Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005574
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01038/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

SUMIT RAI
Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr S. Jaisri, Counsel instructed by Sam Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 10 February 2026
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. Although this is an appeal by the Secretary of State, to avoid confusion, I shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”).
2. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of a FtT Judge (the “Judge”) promulgated on 10 November 2025, in which she allowed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim made in response to the decision to make a deportation order against him. The appellant is a citizen of Nepal. His full immigration history is set out in the respondent’s bundle before the FtT (HB/682-684). He entered the United Kingdom with indefinite leave to enter in 2005 when he was 13 years old. He was born in Hong Kong in 1991 and was educated in India until he came to the UK in 2005 with his sister to join their parents.
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the papers and does not require verbatim repetition herein. In summary, the appellant was previously subject to a deportation order signed on 9 January 2019. The appellant appealed against the decision to deport him on human rights grounds. His appeal was allowed on 11 January 2021 and the deportation order against him was revoked on 27 June 2021.
4. Following the appellant’s conviction on 9 June 2025 for offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, he was sentenced to a total of 16 months imprisonment and the respondent served a Stage 1 notice of a decision to make a deportation order against him. The appellant raised human rights submissions in response to the Stage 1 decision which were refused on 26 August 2025 and he became subject to a deportation order on the same date. His appeal against the respondent’s refusal was allowed by the FtT for the reasons set out in a decision dated 10 November 2025.
The Decision of the FtT Judge
5. I shall set out the decision and findings in some detail in the light of the nature of the respondent’s challenge.
6. Having summarised the appellant’s case at the outset, including information regarding the appellant’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and his dependence on family support to ensure his compliance with the depo medication required to manage his condition, the Judge set out the previous findings of the FtT in the decision dated 11 January 2021 (“the 2021 decision”) at [6] of the decision as follows:
a) the Appellant can communicate effectively in English; otherwise his claim of integration is weak (para 45);
b) the Appellant has been maintained and accommodated by his parents, without recourse to public funds (para 45);
c) the Kugathas criteria are met in respect of his dependence on and family life with his parents; his mother and father have stood by him – despite this being challenging and provided practical and emotional support needed to maintain his mental stability and function on a day-to-day basis (para 45);
d) the Appellant requires their support on a daily basis to counter his tendency to self-neglect; they have been settled in the UK since 2005, and so cannot reasonably be sustained after deportation by them re-settling with him in Nepal or by them attempting to support him from a distance (para 46);
e) though the father has resources to see that the Appellant would not be destitute in Nepal and has access to appropriate medical treatment, there is no close family who remains in Nepal and who would be willing/able to take over the role of the Appellant’s carer (para 47);
f) the only periods the Appellant has spent in Nepal were between the ages of 2 and 6, and 19 months in 2014/15 when living inside a closed facility; from the ages of 6 and 13 he was schooled in India, and in the school holidays sometimes when to Brunei rather than Nepal (para 48);
g) in the absence of direct and daily support from his parents and in light of his ongoing mental health problems, there are very significant obstacles to integration in Nepal (para 49);
h) the repeat offending in 2017 which triggered the liability for deportation came about because he was acutely psychotic; he lacked insight into his offending, was poorly compliant with oral medication and cavalier about taking illicit drugs (para 51);
i) the offending in 2019 (a fine, leading to a sentence of £100) was a temporary relapse; since release the Appellant’s mental stability and capacity to exercise self-control has been maintained by monthly depot regime (Para 53);
j) the Appellant now presents as a low risk of re-offending (para 54);
k) none of the offences triggering deportation constituted a serious offence, save those in 2010 (so deemed by being drugs offences) but none of that nature since 2010 (para 55).
7. The Judge then recorded: that the respondent accepted the appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for more than half of his life for the purposes of section 117C(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”); that there was no updated OASys report or other assessment in relation to the appellant’s rehabilitation; a summary of the judicial sentencing remarks in relation to the appellant’s most recent offending; and the appellant’s patchy compliance with his depo injections at times. She recorded that the key disputed issues were whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK for the purposes of section 117C(4)(c) or, alternatively, whether the public interest in deportation takes precedence over the appellant’s private and family life in the UK, with particular focus on the likely deterioration in his mental and physical health if returned to Nepal absent any support.
8. The Judge directed herself on the relevant law at [14] to [16], including in relation to the public interest in deportation, the requirement to demonstrate “very compelling circumstances” which outweigh the public interest where the Exceptions to deportation cannot be met, and the guidance from HA(Iraq) [2020] EWCA Civ 1176.
9. In relation to section 117C(4)(b) the Judge found that she was not persuaded that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. At [21] the Judge refers to the appellant as someone who is “social isolated (sic)” and states:
There was no evidence that he had made any friends, joined or participated in social clubs/associations/sport, nor undertaken charity or voluntary work, attended any religious/spiritual group/functions, travelled in the UK, or had hobbies or favourite things to do, nor followed/positively engaged with any UK institutions. The Appellant’s offending can be grouped into periods of 2009-2011, 2013, 2017, 2019, then 2024, most of it of an anti-social nature (as opposed to personally directed) until the last offences, which were specific and targeted; I raise these at this point, because his offending has not dominated the picture so much that it leaves no time/space/freedom for developing a social/cultural life here. Rather, he appears to be a person who is social isolated. It is the case that the Appellant can speak English, so integration is not hampered by language skills. The fact that he has lived half his life here and very little time consistently anywhere else, does not translate into satisfying cultural and social integration in the UK; they are clearly different things, and are specific and individual requirements of the legislation.
10. In relation to section 117C(4)(c) the Judge found that there was no reason to depart from the previous judicial findings from the 2021 decision that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration into Nepal. At [22] the Judge refers to the appellant's dependence on his parents “who provide practical and emotional support needed to maintain mental stability and to function on a daily basis, and to counter his tendency to self-neglect” and that “this support cannot reasonably be sustained after deportation, nor remotely, and there is no family available to do so in Nepal”. The Judge found that since the appellant’s previous appeal, the appellant’s father had been diagnosed with and treated for bowel/stomach cancer which meant that he could no longer travel, and which appeared to have played a significant part in the appellant’s deterioration which led to his most recent offending (because of the absence of monitoring and supervision from his father whilst his father was ill).
11. At [25] to [35] the Judge conducted an in-depth assessment of the public interest in the appellant’s deportation, concluding at [32] that there was a “medium public interest” in the appellant’s deportation and that his risk of re-offending can be “diminished considerably, by parental intervention and supervision”. The Judge assessed the appellant’s recent offending as serious in nature and that it appeared to have “come out of nowhere”, with his previous offending in March 2019. She refers to the appellant’s family’s support and supervision in the appellant taking his medication and remaining drug-free, which had meant he had been free of offending for five years. The recent offending arose when he was not taking his depot injections and his schizophrenia was not controlled during his father’s cancer treatment. The Judge found that the appellant’s father is now well and has been able to resume his supervisory role in relation to the appellant.
12. The assessment of the appellant’s rehabilitation at [29] refers to the lack of any courses undertaken (or offered) whilst the appellant was in prison, and that when he was in prison, he was not compliant with his depot injections and took illicit drugs. He was now compliant since he had been moved to immigration detention. The appellant’s offending was linked to when his illness dominates, and his father has largely been successful in supervising the appellant with his illness and medication. His father had also bought a new property for the family to live in away from their previous area, for a “fresh start”.
13. At [34] the Judge attributed the appellant’s lack of social and cultural integration to being moved from one school and country to another at a young age, the late age at which he came to the UK, his low intellectual functioning and paranoid schizophrenia. It was also acknowledged that the appellant’s drug-taking and offending had an impact on his integration. The Judge then states the appellant “has no other country with which he is familiar and could settle in successfully. If he does not remain in the UK, he is destined to not fit in anywhere.”
14. The Judge refers to the appellant’s parents and his younger sister having naturalised as British citizens and having worked hard and prospered as a family. The Judge referred to the previous judicial findings that the appellant’s parents could not reasonably be expected to return to Nepal and found that this has now been “put beyond question” in light of his father’s health. At [36] of the decision it states:
So, the stark reality is that the Appellant would be deported to Nepal, alone, and would deteriorate very quickly, where he would fail to take his medication and be a danger to himself and society. It is a stark choice in this appeal between seeing that this will occur, as a certainty, if he is deported, or not deporting the Appellant and taking a risk that the Appellant will re-offend in the UK, albeit a diminished risk.
15. In conclusion on the balancing exercise in relation to section 117C(6), the Judge recorded that there was a “fine balance” between the public interest and the appellant’s rights in this case. However, in finding that the appellant’s private and family life rights outweigh the public interest on this occasion, the Judge referred to the “certainty of the Appellant deteriorating within a short time if returned to Nepal where he is a danger to others and himself”.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
16. The respondent’s grounds for permission identify a single ground (“ground one”) asserting that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for findings on a material matter. In relation to this ground various submissions are made:
1) The Judge failed to conduct a substantive consideration of Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 in finding that there was additional dependency between the appellant and his parents and sibling such as to amount to an Article 8 claim, and there was no finding that Exception 2 was met in any event.
2) There was no finding that the appellant’s mother or sister could not return with him to Nepal to enable him to access healthcare and no finding that there is no available healthcare in Nepal.
3) The Judge failed to consider that the threshold for “very compelling circumstances” is high and the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the section 117C Exceptions.
17. Permission to appeal was granted by the FtT on 1 December 2025 in the following terms:
3. The grounds are poorly drafted and do not identify with clarity the mischief which is the nub of the case. The matter was allowed on grounds that the decision was disproportionate but the Judge did not identify that which was very compelling and did not given sufficient weight to the failure to meet any of the exceptions and did not explain this correctly.
4. Permission is granted as the matter is arguable. It may be that the grounds require perfection before appearing in the UT given that they hint at a failure to identify a very strong case but do not commit and instead frame it as a general reasoning argument. That is for the Respondent to decide. Nonetheless, the grounds as they are, are arguable.
The Hearing Before Me
18. Mr Terrell confirmed that the respondent had not applied to amend her grounds of appeal and he did not directly adopt the grounds in his submissions to me; accepting that he would not get far on the grounds as drafted. It was Mr Terrell’s essential submission that the Judge had failed to give sufficient weight to the public interest in her assessment of section 117C(6) and had failed to identify what the “something more” was in this case, that was over and above the Exceptions to deportation. He referred to [41] to [43] of Kapikanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987 in support of his submissions.
19. Mr Jaisri submitted that the Judge took precisely the correct approach to her assessment of very compelling circumstances as required by the jurisprudence and her reasoning indicated that she conducted a careful balancing exercise, leading to the conclusion that matters were “finely balanced” at [37]. In Mr Jaisri’s submission, the Judge’s reasoning clearly demonstrates very compelling circumstances in this case.
Analysis and Decision
20. I have in mind throughout the need to exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the FtT. It is now well established that the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge could come to a different decision. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678), at [30]:
Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
21. When it comes to the reasons given by the FtT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FtT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25].
22. The issues that the FtT is deciding and the basis on which the FtT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27].
23. Judges sitting in the FtT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see A4 (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34].
24. It is of the nature of proportionality assessments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case and the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10, [2017] 1 WLR 1260, at [107].
25. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”) on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
26. Section 117A in Part 5A of the NIAA 2002 provides that, when a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 (and, as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the HRA 1998) the court, in considering the public interest question, must (in particular) have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B and, additionally, in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C. Section 117C specifically deals with the weight to be attached to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals and provides a structure for conducting the necessary balancing exercise, dependent in part, on the length of sentence imposed. Section 117C(6) provides:
In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
27. Although the appellant is a “medium offender” for the purposes of the statutory scheme, based on his overall sentence of 16 months, the appellant has not challenged the Judge’s conclusion that he was unable to satisfy Exception 1. The focus of this appeal is therefore on the Judge’s conclusions regarding “very compelling circumstances”. It was confirmed in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 that a medium offender who is unable to satisfy the Exceptions to deportation is able to succeed on Article 8 grounds if he is able to satisfy the “very compelling circumstances” test under section 117C(6).
28. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, Lord Hamblen referred to the “very compelling circumstances” test. He cited the judgment of Sales LJ in Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 W.L.R 4203, at [50], that the test "provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them”.
29. In Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626, Lord Justice Underhill explained:
“53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."
…
57. NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C(6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case", or – as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 – because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors – perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) – to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.
…
62. … I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is.” (my emphasis)
30. Lord Justice Underhill’s approach in Yalcin was cited and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Kapikanya on which Mr Terrell relies.
31. Turning firstly to the grounds of appeal, what I find has been overlooked in the grounds, and what was clearly material to the Judge’s findings and conclusion on very compelling circumstances, were the previous judicial findings from the 2021 decision. These findings are set out above at [6] and include: the appellant was dependent on and enjoyed family life with his parents; he is maintained and accommodated by his parents without recourse to public funds; the appellant requires practical and emotional support on a daily basis from his parents to maintain mental stability and function and counter his tendency of self-neglect; he could not be supported from a distance and there is no family in Nepal who could take over the role as the appellant’s carer; and, there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Nepal where he had only spent time between the age of two and six and in 2014/2015 whilst in a closed rehabilitation facility owing to his mental health. Applying the Devaseelan guidelines, the Judge was required to take these findings as her starting point.
32. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to undertake a substantive consideration of Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 in finding that there was family life between the appellant and his parents. The Judge’s starting point was the previous judicial finding of family life. At [45] of the 2021 decision, the FtT specifically applied Kugathas in reaching a finding of family life. There was no evidence before the Judge that there had been any material change in the appellant’s family relationship with his parents since 2021, and the Judge reached clear findings which demonstrate the additional elements of the appellant’s dependency on his parents owing to his mental health condition.
33. The appellant did not claim that he met the requirements of Exception 2. The Judge did not err in failing to address this issue. The relevance of family life and the level of the appellant’s dependency on his parents was in relation to the matter of very compelling circumstances rather than in respect of Exception 2.
34. Mr Terrell accepted that it would be difficult to argue that the Judge erred in her findings on very significant obstacles to integration into Nepal. The Judge’s starting point from the 2021 decision was that the appellant would encounter very significant obstacles and the Judge provided further findings on this matter, which featured in the assessment of very compelling circumstances. The grounds assert that the Judge made no finding on whether the appellant’s mother or sister would be able to travel to Nepal with the appellant to support him. However, at [35] the Judge states “as recognised in the previous decision, the Appellant’s parents cannot reasonably be expected now to return to Nepal” and goes on to state that this matter is now beyond question in light of his father’s health. Having regard to the papers before me there is no indication that it was ever the respondent’s case that the appellant’s younger sister, a British citizen, could be expected to relocate with her brother to Nepal in order to fulfil the role as his carer there. This was not something the Judge was required to reach a finding on. Moreover, it is clear that from the decision that it is the appellant’s father who takes primary responsibility for the appellant’s care. A key reason for the appellant’s reoffending was found to be the fact that his father was unable to provide the same care and supervision as normal during his cancer treatment.
35. The grounds assert that the Judge failed to make a finding on whether there was appropriate healthcare available in Nepal. This submission fails to meaningfully engage with the appellant’s circumstances. In the UK the appellant has appropriate healthcare. However, without close family supervision and support he is not compliant with his healthcare regime. The availability of such support for the appellant in Nepal was the key matter on which the Judge (and the FtT in 2021) was required to make findings.
36. The thrust of Mr Terrell’s circumstances was that although the Judge may have provided sufficient findings on the facts of this case to find compelling circumstances, there was insufficient for the Judge to conclude that these were very compelling. In his submission, the Judge does not address what the “something more” over and above the Exceptions to deportation was. Respectfully, I am unable to accept this submission.
37. I accept that the Judge does not use the term “something more”, although there is no requirement for her to have done so. It is, however, in my view, apparent from the substance of the reasoning that the Judge was focused on considering whether there was that “something more” to amount to very compelling circumstances. The Judge’s reasoning and findings from [25] et seq are targeted at this issue. Reading the decision as a whole, I find it is apparent that the Judge undertook a holistic fact-sensitive approach and took into account a number of factors which, cumulatively, constituted very compelling circumstances capable of outweighing the public interest.
38. A key factor in respect of a number of issues was the appellant’s illness as a paranoid schizophrenic. This factor is relevant to the appellant’s dependence on his family and the very significant obstacles he would face in integrating into Nepal. It also appears to be the key reason why the appellant has reoffended and cannot be said to be socially and culturally integrated in the UK (and was therefore unable to satisfy Exception 1). However, although the appellant could not meet Exception 1, his length of lawful residence in the UK and the very significant obstacles he would face if deported, are relevant to the overall proportionality exercise to be conducted in the assessment of very compelling circumstances. Taking the decision as a whole, I am able to infer that these were matters taken into account in the Judge’s overall assessment.
39. In relation to what the appellant was likely to face on return to Nepal, the Judge’s reasoning at [36] sets out the “stark reality”. The decision refers to the “certainty” that the appellant would deteriorate very quickly (by failing to take his medication) and would be a “danger to himself and society”. (I note at that it appears the appellant did not appeal the decision on Article 3 grounds.) The Judge accepted there was a risk of reoffending in the UK, albeit a diminished one. However, it was noted that this risk had been previously well-managed by his parents since 2019, until his father became ill with cancer when the appellant was not adequately supervised.
40. In addition to the aspects of Exception 1 which the appellant was able to satisfy, the appellant’s dependence on his parents and the family life that he shares with them were additional matters that weighed in the appellant's favour, as well as his father’s ill health and the Judge’s finding that his parents could not reasonably be expected to relocate to Nepal with him in order to care for their son.
41. Having conducted a detailed assessment of the public interest and the appellant’s circumstances, it is apparent that the Judge conducted a careful proportionality assessment, referring at [37] to there being a “fine balance” between the public interest and the appellant’s rights.
42. I take into account the Judge’s overall reasoning in relation to: the appellant’s private life in the UK, his dependency on and family life with his parents, that he would be returning alone to Nepal and without the support he requires, the clear risk to himself and others without his medication and support, the steps taken to prevent the appellant reoffending (including moving area), and the absence of offending when the appellant is compliant with his medication. Although the Judge did not label this collection of factors as being the “something more” required, I have no difficulty in inferring that the Judge’s findings were focussed on addressing that very issue, and that the Judge was manifestly entitled to find that these matters cumulatively amount to “very compelling circumstances” which outweigh the public interest.
43. In my view, the submission in the grounds that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasoning for how the appellant met the threshold of very compelling circumstances is without substance. The Judge provides wholly adequate reasoning for her findings. The decision must be read as a whole. The Judge conducted a multi-factorial and holistic proportionality assessment in line with that envisaged by Underhill LJ in Yalcin and endorsed in Kapikanya.
44. The Judge’s Article 8 assessment was conducted within the correct legal framework, applying the correct legal principles. The Judge conducted a careful, balanced and fully reasoned analysis and there is no merit in the respondent’s assertion that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons. Although not specifically pleaded, I also record that there is no basis for me to consider that the Judge misdirected herself in law. Furthermore, the finding that the appellant was able to demonstrate very compelling circumstances necessary to outweigh the public interest in deportation was an outcome rationally open to the Judge and the fact that the respondent disagrees, or that another judge may have reached a different conclusion, does not mean the Judge’s decision can or should be interfered with.

45. It follows from what I have said that I am not satisfied that the grounds of appeal are made out in any respect. The decision of the FtT is not vitiated by any material error of law and must consequently stand.
Notice of Decision
The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands
S. Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 February 2026