Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005650
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55390/2024
LP/03587/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

LS
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Brown, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. We have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Ghana. In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but we are satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 27 October 2025, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings after the appellant was convicted of offences arising out of her attempt to deceive the UK immigration authorities into believing that a 12-year-old child was her daughter. She was sentenced to a total period of imprisonment of 14 months which triggered the automatic statutory deportation provisions. The FtT judge considered the appellant’s appeal on the basis that her criminality was not motivated by any intention to cause harm to the child but was a serious and planned enterprise designed to frustrate lawful immigration controls. Deportation was resisted on the strength of a protection ground of appeal in that she claimed to be at risk of persecution or serious harm from the child’s father were she to return to Ghana. Before the merits of her protection claim could have any purchase in the appeal, she was required to rebut the presumption that she was a serious criminal who represented a danger to the community of the UK under s.72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. If unable to rebut the statutory presumption, her international protection grounds of appeal fell to be dismissed.
The Relevant Parts of the FTT Decision
4. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the FtT decision:
• At [14], the judge reproduced extracts from the criminal judge’s sentencing remarks. In sentencing the appellant, the following remarks were cited by the FtT judge:
On the 19th November Border Force Officials had … their suspicions aroused by you [LS] and a twelve-year-old child with you (G). Your efforts to answer their questions were … really hopeless; and your entry into the country was reliant, and, I hasten to add, “on the face of it” legal given your co-accused’s relationship to you being a partner who was studying for an MSC in Scotland. Had there been a valid reason I am sure that this would have been an entirely permissible trip, but I am afraid this is where the illegality and unlawfulness comes in. The application stated that G was your child, and indeed that is not the case; then not one but two different birth certificates were presented, and putting it boldly “those were lies”; and there was, it was suggested, going to be a short visit/a short trip over and then everybody would return. However, it is plain, given what was going on at the airport, certain other men lurking around who then disappeared, and lies told above and beyond the documents, that something more sinister was afoot…
…you were and are married. Your relationship with G … was not “sinister”...
As regards the level of deceit, you [SA] were here lawfully, and you [LS] would have been entitled to come and visit had you not lied but you did; you lied verbally, you knew what was going to happen, that is why there were false documents and there were attempts to perpetuate that lie at the airport.
…this was not (I repeat) for a sinister purpose, trafficking and the like; that this was, misguidedly, but illegally, an attempt to bring a twelve-year-old child into this country for a “benefit” (if I can use that word) to her in her life and her education…I sentence you on the basis that she wasn’t just going to go and live in Scotland; she was going to continue the pretence, no doubt assisted by false documentation, and, I am sure, would potentially have gone to school but been illegally there, placing a drain on limited resources as to people who are lawfully entitled to be part of society in that way…
… G…was a young child who has been brought out of her country of birth to a foreign country, and because of your criminality, and illegal attempts to bring her into the country, has been separated from people she knew, and there is no indication to me as to when she will return back to her home country. I am afraid I take that as a very serious factor in this case whatever the motivation for it: a twelve-year-old child has gone through, and putting it as neutrally as I can, an extremely unsettling and difficult period of time of some six months.
… this is not repeat offending; this is not a case for financial gain; it perhaps does not fall easily under the heading of “humanitarian”, but it certainly does not fall under the heading of anything sinister; strangers were not involved, the child was known to you; and there was no significant conspiracy over any lengthy period of time. There was, it seems to me, a medium to high level of planning and organisation and the two of you were the prime movers. Neither of you have been involved in this type of thing before and you have not exploited or pressurised any others to involve themselves in this offending.
… you are both hardworking and of hitherto good character and neither of you have any convictions. You have caused total devastation back in Ghana to those including children and family members and jobs that you have left behind…
… you acted and planned an illegally assisted immigration of a young child into this country. It is a serious piece of offending even in the circumstances I have outlined.
[Underlining added]
• At [16], in summarising the appellant’s evidence, it was noted that RB, the child’s biological father, had completed the visa application and obtained a court document to say that the appellant was the child’s mother.
• The judge summarised the appellant’s husband’s evidence at [23] and [24] and referred to a letter sent by the child’s father at [25]:
[23] SA added that he has cared for G since her birth with the agreement of her parents and as reflected in the Power of Attorney. He and LS brough G here with the intention of giving her access to better opportunities. Due to misguidance and cultural misunderstanding they presented her as their biological daughter. There was no intention for financial gain or other from of exploitation. The purpose was entirely humanitarian. He is studying for a Masters, and LS is volunteering in community organisations. They continue to experience anxiety, guilt, and distress over the events, even though the intention was never criminal. They pose no threat to the public.
[24] In oral evidence he added that RB gave LS the birth certificates. RB is happy for him and LS to look after G. He has been in contact with RB since he was released from prison. His family called LS a witch. He cannot live with LS now he is head of the family due to tradition. His mother’s family have consulted the gods who said that bad spirits follow LS. When something happens to the head of the family it is a taboo and he will be destooled (dethroned). He became head of the family as he was financially strong. The head has to do good. Going to prison is not good. G came here for a visit. He thought it was for 2 weeks. It was not for a forced marriage. He has not been allowed to contact G recently.
[25] RB wrote (15 September 2023) that he is G’s father. Due to his ill health it was agreed that SA would provide for G from birth. He and PB signed a Power of Attorney for SA to have custody of G and act as her parent. They agreed G could come here with LS to be with SA. If they are able to stay in the United Kingdom he would like G to live with them.
• After noting, at [34], the presumption which applied, the judge addressed his mind to the protection claim between [35] and [42]:
[35] I note the Sentencing Judge’s comments that “this is not repeat offending; this is not a case for financial gain…does not fall under the heading of anything sinister, strangers were not involved, the child was known to you, and there was no significant conspiracy over any lengthy period of time”. However, the Sentencing Judge found that “lies” were “told above and beyond the documents…there were attempts to perpetuate that lie at the airport…for a ‘benefit’ (if I can use that word) to her in her life and education…she wasn’t just going to go and live in Scotland; she was going to continue the pretence, no doubt assisted by false documentation…there was , it seems to me, a medium to high level of planning and organisation involved and the two of you were the prime movers…you acted and planned an illegally assisted immigration of a young child.” This undermines the suggestion that RB was the prime instigator of this by having completed the visa application form and got the false birth certificates, and the oral evidence from LS that she did nothing wrong when she came here and from SA that he thought it was for 2 weeks. Indeed it is clear that the purchase of the return part of the plane ticket for G was part of the ruse to dupe immigration officers by suggesting she would return to Ghana. That is clear also from the statement of RB that it was agreed that G would come here to live with SA. Even given the caveats identified at the beginning of this paragraph, I am satisfied that the conduct identified by the Sentencing Judge in the second sentence of this paragraph, and the subsequent attempt to shift the blame, denial of the length of time it was intended G was coming for, purchase of a return flight, and statement from PB that it was agreed she would live here, all drive me to conclude that LS poses a danger to the community here as she is still being dishonest about the plan which suggests she has no respect for immigration law and there is a real risk of it being repeated.
[36] I am therefore satisfied she is excluded from the protection afforded by the 1951 Convention and humanitarian protection as she failed to rebut the presumption that she constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.
[37] Whilst I note that the NRM has concluded on balance that G was brought here for the purpose of child exploitation - forced marriage, I have seen no evidence to support that assertion and I make no such finding.
[38] In relation to the Article 3 claim, I accept that witchcraft and accusations that women can be accused of being witches occurs as explained by Dr Ngade and in the background evidence. I do not accept there is a real risk of harm from RB or any member of his family for these inter-related reasons. As RB provided the false birth certificates for G it is not reasonably likely he would blame LS or call her a witch. RB was pleased G was coming here. RB and PB are in contact with G and content for her to remain here due to the better standard of living and resources. RB and PB said they would prefer if LS and SA were able to care for G if they are permitted to remain here. It is not reasonably likely RB would drive 4 hours to make threats to LS if he knew she was here. If there was a family feud, given the patrilineal nature of society it is reasonably likely she would have asked her uncle to intervene to seek to resolve the issue. There is no evidence RB’s family is influential. LS does not fulfil expected gender stereotypes, as she is not a widow, unmarried or cannot have children. As I do not accept RB’s adverse interest in LS, I do not accept it is reasonably likely any family member has moved or she would not be in touch with them. She has therefore been able to get evidence from them.
[39] In relation to the fear from AA, I accept LS had a wedding decoration business having seen the pictures, and a complaint had been made that she received payments for services she did not provide given the police note. It is by no means unusual for a person to have a business some distance from their home, and that they do not go every day especially if the business takes them to different places. Nor is it unusual for there to be a cash business. I do not accept that this means it is reasonably likely AA made threats against her or that there is a real risk she will seek to cause her harm as LS intended to return to Ghana, and frustration and anger does not make it reasonably likely threats will be made or reasonably likely action will follow especially where there is a functioning police force and judicial system which would act as a deterrent to AA seeking to harm LS.
[40] In addition, her failure to make an asylum or human rights claim until after served with the stage 1 deportation notice, deception in lying to immigration officials on arrival, and in producing false birth certificates undermines her credibility.
[41] She does not therefore need to internally relocate or seek police protection.
[42] I therefore dismiss the Article 3 claim based on protection issues. Given the findings made, even if I had found that the s72 presumption had been rebutted, I would have dismissed the asylum appeal as if the facts contended for in relation to the claim of what had been allegedly been threatened were not reasonably likely to be true, they were plainly not likely to be true - the protection claim having been made on 13 July 2023.
[Underlining added]
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:
• Ground 1 – the judge erred in law in his assessment of the s72 certificate.
• Ground 2 – the judge made contradictory findings on a material issue.
6. In a decision dated 9 February 2026, a judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission for both grounds to be argued.
7. At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both parties. we address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
8. While not expressed as a reasons challenge, it is clear from the grounds of appeal and the oral arguments we heard that the judge’s decision was said to be faulty due, in part, to a failure to adequately engage with the appellant’s case as to why she had rebutted the statutory presumption.
9. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:
[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).
[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:
“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probably that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”
10. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (we have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  
[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
[…]
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  
(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  
(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  
11. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57], the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.
12. There were three strands to the first ground of appeal in asserting that the judge’s consideration of the s.72 statutory presumption involved errors of law: 1) the judge did not consider the unsafe rationale adopted by the respondent in certifying the case; 2) the judge did not engage with the appellant’s case in support of rebuttal; 3) tension in the judge’s findings of fact vitiated the lawfulness of the overall conclusion on this question. We will address each in turn.
13. We are satisfied that it is misconceived to suggest that the judge was in any way tethered to the rationale adopted by the respondent in certifying that the presumption applied to the appellant. In the leading case, MS (Somalia) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1345; [2019] 3 W.L.R 705, the Court of Appeal considered how a tribunal should approach proceedings where an asylum claim is brought by a serious criminal, but the Secretary of State has not issued the certificate referred to at s.72(9) of the 2002 Act. It was decided that a judge hearing such an appeal is bound to consider whether the presumption has been rebutted even though the respondent had not taken the point in refusing the claim. This makes it clear that the presumption arises from statute and that a judge must address his or her mind to the question as a preliminary question irrespective of whether the respondent has even taken the point. It therefore becomes difficult to understand why the judge in the proceedings before us was required in law to grapple with the reasoning adopted by the respondent in support of certification. This was not the task the judge was required to perform. Instead, he was required to address his mind to whether the appellant had rebutted a presumption against her which arose from statute given the length of sentence passed upon her. The judge was not tethered to the respondent’s reasoning in reaching his own conclusion on this critical and foundational issue.
14. We are not satisfied that the judge can be fairly said to have failed to have had regard to the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s conviction. The judge emphasised these very features of the underlying circumstances by reproducing lengthy tracts of the sentencing remarks and then reiterating the central points at [35] before concluding that her essential case, that RB was the orchestrator, was undermined by these previous judicial findings. It was further observed that she had downplayed her substantial culpability in the commission of undeniably grave and sophisticated offending designed to undermine immigration controls. The duty the judge had to fulfil was to explain why he had found against the appellant on her case to have rebutted the presumption. A fair reading of the judge’s reasoning fully explains why he came to the conclusion he did and the appellant can be in no real doubt as to why she was found not to have rebutted the presumption against her.
15. The underlined parts of paragraphs [35] and [38] above are where it is suggested that the judge’s reasons involve tension and inconsistency. In short, it is said that in one moment the judge found that the appellant had produced the false birth certificates whereas in the next moment he appeared to find that it was, in fact, RB who had furnished these false documents. Both cannot be right and results in the suggestion that the fact-finding exercise is incoherent. We disagree with this characterisation of the judge’s reasoning. Firstly, we consider there to be considerable force to Mr McVeety’s submission that the appellant’s reliance on an isolated sentence in paragraph [35] is overly narrow and shorn of nuance. Mr McVeety argued that the sentence cannot be sensibly understood in isolation but must be read in conjunction with the extracts of the sentencing remarks which preceded it. Seen in that holistic way, the judge was not arriving at a finding of fact that the appellant had produced the false birth certificates but was simply pointing out that the sentencing remarks cast doubt on her narrative that RB was the ‘prime mover’ in providing the false documents. However, even if we take the appellant’s case at its highest, that this was a settled finding that the appellant had provided the false birth certificates, we are not persuaded that the isolated sentence in paragraph [38] is in tension with that earlier observation. This paragraph addressed country background information about beliefs in witchcraft in Ghana before considering a range of factors which appeared to be implausible. Seen in that context, it appears to us that the sentence relied upon could easily be read as a comment on the broad plausibility of RB being the ‘prime mover’ in providing the false birth certificates and yet blame the appellant for the unravelling of the plan or denigrating her as a witch. Mr Brown properly accepted during the hearing that this was a “possible” reading of this line from paragraph [38]. Reminding ourselves of the need to read the judge’s reasons fairly and not hypercritically, we are not satisfied that the appellant has established that the judge reached contradictory findings on who provided the birth certificates to be used to deceive immigration officials to permit a child to enter the UK.
16. We are satisfied that there is no error of law in how the judge resolved the issue of whether the appellant rebutted the s.72 presumption.
17. This suggested inconsistency, said to taint the judge’s reasons at [35] and [38], is the gravamen of ground 2. It follows that this challenge must also fail for the same reasons.
18. Even if we were satisfied that there was an error in how the judge resolved the s.72 point, we agree with the respondent, that the overall outcome of the appeal could not have conceivably been any different because the judge considered the underlying merits of the protection claim and found that it was not made out. In short, the appellant would not have succeeded in establishing a well-founded fear of persecution to a reasonable degree of likelihood even if she had first rebutted the presumption that she constituted a danger to the community of the UK.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision did not involve material errors of law. The appeal is dismissed and the FtT decision stands undisturbed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2026