Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005555
FTT Ref No: PA/57158/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBNAL JUDGE SYMES

Between

OOZM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Heard at Field House on 12 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the appeal of OOZM, a national of Honduras born on 7 December 1961, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal of November 2023 to dismiss his appeal, itself brought on the basis of the refusal (on 1 May 2024) of his asylum claim (made on 20 March 2023).

2. The Appellant’s asylum claim is as follows. In 2019 the company for which he was working as a delivery driver was targeted for extortion by the MS-13 gang; his employers decided to pay the sums requested, and he and his colleagues would deliver the funds as instructed. He himself was contacted by the gang on a number of occasions to pass messages on to the company under threat of severe consequences. Eventually, as the personal threats to him and his family escalated, the appellant reported the matter to the police in March 2022. Following that report, the Appellant was more seriously threatened by the gang and they visited his home and fired shots. He relocated to an area about twenty minutes away, although still working for the same employer. He was then threatened by masked men in a van and decided to flee Honduras, arriving in the UK in September 2022. Since his arrival in the UK, his father has received anonymous threatening telephone calls in Honduras seeking information about the whereabouts of the appellant.

3. The First-tier Tribunal directed itself to the Respondent’s CPIN on Criminal gangs in Honduras which concluded that a person living in an MS-13 controlled area and who has not complied with the gang’s demands or who is considered to have threatened their interests is likely to be at significant risk. The Appellant having done so he should be seen as at risk of persecution or serious harm.

4. It was the Appellant's case that he could find a reasonable safe haven elsewhere in Honduras as it was uncertain which parts of the country that the gang controlled; and that his return from the UK would put him at particular risk as he would be seen as relatively wealthy and thus might attract criminal interest.

5. The Respondent’s CPIN stated that internal relocation would usually be available depending on the profile of the individual, their previous experiences and the reasons why the gang is interested in them; the power and influence of the particular gang is also relevant. There were areas in the main urban centres and in rural communities where gangs do not have control or exert influence.

6. The First-tier Tribunal went on to conclude that the Appellant could find a safe haven. He had already relocated locally without attracting any difficulties that he was unable to escape, suggesting that he was not at any particular interest to MS-13, even having made a report to the police. It seemed unlikely that given that other employees were also involved in facilitating the extortion that he would be of sufficient interest to motivate a national hunt for him.

7. Thus the Appellant could find a safe haven. Life there would not be unduly harsh given he was a healthy young man of working age, educated to college level and with work experience in Honduras, with close and extended family there who it could be presumed would be able to assist him, even if he could not return to his home area. He spoke the language and was intimately familiar with the culture and context. His circumstances would not be substantially different from similarly situated Hondurans of his socio-economic background in an area not controlled or under the influence of the gang.

8. Grounds of appeal contended that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law:

(a) When assessing the risks he faced, in failing to take account of material evidence as to the extent of the gang’s interest in the Appellant derived from his own account: eg that they had learned that he had reported them to the police within days of him having done so, that they had shot indiscriminately at his family home a few weeks later, that he had moved out of that home shortly thereafter and rented a small room, and that he had narrowly escaped being stopped by men in a truck, managing to drive away on his motor bike.

(b) Also when assessing risk, failing to take account of country evidence, as the CPIN cited evidence that those who the gangs believed were guilty of betrayal or enmity may be tracked down and that those who reported the gangs to the police invited extreme retaliation.

(c) When assessing internal relocation, failing to take account of country evidence cited in the CPIN that gangs could monitor movements in and out of their territory and could track persons of interest; the CPIN noted that the more economic resources available to them, the more likely that an individual could move to a safe gated community, which would not be an option for a working man such as the Appellant. Groups including MS-13 were expanding their influence and there were small gangs all around the country who worked with them to facilitate their extortion nationally. All this amounted to a failure to take account of the extent of the likely reach of the MS-13 gang, its connections to the police and politics, its connections to other gangs, and in consequence its likely knowledge of his return to Honduras.

9. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 14 January 2025, without restriction on the points that might be argued, though drawing particular attention to the “gated community” point.

10. The day before the hearing before me the Appellant's representatives wrote stating he could not afford legal representation and that they sought a determination on the papers. Judge Perkins ruled in these terms:

“The appeal remains listed for hearing on 12 March 2026. The Upper Tribunal has power under rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to determine an appeal without a hearing but such an approach is usually only appropriate with the agreement of both parties.
Here the Upper Tribunal has decided that grounds are arguable and will make a decision after a hearing.
In the circumstances the Tribunal will not think it discourteous if the appellant does not attend but the respondent will be able to address the Tribunal.”

11. In the circumstances I considered it appropriate in the interests of justice to hear the appeal in the Appellant's absence.

Discussion

12. The Upper Tribunal should be reticent in overturning findings of fact and inferences from those facts. See eg Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in these terms, per Lewison LJ:

"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

13. Nevertheless, as observed by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 160 at para 44, whilst appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact-finder who has assessed an applicant's credibility, they must be satisfied that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it. And at para 48, if a judge makes material errors in the evaluation of evidence, for instance because the inference drawn from a fact found is logically not one that properly can be drawn, then an appellate court will interfere. This is because: "A material error in logic is an error of law."

14. The fundamental difficulty the Appellant faces on this appeal is that whilst his account of primary fact was found wholly credible, the First-tier Tribunal drew adverse inferences as to the risk of persecution he would face nationally. It accepted, to the real risk standard, that he would be in danger in his home area. But it rejected the proposition he would be in danger elsewhere in Honduras. In coming to that conclusion the Judge was required to give appropriate weight to the various strands in the Appellant's case, such as the presumed elevated risk he faced from having lodged a police report. He clearly did so, repeatedly referring to that factor.

15. The CPIN identifies those at risk in gang-controlled areas as those seen as a threat to them, those not complying with their demands, or being a member of a particularly vulnerable group such as a member of the LGBTi community and that people who gangs believe are guilty of betrayal or enmity may be tracked by them. The inference drawn by the Judge below was essentially that simply having made a report to the police was not something that would create sufficient adverse interest to warrant any record of him being circulated to the gangs’ contacts nationwide. He also noted that the gang did not control every part of the country. Addressing the ground which attracted Judge Perkins, there would of course be no need to live in a gated community in a part of Honduras which the gang did not control.

16. It seems to me that whilst another Judge might very well have taken a different view of the case, Judge Ruth’s conclusions are not outside the range of reasonable responses to the evidence. There is no gap in his chain of reasoning and his conclusions and methodology of reaching them are perfectly clear. So the appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; its decision shall stand. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

30 April 2026

Upper Tribunal Judge Symes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber