Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI‑2025‑005677

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02141/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

PB
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Hingora (Counsel), Law Valley Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 14 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant, PB, is a national of Bangladesh, born on 6 June 1997. She entered the United Kingdom as a student on 24 February 2022 and claimed asylum on 5 June 2022.
2. The Appellant’s claim for international protection was advanced on two principal bases. First, she claimed to be an atheist since approximately 2017, having rejected Islam and publicly expressed secular and humanist beliefs. She asserted that she criticised Islamic fundamentalism and advocated gender equality, including opposition to forced veiling and unequal inheritance practices. As a consequence of these views, she claimed to have been targeted by Islamic fundamentalists and persons within her local community in Bangladesh, including threats and acts of violence.
3. Secondly, she relied upon her circumstances in the United Kingdom, namely that she had given birth to a child outside marriage and had become estranged from her family. She asserted that these matters would expose her to societal hostility and risk on return.
4. The Appellant also relied upon documentary and supporting evidence, including social media material, photographs said to demonstrate hostile activity in Bangladesh, material from the National Secular Society, and the oral evidence of a supporting witness.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The Appellant appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge Chapman (“the Judge”) promulgated on 7 July 2025, by which her appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claim was dismissed.
6. The Judge directed themselves as to the relevant legal framework, including the standard of proof, the assessment of credibility, and the approach to documentary evidence. The Judge accepted, in terms, that if the Appellant were credible as an atheist, the objective country material supported a finding that she would face a real risk on return and that she would not have access to sufficient protection or internal relocation.
7. The appeal was dismissed solely on credibility grounds. The Judge found that the Appellant had fabricated her claim and rejected her account in its entirety. Those findings were principally set out at §57 of the decision, with conclusions at §§68–70 following this.
Anonymity Order
8. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings.
Grounds of Appeal
9. The grounds of appeal advance five complaints.
Ground 1 alleges procedural unfairness in the credibility assessment, on the basis that adverse findings were made on matters not put to the Appellant.
Ground 2 challenges the treatment of delay under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
Ground 3 asserts a failure properly to assess the supporting witness evidence, particularly in relation to current belief and risk.
Ground 4 challenges the treatment of documentary and photographic evidence.
Ground 5 challenges the findings on very significant obstacles to integration and Article 8, as derivative of the credibility errors.

10. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds on 18 February 2026. Permission was not limited.
Appellant’s submissions
11. Mr Hingora, on behalf of the Appellant, forcefully submitted that the credibility assessment undertaken by the Judge was procedurally unfair. Mr Hingora was counsel and first instance and emphasised that the Judge made adverse findings on detail in respect of matters not put to the Appellant to respond to during the hearing. Reliance is placed on Abdi v ECO [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 and YHY (China) [2014] CSOH 11 for the proposition that adverse findings must be put where they are not obvious or arise from evaluative concerns.
12. It was submitted that §57 comprises a series of ex post facto rationalisations, including criticisms of vagueness, inconsistency, and plausibility, which were neither raised in the refusal decision nor put in cross‑examination.
13. It was further submitted that the Judge failed to engage with material evidence, particularly the oral evidence of the supporting witness and the Appellant’s sur place activity, contrary to HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31.
14. In respect of documentary evidence, it is argued that the Tribunal misapplied the approach in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 by rejecting evidence without proper evaluation.
Respondent’s submissions
15. Mr Walker, on behalf of the Respondent relied on the Rule 24 response and submitted that the Judge adopted a lawful structured approach to credibility consistent with KB & AH.
16. It was argued that credibility was central to the case and that the Appellant was on notice of the issues. Reliance was placed on Abdi and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 for the proposition that not every matter requires to be put.
17. It is submitted that the Judge was entitled to find the Appellant’s evidence vague and inconsistent and to attach limited weight to supporting evidence.
18. The Respondent further submitted that the Tribunal’s rejection of documentary evidence was open to it and that the appeal amounts to no more than disagreement.
19. When questioned on the Respondent’s position on sur place activity and risk on return Mr Walker accepted that that even if the Appellant were not credible in respect of past events, the Judge was still be required to consider her current position on return and that failure to do so may amount to a material error of law.
Legal Framework
20. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decision. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
21. I must consider whether the Judge made an error of law which is material to the outcome.
22. In assessing procedural fairness, the principles in Abdi apply. There is no obligation to put every point to a witness, however, fairness may require that a party be given an opportunity to respond where a finding is based on a matter that is not obvious or which depends upon evaluative reasoning not raised at the hearing.
23. In protection claims based on belief, the Tribunal must apply HJ (Iran). The question is whether the individual holds the belief and, if so, whether he or she would face a real risk on return, including by reason of having to conceal that belief.
24. In relation to documentary evidence, the Tribunal must assess such material in the round, consistent with Tanveer Ahmed, giving reasons for the weight attached.

Analysis and conclusions
Ground 1
25. The Judge’s credibility findings are set out at §57. There is no transcript of the FtT hearing for me to review and in the absence of information to the contrary, I accept Mr Hingora’s representations of what was explored before the Judge. The Judge makes a a series of evaluative criticisms.
25.1 At §57(i), the Judge characterised the Appellant’s evidence as vague in her identification of feared actors. That involved an evaluative judgment that her description of multiple actors lacked sufficient specificity. That point was not put to her.
25.2 At §57(ii) and (iii), the Judge criticised the absence of detail in relation to the development of atheism and group activity. These were key matters which were capable of clarification but were seemingly not explored.
25.3 At §57(iv), the Judge drew an inference that adverse attention should have arisen earlier. That constitutes speculative reasoning as to how events ought to have unfolded and the Appellant was not given an opportunity to comment on this.
25.4 At §57(v)–(vi), the Tribunal rejected evidence of assaults as vague seemingly in without addressing the context of vulnerability or seeking further clarification.
25.5 At §57(vii)–(viii), the Tribunal drew adverse inferences from family dynamics and documentary material without those matters being put in the manner relied upon.
25.6 At §57(x), the Tribunal relied on relationship evidence which it accepted to be immaterial but nonetheless used to undermine overall credibility.
25.7 At §57(xi), the Tribunal relied on absence of reference in a social worker assessment without exploring that point.
26. Whilst providing an element of latitude for the Judge to make findings on the evidence, I accept that the finding made are not obvious contradictions. In each instance, the finding depended upon an evaluative reasoning rather than a straightforward contradiction. When taken together, the Judge use these findings to form the basis for the conclusion that the Appellant’s account was fabricated.
27. In these circumstances, fairness required that the Appellant be given an opportunity to address the Judge’s concerns and the decision does not demonstrate that such an opportunity was afforded.
28. The Respondent’s reliance on Abdi and Volpi does not address the difficulty. Those authorities do not provide for reliance on unexplored evaluative findings that ultimately form the basis of the adverse credibility conclusion.
29. Therefore ground 1 is established as an error of law. It is material because the credibility findings were determinative of the outcome.
Ground 3
30. The Judge accepted that an atheist would face risk on return. The Judge also accepted that the Appellant had engaged with the National Secular Society and recorded the evidence of the supporting witness, Mr Kamrul Hasan, who gave unchallenged evidence. Despite this, the Judge discounted that evidence on the basis that the witness could not speak to events in Bangladesh.
31. It is accepted that the Judge’s reasoning fails to address the central question arising under HJ (Iran), namely whether the Appellant is presently an atheist or would be perceived as such on return. There is no structured assessment of the Appellant’s current belief, current expression, or the risk arising from that status in the decision. This omission constitutes a material failure to determine a central issue.
Ground 4
32. The Judge rejected photographic evidence by reference to a CPIN concerning fraudulent documentation. That reflects a material error of approach. The CPIN addresses document fraud. This did not provide a rational basis for rejecting the photographic material of attendance at National Secular Society events without specific analysis.
33. The Judge did not evaluate the photographs in the context of the accepted country material or provide adequate reasons for rejecting them.
34. The Respondent’s submission that the Judge was entitled to reject evidence does not address the error concerning the absence of proper reasoning. This failure feeds into and overlaps with the Judge’s failure to address sur place activity and current risk on return.
35. This failure is material as it forms part of the cumulative rejection of the Appellant’s case.
Ground 5
36. The findings at §§73–87 on Very significant obstacles and Article 8 depend entirely upon the adverse credibility assessment. In light of the errors identified, those findings cannot stand.
Ground 2
37. It is unnecessary to determine Ground 2.
Remaking
38. I consider that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, see, AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). Specifically, the effect of the material error means that there will need to be a fresh credibility assessment and none of the findings of fact can be preserved. I conclude that the proper course is to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.

I set aside that decision and remit the appeal to the First Tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge Chapman.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 May 2026