Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005594
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60196/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

ROBINA KOUSAR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Bokhari, legal representative
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 7 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 17 October 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 7 August 2024 to refuse her human rights claim.

2. The appellant had applied for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of her private and family life in this country. The respondent had not accepted that there were very significant obstacles to her reintegration into Pakistan or that there were other exceptional circumstances rendering refusal unjustifiably harsh for her. The judge agreed and dismissed the appeal.

3. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds. Those grounds in short were that: the judge unfairly reached adverse findings on a misimpression of the evidence and/or without evidential basis (grounds one and two); the judge failed to take into account (at all or alternatively adequately) relevant medical and other corroborative evidence (grounds two and five); the judge consequently made irrational findings (ground three); the judge failed to apply properly Article 8 and GEN.3.2 (ground four); and, the judge misapplied the very significant obstacles test (ground six).

4. In her rule 24 response, the respondent accepted that the judge had made certain factual mistakes but argued that there were immaterial; the key findings, which the judge was entitled to make, were that she would likely be a future burden on the state and that she did not face very significant obstacles to reintegration. Other criticisms outlined in grounds 1, 2 and 3 were factually baseless. The remaining grounds disclosed no errors of law.

5. The representatives each made oral submissions. Whilst I refer below only to those matters necessary to understand my decision, I took the pleadings, submissions and evidence to which I was referred into account in their entirety.

Grounds One, Two and Three

6. Ground one asserts that adverse findings regarding members of the appellant’s family living in Pakistan arose from different witnesses being asked materially different questions. The appellant’s representative below was unable to provide a witness statement giving details of the questioning, and so an appointment was arranged for the parties to listen to a recording of the hearing. The respondent provided a transcript of the recording, the accuracy of which is not challenged by the appellant.

7. It is clear from that transcript that the appellant’s criticism was misconceived, and so that element of ground one must fail. However, the transcript does show that it was never put to the appellant that she had used the services of the NHS. The medical evidence appears on the face of it to have been provided by private medical practitioners, and so I accept the respondent’s concession that the judge had (mistakenly) assumed that the appellant had already been seen under the NHS.

8. That is not, however, the end of the matter. It remained open to the judge to make findings on and take into account the likelihood of the appellant using the NHS in the future (indeed, such an analysis clearly bore on a mandatory consideration – the appellant’s financial independence of the state). It was the appellant’s case that she had a number of physical and mental health issues. As Ms Rushforth submitted, the appellant has not hitherto been entitled to use the services of the NHS, but would be able to so if granted Article 8 leave and on payment of the NHS surcharge. Therefore, the fact that she has not yet used the NHS is immaterial to whether she would do so in the future.

9. The question of financial independence from the state, a mandatory consideration under s117B(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is a fact to be proved by the asserting party (the appellant). It is, in any event, a consideration which at best weighs neutrally for the appellant.

10. The evidence for the appellant on the point was her having been seen privately by a consultant rheumatologist on 30 May 2024, 27 June 2024 and 16 November 2024, and a consultant radiologist on 20 June 2024. Even accepting that this family could afford to continue to fund all necessary treatment privately (notwithstanding it being the appellant’s case that she had significant physical and mental health issues and the financial evidence showing her sponsor to have a very modest income from taxi driving), the judge was still entitled to infer that the appellant would not if successful be a tax payer but instead would claim disability benefits, and her family associated benefits. Indeed, these findings are not challenged in the grounds. Consequently, it is inevitable that the judge would have found that the appellant would be financially dependent on the state even if not reliant on the NHS.

11. Consequently, grounds one, two and three, insofar as they rely on the judge’s mistake of fact regarding the appellant’s past use of the NHS, disclose no material error of law.

12. Contrary to paragraph 13 of ground two, the judge did not describe Dr Hussain’s report as ‘self-serving’ and ‘unsupported’. Instead, she found that there was evidence to contradict his opinion [43]. It was perfectly open to the judge to note that many individuals of the appellant’s age manage on their own. The key point is that the judge assessed the evidence before rejecting the appellant’s claim not to be able to. Paragraph 17 of ground two incorrectly asserts that the judge dismissed Mr Khashif’s letter in its entirety because he was a psychologist. In fact, that was only the reason for giving little weight to his assessment of the appellant’s physical health [50]. That was an entirely rational approach by the judge. The judge had earlier given permissible reasons for rejecting his assessment of the appellant’s mental health [40]-[42].

13. It is clear from the decision that the judge engaged with all of the medical evidence relied on by the appellant. She reached conclusions which were both rational and reasonably open to her. Insofar as the grounds criticise her conclusions on the issue, they amount to mere disagreement.

Ground Four

14. Ground four complains that the judge simply asserted that refusal would not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences; however, the judge recorded at [61] that she had reached that conclusion on the basis of the findings made in the preceding and following paragraphs. Whether or not criticism could be made of the structure of the judge’s analysis, I am unable to agree that any material factor has been left out of the equation or immaterial matter taken into account. I have dealt above with the judge’s factual errors, and do not find them to have made any material difference either to her GEN.3.2 assessment or her overall Article 8 analysis.

15. Regarding the latter, the grounds complain that the judge ignored the public interest balance under s117B of the 2002 Act. However, the judge directed herself to that section at [75], and it is clear from that paragraph that the statutory considerations contained therein were applied. The judge is criticised for finding that the appellant would not integrate; however, the grounds point to no evidence before the judge that any attempt had been made by the appellant to integrate into wider society during the 2 ½ years she had already been in the United Kingdom. This was, in short, an inference reasonably open to the judge. In any event, this was a finding made in the context of s117B where the ability of an individual to integrate is linked to the ability to speak English and financial independence, in respect of both of which the judge made permissible findings.

Grounds Five and Six

16. Ground five fails to identify any material in either Mr Ahmed’s statement or the country material which has been left out of account and which might have had a material bearing on the principal controversial issues. The appellant’s problem in any event is that the judge found that she would be able to return to and live with family members in Pakistan other than the family member it was said had abused her (see [49]-[54]).

17. Indeed, it cannot properly be said that the judge left out of account any of the matters advanced on the appellant’s behalf when assessing the existence of very significant obstacles to reintegration. In an extremely comprehensive analysis, the judge considered the appellant's health, family circumstances and availability of support. It was in short, perfectly open to the judge to find that no such obstacles faced the appellant.

18. For these reasons, this appeal fails and the judge’s decision stands undisturbed.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law, and so stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 May 2026