Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005696

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54676/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

FS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Burrett, counsel, instructed by Law Lane Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 12 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. I have considered whether to make an anonymity order and have decided that one is necessary because the need for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 21 October 2025, dismissing the appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant claims a well-founded fear of persecution and/or serious harm in Pakistan for reason of his political opinion. He claims that he is at real risk from the Terikh Taliban Pakistan (TTP) because of his membership of the Awami National Party (ANP), a strongly anti-Taliban party.
4. In dismissing his appeal, the judge of the First-tier Tribunal (the judge) found that the appellant was not credible and placed little or no weight on the documents relied on by the appellant. The judge did not accept that the appellant was subject to a fatwa; that his father’s injuries (which the judge did accept) were the result of a targeted attack by the TTP; that the appellant held the position of General Secretary in the ANP; that the appellant was or would in the future, be of adverse attention to the TTP; or that the appellant had been cut off by his family.
5. An application for permission to appeal was made on five grounds, with permission being granted in respect of the following of the five grounds:
2) The judge failed to have regard to the appellant’s mental health when considering the evidence given at all material times including during the screening interview, the substantive interview and at the appeal hearing.
3) The judge erred in assessing the corroborative impact of the appellant’s evidence as to the death of his father.
5) The judge erred in the assessment of credibility by failing to consider the appellant’s evidence in the round, and in failing to give weight to three important matters: the acceptance that the appellant was politically active in Pakistan; the appellant’s poor mental health and vulnerability; and the acceptance that the appellant’s father was subject to trauma and badly wounded before his death.
The hearing
6. I considered the composite bundle prepared by the appellant together with the oral submissions from both parties in reaching my decision.
7. I clarified the extent of the grant of permission at the beginning of the hearing, as the skeleton argument for the appellant contended that the grant was not limited. Mr Burrett sought to argue that unless the scope of permission to appeal was expressly limited, all grounds may be argued at the error of law hearing. He submitted that none of the grounds advanced was expressly excluded from the grant of permission.
8. As a matter of principle, it is correct that unless the scope of permission is limited, all grounds may be argued. In this case, I find that the scope of permission is expressly limited. That can be seen from the notice of decision which states: ‘Permission to Appeal is Granted on Grounds 2, 3 and5’. It can also be seen from the reasons, which in paragraph 2 include reasons as to why grounds 1 and 4 are not arguable. The reasons also explicitly state in relation to each of grounds 2, 3, and 5 ‘This point may be argued’. This is not stated in respect of grounds 1 and 4.
9. I confirmed that the grant of permission is limited to grounds 2, 3 and 5 and we proceeded accordingly.
Discussion
10. All three grounds are in effect different aspects of the same argument, i.e. that the judge’s assessment of credibility was flawed.
11. Mr Burrett helpfully clarified the scope of his submissions in respect of the asserted failure of the judge to take the medical evidence into account. He stated that it was not contended that the judge’s failure to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness amounted to a material error of law. Rather, the material error of law was the failure to have regard to the medical evidence at all in the assessment of credibility.
12. Ms Keerthy submitted that this was not a material error because the medical evidence before the judge was very limited; records that he has depression and suicidal thoughts, but no active intent; because the medical evidence did not contain any information as to the cause of the appellant’s depression; and because the medical evidence did not record any mention of issues with memory. Ms Keerthy noted that the appellant had requested a letter from his GP in connection with his immigration case and submitted that I should have regard to HA (expert evidence, mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) and the fact that a person facing removal from the United Kingdom may exaggerate their symptoms of mental illness.
13. I do not draw any negative inference from the fact that the appellant asked his GP for a letter in connection with his immigration matter. This of itself is not significant, as it is unclear how else he could be expected to discharge the burden of showing that he was suffering from mental illness. There is no evidence in the medical records that the appellant exaggerated or feigned his symptoms. He confirmed that he had supportive friends and had no intention to end his life or self-harm. The GP prescribed medication and I am entitled to infer that they did so having assessed the appellant’s symptoms and clinical presentation.
14. The medical evidence shows that the appellant had a history of treatment for depression including medication and three attempts to engage with talking therapy. The GP records that the appellant experienced poor concentration and poor sleep. While the evidence may not be especially strong, or detailed, it was nevertheless a relevant consideration as part of the appellant’s circumstances as a whole and should have been taken into account in the assessment of credibility. Poor concentration and poor sleep are both things that might have impacted on the consistency of the appellant’s evidence. Even if the judge ultimately found that the appellant’s mental health was not relevant to his credibility, the failure to consider the evidence at all and/or to give reasons for rejecting the evidence is a material error of law.
15. Regarding the approach to the evidence about the death of the appellant’s father, Mr Burrett submitted that having accepted the timing of his death and the fact that he had suffered trauma before he died, the judge ought to started from the position that this was evidence that supported the appellant’s account and gone on to consider the appellant’s account in the light of it. He noted that the judge could still give reasons for giving little weight to or rejecting the evidence, but only after following the correct approach. Mr Burrett submitted that although the judge referred to Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439, he did not in fact apply it correctly.
16. Ms Keerthy submitted that the judge’s findings on the medical evidence about the appellant’s father were in line with Tanveer Ahmed; was entitled to attach little weight to it; and that the judge did not reach a final conclusion on credibility until after having evaluated all the evidence. She submitted that the judge was entitled to conclude that due to other credibility failings, it was not reasonably likely that the Taliban caused the death of the appellant’s father.
17. Contrary to what Ms Keerthy asserted, paragraph 36 of the decision makes it clear that the judge has reached a conclusion on the appellant’s credibility before finding that it is not reasonably likely that the Taliban caused his father’s death. The judge does not engage with how or whether the evidence supported the appellant’s account, and if it did, what impact the evidence had on the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
18. Mr Burrett submitted that the judge followed the same erroneous approach in relation to other aspects of the documentary evidence relied on by the appellant, for example the newspaper reports.
19. Structuring a coherent credibility assessment can be difficult. It is of course necessary for a judge to consider aspects of the evidence in some order and to make findings in relation to that evidence. However, when assessing credibility, all the evidence and relevant factors must be considered in the round. In this case, the judge has considered various factors which he found to damage the appellant’s credibility and has then used those matters to justify giving little weight to the documentary evidence rather than considering both the negative and positive factors in the round before giving reasons for which factors carry more weight in the overall conclusion.
20. I find that the judge’s assessment of credibility involved the making of a material error of law. Both parties agreed that in the event I found a material error of law that the appropriate disposal of the appeal would be remittal to the First-tier Tribunal due to the level of fact finding required.
21. Having had regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022], Civ 1512, I find that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. I consider that the errors in the credibility assessment are such that no findings should be preserved.
Notice of Decision
22. The decision of Judge Smyth promulgated on 21 October 2025 involved the making of a material error of law.
23. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House for a de novo hearing before any judge other than judge Smyth.

J K Swaney

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 February 2026