Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005610
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58134/2023
LH/00093/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

TUOI THI TRAN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. C Physsas, Counsel, Instructed by Dayton Rayleigh Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 21 May 2025 dismissing her appeal against the decision of the respondent dated 20 June 2023 refusing her application for entry clearance to settle in the UK as the adult dependent relative of her daughter.
2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam. She was born on 1 October 1955 and is now 70 years old. She applied on 2 May 2023 for entry clearance under Appendix FM to settle in the United Kingdom as the Adult Dependent Relative (ADR) of her (sponsor) daughter Thu Xuan Thi (Nguyen), a naturalised British citizen.
3. The appellant suffers from a number of diagnosed conditions, namely Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder and the sequelae of tuberculosis, hypertension, high cholesterol and oesophageal reflux. A diagnosis of severe generalised anxiety disorder and severe depression was confirmed in initial and addendum psychiatric assessments by Dr. Malcolm Cameron.
4. In essence, the basis of the appellant’s claim is that her physical and mental health have deteriorated such that she can no longer care for herself including tending to her personal hygiene, cooking, housekeeping, and shopping. Her only support is from neighbours who provide occasional assistance with personal care. Her brother and sister-in-law who had supported her are no longer able to do so having moved a significant distance away. She claims not to be able to access state funded care. She further claims that private care is not affordable.
5. The respondent refused her application on the grounds that she failed to meet the requirements under E-ECDR.2.4 and E-ECDR.2.5 which I set out in full below.
Grounds of Appeal
6. The appellant’s are four grounds of appeal summarised as follows:
a. The judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s eligibility under E-ECDR.2.4 in failing to make findings on the evidence in respect of the appellant’s required level of need.
b. The judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s eligibility under E-ECDR.2.5, that is, whether the appellant can receive the required level of care in her home country, given that she failed to make any findings on the appellant’s level of care needs.
c. The judge erred in her assessment of the evidence.
d. The judge erred in failing to consider the impact of the refusal of the application and whether it was unjustifiably harsh.
The Hearing
7. Prior to the start of the hearing I was helpfully advised that Ms. McKenzie, on behalf of the respondent, conceded that the FtT had made a material error of law in failing to make any findings as to the appellant’s required level of need. She also accepted before me that the FtT had erred in failing to make any findings as to whether she accepted or placed any weight on the expert evidence of psychiatrist Dr. Malcolm Campbell.
8. In my judgment the respondent’s concession is properly made for the reasons I set out below.
9. Both Ms McKenzie and Ms. Physsas shared the view that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no preserved findings given the nature of the error, namely the failure of the FtT to make findings on the central issue to be determined.
10. Ms. Physsas invited the respondent to review her decision in the interim, but emphasised that such a review should not delay a listing at the First-tier Tribunal given the protracted history of this case, the age of the appellant and her health.
Error of Law
11. To succeed in an application for entry clearance to settle in the UK as an Adult Dependent Relative (ADR), an applicant must satisfy eligibility requirements which at the time of the appellant’s application were set out in Appendix FM. The relevant criteria were as follows:
E-ECDR.2.4. ‘The applicant … must as a result of age, illness or disability require long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks’.

E-ECDR.2.5. The applicant … must be unable, even with the practical and financial help of the sponsor, to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, because
(a) it is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it; or
(b) it is not affordable.
12. The applicable Home Office Guidance is Family Policy: Adult Dependent Relatives, Version 3.0 (January 2022) which sets out the criteria and the evidence required to satisfy the tests in E-ECDR.2.4 and E-ECDR.2.4
13. The relevant authority is BRITCITS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA civ 368 in which the then Master of the Rolls, Sir Terrence Etherington, addressed the relevant tests at [59]:
Second, as is apparent from the Rules and the Guidance, the focus is on whether the care required by the ADR applicant can be “reasonably” provided and to “the required level” in their home country. As Mr Sheldon confirmed in his oral submissions, the provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, and the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant. It is possible that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to these considerations, which focus on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in their home country. Those considerations include issues as to the accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. They are capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements verified by expert medical evidence. What is reasonable is, of course, to be objectively assessed.
And at [76]:
In particular, rejection on the basis of the availability of adequate care in the ADR’s home country turns upon whether the care which is available is reasonable for the ADR to receive and of the level required for that applicant. Contrary to the submission of the appellant, those considerations are capable, with appropriate evidence, of embracing the psychological and emotional needs of elderly parents.
14. At [28] the FtT found that the appellant had not met the requirements of paragraph E-ECDR.2.4 stating:
I do not find the find the support described as occasional assistance from neighbours reaches the threshold.
15. The FtT goes on to consider, as she says, in the event she is wrong in her assessment of E-ECDR.2.4, whether the appellant meets the requirements under E-ECDR.2.5.
16. At [30] the FtT found that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the level of care she required is unavailable in Vietnam, finding:
there is simply no evidence has been provided to demonstrate that private or public care would be either unaffordable or unattainable for the appellant.
17. At [31] the FtT found that the evidence provided showed that practical assistance was available from the neighbours. With respect to alternative sources of care the FtT says:
I have little hesitation in finding that if the appellant wished, she would be able to find and pay for the care which she currently claims she obtains freely from neighbours.
18. It is clear to me that the FtT made a material error of law in assessing the appellant’s eligibility under ECDR.2.4 by applying the wrong test and failing to make the specific findings she needed to make in relation to the level of care the appellant required. Put simply, the FtT at [28] assessed the appellant’s eligibility under ECDR.2.4 on the basis of the assistance she receives rather than on the level of care the appellant requires.
19. The level of assistance the appellant is currently receiving is relevant to ECDR.2.5. However, a determination on ECDR.2.5 that is, whether an applicant’s care needs can be met in their home country, can logically only be made once those needs are identified. In my judgment, it is was simply not open to the judge to the FtT to purport to make a finding in relation to ECDR.2.5 as she had not made specific findings as to the appellant’s level of need and as such constitutes a further material error of law.
20. Having found material errors of law in respect of the challenges raised in Grounds 1 and 2, it is not strictly necessary to consider Ground 3. However, for completeness, I do find a further error of law in the judge’s failure to engage properly or at all with material evidence.
21. The FtT refers at [21] to the medical evidence, including medical letters from Specialist Dang Hong Tu at Tam Binh Medical Clinic. That letter at [UTB 138] dated 8 September 2022 includes the following:
Doctor’s advice: a caregiver is required because she cannot take care of herself.
22. This letter was in the bundle for the appeal on 7 February 2024 and referred to in the Appellant’s original skeleton argument dated 24 October 2023 both of which would have been before the FtT at the hearing on 6 May 2025. Nevertheless the FtT makes no mention of the letter which is relevant to level of care the appellant required.
23. Similarly, the FtT at [26] refers to “un-named” neighbours who assist the appellant. At [UTB 55] and [UTB] 59 are translated statements from the neighbours Le Kim Anh and Tran Ti Xuan supported with photocopies of identity documents. No reference is made either to these statements nor to the contents thereof which are relevant to the level of care required and availability thereof. Assessment of the statements and weight to be attached is a different matter but the failure of the judge to engage at all with this evidence is a material error.
24. As properly acknowledged by Ms McKenzie, the FtT comments on the evidence of Dr. Cameron but does not state whether or to what extent she places any weight upon it [23] to [27]. That evidence, together with the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor is relevant to the psychological and emotional requirements of the appellant, recognised in BRITCITS at [59] as material to the applicable criteria.
25. Further, the FtT does not acknowledge the evidence of the appellant, the sponsor and the appellant’s sister-in-law regarding the cost of private care in Vietnam set out in their respective witness statements.
26. For the above reasons, I find the decision of the First-tier reveals material errors of law.
Notice of Decision
27. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves material errors of law and is set aside.
28. Having considered the submissions on behalf of the appellant and respondent and applying the principles set out in the Practice Direction, according to the guidance given in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) I consider it appropriate to remit the Decision to the First-tier Tribunal given the nature and the extent of the findings to be made.
Directions
29. Given the history of this appeal and the appellant’s age, this appeal should be listed before the First-tier Tribunal at the earliest opportunity.

M Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 March 2026