Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005580
First-tier Tribunal No:
EA/02466-2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

MAAME ABENA OKYERE ADJEI
(No Anonymity ORDER)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared as a Litigant In Person
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 17 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Ghana, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Willaims dated 23 July 2025 in respect of the dismissal of her application for leave to remain under Appendix EU.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision then the Judge’s decision will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal Judge. On a renewed application permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blum by way of a decision dated 20 January 2026. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s application was late but was minded to admit it.
The Hearing Before Me
4. Because the Appellant is a litigant in person, I heard from Tan first so that he could outline the Respondent’s reasons for resisting the appeal.
5. Mr Tan submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. He said that the grounds as drafted referred to the issue of dependency on two matters that the judge failed to deal with. One was accommodation and the second was emotional support. Mr Tan said that the Judge had referred to the definitions for EUSS cases at paragraph 7 of his decision. Mr Tan said that the consolidated bundle set out the Appellant’s case at section C. The issue was whether the Appellant was financially dependent on her Sponsor. There was no suggestion that there was an argument based on emotional dependency or on accommodation. The Judge was no obliged to deal with every single issue. Mr Tan said that therefore the single issue was financial dependency and the Judge had given clear reasons for his decision. The relevant date for the decision was referred to at paragraph 17 of the decision as being 11 February 2024. The Judge had said at paragraph 15 of the Judge’ decision by concluding that the Appellant was not resident with the Sponsor. The only evidence provided the Judge said were the utility bills in the Monzo bank statements. Mr Tan said that the Judge had provided clear reasons. The Judge found that the evidence was lacking in consistency and was not reliable. The Judge also noted that there was no evidence of dependency at the time of the application. Mr Tan said that therefore because the bank statements were not reliable for evidence of financial dependency then they could not be reliable for cohabitation and the principal argument from the Appellant was real dependency.
6. I invited Ms Adjei to provide me with her submissions. She said he was living at the same address with her mother and that her mother takes care of her. That has been the case since she had arrived in the UK. Ms Adjei said that her mother meets all the bills and household bills. She said that even though she was working, she did not contribute to the home. Ms Adjei said that even though there was money showing in his bank statements, it was just “temporary money” that her mother put into her account. Ms Adjei said, “It was not based on anything”.
7. Ms Adjei said that was all she wanted to say. I invited her to take time to consider if there was anything else that she wished to say. She said, “It was just the Monzo bank statements with her name and address and not the utility bills”.
8. Asked if she wished to say anything else, Ms Adjei said that the Judge had accepted she was at that ‘exact’ address. She provided me with the address in Manchester which I will not set out in this decision.
9. I had reserved my decision.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
10. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
11. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
12. The Presidential Panel made clear in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC):
“3. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.”
13. The Tribunal is not obliged to consider potential points which have not been referred to by the parties and which have not previously been identified. That is so even when one or more of the parties is a litigant in person, albeit some account is taken of the party’s unrepresented status. Whilst there are cases in which Robinson obvious points may be considered by the Tribunal, this case comes nowhere near the points being ‘obvious’.
14. In my judgment, the Appellant was put on notice and she knew fully and clearly what the issues were and which she had to satisfy the Judge in respect of.
15. As the Judge made clear in his findings, the issue was one of dependency. The Judge correctly referred at paragraph 7 of his decision the definition of ‘dependent’ according to EU14A of Appendix WU.
16. The Judge referred at paragraph 9 to the failure by the Appellant to provide evidence in support to show that dependency existed at the time of the application. The Judge then set out 9 examples of monies being transferred to the Appellant by the Sponsor, but then almost immediately being returned to the Sponsor. The Judge said at paragraph 11 of his decision that the transactions were being concocted to give the appearance of dependency. There was then the “troubling” concern of the Judge that the Appellant and Sponsor provided inconsistent evidence in respect of the transactions. The Judge said that the explanation provided ‘made no sense’. The Judge again at paragraph 14 referred to the Appellant’s evidence having been concocted. The Judge noted that he needed to look at the post application matters to assess what the position was at the time of the date of the application at paragraph 15 of this decision. He was right to do so.
17. In my judgment, and as Upper Tribunal Judge Blum said, the Appellant was required to prove that she was dependent on the sponsor (her mother) in order to be granted leave to remain as a joining family member of a relevant sponsor under EU14A. The Judge gave clear reasons for finding that the appellant and sponsor had given incredible evidence relating to bank transactions. There has been no challenge to the judge’s findings that the bank transactions had been concocted to give the impression that the sponsor was sending money to the Appellant. The Judge was clearly entitled to take this into account in determining whether the sponsor did actually provide material support that the Appellant required to meet her material needs.
18. Whilst permission was granted to deal with the living together and emotional matters, those were not matters set out in the list of issues to be considered. In any event though, as Mr Tan has said, the Appellant’s evidence and that of her mother (the sponsor) was found to be untrue because it was concocted. Those findings have not been challenged. The Judge made unarguably lawful and adequate findings in respect of the claimed dependency.
19. In my judgment, the untruthful evidence of the Appellant and her mother (the sponsor) is what led to the appeal failing before the Judge. There is no arguable basis for me to go behind the unchallenged findings of the Judge. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and from her legal representative at the hearing.
20. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE OF DECISION
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal stands. The Appellants appeal therefore remains dismissed on all grounds.

30 May 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber