Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005601

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58365/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOKE

Between

NM
(Anonymity Direction Made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J. Doerfel, Counsel instructed by Portway Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Keerthy , Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Friday 13 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) dated 9 October 2025 (“the Decision”) dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 21 January 2023 refusing her application for asylum.
2. The Appellant filed an application for permission to appeal with the FtT on 23 October 2025. This application was refused by the FtT on 25 November 2025. The application was renewed before the Upper Tribunal who granted it in part on 15 January 2026.
3. The Grounds originally relied on by the Appellant in their document dated 23 October 2025 can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: The Judge erred in finding that women facing gender based violence did not form part of a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
Ground 2: The Judge irrationally found that internal relocation was a viable option.
Ground 3: The Judge irrationally found that the Appellant did not qualify for leave to remain on the basis of Article 8.
4. In granting permission, First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimes stated:
“2. In relation to Ground 1, no submission was made regarding membership of a particular social group, with reference to the case of Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC). The Judge’s conclusion regarding whether or not the Convention was engaged was open to him on the basis of the evidence. In regard to her late claim for asylum, while the Judge found at [18] that this damaged her credibility, in the following paragraph [19] he finds her to be a credible witness. Ground 1 is not made out.
3. In relation to Ground 2, it is arguable that the Judge has failed to consider the appellant’s personal characteristics in the round when considering whether it would be reasonable for her to internally relocate, in particular her mental health. Under Ground 3, the same applies for his consideration of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi), where it is arguable that he has not considered the impact of her mental health.
4. Permission to appeal is granted on grounds 2 and 3 only.”
ISSUE
5. My task is to determine whether the FtT made a material error of law. I am not determining the appeal against the decision of the SSHD. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. It does not matter that I might have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached, or is otherwise vitiated by some other identifiable error of law.
6. I remind myself of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering. I summarise those, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693, AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
1. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently
2. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
3. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the UT's assessment of the facts.
4. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
5. The UT is an appellate court and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
6. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
7. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
8. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
9. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required
7. If I determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, I then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If I set the Decision aside, I must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
8. I had before me a bundle running to 474 pages (pdf) ([B/xx]) containing the documents relevant to the appeal before us, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. In addition I had a 76 page medical records bundle, an Appellant’s Rule 25 reply, and an 8 page application for permission to amend the grounds of appeal.
9. Having heard from the representatives I indicated I would reserve our decision and provide that in writing, which I now turn to do.
APPLICATION TO AMEND GROUNDS
10. At the hearing Mr Doerful produced an application to amend the grounds of appeal, which had been filed and served the day before the hearing. In summary he applied to:
a) Re-argue the original Ground 1 relating to the judge’s conclusion regarding whether the Appellant was part of a particular social ground. Permission to advance this ground had already been refused twice previously on the papers by the FtT and this Tribunal.
b) Advance a new Ground 2, relating to the Judge’s consideration of what constituted ‘serious harm.’
c) Advance a new Ground 3, submitting the Juge had failed to apply para 339K of the Immigration Rules.
d) Advance a new Ground 4, submitting the Judge erred in considering there was sufficiency of protection.
Mr Doerful included within his application a Ground 5 (misnumbered as Ground 4 in his application), which was the original Ground 3 relating to Article 8. Upon clarification Mr Doerful confirmed that he also intended to rely upon the original Ground 2 relating to internal relocation, which had not been included in his application.
11. In considering whether the grant this application I apply the three-stage test set out originally in Denton v White [2014] EWCA Civ 906, and held to be adopted in applications for extensions of time; R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 2472. The first consideration is to identify the default and assess its seriousness or significance. The Judge’s decision was promulgated on the 9 October 2025. The deadline for the application for permission to appeal to the FtT was 29 October 2025. Having had this application refused on 25 November 2025, the Appellant had an opportunity apply to amend the grounds before the application for permission was made to this Tribunal, the deadline of which expired on 15 December 2025. Permission having been granted by this Tribunal in part, the usual directions regarding the service of documentation were issued, and at any stage it was open to the Appellant to make this application. The Home Office provided a Rule 24 response by 27 January 2026, and a Rule 25 reply was filed on behalf of the Appellant on 5 March 2026, with no indication that this application was forthcoming. This application was not submitted until the day before the error of law hearing on 12 March 2026. Submitting this application some four or so months late and with plainly insufficient notice to the Home Office, is a serious and significant breach. Sensibly, Mr Doerfel did not attempt to argue otherwise.
12. I turn to the second limb, whether there is a good reason for the late application. The application itself contains no explanation whatsoever as to why it is submitted so late. I noted to Mr Doerfel that I accepted that there was a late change in counsel which can sometimes cause some issues, and in fact Mr Doerfel indicated he had only been briefed a few days prior to the error of law hearing. However, this in itself, without more, in my view cannot amount to a good reason. The Appellant was represented at her appeal hearing by counsel, who drafted the skeleton argument in support. The original grounds of appeal were settled by solicitors, upon which permission was granted with respect of two of those grounds. This is not a case where the Appellant had represented herself previously, which might have provided some good reason. The fact there has been a late change of counsel in these circumstances, where the same solicitors have represented the Appellant throughout, in my view does not amount to a good reason for the timing of this application.
13. Finally I turn to the other circumstances in the case. Granting this application at such a late stage would plainly cause some prejudice to the Respondent, although the Respondent was able to make brief submissions on the proposed amended grounds before me. In any event, the absence of prejudice does not in itself justify granting such an extension. The principle submission made by Mr Doerfel is that the grounds were ‘Robinson’ obvious; R v SSHD exp Robinson [1997] 3 WLR 1162. I bear in mind what was said in Hysaj at [46]:
"If applications for extensions of time are allowed to develop into disputes about the merits of the substantive appeal, they will occupy a great deal of time and lead to the parties' incurring substantial costs. In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process. In most cases the court should decline to embark on an investigation of the merits and firmly discourage argument directed to them. Here too a robust exercise of the jurisdiction in relation to costs is appropriate in order to discourage those who would otherwise seek to impress the court with the strength of their cases."
There the Court found the grounds to be arguable, but not strong and therefore refused the application to extend time.
14. I turn to whether, upon a brief investigation, the proposed new grounds are indeed very strong. Firstly, with respect of the proposed new Ground 1, this particular ground falls into a different category from the proposed new Grounds 2-4. Permission to argue this particular ground had been refused on the papers by the FtT and this Tribunal. Permission to argue this ground therefore has not been granted, and there is no authority before me to indicate I have any jurisdiction to revisit those decisions.
15. In any event, I note that the skeleton argument for the appeal dated 31 August 2024 at B/175 was framed such that it forwarded a protection claim only, and did not substantively address any asylum claim, or argue that the Appellant was part of a particular social group. Furthermore, it cannot be said to be ‘Robinson obvious’ that women facing gender based violence could satisfy the second limb of the test laid out in DH (Particular Social Ground: Mental health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC), namely that they have a distinct identity in Georgia as they are perceived as being different from the surrounding society. The objective material relied upon in the application address the patriarchal attitudes of Georgian society, but fail to evidence how a victim of gender based violence would be perceived as being distinctly different within Georgia.
16. With respect of the proposed new Grounds 2 and 3, they can be dealt with together, as they involve overlapping submissions. It was submitted that having accepted the Appellant’s account of being abused by her former partner, which included being raped, it was irrational for the Judge to find that this did not amount to ‘serious harm’ and it was irrational for the Judge to conclude that there were good reasons to consider such serious harm would not be repeated. I accept Mr Doerfel’s submissions that rape does arguably fall under the ambit of Article 15(b) treatment. Having accepted the Appellant as credible, the Judge’s conclusions that the treatment suffered did not amount to ‘serious harm’ is potentially open to challenge. However, the ultimate issue for the Judge here is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that if returned to Georgia, the Appellant would face serious harm.
17. The Appellant’s account at Q39 of the asylum interview which contains the rape allegation, relates to the treatment meted out to the Appellant whilst she was still in the family home. Having left the family home in July 2020 after SK had discovered her affair, the Appellant moved in with her mother. SK then visited her mother’s address on three occasions before neighbours called the police. The police verbally reprimanded SK, and since then he did not return to the address (Asylum Interview Q25-28). Thus from July 2020 until her departure in September, the Appellant had no contact with SK. The Appellant’s account is that upon arriving in the United Kingdom, matters settled for some time and then inexplicably SK changed his behaviour and threatened her again (Asylum Interview Q34-37). The threats received were on 26 November and 26 December 2022 by text message (Asylum Interview Q53).
18. Thus the Judge was entitled to note at [19] of the Decision that despite finding the Appellant credible, there were lengthy periods of time since the Appellant had left the family home, where the Appellant had not had contact with her former partner. The conclusion of the Judge that ‘the appellant’s account is not one of serious continuous physical violence and harm’ when looked at in context is not the Judge applying the incorrect test, but reflects the preceding observation that there had been lengthy periods of non-contact with her former partner. The Judge plainly had in mind the correct test, as she addressed it subsequently at [20] of the Decision. The Judge’s conclusion is not prima facie irrational, given that since leaving the family home in 2020, the Appellant had been subjected to three visits which stopped after police attendance, and two texts two years later and a month apart. Even if the Judge had concluded that the treatment previously meted out to the Appellant by SK was ‘serious harm’ and therefore had considered 339K, her findings on the level of threat currently faced by the Appellant would have been unchanged given the Judge’s reasoning.
19. I turn to proposed new Ground 4, which address the Judge’s conclusions regarding sufficiency of protection. The ground complains that the Judge failed to consider the objective evidence. At [22] the Judge indicates that she took account of the Appellant’s submissions, noting that these were based on general assertions about domestic abuse in Georgia. The Judge turns her mind to the evidence before her, and notes that police were called when SK attended her mother’s house, and that the Appellant was able to remove her son from SK’s care in 2023. Furthermore there is an ongoing criminal case against SK. The Judge’s conclusions therefore regarding sufficiency of protection, while they did not address the objective evidence directly, cannot be said to be so irrational such that they amount to an error of law.
20. This is a case where the delay in filing an application to amend grounds was significant, and there was no good explanation for the delay. The Appellant has been represented throughout proceedings and the representatives knew full well the consequences of failing to comply with the rules governing time limits. There are no circumstances which justify extending time. The application for permission to appeal does not arise for consideration in these circumstances, however I would have refused permission in any event for the reasons given above.
ORIGINAL GROUNDS 2 AND 3
21. I turn to the grounds upon which permission was granted.
22. With respect of original Ground 2, the Judge’s conclusions regarding internal relocation, it was submitted that the Judge failed to consider the Appellant’s mental health issues when considering her ability to relocate. I make the following findings and observations:
a) The medical evidence before the Judge was relatively limited. There was evidence the Appellant was on Sertraline, a photograph of this is at B/333. There is also a one page psychological opinion at B/410 dated 11 March 2023 which summarised the Appellant’s symptoms and confirmed that the Appellant received psychological counselling in November 2021 as a victim of domestic abuse. This is a document from a psychologist in Georgia, who acknowledged that the Appellant had been in the United Kingdom since October 2020. It is unclear how psychological treatment was received given the Appellant was in the United Kingdom. In any event, the appeal hearing was listed on 6 October 2025, and there was no up to date assessment of the Appellant’s mental health issues before the Judge.
b) The 76 page medical records bundle that have since been provided was not before the Judge, and therefore any failure to consider that cannot be an error of law.
c) In her screening interview at Q2.3 at B/378 and in her asylum interview at B/441 the Appellant was specifically asked about whether she had any mental health issues and indicated that she had none.
d) There is no evidence in the Appellant’s witness statements addressing her mental health. Furthermore there are no submissions within the skeleton argument arguing that the Appellant’s mental health was a concern.
Given the above I am not persuaded that the Judge’s failure to mention the Appellant’s mental health is an error of law. The Appellant’s mental health was simply not argued substantively or evidenced such that it ought to have been considered extensively in any event. The Judge at [27] was aware that the Appellant was on medication for depression, the fact that this was not explicit at [24] when considering of internal relocation does not necessarily mean that the Judge failed to take it into account at all; MA (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 49.
23. Finally turning to original Ground 3, the same observations apply to this ground. The Judge was aware that the Appellant was on medication for depression and took this into account amongst other factors. As already observed, there was limited evidence of the Appellant’s current mental health condition and no substantive submissions made with respect of it. For the Appellant’s mental health condition to have made an impact on the Article 8 assessment there would at the very least have to have been some up to date medical information before the Judge. I do not find that Ground 3 discloses an error of law.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Richards-Clarke stands.

S Y Loke
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Loke
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 March 2026