Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005688
PA/66178/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th of June 2026

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between
SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rahman, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 May 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 30 June 2025, in which his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim was dismissed.

Background to the appellant’s asylum claim
2. The appellant’s claim asylum has two strands. The first concerns a claimed risk arising from individuals responsible for the killing of his father in 2006. That aspect of the claim is not the subject of the present appeal and I say no more about it.
3. The second strand concerns the appellant’s sexuality. The appellant asserts that he is a gay man. He claims that he disclosed this to his cousin prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom as a student and that, as a result, his family became aware of his sexuality. He claims to be at risk from family members, in particular elder relatives, on that basis. He also claims that he would generally be unable to live in Pakistan due to being a gay man.
4. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim for asylum. The respondent did not accept that the appellant is a gay man. The respondent relied upon the appellant’s failure to refer to his sexual orientation at his screening interview, the lack of detail in his account, and what were said to be inconsistencies in his narrative. It was, however, accepted that if the appellant were found to be credible about his sexuality, there would be neither sufficiency of protection nor a viable internal relocation alternative available to him in Pakistan.

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Central to that decision was the finding that the appellant had not established that he is a gay man.
6. The reasons that the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) made that finding are set out at paragraph 27 of the decision. The judge identified within that paragraph a series of reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim to be a gay man, including concerns about the consistency and detail of his account, the plausibility of his account of disclosure to his cousin, his failure to raise his sexuality earlier, and the weight to be attached to photographic and supporting evidence. It is perhaps helpful if I set out this paragraph in full:
I do not find credible the appellant’s account that he is gay. I say this for the following reasons. First, I am not satisfied that the appellant has given a clear consistent credible account about his gay relationships in Pakistan. I found the appellant’s evidence regarding his relationships in Pakistan to be limited, vague and inconsistent. Second, I am do not find credible the appellant’s account that he informed his cousin about his sexual orientation in December 2023 or that he has been disowned by members of his family. Third, I find that the appellant has not provided a credible explanation as to why he did not mention that he was gay in his asylum screening interview of subsequent Statement of Additional Grounds in June and July 2023. Fourth, I found the appellant’s evidence regarding his relationships in Pakistan to be limited, vague and inconsistent. Fifth, I do not find credible the appellant’s assertion that he was not aware that gay men are able to live freely in the United Kingdom and reject this as a reason for the delay in his claim. Sixth, I attach little weight to the photographs relied on by the appellant [hearing bundle page 87 to 99 and supplementary bundle page 60 to 61]. These are pictures of the appellant across the road from G.A.Y. club and pictures of the appellant standing or sitting by others or with others in unnamed bars and elsewhere. Neither the unnamed individuals nor the appellant have provided letters confirming the nature of their relationship or where the photographs were taken. Seventh, the appellant does not rely on evidence from friends, past partners, community groups or elsewhere in support of his assertion that he is a gay man. For these reasons I therefore do not find credible the appellant’s account of his claimed sexual orientation as a gay man

The Grant of Permission
7. The appellant’s grounds of appeal, which were prepared by him in person, were refused by the First-tier Tribunal but permission was subsequently granted by the Upper Tribunal.
8. Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted permission on a Robinson obvious point, stating:
“The appellant raises six grounds of appeal. Before turning to them, I would first explain that I am granting permission to appeal on a Robinson obvious point. At [27], the judge gives six reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim to be gay. However, in respect of the first to the fourth points, the judge arguably fails to provide any, or any adequate, reasons to support her findings. For example, she does not identify the alleged inconsistencies in the evidence; she does not explain why the account of how the appellant’s family discovered his sexuality is incredible; she does not explain why the appellant’s reasons for not raising his sexuality earlier are incredible; and she does not identify the purportedly vague aspects of his evidence. I have considered whether these matters are immaterial given that the fifth and sixth reasons appear sustainable. However, I am satisfied that this is an issue to be addressed at an error of law hearing.”
9. It had appeared that the appellant was legally represented but on the day of the hearing his interests were represented by Mr Rahman. At the error of law hearing, no attempt was made to pursue or develop the appellant’s original grounds. The focus of submissions was therefore upon the issue identified in the grant of permission.

Discussion
10. On the day of the hearing the appellant had provided a very detailed bundle of evidence. It had not formal Rule 15 (2A) notice accompanying it. In response to my questions Mr Rahman confirmed that the bundle was only relevant to any remaking were an error of law to be found.
11. Turning to the error of law and the real issue for me is whether the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning, in particular at paragraph 27, is legally adequate when read in the context of the decision as a whole.
12. I have been assisted by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 from which I have derived the following principles
(a) Reasons must be intelligible and adequate;
(b) They must enable the losing party to understand why they have lost;
(c) Reasons need not be lengthy or elaborate;
(d) There is a need for judicial restraint. Appellate tribunals should not assume error merely because every step of reasoning is not set out.
13. It is apparent that, on its face, paragraph 27 of the Judge’s determination sets out a number of reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim. The issue, however, is notwithstanding the fact that what is described in paragraph 27 are reasons is whether those reasons are sufficient.
14. On one hand I can see the attraction that the Judge has clearly headline that their reasons are contained at paragraph 27. This enables the reader to understand the justification for finding that the appellant had not discharged the burden upon him to prove that he is gay was made out. However it is necessary in light of the grant of permission for me to look more closely at the reasons given by the Judge.
15. The first reason given is that the appellant’s account of his same-sex relationships in Pakistan was “limited, vague and inconsistent”. Whilst vagueness may sometimes be self evident or at times difficult to particularize the decision does not identify the respects in which the appellant’s account was inconsistent or lacking in detail. The appellant is therefore unable to understand why his account was rejected on this basis.
16. I have considered the respondent’s Rule 24 response, which seeks to identify inconsistencies from the wider evidence. The point advanced was that there is no requirement for the Judge to cite every piece of evidence that they rely on to support their conclusions. I agree. The submission is that the determination must be read as a whole in the context of all the evidence. Once the determination is read in this way the reasons given are adequate. Whilst attractively argued by Ms Nolan I felt unable to accept that submission in this particular instance. It is not apparent from the Judge’s decision that these specific matters highlighted within the Rule 24 response formed part of the Judge’s reasoning. It is not for me to read in or supplement the reasoning of the First-tier Tribunal by reference to matters not clearly identified within the decision. It may have been different if the Judge has referred to an inconsistency highlighted elsewhere, for example, in the reasons for refusal letter, or the respondent’s submissions. However this is not evident in the Judge’s determination and again it would not be appropriate for me to infer that this is what was done on the basis of the determination before me.
17. The second reason given for the Judge’s finding on the appellant’s sexuality is that it was not credible that the appellant informed his cousin of his sexuality, or that his family became aware of it. This is, on closer analysis of the determination, a bare conclusion rather than a reasoned finding. The judge does not explain why that account was rejected. Again the expansion of this need not have been lengthy, but it is difficult for the reader to discern why the Judge reached this view.
18. The third and fourth reasons suffer from similar deficiencies. Whilst expressed as findings, they do not identify the evidential basis for the conclusions reached.
19. I have reminded myself of the need for restraint and that it is not appropriate to conduct an overly forensic scrutiny of the decision. However, the acid test remains that the reasons should be such that they enable the losing party to understand why the decision was reached. In respect of these findings, even reading the determination as a whole I cannot say that this is the case.
20. The later reasons relating to the weight attached to the photographic evidence and the absence of supporting evidence are more clearly reasoned. I have considered whether these are able to, again when reading paragraph 27 as a whole and along with the surrounding determination make the earlier points into reasons. However, when stepping back they do not cure the deficiencies in the earlier findings, which go to the core of the credibility assessment.
21. Standing back and considering the decision as a whole, I am satisfied that the reasoning in paragraph 27 is not legally adequate. The deficiencies identified are material, as they relate to central aspects of the appellant’s claim.
22. For the reasons set out above, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
23. The decision is therefore set aside.
24. Having considered the submissions on disposal I felt unable to accept counsel’s submission that this is an appeal that should be allowed. It needs further extensive findings of fact before such a decision could be made.
25. I have considered the appropriate disposal of this appeal and agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent.
26. The credibility of the appellant’s claimed sexual orientation remains to be determined. This will require primary findings of fact to be made following oral evidence and a full assessment of the evidence in the round.
27. In those circumstances, and having regard to the nature and extent of the fact-finding required, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) for a de novo hearing before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge than the one who heard the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

R A Pickering
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
22 May 2026