Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005568
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58512/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

AQM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Mukherjee, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr D. Simpson, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, born in 1986, is a national of Bangladesh. He seeks to appeal on protection grounds against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilsher (“the judge”) dated 9 September 2025.

2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom with his wife as a visitor in November 2022. The appellant made a protection claim on 15 January 2023. It was refused on 15 March 2024. The reasons for refusal letter of the same date states that while accepted that the applicant was a supporter of the Awami League (sometimes referred to in the documents comprising the 1167-page bundle referred to as the “AL”), the respondent accepted neither that he was the subject of adverse attention from the elected Awami League representative and his supporters in Bangladesh, nor that he had received threats from the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”). This adverse attention, on the appellant’s case, included an attack on his shop orchestrated by the elected Awami League representative in December 2022; and an attack on his home by the BNP and Jamaat in August 2024. The threats relied upon include social media posts, translated with a translation stamp. It was noted by the respondent that no accompanying letter was provided to confirm the translations were produced by a certified translator.

3. The grounds of appeal (“the grounds”) are dated 30 September 2025. Permission to appeal on both grounds therein was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys in his grant of permission dated 4 December 2025. Those grounds assert material errors of law in:

a. Ground 1: finding that the ban on the Awami League was justifiable and therefore not a breach of human rights as to amount to persecution; and
b. Ground 2: failing to properly consider the evidence of the targeting of Awami League activists.

4. Following the grant of permission, on 24 February 2026 the appellant applied under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 for further evidence to be admitted that, it was argued, is directly relevant to the risk of persecution of Awami League activists under the current BNP government elected in February 2026. Those documents included a Global Center for Democratic Governance report dated 23 June 2025 that states 205 Awami League leaders and activists had been killed in the preceding year; and a Human Rights Watch World Report from 2006 and an Amnesty International report from December 2001 describing violence (including killings) and mass arbitrary arrests. While the latter two documents are now 20 years old or more, it was argued that the landslide re-election of the BNP, and therefore the relevance of those documents, could not have been anticipated when the matter came before the judge. That application was granted.

5. I shall begin with the second ground. Mr Mukherjee, who appears for the appellant and drafted the grounds, contends that the judge’s findings within the decision are mutually inconsistent. At [6] the judge found the appellant to be a “a largely credible witness”, on the basis of the overall consistency of his account [7], the spontaneous detail contained within his asylum interviews [8], and “considerable documentary evidence” in support of his claim at [9]. The judge was satisfied at [10] that the attack on his shop in December 2022 was the “prompt for his claim” in the following month. The judge was further satisfied at [11] that none of the contradictions identified by the respondent “held significant weight”; and moreover that the respondent “alleged contradictions in certain aspects of his claim but I found none”. I set out the detailed finding in [12] in full:

“The above account of his involvement with the AL and the internal dispute that led him to leave and seek asylum is well-supported for the reasons set out above. I find therefore that he was involved with the AL from around 2007. He worked his way up and was elected to the local branch committee as cultural secretary in 2019 and remained in the role until he left the country. He was responsible for arranging social events and processions under the supervision of his local leader. At election time he would engage in door-to-door campaigning as directed. He never held a national role or engaged in prominent public-speaking. He was a committed activist but with a local profile. He remains so in the UK, having joined the local party here and engaging in all events open to him. He awaits a committee place here but none has become open thus far. He had become involved in a dispute when a rival faction had come to power in his region. He had campaigned for the Mofur group but their candidate lost and the Habib group took over. His group was threatened by their rivals and it is likely that they attacked his shop in 2022. He maintains a commitment to the AL and, when questioned on its abuses whilst in power, believes the criticisms of it are not entirely true.”

6. However, at [17] the judge concludes:

“The final point is whether someone of the profile of the appellant would face serious harm in his home area. I find that he would not. The CPIN passages set out above (12.3) confirm that there have been no widespread reprisals and killings. I have considered the appellant’s bundle on this but this largely comprises a number of individual reports of leading AL figures being attacked. Much of the violence occurred back in August 2024. There is now a trial process for leading AL figures. There is no evidence that the appellant had the kind of local prominence that would lead to him being targeted. Furthermore, the CPIN confirms that there is in general a sufficiency of protection from the police (CPIN section 4). There is no suggestion that any malicious case has been filed against the appellant or other particular reason to believe he is at risk or could not secure sufficient protection. He cites threats on Facebook but I attach little weight to these because it is not clear that they have any serious intent beyond the usual hostility shown in social media interactions. Finally, I find that in any event any risk he faces is localised; he could internally relocate and this would not be unreasonable. He has run a business successfully and held political roles. He has the support of his siblings and has show resilience. No adequate reason was given as to why he could live safety in another major city in Bangladesh.”

7. This, says Mr Mukherjee, goes against the evidence. Firstly, the appellant relies upon the evidence admitted under Rule 15(2A) as above: there is evidence, it is said, of “widespread reprisals and killings”. But secondly, even without the Rule 15(2A) evidence, Mr Mukherjee confirmed in the grounds that the appellant did give evidence that that most of his local Awami League committee had suffered attacks on their homes. This is especially problematic in the light of the reasoning at [13] where the judge distinguished the matters on which he found the appellant credible from those where he did not:

“The account he gave after the refusal of his home being attacked by the BNP and Jamaat on 6 August 2024 was however not credible. This is because it was only supported by a single line in his statement (para.6) and a newspaper report from the Shyal Sylhet of 7 August 2024. This report is written in a generic style that lacks individual details and appears to be tailored to order. There is no witness statement from any of his family giving details of the incident and there was no police report or other photographic evidence. It also does not reflect the thrust of the background evidence. Whilst some retaliation against AL members did occur, it does not appear that it was systematic in targeting the AL at all levels. It focused upon university campus groups of the AL (see CPIN 12.3). It appears that the BNP managed to restrain its local operatives to higher level than was expected.”

8. The judge appears to accept at [10] and [12] that the appellant’s shop had been attacked. The difference between the matters where the judge believed the appellant and where he did not appear, from [13], to rest on the amount of supporting evidence provided, and its specificity. As to the latter, a reason the judge did not believe that the appellant’s home was attacked because the newspaper report was “generic”. But the focus seems to be on the limited range of that evidence: it being mentioned only obliquely in a single line of the appellant’s statement dated 5 September 2024; there being no witness statements in support; and there being no police reports or photographic evidence. The distinction the judge made, says Mr Mukherjee, is undermined by his having heard much more detailed evidence from the appellant than is recorded or reflected in [13]. The judge had already found the appellant to be a “largely credible witness” at [6]. He heard oral evidence from the appellant as to attacks on Awami League members’ homes. It is unaccountable to conclude at [13] that the reason the appellant is not to be believed is the lack of evidence, when the judge did have that evidence. The conclusion, says Mr Mukherjee, is that the judge simply ignored the evidence that was before him.

9. Against this, Mr Simpson, for the respondent, says that the judge made clear adverse credibility findings as set out above. The judge did so safely because, at [12], he had found that “He never held a national role or engaged in prominent public-speaking”. That finding is not under attack. It underpins the distinction made in [13] between it being credible that the appellant’s shop was attacked in December 2022, but incredible that his home was attacked in August 2024. That is clear from the judge concluding that: “Whilst some retaliation against AL members did occur, it does not appear that it was systematic in targeting the AL at all levels”. The appellant was a local presence and not a leader; there is no reason to think his home would be targeted. The judge did not ignore evidence: he was entitled to view some aspects of the appellant’s version of events as more satisfactory than other aspects, and clearly sets out at [13] why that evidence was unsatisfactory. The decision is, says Mr Simpson, well-made, and with sufficient reasoning.

10. I do consider that ground 2 discloses a material error of law. It seems the respondent accepted at [6], the appellant not being cross-examined on it, that the respondent was a Awami League branch cultural secretary. The judge in any event sets out at [9] the evidence that satisfied him as to the appellant’s being an Awami League activist. The judge also found at [9] that he had suffered political violence. The judge specifically found that the appellant’s shop was attacked at [12]; and that the attack occurred following a rival faction coming to power in his region. The reasoning in [13] does not adequately explain why the appellant, found to be largely credible, is to be believed about his shop; but not to be in his apparently similar claim that his home was also attacked 20 months later for political reasons. The judge had already concluded that the appellant had been targeted in his home area; and found at [17] that the appellant had held “political roles”. It is not clear why the ongoing Facebook threats referred to in [17] should be dismissed as “usual hostility shown in social media interactions” when the appellant had already suffered political violence; nor why he would not face serious harm in the future in his local area where he has already done so as a result of his political activity. The judge did not, it seems, take up the translation point referred to above as raised by the respondent. The finding at [17] that the appellant would not be targeted is unsafe: being inconsistent with the findings at [6] to [12]; and are not saved by the findings at [13]. The error of law is plain before the documents admitted pursuant to Rule 15(2A) are considered; but those documents, speaking as they do to the increased risk to Awami League activists under the new BNP government, tend only to underline the risk to the appellant where it has already been found he was a victim of political violence.

11. Having found that error of law, I consider myself unable to preserve any findings of the decision; and remit it to the First-tier Tribunal. For completeness, I will also consider ground 1 briefly. The salient paragraphs in the decision are [15] and [16], which I reproduce in full:

“I turn now to risk on return which I must assess at the lower reasonable likelihood standard. I start with the fact that on 12 May 2025 the interim government issued the following order published in the government gazette: ‘So, the government reasonably believes that it is appropriate to prohibit all activities of the party and its front organizations until the trial of the leaders and activists of the Bangladesh Awami League is completed in the ICT by virtue of the powers conferred by the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025 and Section 18(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009’.” [15]

“It was argued for the appellant that this meant he could no longer engage in AL activism if returned to Bangladesh, a breach of his civil and political rights. This raises the HJ (Iran) point. I accept that his long-term commitment to the AL, which he maintains in the UK, means he would wish to reengage with such activities if returned. I also accept that this ban means that he would not do so due to fear of being punished. I find however that the ban reflects the particular balance of public interests that the government has deemed appropriate at this time. The violent history of the AL indicates that it is not far-fetched to call the group one with terroristic tendencies. The gazette does not set out how the ban will be enforced, much less any punishments attached but the appellant did not provide evidence that it would be used in a disproportionate manner or lead to torture. Imposing a derogation on the civil rights of members of the AL for a period pending the trial of its leaders cannot be said to be disproportionate in my view.” [16]

12. Mr Mukherjee, for the appellant, developed the first ground in his submissions, referring also to his reply to the respondent’s rule 24 response dated 2 March 2026. In essence, he says that it is amply clear that the Awami League ban is so wide, and both applied and capable of being applied so indiscriminately, as to amount to persecution. In this submission he relies on R (Ammori) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin), where the High Court considered whether it was disproportionate to prescribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000. The conclusion at paragraph 138 was that, finding only “a very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”, a blanket proscription was disproportionate. The court went on to explain at paragraph 140:

“Considering in the round the evidence available to the Home Secretary when the decision to proscribe was made, the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities, so far as they comprise acts of terrorism, has not yet reached the level, scale and persistence that would justify the application of the criminal law measures that are the consequence of proscription, and the very significant interference with Convention rights consequent on those measures.”

13. Mr Mukherjee draws a distinction between the detailed assessment undertaken in R (Ammori) with the approach taken at [15] and [16] of the decision. He argues that characterising the Awami League as having “terroristic tendencies” is not enough for him to find “that the ban reflects the particular balance of public interests that the government has deemed appropriate at this time”. Having accepted at [15] that all Awami League activities are proscribed until the trial of its leaders – itself an indeterminate terminus – it was incumbent upon the judge to consider whether those terroristic tendencies warranted an outright ban. Had the judge undertaken that assessment, he would have concluded that it did not; and it follows inevitably from the ban being disproportionate that it amounts to persecution.

14. In response, Mr Simpson says that R (Ammori) considered a situation so factually different as to be irrelevant to the decision. In any event, the judge did grapple with the point identified by Mr Mukherjee. At [16], the judge decided that the ban was justified. The judge could not be expected undertake an analysis and make findings as detailed as those demanded by Mr Mukherjee. The judge found that the ban was justified on the basis of the evidence before him. That evidence included a Human Rights Watch article entitled “Bangladesh Events of 2005” which reported such serious matters as “Throughout 2005, there were persistent reports of abductions and forced conversions of minorities, and destruction and desecration of religious sites”. The reference to HJ (Iran) UKSC 31 at [16] demonstrates that the judge was alive to the relevant issues. In any event, if safe, the judge’s findings that the appellant was no more than a local political presence justify the finding at [17] that any risk he faces is merely localised.

15. I have already commented on the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility and his risk of being targeted in my consideration of ground 2: that addresses Mr Simpson’s last point. I have some sympathy with Mr Simpson’s argument that Mr Mukherjee, in expecting to see an R (Ammori) analysis is expecting perfection from the judge where a much shorter analysis would both suffice and be more proportionate. However, the fundamental difficulty is, in my view, that there is no adequate analysis in the decision at all. The point is encapsulated in paragraph 6 of the grant of permission:

“At [16] the Judge accepts that the Appellant has a long term commitment to the Awani League, and that he would wish to re-engage in activities if he returned. It is further accepted that the Appellant would not do so due to a fear of reprisals. On the face of it, therefore, the Judge has found that the Appellant would not engage in activity reflecting his genuine political beliefs because of a fear of persecution. It is accordingly arguable that, in finding in the relatively brief passage that follows that such a restriction has not been shown to be disproportionate, the judge has fallen into error.”

16. The judge accepted at [12] that the appellant has been involved with the Awami League for nearly 20 years. He “worked his way up” and, although not found to be a leader, had an organisational role and remains a “committed activist”. The judge was satisfied at [16] that, on return to Bangladesh, he would wish to re-engage with those activities; but would not do so for fear of being punished. Reading the decision as a whole, and in particular [16] and [17], I am unable to discern adequate reasons explaining why that acknowledged restriction to his re-engagement is not disproportionate. Ground 1 therefore also discloses a material error of law.

Notice of Decision

1. The judge’s decision involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 July 2026