Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005589
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02942/2024
PA/64057/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

M. T.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr D Eteko of Ben Darlington Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 17 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant, his wife, and their children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant or his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Scullion promulgated on 22 September 2025.
2. Although before me the Secretary of State is the appellant, and MT is the respondent, for the sake of consistency with the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal I shall hereafter refer to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and MT as the Appellant.
3. The Appellant was born on 10 October 1988. He has dual nationalities: he is a citizen of Syria, where he was born; he is also a citizen of Lebanon – his mother is originally from Lebanon, and he lived there from approximately the age of 5 until 2011 when he left for South America.
4. In about 2014/2015, after spending some time in Venezuela and Colombia, the Appellant arrived in Brazil. In 2018 he married a Brazilian national (d.o.b. 15 September 1996). They have two children (d.o.b. 22 September 2021 and 29 February 2024), who are also nationals of Brazil. The Appellant’s wife and children are his dependents in his protection claim, made on 23 January 2023.
5. The Appellant claimed that he had left Lebanon in fear of Hezbollah; Hezbollah wanted to recruit him; because he was resistant, he was viewed as a traitor. The Appellant also claimed that he would face problems in Brazil from members of his wife’s family.
6. The Appellant stated in his screening interview that he had flown directly from Brazil, using a false passport, arriving in the UK on 22 or 23 April 2022. His wife and first child arrived later travelling on their own duly issued Brazilian passports.
7. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant had no close family members still in Syria. The Respondent also accepted that the Appellant had faced past adverse attention from Hezbollah in Lebanon; however, the Respondent did not accept that there was any current risk from Hezbollah. Nor did the Respondent accept that the Appellant faced any relevant risk in Brazil.
8. The ‘reasons for refusal’ letter (‘RFRL’) of 24 April 2024 states in summary:
“It is accepted that you are a national of Syria and Lebanon …. However, it is considered that you can be removed to Brazil …. It is not accepted that you have established a real risk of persecution or that there would be a breach of the ECHR if you were returned to Lebanon …. It is not accepted that you have established a real risk of persecution or that there would be a breach of the ECHR if you were returned to Brazil …. You will be removed to Brazil.”
9. In this latter regard it as also stated:
“I am also satisfied that you are removable to Brazil as your wife and children are nationals of Brazil. You have failed to demonstrate how you would be unable to return in line with your family to Brazil.”; and
“You have failed to demonstrate how you would be unable to return in line with your wife to Brazil. You state that you obtained illegal documentation to stay in Brazil for 5 years. (SAIR1) However, it has been considered that you would be eligible to apply for residency as a spouse of a Brazilian national to which after 4 years you would be able to apply for citizenship.”
10. There has at no point been any suggestion that the Appellant should return to Syria.
11. The First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the Respondent had been wrong to marginalise the notion of a continuing risk to the Appellant from Hezbollah, concluding that there would be a continuing risk if the Appellant were to return to Lebanon.
12. Paragraph 32 of the Decision is in these terms:
“In light of my findings, and taking all of the evidence in the round, I therefore find that the appellant does have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and that the appellant faces a real risk of serious harm on return to Lebanon and that there would not be a sufficiency of protection or ability to safely internally relocate on return to Lebanon. I therefore find that the appellant is entitled to asylum.”
I shall return to that final sentence – “I therefore find that the appellant is entitled to asylum”.
13. However, the Judge did not accept the Appellant’s narrative in respect of risk in Brazil: see paragraph 30 and paragraph 35 et seq.. In particular, it was concluded “that the appellant is not at real risk of serious harm from his wife’s family on return to Brazil” (paragraph 40).
14. Further to this, the Judge found that the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles on return to Brazil. Amongst other things, the Judge stated:
“I find that no credible evidence has been provided that the appellant cannot return as a family unit with his wife and child to Brazil. No documentary evidence of the appellant seeking a visa to return to Brazil, or anything similar has been submitted. I find that the appellant lived in Brazil for approximately 13 years and is familiar with the culture and society there. He is clearly a resilient and determined person and I find that, returning as a family unit with a Brazilian wife, he would be able to reintegrate into society there. [His representative] submitted that the appellant spoke four languages, and I find it reasonable to find that on the balance of probabilities one of those languages is Portuguese, allowing the appellant to understand the society in which he would find himself back in Brazil.” (paragraph 49)
15. The Judge went on to conclude that any proportionality balance favoured the Respondent rather than the Appellant in respect of return to Brazil: see paragraph 65.
16. Notwithstanding the adverse conclusions in respect of Brazil, the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appeal on protection grounds and on human rights because of the conclusions in respect of Lebanon.
17. For completeness, I note that the appeal was also allowed “in the alternative” on humanitarian protection grounds by reference to the risk in Lebanon: see paragraphs 33, 34, 45, and the ‘Notice of Decision’ paragraph. However, I observe in this context that the Judge’s evaluation of humanitarian protection was not undertaken on a proper ‘in the alternative’ basis. As the Judge noted at paragraph 16, a person satisfying the definition of ‘refugee’ can not qualify for humanitarian protection; accordingly, any ‘in the alternative’ consideration of humanitarian protection needs to proceed on the basis that the Appellant had not established that he was a refugee; however the Judge’s evaluation of humanitarian protection proceeds on exactly the same factual findings as informed the favourable conclusion in respect of risk in Lebanon; for it to be a genuine ‘in the alternative’ assessment it should have proceeded on the basis of an assumed rejection of that narrative, and a consideration of more generalised risks in Lebanon. The Judge’s conclusion in respect of humanitarian protection, favourable to the Appellant in respect of Lebanon, was fundamentally flawed in its premises.
The Challenge
18. The Respondent challenges the decision of the First-tier Tribunal pursuant to permission granted on 21 November 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu. In material part the grant of permission to appeal states:
“It is arguable that the FTTJ having found that the appellant faced no risk of serious harm or very significant obstacles in Brazil that the FTTJ has erred in allowing the appeal.”
19. There has been no cross-appeal by the Appellant in respect of those matters on which he did not succeed before the First-tier Tribunal. Nor has the Appellant filed a Rule 24 response.
20. There is merit in the Respondent’s challenge.
21. In substance the Judge allowed the appeal under the Refugee Convention on the sole basis that the Appellant met the definition of a refugee. However, this is to disregard the substance of section 84(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 2002, which sets out the available grounds of appeal against a refusal of a protection claim.
22. Section 84(1) provides:
“An appeal under section 82(1)(a) (refusal of protection claim) must be brought on one or more of the following grounds—
(a) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention;
(b) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom's obligations in relation to persons eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection;
(c) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (public authority not to act contrary to Human Rights Convention).”
23. It may be seen that in respect of the Refugee Convention an appellant must demonstrate that removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Convention. As such, it is not sufficient for an appellant merely to demonstrate that he meets the definition of a refugee; he needs to demonstrate that his proposed removal would be in breach of the Convention. The essential issue is the risk of refoulement, in contravention of the protection of Article 33 of the Convention – ‘Prohibition of expulsion or return (’refoulement’)’. Removal to a safe country would not involve any risk of breach. On the Judge’s own findings, the Respondent’s proposed removal of the Appellant to Brazil did not give rise to a risk of refoulement.
24. Mr Etoko, helpfully and sensibly, recognised the strength of the Respondent’s challenge and did not put up any meaningful resistance to the notion that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal could not stand in respect of either the Refugee Convention, humanitarian protection, or in turn, Article 8 of the ECHR. His position was that in the event of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal being set aside, the Appellant would wish to advance arguments in respect of his returnability to Brazil.
25. In my judgement, the difficulty with Mr Etoko’s position is that there is no cross-appeal, and no Rule 24 response - and as such no formal challenge to the findings of the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly, whilst the legal conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal cannot stand, there is no basis to justify interference with the primary findings of fact of the First-tier Tribunal. I consider this to be a straightforward case where the role of the Upper Tribunal should be limited to recognising the error of law, and applying the law correctly to the formally unchallenged factual findings of the First-tier Tribunal. In substance, this means a reversal of the decision: the First-tier Tribunal on its own findings, had it applied the law correctly, should have concluded that the Appellant was not entitled to succeed on either protection or human rights grounds. The Upper Tribunal may now make that correct decision: I determine the appeal accordingly.

Notice of Decision
26. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated for error of law, and is set aside.
27. The decision in the appeal is re-made: the appeal is dismissed.

I. Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 September 2026