated 5 June 2024 found at pages 226-238 of the consolidated bundle (hereinafter referred to as “CB”).
19. I am grateful for the helpful submissions proved by both advocates.
20. It is not necessary to set out those submissions in any detail as they are a matter of record, and I confirm that I have had regard to those submissions in reaching an analysis on the issues in this appeal.
Discussion:
21. The appellant has appealed under s82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision of the respondent to refuse his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection. The appellant claims to be a refugee whose removal from the UK would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
22. The appellant bears the burden of proving that he falls within the definition of "refugee". In essence, the appellant has to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing, more simply expressed as a 'real risk', that he is outside of his country of nationality, because of a well-founded fear of persecution for a refugee convention reason and he is unable or unwilling, because of such fear, to avail himself of the protection of that country.
23. The degree of likelihood of persecution needed to establish an entitlement to asylum is decided on a basis lower than the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. This was expressed as a "reasonable chance", "a serious possibility" or "substantial grounds for thinking" in the various authorities. That basis of probability not only applies to the history of the matter and to the situation at the date of decision, but also to the question of persecution in the future if the Appellant were to be returned.
24. The Immigration Rules provide at paragraph 339L as follows:
'It is the duty of the person to substantiate the asylum claim or establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate their human rights claim. Where aspects of the person's statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate their asylum claim or establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate their human rights claim.
(ii) all material factors at the person's disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given.
(iii) the person's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person's case.
(iv) the person has made an asylum claim or sought to establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or made human rights claim at the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established.'
25. The relevant guidance from the Upper Tribunal which I have reminded myself of and applied is as follows, BA (Demonstrators in Britain-risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC); HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430. PS (Christianity-risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 046 (IAC), XX (PJAK- sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 000 23 (IAC) and also OM v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585. I observed that I have not been directed to any particular paragraphs during the submissions made by the advocates but that reliance was placed on those decisions in their general submissions and to which have had regard.
26. The starting point in the factual assessment are the preserved findings for the decision of the FtTJ as preserved by the UT panel.
27. They are as follows: Paragraphs 11-31 which related to the appellant’s claim to be working as a Kolbar ( smuggler) and his account having been encountered by the Pasadar. The FtTJ rejected his account of events in Iran. The FtTJ at paragraph 31 considered his journey to the UK via a number of safe countries but rejected the appellant’s account as to why he had failed to claim asylum in those safe countries. The judge made his finding that “I find it reasonably likely that the appellant’s intention was always to come to the UK. His conduct before arriving in this country damaged his credibility and is one of the factor that determines the outcome of the appeal.”
28. The FtTJ’s final summary is at paragraph 39, “I do not accept the apparent account of his alleged encounter with the Pasdar in 2016. This is central to his claim and my findings undermine his overall credibility. I find that the appellant was not a Kolbar as he claims. It is free to be likely that the appellant left Iran as an economic migrant with the ultimate intention of getting to the UK. He was not of interest be Iranian authorities then and it is reasonably unlikely that his political activities in the UK have come to their attention now.”
29. I make the relevant factual findings considering the evidence as a whole and whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the material aspects of the appellant’s claim are demonstrated. The burden of proof remains on the appellant.
30. The first issue identified is whether the appellant’s sur place activities are motivated by a genuine political belief held by him.
31. Having had the opportunity to consider the evidence including the oral and the documentary evidence and considering it “in the round” I have concluded by applying the lower standard of proof that the appellant has not demonstrated that his activities in the United Kingdom have been carried out from any genuinely motivated beliefs that are held by him. I have reached that conclusion for the reasons set out below.
32. The appellant has previously been found by FtTJ Forster to have not told the truth concerning his claimed activities in Iran which led to him leaving that country. His account of being a Kolbar involved in smuggling alcohol and being encountered by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards whom he claims shot at him but he was able to hide and then escape was wholly rejected by the FtTJ. The FtTJ concluded that he did not accept the appellant’s account of his alleged encounter with the Pasdar in August 2016 ( see paragraph 39). The FtTJ made a finding that he had travelled through a number of safe countries but did not claim asylum in any of them and found that it was reasonably likely that the appellant’s intention was always to come to the UK and that “his conduct before arriving in this country damaged his credibility..”(at paragraph 31). The FtTJ also found that it was reasonably likely that the appellant left Iran as an economic migrant with the ultimate intention of getting to the UK” and that “he was of no interest to the Iranian authorities” ( see paragraph 39). Those findings of fact were preserved by the UT panel and they remain undisturbed.
33. The appellant has been found to have been an untruthful witness and as lacking in credibility in a core aspect of his claim. In this context I take into account that a person may lie about one matter but may be truthful in others. Whilst I would accept that those findings are not determinative, in my judgement and on the facts of this case it is a relevant factor in assessing his overall credibility in the same way if he had been credible in his account as to why he left Iran and the circumstances in his country might be viewed as a positive factor or one in his favour.
34. I find on the evidence that the appellant’s account has shifted from being a Kolbar to claiming to hold and express political views. This was the finding of fact made by the FtTJ at paragraph 15 which was a preserved finding. The FtTJ made a finding of fact that following his arrival in October 2019 and his interview in April 2022, whilst not abandoning his claim to have been a Kolbar who was of interest to the Iranian authorities, he shifted the focus of his claim to that of political activities. Having considered the evidence and in the light of the submissions made, I would also make that finding on the evidence before me. When the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom he undertook a screening interview. At Q4.1 (p 642CB), the appellant was asked to briefly explain ALL of the reasons why he could not return to his home country ( the emphasis on “ALL” is recorded in the SI). The only reference made by the appellant is that he had been smuggling alcohol and that this was the reason why he could not return. There is no reference at all to having held pro-Kurdish political views in Iran. Whilst Mr Wood submitted that the appellant understood the question meaning why he had to leave Iran, that was not the question that was asked - he was asked for all the reasons why he could not return to his own country. I am satisfied that if it was true that he held pro-Kurdish views which he had held before leaving Iran and which he had wished to voice that he would have referred to that.
35. This finding is supported by other relevant evidence. The appellant in interview (q126) when asked about whether he supported a political party when in Iran stated, “No but I support my Kurdish ethnicity, to be able to live free in this life. To have a safe life and to obtain and achieve my objectives in a peaceful way. To live freely like everyone else and to experience wellbeing…” Whilst initially during cross examination he did not accept that this was a reference to any political interest, he did agree that it was. Despite this the appellant made no mention of not being able to return to Iran because he wanted to support his Kurdish ethnicity in his screening interview which is what he later claimed. Furthermore, it is not consistent with his interview response at question 34 when asked “Can you briefly tell me your reasons for claiming asylum in your own words? His replies as follows, “Because when I was in Iran, I could not achieve any of my objectives, that is why I came to the UK, a democratic country. There is no democracy in my home country. The country that I lived in, they didn't regard human rights”. A further inconsistency in his evidence is given in question 147, when asked if he had been politically active in Iran, the appellant stated, “No but I secretly I was against the state, I could not do it openly or they would kill me”. Thus, taking together those interview responses, if the appellant had held pro-Kurdish, secret views against the state and that he had come to the UK because he could not achieve any objectives whilst in Iran in the sense of any political views, I am satisfied that it is reasonably likely that he would have said that following his arrival in 2019 and prior to the interview in 2022.
36. I have not viewed the interview responses in isolation but also find that this is supported by his conduct between leaving Iran in 2016 and his arrival in the UK in October 2019.
37. The FtTJ made a finding at paragraph 31 which is a preserved finding that the appellant travelled through a number of safe countries but did not claim asylum in any of them. The FtTJ made a further finding that it was reasonably likely that the appellant’s intent was always to come to the United Kingdom and that his conduct before arrival in the country damaged his credibility. The evidence given by the appellant is that he left Iran on 20 August 2016 and spent five months in Turkey. He was in Bulgaria for 45 days and then went to Serbia where he resided for a period of 4 to 5 months supported by charities. He then went to Italy where he stayed for one month and then on to France for 10 months ( see SI p622CB). Despite his claim made in interview that he held secret political views when in Iran which he could not express because he was fearful, when he was in a number of safe countries outside of Iran where he resided for extended periods, the appellant did not seek to either express or vocalise political views in any way including the use of any social media. In evidence during the hearing, he agreed that he had told FtTJ Forster that he had not been politically active in the three years prior to entering the UK and that he had given his explanation that he was unable to voice his political views until he reached a safe country, that is the UK, and because he was unwell. In his oral evidence he reiterated that he could not voice his political views because he was unwell and when asked whether it was due to the same problems that he had referred to previously in his evidence he agreed. The evidence demonstrates that the medical problems that he identified in 2019 were rheumatism and a lump on his hand and he had a swollen leg ( see para 2.1 S I at p671CB). In the asylum interview in 2022 (q5) when answering questions about his ill health he said that he had eczema and problem with his left leg. In my judgement that evidence provides no reasonable or cogent explanation as to why was not able to express any form of his political views during the three-year period identified if his account given now is true that he had always held secret views which he wished to voice but had been unable to do so.
38. This also stands in stark contrast to his claim that he had set up a Facebook account in France so “ I could express my opinions freely “(see witness statement; para 2 at p241CB). Whilst the appellant claims to have provided his social media account the evidence presented does not show a Facebook account being open prior to his entry in the UK. The first evidence of this is 16 October 2019 (p 703CB).
39. Taking that evidence together, in my judgement the appellant has provided no reasonable or credible explanation as to why he had not sought to express his views during that extended period in a number of safe countries as I find them to be, but that he only did so when he came to the UK. I find that this undermines the credibility of his claim to hold genuine political views and the wish to express them.
40. It is also relevant despite the appellant being resident in the UK since October 2019, the first demonstration he attended was in 2021. In cross-examination he was asked about question 45 (p642CB) and his reply that he had been smuggling alcohol but since arriving in the UK he had taken part in demonstrations so he could not return to Iran. He was asked whether that answer meant he had been attending demonstrations since 2019? His first answer was that he had attended demonstrations in 2019 but when it was put to him that his witness statement referred to the first demonstration as the 4 April 2021 and not 2019, he agreed. When asked why he did not attend any demonstrations from October 2019 until April 2021, his reply was that he needed some time “to be stable” but that he was “active on social media”. I do not consider that explanation to be a reasonable nor credible explanation for a lack of political activity between those dates. Firstly, it does not sit well nor is it consistent with the oral evidence given during the hearing that in 2019 he was living with friends from Iran who had set up his Facebook account and were posting for him. Therefore, his own evidence demonstrated that he had a stable network.
41. Mr Wood submits that the appellant has attended demonstrations and that he has not sought to exaggerate his role in the demonstrations, for example by wearing a high vis jacket and that this supports his claim to be genuinely politically motivated. Whilst the appellant has attended demonstrations, this is not in dispute. What is disputed is why he has attended them and for what purpose. Contrary to the submission made, there is one post showing the appellant wearing a hi viz jacket ( see page 53CB). It is not explained why the appellant would wear a hi viz jacket given his evidence that he is not involved in the organisation of the demonstrations or has any role in them beyond attending.
42. In support of his claim to hold genuine political views the appellant relies upon his social media usage (Facebook account). Having assessed the appellant’s evidence relating to this account and how it is operated I have reached the conclusion applying the lower standard that his evidence is not consistent nor is it credible.
43. It was put to him in cross-examination that in view of the evidence he gave in interview (question 89) and also the evidence he gave in September 2025, that he was not able to operate the account himself and that he would not be able to either look at or post independently of other unnamed and unidentified third parties. The appellant’s answer to this that he was able to use this account and that “right now” he was able to post and share information and was able to copy posts and information on his Facebook account. He said that he was able to do this because “slowly, slowly I get knowledge about how to do this.” The appellant also said that he was able to do so because, “I have a year in college.”
44. I have considered those responses given in cross-examination in light of the evidence. It is his case that his social media has been operative since 2019. In interview when asked if he could read or write, the appellant responded, “No I cannot. Very little - that is because I go to college and I learn bit by bit”(Q89). He later claimed to have gone to college for one year when interviewed in 2022.
45. When asked in 2022 if he was able to post on Facebook when he could not read or write, he gave an account that “When I go to the demonstrations, I give people my mobile and say post that for me. Because I cannot read or write, I have no option but to ask my friends”.
46. In 2025 his evidence was of a similar kind and his evidence is recorded as stating that he had difficulty reading and writing; that he writes on Facebook with help from friends. He was unable to read very much of the content which he has liked or reposted on his account and that he and his friends cut-and-paste material to put on his site.
47. In light of that evidence, I do not accept that he has demonstrated the ability to be able to operate the account independently as he has claimed now. He has not credibly explained why in September 2025 he was not able to read much of the content that others were posting on the account but that now in June 2026 he was able to operate the account himself. His reference to having attended college for one year does not in my judgement provide any reasonable or credible explanation. In 2022 when interviewed he claimed to have gone to college for one year at that stage. There is no evidence of any further reference to the appellant having renewed any place at college since then (see question 90), and therefore it has not been evidenced that his claimed changed ability to operate the account is due to any further educational assistance. Any assistance given in college would not help him to learn to read or write in Kurdish Sorani.
48. His oral evidence in answer to the suggestion that his social media was in essence someone else’s and not his, the appellant replied “no I’m using my account from 2019. I have knowledge and use of social media. “However, his oral evidence that he does not let others uses Facebook account as it is “personal” is not consistent with the earlier evidence set out above that related to 2019 onwards nor that given in September 2025.
49. I conclude from the evidence “in the round” that whilst the account is in his name it is not in reality operated by him and that he has not explained satisfactorily or evidenced the apparent change in his ability to operate, use and access the account as now claimed.
50. Despite his claim made earlier that others been instrumental in providing assistance so that he can voices his genuine political views there has been no evidence of those involved at either of the two previous hearings (in 2023 and 2025). When asked in cross-examination why he had not obtained any evidence from those who had supported him, the answer given in my judgement was wholly lacking in credibility. He claimed that he was not living with those friends from Iran from 2019 who had moved. That is not consistent with the evidence given in September 2025 that others are placing posts on his Facebook account. If that is so, he is in contact with those third parties.
51. Whilst it might be said that it is credible that someone who is of Kurdish ethnicity would have views which were supportive of that ethnicity as set in the context of the position of Kurds not only in Iran but in other countries, I have balanced that against the other evidence available relating to his claim but having done so I am not satisfied that this outweighs the other credibility points raised which are adverse. I find the reality to be that the appellant has not demonstrated that he does operate Facebook account himself independently of other unnamed and unidentified third parties. I am satisfied that the posting of Facebook is not a reflection of any genuinely held views of his own. Facebook is not an obvious means of expression for someone who cannot read or write very well as he previously claimed and he would have no way of knowing what was on the site other than in the most general of terms. Given the claim that it had been set up in 2019 and the evidence shows that a couple of weeks after his arrival in October 2019 he had posted on Facebook, I am satisfied that that was demonstrative conduct of someone who was seeking to contrive a political profile as is his attendance at the demonstrations. When asked in evidence if he used Facebook to post pictures of himself or others going about ordinary activities such as visiting places et cete he said, “I have no personal information all of it is political”. That is indicative of someone in my view who was using Facebook to contrive a claim for asylum rather than holding genuine views.
52. I find that the Facebook posts are not his views but are those of others and not reflective of his own. As stated there is no evidence of any those involved despite the claim made that others have been. Nothing is known about those third parties, who they are why they have posted items or whether they have any genuine political views or otherwise.
53. Turning to the remaining issues, Mr Wood submits that even if the appellant is found not to have genuinely motivated political views, the appellant still is at a real risk of persecution on return to Iran as a result of his attendance at demonstrations and in light of the material that he has available on his Facebook social media. His submission is that as a result of attending frequent demonstrations he has already been identified as a person of adverse interest and likely to be monitored by the authorities in Iran.
54. It was submitted by Mr Wood that it is not unreasonable that the Iranian authorities would seek to film those who attend demonstrations in the UK and that building on this, the photographs would be captured and sent abroad. He relies upon the decision in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 and BA (demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG).
55. He submits that the Iranian authorities are sophisticated and by reference to the key passage index, there is objective material to show that they have access to facial recognition software to identify people of interest. He submits that even if that material relates to Iran rather than the UK, the transmission of information to the Iranian authorities generates a real risk to the appellant on return.
56. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent submits that the appellant has no previous profile with the Iranian authorities given that his account of being at risk in Iran was rejected by the FtTJ. By reference to the decision in BA (demonstrators in Britain), the demonstrations that he has attended are sporadic and he is no more than one of the crowd, could not be described as anyone having a significant political profile. He has not been involved in organising demonstrations as accepted in his witness statement (p248CB). When applying the decision in XX (PJAK) and by reference to the social graph, it has not been demonstrated that it is reasonably likely that his attracted adverse interest and this would be subject to prior surveillance.
57. He further submitted that the social media evidence has little evidential value given that it is limited to photographs/screenshots and has not provided the full disclosure as indicated at paragraph 7 of XX (PJAK). The posts are in the main reposting of other posts; there is little evidence of a large number of likes from others and no indication of how many “friends” he has on Facebook given the lack of compliance with XX (PJAK).
58. I therefore turn to my analysis of the points raised by the advocates and of the evidence relevant to the issues to be determined and in particular an assessment of the number of protests/oppositional events an individual attends, the people that they are socialised with and are seen with, number of followers online when assessing the likelihood of whether an individual is monitored and would be of interest to the Iranian authorities (see BA (demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG) and as approved in XX (PJAK)).
59. Mr Wood has cited the decision in MH (Bangladesh) which I have taken into account in this assessment. The Court of Appeal found that the FtT had not placed an unrealistic evidential burden on the appellant in that appeal in determining that it failed to establish that his political activities in the UK against the regime were at such a level that he would be at risk of harm if returned to Bangladesh. Arnold LJ reviewed the authorities in the decision as set out in paragraphs 37 and 38. However , paragraph 39 states:
“Furthermore, as Patten LJ made clear in EM (Zimbabwe), the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and, if not, whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest in the regime. To take a simple example, if there is a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, and there is a considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing the slogan hostile to the government and a person who stands at the back with no placard: it is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noticed by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance and monitoring than the latter..”
60. I have therefore considered the evidence on this issue. As the decision in XX (PJAK) states by reference to BA (demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG) when assessing risk from attending demonstrations it is necessary to consider the evidence such as leadership role and/or degree of involvement in the protests, nature of activities, political and/or sectarian background of the individual, gender, visibility, being known to the authorities (e.g. previous arrest), etc. It is thus recognised that the sole fact of participating in protests/demonstrations are sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
61. Applying the guidance to this particular appellant, he was not a member of any political party in Iran before he came to the UK, he was not politically active in Iran and relying on the findings of fact made by Judge Forster had not come to any adverse attention of the Iranian authorities before he left. Thus, he was of no adverse interest to the authorities in Iran before he left nor did he have any profile of interest to them.
62. The demonstrations he has attended can be summarised as follows. In 2021 he attended 2 demonstrations on April 2021 and 10 June 2021. In 2022, he attended 3 demonstrations on 19 January 2022, 29 June 2022, and 29 August 2022. Those demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy in London.
63. In 2023 he attended 1 demonstration on 5 March 2023 in (Northern city) and 16 September 2023 does not show demonstration outside the embassy but a street in a northern city (p379) and attended on 3 September 2023 in London.
64. In 2024 he attended a demonstration on 26 May 2024 outside the embassy.
65. In 2025 he attended demonstrations in London on 20 July 2025 and 21 September 2025.
66. In 2026 he attended demonstrations on 11 January 2026, 1 February 2026, 9 March 2026, 4 April 2026 which took place in a northern city. He attended one demonstration on 14 June 2026 in London.
67. I find as a fact that the demonstrations that he has attended are limited both in their number over the period of years as set out above. Whilst he claims to have spent two hours at the demonstrations, there is no supporting evidence from others with whom he was present and presumably taking the photographs of him and those photographs of his attendance can show no more than a snapshot of the time they were taken.
68. When referring to the theme of the demonstrations, the evidence given by the appellant is generalised that they were against the Iranian authorities. However, there is no evidence that any of those demonstrations that he attended sporadically were publicised in the media or generated any other type of exposure.
69. When assessing his role, I do not find that he has played any prominent part in those demonstrations. He has stated that he is not involved in any of the organisation for those demonstrations and he has no political affiliation to any political party adverse to Iran or otherwise. When assessing the nature of his attendance at the demonstrations, the only real evidence is the photographic evidence that he has collated. Looking at that material, it is not demonstrated that he is prominent in those demonstrations and I accept the submission made by Mr Wain that he is no more than a member of a crowd. The appellant was asked in interview about the amount of people attending demonstrations and he was not able to give a number stating that there were hundreds. The photographs show that there are large numbers of individuals attending at these events and there is nothing to show that his role is anything other than peripheral. It is not claimed by him that he is standing alongside anyone of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities or anyone who is a political activist or known or identified to be so.
70. Whilst he attended a demonstration in the northern city on 5 March 2023 and on 16 September 2023, there were no further local demonstrations the attended until 2026, from January 2026-June 2026. I am satisfied that those are local demonstrations which were not held outside any Iranian embassy or any notable institution affiliated or otherwise connected to Iran. The appellant provides no evidence as to the organisers of those demonstrations. He was asked whether the demonstrations in the local town also related to others from Kurdistan. Whilst he claimed that he was participating in a demonstration against the Iranian regime, in the local town they give the appearance of other participants who are not Iranian Kurds but have Kurdish ethnicity from other countries. That is shown by the banners that they are holding showing “free Kurdistan”. In any event it is not suggested that in those local demonstrations he played any role other than being one of the crowd nor was he involved in any of the organisation of such demonstrations.
71. Returning to the issue of surveillance as relied upon by Mr Wood, there is evidence that the Iranian authorities have cameras at the embassy and in the circumstances are likely to film demonstrations that occur outside their embassy. However, taking into account the country guidance decision is relevant to Iran (both the decision of BA (demonstrations) and XX (PJAK)) and due to the large number of people who attend the demonstrations in the UK, and as demonstrated by the photographs taken by the appellant, the Iranian authorities are not able to monitor all of those concerned or those who attend.
72. It is in this context that Mr Wood submits that the Iranian authorities have facial recognition technology therefore the appellant will be someone who will be viewed as a person of adverse interest. In his submissions Mr Wood did not take me to the individual pieces of evidence relied upon that relied upon the key passage index in support (page 725CB). In his submissions he recognised that the materially highlighted in that key passage index in the main refers to facial recognition in use in Iran rather than in the UK. Having considered that material and whether Iran has used or drawn upon software available from China, the material refers to the authorities focusing on those described as dissidents with a public profile (see p159CB) and those who speak in public (p159CB). Others identified as a focus for the regime are those who have organisational ties with political groups or those who are influential or have profiles such as social media influences with large followings (p154 and P157). There is no evidence that the Iranian authorities operate a mass surveillance program to monitor all its citizens in the UK or elsewhere nor that they monitor all online activities. As set out previously due to the large number of people who demonstrate in the UK it has not been shown that the Iranian authorities are able to monitor all those who demonstrate.
73. Mr Wain argues that the submission made by Mr Wood concerning facial recognition is so wide that it would encompass everyone who demonstrated outside the embassy and therefore the submission made in essence means that all of those who would do so would be at real risk on return. In my view when assessing risk on return it should be assessed by reference to particular profile and activities of the person in question, in other words an individualised risk assessment is required.
74. On the findings made in relation to this particular appellant, I am not satisfied that it is reasonably likely that his attendance at demonstrations or his postings have come to the adverse attention of the authorities and by reference to his profile on the “social graph”. As set out above, the appellant is no more than a person in a large crowd of demonstrators. He stands away from the embassy and there is nothing to draw him to the authorities attention as either an organiser or holding any particular role in the demonstrations. He is not affiliated to any particular political party and is not seen on the photographs posted as standing by someone who holds a particular role or affiliation.
75. As set out above in terms of activity I reject the submission made that he is active in the sense that he is chanting and shouting slogans (see submission made by reference to the witness statement paragraph 6). The photographs do not show that but show him posing and holding a picture/photograph or a flag on occasion ( see 5/42021(p266), p265, p271). There is a picture of flag being burnt but does not show any faces (p264). Mr Wood did not draw to my attention any evidence in support of the claim of him to be “active” in the way as claimed by way of any photographs of him shouting. The photographs give the appearance of them being staged showing him posing in front of the person taking the picture.
76. In respect of the posts, they are in the main reposts of material from others and not from the appellant (see pages 241, 422, 429, 450, 435). The posts show the same photographs of the appellant which appear to be taken on the same date but are posted on different dates. For example, on 13 July 2021 (page 271) there is the same photograph posted on 5 June 2021 (page 268), and on 23 May 2021 (page 272) and on 25 August 2021 (page 274). Therefore, five different dates show the same photograph. On 25 August 2021 (p274) and 18 Jan (page 255) show the same photograph.
77. When assessing his social media activity, the posts are in the main reposting of other posts; there is little evidence of a large number of likes from others and no indication of how many “friends” he has on Facebook or who they are.
78. Given his lack of ability to post his own material(see earlier findings made), he is not someone who could be described as a social media influencer who has a large following, the likes are in small numbers and as set out in my analysis above his understanding of the account is limited. There is no evidence that the Facebook that he operates has been the subject of any hacking or any other action taken or interference by the Iranian authorities or their proxies. Nor is there evidence from the appellant that he has been subject to any threats as a result of any posts or attendance at the demonstrations.
79. In light of the previous findings of the FtTJ the appellant is not known to the Iranian authorities when he was in Iran. He has not been of any adverse interest to them previously. He has not posted political material or previously been involved in any particular activity when in Iran and therefore has no previous profile of interest.
80. Taken those factors together it is not demonstrated on the material relevant to this particular appellant that even if the Iranian authorities film those at demonstrations that in his case there is a real risk of having been identified as a person of adverse interest who would therefore be someone subjected to “targeted surveillance” (as set out in the decision of XX (PJAK)).
81. It has not been shown either that if they have or use facial recognition that the Iranian authorities have the ability to monitor and then subsequently identify someone who has the profile of this particular appellant, who, on the evidence, is not known to the authorities, and on the findings of fact made has not attracted targeted surveillance.
82. In summary, the appellant has not demonstrated that his claimed political activities in the UK are genuinely held nor that those activities, either via social media or by attendance the demonstrations, that he has been the subject of any targeted surveillance so that he is of any adverse interest to the authorities in Iran.
83. Against that background the risk on return to Iran is to be conducted. As the FtTJ found previously there is no risk to appellant based on any previous profile from any activities in Iran. He is also not of any adverse interest based on the activities carried out in the UK for the reasons given above. In light of the assessment made that he does not have a genuine political belief, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant will seek to express any political opinion when in Iran, either attending demonstrations or by posting on social media. In those circumstances as the appellant does not have genuine beliefs that he would express on return and therefore would not be at risk based on HJ(Iran).
84. I therefore apply the relevant country guidance decisions. In XX (PJAK- sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG[2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) the UT confirmed the guidance in BA (demonstrators in Britain) Iran CG [2011) UKUT 36(IAC); SSH & HR Iran CG[2016] UKUT 308, PS (Christian – risk) Iran CG [2020) UKUT 00 46 and HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC).
85. There is no dispute that the appellant left Iran illegally and is a failed asylum seeker. Having exited Iran illegally and returning from the UK as a failed asylum seeker does not lead to a real risk of persecution ( see BA (demonstrators) paragraph 67). The decision in SSH and HR confirms that Iranian nationals who do not have a passport will be returnable to Iran via a document called a “Laissez passer”. This is obtained from the Iranian embassy. It is further set out in the country guidance decision of XX (PJAK) that the first “pinch point” where a risk may crystallise, is where the appellant applies for the emergency travel document (“EDT”) where the author Iranian authorities carry out a check on the person’s social media activity.
86. When assessing risk on return in this context I take into account the decision of XX (PJAK). At [6] and [9] of the headnote, the following guidance was given:
[6] The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a "critical" Facebook account, provided that someone's Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.
[9] In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
87. The above parts of the headnote are to be considered together with the relevant part of the body of the decision in which the following observations were made at [98] - [102]:
To what extent can a person be expected not to volunteer the fact of having previously had a Facebook account, on return to his country of origin?
[98] Our answer is in two parts. The first is whether the law prevents a decision maker from asking if a person will volunteer to the Iranian authorities the fact of a previous lie to the UK authorities, such as a protection claim made on fabricated grounds, or a deleted Facebook account. We conclude that the law does not prevent such a question, in this case. Whilst we consider Mr Jaffey's suggestion that Lord Kerr had specifically counselled against asking the question at §72 of RT (Zimbabwe), that was in a very different context, namely where political loyalty, as opposed to neutrality, was required by the Zimbabwean regime. In that case, the relevant facts included the risk of persecution because of the activities of ill-disciplined militia at road blocks. The means used by those manning road blocks to test whether someone was loyal to the ruling Zanu-PF party included requiring them to produce a Zanu-PF card or to sing the latest Zanu-PF campaign song. An inability to do these things would be taken as evidence of disloyalty, where even political neutrality (as opposed to opposition) would result in a real risk of serious harm (§16). In that context, Lord Kerr regarded an analysis of whether a person could avoid persecution by fabricating loyalty as unattractive. He raised practical concerns in evaluating whether lying to a group of ill-disciplined and unpredictable militia would be successful (§72) but made clear that his comments were by way of "incidental preamble," as the critical question was whether the appellant in that case had the right to political neutrality (§(73).
[99] The key differences in our case are that the Iranian authorities do not persecute people because of their political neutrality, or perceived neutrality; and a returnee to Iran will not face an unpredictable militia, but a highly organised state. In our case, a decision maker is not falling into the trap of applying a test of what a claimant "ought to do," in cases of imputed political opinion. That was counselled against by Beatson LJ in SSHD v MSM (Somalia) and UNHCR  [2016] EWCA Civ 715.
[100]  Instead, in deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution in this sense, because there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.
[101]  The second part of our answer relates to Lord Kerr's concern about whether an analysis of what a person will do is too speculative or artificial an exercise. We accept Mr Jaffey's submission that there may be cases where the exercise is too speculative, particularly in the context of a volatile militia. That is not the case here.
[102]  We consider that it may be perfectly permissible for a decision maker to ask what a returnee to Iran will do, in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but factors which may point to that question not being impermissibly speculative include: where a person has a past history of destroying material, such as identification documents, or deception or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials; whether the government has well-established methods of questioning (in the Iranian state's case, these are well-documented and therefore predictable); and whether the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion, are minimal, because a personal's social graph or social media activities are limited.
88. In this context the appellant has stated that he will not delete his Facebook account. Whilst he asserts in the witness statement that he will not delete his Facebook account I do not consider that this response can be viewed in isolation but should be seen in the context of the overall claim made by him. On the assessment made of his activities in the UK I found them to be nongenuine and have been undertaken in support of a contrived asylum claim and that I do not accept that he intends to carry out any political activities either by way of demonstrations or by use of social media on return to Iran. Given the absence of any genuinely held beliefs in support of his attendance at demonstrations and posting of Facebook, there is nothing objectionable about him being expected to delete his account. As XX (PJAK) set out deleting the account will neutralise any potential risk of having a “critical” Facebook presence and that it is highly likely that the appellant will be aware of this and/or would receive clear legal advice to this effect before any pre- removal process begins. Taking the evidence as a whole, I do not accept his evidence that he would not delete his account because it is premised on his factual claim to hold political beliefs which on the findings of fact made he does not hold.
89. Thus, it is has not been demonstrated to the lower standard of a reasonable likelihood that the appellant will be at a real risk on return during the first pinch point of the pre-removal process.
90. This leads to the second pinch point of return and involves an assessment of the circumstances referred to as the “ hair trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities. This is described in the decisions of the approach held by the Iranian authorities towards those suspected or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or in support of Kurdish rights. The threshold of suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is said to be extreme. I am plainly aware of recent events in Iran arising out of the conflict between the US and Iran. Neither party has provided any objective country material concerning the recent events nor have they addressed me as to any possible effect. However, it is likely that the Iranian authorities will be at a heightened level during a time of such conflict.
91. As set out above and by reference to the facts, the appellant left Iran illegally and therefore applying the country guidance decision of BA (demonstrations) at paragraph 36 if a person has a travel document issued by the Iranian embassy abroad there will be questions on arrival. SSH & HR confirms at paragraph 23, “In our view the evidence does not establish that a failed asylum seeker who had left Iran illegally would be subjected on return to a period of detention or questioning such that there is a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. The evidence in our view shows no more than that they will be questioned, and that if there are any particular concerns arising from their previous activities either in Iran or in the United Kingdom or whichever country they are returned from, then there would be a risk of further questioning, detention and potential ill-treatment….  “.
92. The Upper Tribunal at [23[ also stated: "… a person with no history other than being an asylum seeker who had exited illegally and who could be expected to tell the truth when questioned would not face a real risk of ill-treatment during the period of questioning at the airport." The conclusion summarised in the headnote was:
"An Iranian male in respect of whom no adverse interest has previously been manifested by the Iranian State does not face a real risk of persecution / breach of his Article 3 rights on return to Iran on account of having left Iran illegally and/or being a failed asylum seeker. No such risk exists at the time of questioning on return nor after the facts (i.e. illegal exit and being a failed asylum seeker) have been established."
93. While being Kurdish was accepted in SSH and HR to be "an exacerbating factor for a returnee otherwise of interest", being Kurdish coupled with being undocumented was not sufficient to give rise to a risk of ill-treatment. This was confirmed and restated in HB (Kurds). Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant will be questioned on return however factors identified above (being Kurdish, failed asylum seeker and illegal exit) would not lead to a second stage interrogation unless something of concern arises during the initial questioning.
94. Applying the facts as found above notwithstanding the “hair trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities, I am satisfied that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant will be detained for a second stage interrogation. This is because the Iranian authorities have no adverse interest in the appellant from when he lived in Iran or from his activities in the UK given that he has not been the subject of targeted surveillance in the UK nor that they are aware of him via facial recognition. His Facebook account will be deleted therefore not available to the Iranian authorities. The appellant does not hold any genuine political beliefs and his actions in the UK have been undertaken to support a false claim of asylum. Whilst Mr Wood submits that the appellant was volunteer when asked about his activities in the UK in the context of being asked why he claimed asylum, I do not accept that the appellant will make a voluntary disclosure to the authorities of any activities undertaken in the UK. This is because he has not been genuine in those political activities as undertaken and as with the Facebook posts which I find he will delete, I draw the inference that the appellant will also not volunteer information which is a step I find on the evidence is not likely to take. This is an inference that I am able to draw from the evidence and from the findings of fact made (see OM v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585 at paragraph 54). The appellant has not been truthful in his asylum claim and therefore is relevant to the assessment of whether he will conceal information on return (see XX (PJAK) at paragraph [102]). On my analysis it is not demonstrated that the appellant will be at risk of any additional detailed questioning at a second stage as it has not been demonstrated the appellant would be of sufficient interest to the Iranian authorities even applying the “hair-trigger approach” on any heightened basis in light of the findings of fact made an assessment of the evidence.
95. I therefore conclude for the reasons set out above that the appellant has not demonstrated that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on return on account of any political opinion or that which would be perceived by either the Iranian authorities on return.
96. For those reasons, the appeal is dismissed on all grounds (Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 of the ECHR).

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision was set aside by the decision of the Upper Tribunal. It is re-made as follows: the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.


Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
6 August 2026


ANNEX 1
DECISION OF THE UT PANEL


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL Case No: UI-2025-005551
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52113/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued

29/04/2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between

VT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood (IAS)
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain (Counsel)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 30 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. We have decided to make an anonymity order in these proceedings. The underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the Appellant claims to fear persecution serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but are satisfied, taking the Appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 4th September 2025 (“the Decision”), of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) to dismiss his appeal on protection grounds.
Background
3. The broad factual background to the appeal is not in dispute between the Parties. It is set out at [5&6] of the Decision. In brief summary the Appellant’s case is that he started working as a kolbar smuggling alcohol into Iran in August 2016. The second time he did this he encountered the Pasdar (Islamic Revolutionary Guards) who shot at him. He was able to run away and return to his village where he hid for a time before leaving Iran. Since arriving in the United Kingdom in 2019, the Appellant has attended demonstrations and posted material on Facebook against the Iranian regime. The Appellant claims he would be at risk on return to Iran because he smuggled alcohol and because of his sur place political activities in the United Kingdom.
4. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim. Whilst the Appellant’s nationality and ethnicity are accepted, his claim to have been a kolbar and that he would be at risk on return to Iran either because he was a smuggler or because of his political activities in the United Kingdom was rejected.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal:
5. The Appellant appealed.
6. In dismissing the appeal, the FtT made the following findings:
a. “I do not accept the Appellant’s account of his alleged encounter with the Pasdar in August 2016. This is central to his claim and my findings undermine his overall credibility. I find that the Appellant was not a kolbar as he claims. It is reasonably likely that the Appellant left Iran as an economic migrant with the ultimate intention of getting to the UK. He was not of interest to the Iranian authorities then and it is reasonably unlikely that his political activities in the UK have come to their attention now. The facts as I have found them to be do not engage the Refugee Conventiuon (sic)” [39]
b. “I have rejected the Appellant’s core claim to be at risk as a kolbar and because of his political activities in the UK. I find that the Appellant’s political views are more a matter of expediency than conviction. On return it is reasonably likely that when he is interviewed the Appellant will not disclose his activities since leaving Iran nearly ten years ago because he does not have any deep seated political opinions to reveal.” [43]
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The Appellant’s grounds for permission to appeal contend that the FtT has erred in law by adopting an approach that was procedurally unfair as follows:
“It is apparent from the contents of the Respondent’s refusal decision that she did not challenge the genuineness of the Appellant’s sur place political activity see [38]-[40] rather the case is put forward as to the likelihood of the activity having come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.” [2]
“It was not put to the Appellant that his sur place political activity was not genuine at the hearing, according to counsel’s hearing notes (see attached).” [4]
8. In a decision dated 14th January 2026, this Tribunal granted permission to appeal.
9. At the error of law hearing, we heard submissions from both advocates. Mr Wain confirmed that the appeal was resisted.
Discussion
10. There is no challenge to the FtT’s adverse credibility findings relating to the Appellant’s claim to fear persecution on account of being a kolbar [11-31 & 39]. The following points emerge from the material we have considered:
a. The Respondent’s decision of 20th May 2022 referred to the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and Facebook posts [39&40] in the context of identification risk but there was no clear assertion in that decision that the posts and attendance at demonstrations were not motivated by a genuine political belief;
b. As Mr Wain pointed out, the Review does assert that the Appellant can delete his Facebook account, however, it is not clearly articulated that the posts and attendance at demonstrations were not motivated by a genuine political belief;
c. Whilst counsel’s note of the hearing does indicate that the Respondent made submissions that the Appellant’s sur place activities were not genuinely held, it does not appear that the Appellant was actually asked any direct questions concerning the genuineness of his political activities.
11. We are satisfied that an essential component of the FtT’s decision was the finding that the Appellant was not driven by political conviction in pursuing sur place activities since his arrival in the United Kingdom. In other words, the FtT appears to have found that the Appellant engaged in these activities disingenuously. Before such a judicial conclusion can be reached touching on credibility, it is important that the Appellant has an opportunity to address the concern. It is procedurally irregular for such a finding to be reached in circumstances where the FtT’s concern was never the subject of questioning during the hearing and had not been raised as an issue by the Respondent prior to the substantive hearing. While the point appears to have been briefly aired in the Respondent’s oral submissions, this necessarily came after the Appellant had an opportunity to address the point. It was, of course, open to Appellant’s counsel to object at the time to the submission of the Respondent - and it is not suggested that counsel did so – however that does not undermine our overall conclusion that the Appellant has not been afforded the opportunity to speak directly to the challenge to the nature of his political conviction.
12. We are satisfied that the failure to afford the Appellant a fair opportunity to deal with a material point held against him in the final judicial analysis is a material error of law. This is because the genuineness of his sur place activities might well have played a meaningful role in the lawful assessment of whether the Appellant could be lawfully expected to delete his Facebook activity or dissemble about his activities in the United Kingdom upon being returned to Iran.
Disposal
13. It was agreed that were we to find a material error of law the appropriate course would be for the Upper Tribunal to retain this matter and remake the decision on the protection appeal. We see no reason to depart from the starting point identified at paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) that the decision should be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
14. The findings of fact at [11 to 31] and those at [39] relating to events in, and the Appellant’s motives for leaving, Iran, are preserved. There is no challenge to the findings at [44] of the Decision in respect of the appeal brought on Article 8 ECHR Grounds and those are also preserved.
15. The issues to now be determined by the Upper Tribunal, are:
a. Whether the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom are motivated by a genuine political belief;
b. Whether the Appellant’s sur place activities have already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities;
c. Whether the Appellant can be expected to delete his Facebook account;
d. Whether the Appellant is at risk on return to Iran as a result of his sur place activities in the United Kingdom.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the FtT involved a material error of law. We set aside the Decision. We preserve the findings of fact at [11 to 31] and those at [39] relating to events in, and the Appellant’s motives for leaving, Iran. The findings at [44] are also preserved. The underlying appeal decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
We make the following directions:

i. The matter is to be listed for a remaking hearing for 3 hours on the first available date.
ii. No later than 14 days before the resumed hearing, the parties must upload to CE-File, and directly serve on the other party, any further evidence they intend to rely upon.  
iii. A Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter is to be booked for the hearing. 


Roxanne Frantzis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20th April 2026