Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-005590
UI-2025-005591

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EU/57096/2023
EU/57097/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

Evelyne Makububya Sanyu (1)
Zac ssenungi (2)
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Fazil, counsel, instructed by Titan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, senior presenting officer
Heard at Field House on 12 February 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellants appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 3 September 2025, dismissing their appeals against the refusal of their applications for leave to enter the United Kingdom under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS).
2. The appellants are Ugandan nationals and are mother and son. The first appellant is married to a German national who has settled status in the United Kingdom (the sponsor).
3. The first appellant’s application for entry clearance was refused on the basis that it was not accepted that the appellants were the family members of a relevant EEA citizen. This is because the respondent did not accept that the marriage between the first appellant and the sponsor is a valid marriage because of an inconsistency in the sponsor’s place of residence at the time of the marriage and because the marriage certificate was not in the expected format. The second appellant’s application was refused on the basis that because the first appellant’s marriage was not accepted as valid and because his application was dependent on her relationship with the sponsor, it was not accepted that the second appellant is related to the sponsor as claimed.
4. The appellants appealed the decisions. The respondent conducted a review of the appellants’ skeleton argument and evidence on 14 November 2024. She maintained her position that the marriage certificate was not in the expected format but did not specify how it failed to conform. The respondent noted evidence of money transfers, documents relating to the sponsor’s means, evidence of travel and photographs. She stated that such evidence from the start of the first appellant’s relationship would be expected and placed little weight on the photographs because they were undated. The respondent stated that the marriage certificate was insufficient to demonstrate a relationship between the first appellant and the sponsor. Although the respondent accepted the DNA evidence as substantiating the relationship between the two appellants, she did not accept that the second appellant had demonstrated a relationship with the sponsor.
5. In dismissing the appeals, the judge made the following findings:
(i) The expert report relied on by the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024.
(ii) The requirements of section 10 of the Marriage Act are mandatory, and if not met, a Form C certificate cannot be issued.
(iii) The marriage has not been validated under Ugandan law and is therefore not recognised under United Kingdom law.
(iv) The second appellant has failed to show that he has family life with the sponsor.
(v) The marriage is genuine.
6. The appellants sought permission to appeal on the basis that the judge had misdirected himself as to Ugandan law, specifically in relation to the validation of Ugandan marriages. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis that it is arguable that the judge dismissed the appeal based on a technical point of foreign law which was not obviously in issue prior to the hearing; and because it is arguable that the judge reached the wrong conclusion on that point of law.
7. The respondent filed a response pursuant to rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the Procedure Rules) opposing the appeal because the first appellant was aware that the validity of her marriage was in issue; the judge did not consider that the first appellant had adduced expert evidence capable of rebutting the respondent’s argument about the validity of the marriage; and because the judge erred in making a positive finding about the genuineness of the marriage without resolving the controversial issue of the sponsor’s whereabouts at the time of the marriage.
8. On 29 January 2026, the appellants made an application pursuant to rule 15 of the Procedure Rules to adduce evidence that was not before the judge, the purpose of which is to clarify the position regarding the validity of marriages under Ugandan law. On 6 February 2026, the appellants were directed to serve a copy of the evidence on the respondent and the tribunal by no later than three days from the date of the order. I note that the evidence is contained in the composite bundle filed by the appellants on 2 February 2026. The respondent was directed to serve any response by no later than ‘five days thereafter’ which deadline is after the date of the hearing before me.
The hearing
9. At the hearing, Ms Keerthy helpfully indicated that the respondent, having had a chance to review the matter, conceded that the judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law. Ms Keerthy submitted that the only issue was disposal of the appeal, and that a de novo hearing, whether by remittal to the First-tier Tribunal or retaining the appeal in the Upper Tribunal was appropriate.
10. Ms Keerthy proposed remittal on the basis that the genuineness of the marriage is in issue and that oral evidence would be required. She submitted that it would be inconsistent to preserve findings on the genuineness of the marriage while overturning the findings in relation to the validity of the marriage. I pointed out that it was possible to have a marriage that was genuine without it being a valid marriage, which Ms Keerthy accepted, but maintained her position.
11. Mr Fazil noted that the respondent had failed to cross appeal and so had not challenged the findings of the judge in relation to the genuineness of the marriage and accordingly submitted that those findings were not within the scope of the grant of permission to appeal. He submitted that it would be possible to remake the decision on the question of validity without the need for oral evidence, as the additional evidence addressed that narrow issue.
12. Ms Keerthy accepted that the respondent had not sought permission to appeal in respect of the judge’s findings on the genuineness of the marriage. She nevertheless sought once again to persuade me that the genuineness of the marriage was in issue. On the basis that the respondent had not challenged the findings of the judge about the genuineness of the marriage, I determined that the sole remaining issue in the appeal was the validity of the marriage and that the findings in relation to the genuineness of the marriage are preserved.
13. I confirmed with Ms Keerthy that the respondent had no objection to the admission of the additional evidence and indicated that I would remake the decision. Ms Keerthy sought 30 minutes to consider her submissions, which I granted. Mr Fazil indicated that he would not seek to make oral submissions and would simply rely on the new evidence.
14. Having had 30 minutes, Ms Keerthy advised that the concession as to a material error of law was maintained and that the respondent also conceded the appeal based on the new evidence. She accepted that if the genuineness of the marriage was not in issue, then the concession in respect of its validity was determinative of the appeal.
Remaking
15. As a preliminary matter, I admit the letter dated 26 January 2026 from the Diocesan Secretary of the Namirembe Diocese of the Anglican Church of Uganda. The evidence was not before the judge, and I find that this is because the issue which it addresses was not properly identified before the hearing such that the appellant had a proper opportunity to address it or identify that such evidence would be required. The absence of a Form C certificate was not identified in the decision appealed, or in the respondent’s review. Only the format of the marriage certificate itself was questioned. It is in the interests of justice to admit the evidence.
16. It was not disputed that the first and second appellants are related as claimed, or that if the first appellant’s marriage is valid, that they both meet the definition of ‘relevant family member of an EEA citizen’.
17. I find as follows based on the documentary evidence before me, which includes a copy of the Ugandan Marriage Act, the letter dated 26 January 2026, and the evidence of the first appellant’s marriage:
(i) The appellant’s marriage was conducted in St Andrew’s Masuliita Church of Uganda.
(ii) St Andrew’s Masuliita Church is a licenced place of worship authorised to conduct and solemnise marriages.
(iii) The church is responsible for keeping a register of marriages.
(iv) The first appellant’s marriage certificate is in the format of Form E as set out in Schedule 1 to the Marriage Act (page 36, composite bundle).
(v) The first appellant’s marriage was entered into the register of marriages (page 38, composite bundle) and that entry is in the format of Form F as set out in Schedule 1 to the Marriage Act.
(vi) There is no requirement for a form C certificate to be completed in relation to a marriage solemnised in the Church of Uganda (letter dated 26 January 2026).
(vii) The first appellant’s marriage is valid.
(viii) The issue of the sponsor’s place of residence at the time of the marriage is resolved by the evidence showing his travel from the United Kingdom to Uganda in the respondent’s bundle. This includes evidence of flights; entry and exit stamps in his passport; and the witness statements of the first appellant and the sponsor. The passport evidence shows that the sponsor entered Uganda on 10 November 2019 and that he left on 24 November 2019, . The marriage took place on 17 November 2019. I find on the balance of probabilities that the sponsor’s permanent place of residence was in the United Kingdom and that his residence is recorded as Ndejje on the marriage certificate because that is where he and the first appellant were staying together at the time of the marriage.
(ix) The appellants are the family members of a relevant EEA citizen.
Notice of Decision
18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
19. The appeal is allowed under the Immigration Rules.

J K Swaney

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 February 2026