Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005596

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03572/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

PWN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
-and-

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipi of counsel, instructed by Templeton Legal Services
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a Kenyan national, born on 3 March 1961. She arrived in the UK on a visit visa on the 22 August 2007. Her claim for asylum was made on 15 June 2022. During this time, she made an application to the Home Office on human rights grounds on the 22 December 2011 which was refused on 17 January 2013.
2. I was also taken to correspondence dated 20 May 2013 which makes reference to a request made on 24 January 2013 seeking reconsideration of the decision to refuse to grant the Appellant leave to remain.
3. The claim for asylum was refused by letter dated 10 September 2024. This letter refers to issues relating to the Appellant’s credibility. Those issues continued to be relied upon at the appeal hearing referred to below.
4. The Appellant appealed to the First tier Tribunal and her appeal was heard on 27 August 2025. The decision of First tier tribunal Judge Latta (“the Judge”) was promulgated on 12 September 2025. The appeal was dismissed under the Refugee Convention, on Humanitarian Protection grounds and on Human Rights grounds.
5. Permission to appeal was sought and was granted by First tier Tribunal Judge Dieu on 21 November 2025. The error of law hearing came before me on 6 February 2026.
6. I am grateful to Mr Pipi and Ms Ahmed for their submissions. I confirm that I have had regard to all submissions and documents, whether or not specifically referred to.
7. The basis of the Appellant’s claim for asylum was that she feared the government and members of the Mungiki tribe. She had attended a protest against female circumcision being practised by that tribe, following which she was abducted and taken to a forest where she was ill-treated, including being raped and forcibly circumcised. Her account was that persons had helped her by taking her to the hospital. The identity of those persons is discussed further below in relation to the grounds of appeal. The Appellant claimed that, shortly thereafter, she was detained at a police station but was released with the help of an officer who knew her, and then went into hiding before leaving to come to the UK.
8. The Judge did not regard the Appellant’s account as credible.
9. The grounds of appeal are summarised as follows:
(i) Ground 1 challenges the Judge’s finding that the Appellant’s account lacked credibility because she had at different times described the people who found her and took her to hospital as “women” and as “farmers”. The Appellant asserts that both descriptions are capable of being correct. I was taken to references in the Appellant’s witness statement and asylum interview and it is right that reference was made to those persons who helped her being farmers in her oral evidence, whereas in her substantive interview she said that it was women who found her. I was taken to question 49 of her asylum interview where she made reference to farmers, and there is another reference at paragraph 8 of the Appellant’s witness statement to farmers, so, it is said, this does not represent a discrepancy as between the interview and oral evidence. Mr Pipi accepted that at question 3 of the interview, the Appellant referred to being found by women but this was said not to be inconsistent as women can also be farmers.
(ii) Ground 2 is that the Judge did not refer to explanations provided in the Appellant’s witness statement in relation to the adverse credibility matters raised in the refusal letter, paragraph 6, to which the Appellant had responded in her witness statement. This ground asserts that it was not sufficient for the Judge to state that documents contained in the bundle had been considered, as there were specific inconsistencies requiring express consideration if the explanation the Appellant offered was to be rejected. It was accepted that the Judge need not go through the refusal letter and response “paragraph by paragraph” but was argued that the Judge needed to make clear what view was taken about the Appellant’s explanations of the credibility issues raised against her.
(iii) Ground 3 relates to the Judge’s reliance placed on the fact that the Appellant was able to leave Kenya in her own identity. This ground of appeal is in any event not pursued.
(iv) Ground 4 asserts that the Judge was wrong as a matter of fact about the timeline of the Appellant’s applications for leave to remain, having failed to refer to documents in the bundle showing an application and the rejection of the same in 2013, and it is argued that this amounts to an error of law. This ground refers to paragraph 36 of the Judge’s decision, making reference to the Appellant’s delay in claiming asylum. The Appellant’s position is that she had explained the late claim and that the Judge did not consider the explanation. Reference is made to question 77 of the asylum interview and page 24-27 of the bundle (the Appellant’s witness statement) which gives her reasons for the late claim. In particular, the Appellant says that she had produced evidence in the form of the letter dated 20 May 2013 showing that a request had been made to the Home Office in January 2013, and the Judge should have referred to this. The Appellant accepts that she had made no attempt to regulate her stay between 2013 and 2022, but she relies on the Judge referring at paragraph 36 to there having been no such attempt between 2011 and 2022.
Analysis
10. In terms of reasons, I take into account the Practice Direction – Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 issued by the Senior President of Tribunals (SPT). I note paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Practice Direction in particular.
11. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693.
12. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49.
13. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
14. I take into account that the Judge in this case had the benefit of seeing and hearing the Appellant’s oral evidence.
15. I find no material error of law in relation to Ground 1. The Appellant had mentioned both women and farmers as a description of the people who helped her. The Judge was not required to consider the possibility that those people were both women and farmers, in circumstances where the Appellant’s own descriptions had separately identified them (variously) as women and as farmers.
16. Further or alternatively, if there was an error on the part of the Judge in failing to consider that the persons who helped the Appellant could have been both farmers and women, I do not consider that it is material to the overall assessment of the Appellant’s credibility. There are a number of aspects of credibility that were found against her. Some of those are not challenged. The Judge was entitled in my view, looking at matters in the round, to conclude that the Appellant’s claim was overall lacking in credibility.
17. I find no material error of law in relation to Ground 2. The complaint here is that the Judge did not make express reference to the explanations given by the Appellant in relation to the credibility issues raised in the refusal letter. Mr Pipi accepted that there was no duty on the Judge to conduct a “paragraph by paragraph” analysis of the refusal letter and the explanations for the issues raised therein, but he argued essentially that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons for the findings against the Appellant.
18. I conclude that the Judge is not required to explain every step their analysis, see Jones (above). I cannot conclude that the Appellant’s witness statement was not taken into account when the Judge has stated that “I have taken into account the evidence and the submissions as set out fully in the record of proceedings when reaching my decision. I have considered all of the evidence on file, the subjective and objective evidence, some of which may not be specifically referred to herein” [paragraph 24] and has also stated at paragraph 38 that there has been consideration of “… all of the evidence currently before the Tribunal in the round”.
19. Insofar as this is a reasons challenge, I consider the reasons given to be adequate. The Judge has identified a lack of credibility on the part of the Appellant and specific reference is made to aspects giving rise to that finding. The Judge was not required to engage with each and every issue raised against the Appellant and her response to it. The approach required by the Practice Direction is a proportionate one. There is sufficient information for the Appellant to understand the basis of the finding in this regard.
20. I find no material error of law in relation to Ground 4. I accept that there was an attempt by the Appellant to regulate her status in 2013, as there is correspondence in the bundle in relation to this. It is accepted by the Appellant that, thereafter, no action was taken by her until 2022. I also accept that the Judge did not specifically refer to the 2013 application. However, the Judge’s overarching position was that the Appellant’s delay in seeking asylum was relevant to the credibility of her claim. I consider this to be a point the Judge was entitled to take into account, whether the delay spanned 2011 to 2022 or 2013 to 2022. There is, I conclude, potentially an error of fact in that the Judge appears to have recorded the latest attempt at regularisation as having been in 2011. However, I do not consider it to be an error of law, or a material error of law, because the core point being made by the Judge was the prolonged delay on the part of the Appellant in claiming asylum: that point is a fair one, I conclude, by reference to the delay from 2013 to 2022 such that any error of fact regarding the date of application is not an error of law and is also not material to the key credibility finding.
21. It is important to note that credibility is an assessment in the round. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing the Appellant’s oral evidence. I bear in mind HA (Iraq) v SSHD (above). I do not consider that the Judge erred in failing to make reference to each and every piece of evidence. The Judge acknowledges the correct approach to credibility assessment at paragraph 25 of the decision. Mr Pipi acknowledged this to some extent by accepting that the Judge did not need to go through the credibility concerns and responses “paragraph by paragraph”.
22. There is a duty to give reasons, but they need not be elaborate. Paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction states that, “Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning”. I find that there is no error of law in the Judge’s approach to credibility and I consider the decision to contain adequate reasons.
Notice of Decision
1. The anonymity direction is maintained.
2. There is no material error of law in the First-tier tribunal decision dated 12 September 2025
3. The appeal is dismissed.

Sian Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 February 2026