Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-005639
(PA/55962/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 April 2026 On 5 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

ZAS
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Sanaz Saifolani of counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, a Home Office presenting officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the decision of FTT Judge Roblin (the judge) who, on 14th of June 2025, refused the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to find that the appellant would not be persecuted for a Convention reason and/or that there would be insufficient protection available to him and/or he could internally relocate within Pakistan.
2. Permission to appeal that decision was given by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on 9 February 2026.
3. The grounds assert that:
1) There had been a failure to make a proper assessment of the appellant’s account before making an adverse finding under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (section 8). In particular, it was asserted that the appellant’s subjective fear of persecution did not arise until after he came to the UK and therefore the lateness of his claim could be explained by that fact;
2) The second ground was that the judge had failed to make adequate findings or give adequate reasons, alternatively, his decision was irrational in relation to the assertion in the appellant’s evidence that his mother and cousin had been killed. Furthermore, it was perverse for the judge to place excessive weight on the fact that a BBC article had not named his mother and cousin, given that it had not been the appellant’s evidence that they had been “singled out for the attack in 2005”. Ground 2 also asserts that the FTT’s decision in relation to internal relocation and protection had been “infected” by the judge’s error in concluding that the appellant had not been at risk of harm. It was argued that the appellant had a credible claim to fear the authorities – a fear which had been increased by his social media posts;
3) Ground 3 asserts that there was a failure to have regard to material evidence and all the factors in the case and in particular:
i. an extract from Pardais News and other documents which suggested that the appellant had been seen talking about his mother’s and cousin’s deaths;
ii. His subjective claim was bolstered by being wanted by an extremist Islamic organisation called Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP).
2. Judge Ruddick concluded that all three grounds were arguable – the first because of the judge’s allegedly strained logic, the second because the judge appeared not make sufficiently clear findings and the third because of the contradictions stated above between the judge’s conclusions and what was found in Pardais News and in relation to the appellant’s TLP involvement.
3. Following the grant of permission to appeal, on 26 February 2026 the respondent submitted a response to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the rule 24 response) to the effect that the appellant in his asylum interview (as recorded at paragraph 8 (d) of the refusal letter) attributed the death of his mother in 2005 to the authorities and therefore there was a claim to historical risk whilst he was in Pakistan. Accordingly, it was not perverse nor was it an error for the judge to apply section 8 of the 2004 Act and reach the conclusion or conclusions that he reached. It was impossible to stipulate those matters which may damage credibility exhaustively – it was a matter for the judge to decide that and he had done so, finding the appellant’s credibility to be damaged. The judge also had also been entitled to consider the BBC article and the fact that it did not refer to the appellant’s mother by name. Ground 3, and the criticism of the manner in which the judge had dealt with the appellant’s social media history, had been matters for the judge. He had had not be required to deal with evidence of the appellant’s social media activity in any particularly “elaborate” way. Even if the grounds identified an argument in relation to the managing which the judge had treated the appellant’s evidence about his social media history, this was not a material error. The appellant had confirmed before the FTT that he had not received any threats since leaving Pakistan.
4. There was also an application by the appellant to adduce additional documentary evidence under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
The hearing
5. At the hearing I heard submissions by both representatives.
6. Ms Saifolani submitted that the grounds of appeal summarised above broadly fell into the categories of:
1) The delay to the claim;
2) A failure on the part of the judge to make adequate findings, give adequate reasons and consider material evidence;
3) Specifically, the making of inadequate findings and/or giving inadequate reasons in relation to the sufficiency of protection.
7. Ms Saifolani submitted, by reference to paragraph 21 of the decision, at page 10, that the judge had not dealt appropriately with section 8, pointing out that it does no more than stipulate matters which damage credibility without indicating to the court or tribunal what weight should attach to those matters. It was not “necessarily conclusive”, as the judge records at paragraph 21. The appellant had arrived in the UK in 2022. The judge had gone on to find that the appellant had not claimed asylum at the first opportunity and was urged to take on board the “overarching submission” that the appellant had not made a claim, having entered the UK legally in 2022, under a student visa, but did not claim asylum until 9 February 2022 a month or so after his arrival. He wrote that he feared people and said that as a direct result of his social media activities he would “…be looked into”. The appellant said what those activities were (see ground 1 at paragraph 6). It was submitted that the judge had failed to grapple adequately with this evidence. It was therefore submitted that the judge had been wrong to reject the evidence that the appellant was effectively a refugee sur place. It was submitted that the judge had failed to grapple adequately with the power of the Pakistan state until he came to the UK, by reference to paragraph 10 of his witness statement (at page 16 of pdf), referred to paragraph 6 of the grounds of appeal, which deals with ground 1. This ground is to the effect that the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Pakistan until he came to the UK.
8. Ms Saifolani then turned to ground 2 (the judge’s failure to make adequate findings/give adequate reasons for his decision). She referred me to paragraph 23 of the decision (quoted at paragraph 12 of the grounds). The BBC article which is the subject of that paragraph was referred to by the judge as indicating that the appellant was not of interest to the authorities. The point had been made that this was not the appellant’s primary case, but in any event, it was submitted the judge had not made adequate findings in relation to the BBC news article. The BBC news article was put forward as supporting the death of the appellant’s mother in 2005 but it was not the appellant’s case that his mother or brother were described in the article. It was merely put forward as corroborating that the events had occurred at that time. This, it was submitted, gave credence to the appellant’s case. It was submitted that the judge’s findings were insufficient to base his finding that the appellant had not been credible.
9. The last-mentioned ground of appeal also contained a criticism of the judge’s decision in relation to risk on return and internal relocation. In short, by reference to the grounds at paragraph 16, it was submitted that if the judge’s findings in relation to the adequacy of protection were impugned it was submitted that his finding in relation to internal relocation protection was also to be questioned.
10. The court was referred to ground 3 which was dealt with in the paragraph 17 et seq of the grounds of appeal. In particular:
1) 17.1 asserts that the appellant had been criticised by the judge in relation to the lack of a translated document or documents when in fact the appellant’s bundle contained social media post by Pardais news and a further post;
2) 17.2 which states that the judge did not adequately engage with the appellant’s subjective claim.
11. Ms Saifolani said that paragraph 26 of the decision which refers to the posts for which the appellant has been responsible since his arrival in the UK reaching a large number of recipients. The appellant also claimed that the posts had been referred to in news organisations in Pakistan. Contrary to the judge’s finding in that paragraph, this evidence was not adverse to the appellant’s credibility but rather the opposite. Translations of the Pardais news stories were provided at, for example, page 72 . According to that page, provided by the appellant, on 13 October 2005 the appellant’s mother and “cousin sister” had met their deaths. He accused the then government of being their “killers” and provided a warning of the consequences. This article should have been properly considered by the judge as it was said to go to the substance of the claim. There was said to be a risk on return from the social media posts including that one. Reference was also made to the social media post translated at page 100 which refers to “removing trash from Pakistan God willing” and to the “Qadiyanis and their supporters who have no right to live in Pakistan”. This was a further important part of the case that should have been considered by the judge. The appellant also relied on background material and the fact that as far as the appellant could establish the insufficiency of protection from persecution in Pakistan. I was referred in this context to paragraph 11) at page 500 (internal page 10) of the respondent’s refusal where the generality of the threat the appellant faced was accepted. I was invited to set aside the decision of the FTT and remit the matter for a fresh hearing before a different judge of the FTT.
12. Ms Khan, for the respondent, relied on her client’s rule 24 response and said that her case included asserting that the section 8 assessment made by the FTT was sound. Section 8 was engaged and the refusal explained the criticisms of the appellant’s behaviour including delay and other factors relevant to that question. The appellant asserted that his mother had disappeared in 2005 and the judge had been entitled to take into account the lack of corroborating evidence. His credibility had been damaged by a number of factors, which were set out in the decision. For example, paragraph 21 of the decision (at page 10) points out that the appellant did not claim asylum until 9 February 2023. The section 8 findings could be characterised as “concise” but the judge did not lack the essentials for such a finding. In any event, section 8 was not determinative of the outcome, nor did the judge treat it as such. The overall impression the appellant made on the judge was negative. The judge had been entitled to reject the credibility of his claim in all the circumstances.
13. It was open to the judge to attach little weight to the social media posts. The judge was entitled to consider the case “in the round”. The appellant had not been subject to any threats whilst in Pakistan and the respondent submitted that the death of his mother if established was not itself determinative of the extent of his ongoing risk, given it had occurred many years ago. It was accepted the judge placed weight on the item from the BBC. In the respondent’s view he was entitled to come to the conclusions he came to. I was referred in this context paragraph 23 of the decision which explains fully his reasons for accepting the BBC article.
14. In relation to ground 3, the appellant asserts that his social media posts reached 22 million people but we have only his word for that. According to paragraph 26 of the judge’s decision, that figure was “sourced by the appellant from the internet” but the document which makes reference to that figure had not been provided. Furthermore, it did not appear to be a document to which much weight should attach. Given his credibility was rejected the judge had been entitled to reach the same view on his documentary evidence as his oral evidence. In any event, Ms Khan referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA 464 at paragraph 2 (especially at sub – paragraphs (iii) and (iv)) where the court said the exact extent to which a judge of that is weight to that particular point is a matter for the judge is not for the appeal court or tribunal to gainsay. The judge was entitled to reach the decision he came to on the facts as recorded.
15. Miss Saifolani responded to reiterate the fact that the appellant had not claimed asylum on arrival because the threat had not yet arisen. The social media posts supported that case. I was referred to page 75-76 where there were translations of some important posts. There were also other documents which were said to be relevant.
16. Finally, Ms Khan addressed internal relocation as she had omitted to cover this in her earlier submissions. This was adequately dealt with at (the first) paragraph 32 (there being two paragraphs bearing that number). There was a concise finding, which the judge had been entitled to come to.
17. I was invited to uphold the decision of the FTT. The judge reached clear conclusions.
18. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
19. The judge was entitled to attach greater weight to some parts of the evidence than other parts. Although he had to demonstrate he had taken all material evidence into account, this needs to be read in the context of the passages from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Volpi, to which my attention was drawn. An appeal court is bound, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, to assume the trial judge (or first-tier tribunal judge, in this case) had taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The fact that the judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it (Volpi at paragraph 2 (iii)). Secondly, the validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge, or first-tier tribunal judge in this case, are: “not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the evidence and the weight to which he gives it is pre-eminently a matter for him” (paragraph 2 (iv)).
20. With these general points in mind, I turn to consider the specific challenges to the judge’s decision in this appeal.
1) The delay to the claim, section 8 and the sur place claim
21. Section 8 provides that when judging the credibility of the appellant’s account the “deciding authority” shall take into account any failure on the part of the appellant to advance an asylum or human rights claim when there is a reasonable opportunity to do so within a safe country (section 8 (4)) and a failure to make an asylum or human rights claim before being notified of an immigration decision is also to be taken into account. However, case law on the section suggests that a global assessment of credibility must be made by the FTT and purpose of the legislation is to set out the minimum array of factors that must be considered when judging the appellant’s credibility, where applicable. The section does not set out what weight should attach to each factor. Other than its use of the word “shall”, the section is not designed to be prescriptive or require greater weight to be given to one factor than another.
22. The appellant’s essential point was that he was a refugee sur place and therefore the failure to mention his mother’s and cousin’s disappearance when a reasonable opportunity arose was a material omission for the purposes of making a section 8 assessment.
23. I agree with the respondent that the fact that the events occurred 23 years prior to the claim can be taken into account when judging the risk on return. Although was not primarily said to be the cause of the appellant’s continued interest to the authorities in Pakistan, it was clearly material to the asylum and human rights claims to mention this and he indeed put forward these facts in support of his own claim. In the circumstances the judge was entitled to attach some weight to the delay.
24. The judge correctly directed himself in relation to section 8, referring to the limited damage to the appellant’s credibility but emphasising the fact that the section 8 finding was not determinative of the outcome of the claim. The judge was entitled to take the view that if the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution in Pakistan when he entered the UK, he should have made that claim as soon as possible as the UK was a safe country within which to make that claim.
2) A failure on the part of the judge to consider material evidence including sufficiency of protection
25. The judge is criticised for the manner in which he dealt with the evidence in relation to the death of the appellant’s mother and other matters (see Ground 2 at page 17).
The death of the appellant’s mother and the BBC article
26. The BBC article dates from 2012 (at page 156) and provides that as many as 12 people, including several Shia Muslims, were alleged to have been subject to a sectarian attack in Pakistani-administered Gilgit-Baltista.
27. Reference is also made to the article is at page 75, which refers to the aftermath of the 13 October 2005 incident.
28. The judge accepted that the appellant’s mother had met her death in the 13th October 2005 incident by virtue of a translation of it dated 22nd October 2022 at page 75. The appellant said that the incident covered and the BBC article was corroborative of his claim in the sense that such violence had continued. It was said that the later BBC article showed that such later events occurred to Shia Muslims in the same area (see page 175). The judge at paragraph 27 had regard to these documents, but having applied the well-known decision in Tanveer Ahmed 2002 UKIAT 00439, concluded that the burden rested on the appellant to show that these documents leant support to his appeal. The judge found that they did not do so.
29. The judge is said to have failed to look sufficiently closely at the appellant’s sur place activities. In particular, it is said that the judge was wrong to attach little weight to the appellant’s numerous social media posts given that he was said to have reached over 22 million Twitter followers! However, for reasons given by Ms Khan, the number of followers was not independently verified and the judge was entitled to attach little weight to this evidence.
30. It is true that the judge dealt with these issues concisely but that was a matter for him.
31. The judge rejected the appellant’s evidence on credibility grounds and these findings need to be seen in that light. In all the circumstances these findings appear to have been open to the judge.
The inadequate findings and/or reasons in relation to the internal relocation and sufficiency of protection
32. The judge had in mind that state protection was generally available (see the passages from the CPIN cited by the respondent at paragraph 5 of its rule 24 response on page 279 of the bundle).
33. The judge fully dealt with the issue of the adequacy of state protection at page 8 of his decision (page 8 of the where he referred to the Country Policy and Information Note: Actors of protection, Pakistan July 2024). He also cited the CPIN, pointing out that the burden rested on the appellant to demonstrate why protection was not available. The extent to which he accepted the appellant’s evidence turned on the credibility of the appellant’s case generally, which the judge rejected. The judge found an absence of state involvement in any attack on the appellant or his family members, denying any targeting by militias. He found an absence of supporting evidence in relation to threats or targeting and there was no substantive link between the threats and targeting by the Pakistan state.
34. Based on his findings, the judge was entitled to find that protection exists in principle and was available to the appellant in practice. The evidence that state protection would be available was insufficiently contradicted by the evidence the appellant had supplied. The judge was entitled to conclude that adequate protection was available which undermined his refugee claim.
35. As far as internal relocation was concerned, the judge found that the appellant could safely relocate within Pakistan, which has a widespread Shia population, large urban centres where he could settle. The judge rejected the suggestion that there were nationally based extremist groups who would have targeted the appellant.
36. The judge had careful regard to the CPIN in relation to Shia Muslims and in particular to the evidence that there is a large Shia population and that they are well-integrated in the large cities (see his decision at paragraph 29). The Shia Muslim population was widely dispersed. There was no accepted evidence that the appellant was a high-profile individual who had come to adverse attention of the authorities or would face risk in the whole of Pakistan. In as far as the appellant contended to the contrary, his account was rejected by the judge, whose overall conclusion was that relocation internal relocation would be both available and reasonable. The prospect of internal relocation need only be considered if the judge’s fight primary finding was that the appellant was at risk in his home area, which the judge had not accepted. However, in the event that the appellant had been at risk of persecution in his home area, there was sufficient evidence that the appellant would be able to live in another part of Pakistan without being reached by militias. The appellant could safely integrate within a large city containing an integrated Shia population.
3) Failure to consider material evidence/ factors.
37. The case as a whole turned on the credibility of the appellant’s account, the extent to which it was reliable and whether it was sufficiently corroborated. Key events were the death of his mother and 2005, his social media activism, particularly since arriving in the UK, the alleged threats the nature of source and frequency and the reliability of foreign documents produced.
38. The judge found the appellant to be lacking credibility overall and the Upper Tribunal is reluctant to interfere with such finding for the reasons already given. The delay, inconsistencies and vagueness, the ability to exit Pakistan without any issue and a lack of history of arrest or state interest meant this was a decision which the judge was entitled to come to. The Tanveer Ahmed principle meant that the appellant had the burden of proving the reliability of the documents upon which he relied, some of which were untranslated, unverified or unsigned. They were documents to which little weight was given, therefore. The social media evidence was subject to the important caveat that the reach of the appellant’s social media presence was not proven, there was only the appellant’s word for the number of followers he had and there were no verified threats from state actors or identified agents. The appellant had not therefore proved any risk to him on return to Pakistan.
39. Overall, the judge was entitled conclude the appellant to have been internally inconsistent and externally unsupported by other corroborating evidence. His evidence was sufficiently unreliable not to be given credence, he had not established his claim to the lower standard. There is no real risk of persecution in his case nor were the other international instruments on which he relied engaged.
Conclusions and decision
40. The judge had properly engaged with the threats to the appellant arising from his TLP membership and no error of law has been shown.
41. The appeal against the FTT’s decision is accordingly dismissed.

Signed Dated this 20th May 2026

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury