Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005701
UI-2025-005707, UI-2025-005709
UI-2025-005704, UI-2025-005705
UI-2025-005710, UI-2025-005706
UI-2025-005700, UI-2025-005703
UI-2025-005702

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53574/2024
HU/53575/2024, HU/53554/2024
HU/53558/2024, HU/53564/2024
HU/53560/2024, HU/53566/2024
HU/53553/2024, HU/53569/2024
HU/53572/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between
YM (1st Appellant)
FAM (2nd Appellant)
NAM (3rd Appellant
AAM (4th Appellant)
AAM (5th Appellant)
IAM (6th Appellant)
SAM (7th Appellant)
GZAA (8th Appellant)
MZ (9th Appellant)
SZAA (10th Appellant
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G Rea, Counsel instructed by Wilsons Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrel, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants or the sponsor. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants are Syrian citizens and are all members of the same extended family. The first and second appellants are married and they have six children. The second of those children is the sponsor, who is 22 years old and living in the United Kingdom. The other five children are the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh appellants. The seventh appellant has three children of her own and they are eighth, nineth and tenth appellants.
2. The sponsor left Syria in September 2020 and having travelled through Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Austria, Germany and France he arrived in the United Kingdom without permission at the age of 17 in February 2021. The sponsor claimed asylum and on 24 May 2022 he was recognised to be a refugee and granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom. Three of the sponsor’s paternal uncles and two of his maternal aunts also live in the United Kingdom with their families.
3. The first and second appellants live in Syria with the third, fourth fifth and sixth appellants, who are 19, 14, 12 and 9 years old respectively. The seventh appellant married in 2014 and moved to live with her husband’s family. The eighth, nineth and tenth appellants were born in 2105, 2017 and 2019. Shortly after the birth of the tenth appellant in 2019, the husband of the seventh appellant went missing and nothing has been heard from him since. When her husband went missing the seventh appellant returned to her parents home with their children. The extended family have continued to live together since then.
4. In December 2022 the appellants each made applications for entry clearance to the United Kingdom for the purpose of family reunion with the sponsor. Those applications were refused by the respondent in a series of decisions issued on 28 February 2024. The appellants appealed against those decisions to the First-tier Tribunal on the sole permitted ground that they were unlawful under section 6 Human Rights Act 1998. Specifically, they argued that the decisions were incompatible with the right to respect for their family life provided by Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention (the Convention).
5. Their appeals were consolidated and heard together by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ruth (the Judge) on 4 September 2025. The Judge heard oral evidence from the sponsor and one of his paternal uncles. A large amount of documentary evidence was also adduced including reports about the sponsor by Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist Dr Thomas Hillen, a report about the seventh appellant by Clinical Psychologist Dr Katherine Boucher, and letters about the first appellant and the seventh appellant from Dr Mohammed Al Madhloum and Dr Alaa Hassan Sobh in Syria. The Judge heard submissions from the parties representatives before he reserved his decision.
6. On 17 September 2025 the Judge promulgated his decision. At [20] – [25] of his decision, the Judge found that the sponsor does not share a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention with the seventh, eighth, nineth and tenth appellants. At [26] – [31] the Judge found that the sponsor does not share a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention with the third, fourth, fifth and sixth appellants. At [32] – [35] the Judge found that the sponsor does share a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention with the first and second appellants (his parents). At [36] – [47] the Judge found that when the public interest in immigration control is balanced against the strength of that family life, the interference with the family life that the respondent’s decisions involved was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. Accordingly the Judge dismissed the appellants appeals.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellants were granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on the following ten grounds:
Ground 1: The Judge reached an irrational conclusion on family life as he failed to consider the Sponsor’s evidence that he gave a significant proportion of his damages award to his uncle in order to repay him for the money sent to his family in Syria.
Ground 2: The Judge failed to engage with the Sponsor’s expert medical evidence, namely the report of Dr Hillen, regarding the effect of ongoing separation on the Sponsor.
Ground 3: The Judge failed to give the Sponsor’s mental health sufficient weight in assessing proportionality.
Ground 4: The Judge inappropriately referred to the Sponsor’s role within his family as a “cultural context” which would not carry weight in the UK, as opposed to being the Sponsor’s subjective experience of his family life with the Appellants.
Ground 5: The Judge erroneously found that no family life existed between Sponsor and his adult sister [7th Appellant] and her children [8th, 9th and 10th Appellants].
Ground 6: The Judge failed to refer to or otherwise engage with the medical evidence provided in respect of [the 7th Appellant].
Ground 7: The Judge erroneously found that no family life existed between the Sponsor and his minor siblings.
Ground 8: The Judge erroneously found that despite family life existing between the Sponsor and his parents, a refusal would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, within the meaning of the immigration rules, by giving undue weight to the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
Ground 9: The Judge made findings in respect of the available medical treatment in Syria which contradicts the CPIN on the current situation in Syria. Such a finding was not open to him to make.
Ground 10: The Judge failed to consider the position of the Appellants as a family with a female head of household who suffers from disabilities, where the only male adult member of the family also suffers from disabilities.
8. The respondent did not serve a reply to the appellants’ notice of appeal.
9. Between the grant of permission and the hearing of the appeal the Court of Appeal issued judgment in IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. As the judgement of the Master of the Rolls in IA and Others reviewed the authorities concerning the test to be applied when deciding whether Article 8(1) family life is shared by an adult and his parents or an adult and his siblings, I directed that the parties filed skeleton arguments detailing the impact of the judgment on this case. The appellants filed such a skeleton argument late. The respondent failed to provide a skeleton argument.
10. At the hearing Mr Terrel confirmed that notwithstanding the respondent’s failure to provide any written response to it, the appeal was contested. I then heard oral submissions from Ms Rea and Mr Terrel. I will refer to those helpful submissions when explaining my decision. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
11. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the submissions with care I am satisfied that the decision of the Judge did not involve a material error of law and that the appeal to this tribunal should be dismissed. My reasons for that decision follow.
Legal Framework
12. The appellants’ appeals are human rights appeals as defined in section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act). The sole permitted ground by virtue of section 84(2) of the 2002 Act is that the SSHD’s decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which prohibits public authorities from acting in a way incompatible with a Convention right. The relevant Convention right in this case was Article 8 of the Convention which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
13. In IA and Others the Maters of the Rolls identified that a family life for the purpose of Article 8(1) of the Convention: “is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate ‘additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties’ “ This is higher than a test of “real committed or effective support” requiring a significant relationship of dependence but not complete dependence “see [116] – [125] of the judgment.
14. Where a family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention is found the question to be answered is whether interference with that family life is justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. Section 117A of the 2002 Act defines that as “the public interest question” and states that a court or tribunal considering that question must have regard to the considerations listed in s.117B of the 2002 Act. Those considerations include that: the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest (s.117B(1)); it is in the public interest that those seeking to enter the United Kingdom speak English (s.117B(2); and it is in the public interest that those seeking to enter the United Kingdom are financially independent (s.117B(3)).
15. The Secretary of State for the Home Department seeks to maintain effective immigration controls through the Immigration Rules (the Rules) which reflect the responsible Minister’s assessment, at a general level, of the relative weight of the competing factors when striking a fair balance under Article 8. As the Secretary of State for the Home Department has constitutional responsibility for policy in this area, courts and tribunals must attach considerable weight to the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s policy at a general level as well as considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case - see [47] of Lord Reed’s judgment in R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11). Where however a person satisfies those requirements of the Rules this will be positively determinative of their article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that refusal of their application would then be disproportionate (see TZ (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.)
Analysis
Ground One
16. The first ground of appeal avers that the Judge reached an “irrational conclusion on family life” because the Judge failed to accurately consider the sponsor’s evidence about financial support he provides to the family.
17. In support of this assertion Ms Rea submitted that the Judge misunderstood the evidence about the financial support the sponsor provides to his family in Syria and made an irrational finding at [24] of his decision that the sponsor provides “relatively small amounts of money when he can afford to do so”. In that paragraph and again at [29] when he said the sponsor “provides very limited financial support on his own evidence” the Judge said that the majority of the financial assistance for the appellants in Syria comes from the sponsor’s uncle in the United Kingdom. Ms Rea submitted that this finding failed to recognise the sponsor’s evidence that he gave his uncle £3,000 from an award of damages totalling £10,000 he received for wrongful detention, so that money could go to family members in Syria. Ms Rea also submitted that the Judge’s finding ignores evidence from the sponsor that he will pay his uncle back for all the money the uncle sends to the family because the sponsor views that as a debt that he must pay.
18. Mr Terrel submitted that the Judge’s findings at [24] and [29] accurately reflected the evidence of the sponsor and his uncle which was that at the time of the hearing the sponsor was only able to send small amounts of money to the appellants in Syria while the uncle was sending about £100 per month. Mr Terrel submitted that there was nothing in the Judge’s decision that was inconsistent with the sponsor’s stated ambition to repay his uncle in the future and that the Judge was right to focus on who was actually providing support at the time of the hearing. Mr Terrel further submitted that in any event, IA and Others reminds tribunals that financial support on its own has never been considered sufficient to establish family life between adult family members and therefore even if established the asserted error in relation to financial support would not be material.
19. The Judge’s factual finding expressed at [24] was that at the time of the hearing the sponsor was providing relative small amounts of money to the appellants as and when he can afford to do so, and that his uncle provides the majority of financial assistance to the appellants. The Judge repeated that factual finding at [29]. I am satisfied that that finding was an entirely rational assessment of the evidence that was advanced before the Judge. That evidence included the sponsor’s witness statement dated 15 November 2024 in which he said that he had had to send reduce the amount of money he sends “because I was struggling with my financial situation” and that “in the last 4 months I have only been able to send around £50 and my uncle K has not contributed at all.” The evidence also included the uncle’s witness statement in which he said “I help [the sponsor] out financially when he needs it, with maybe around £80 - £100 each month. I also continue to send money to his father, my brother [2nd Appellant], as I have done since I established myself in the UK, because I know how difficult it is to survive in Syria. I try to send about £100 each month.. Other family members also help out with sending some money” Further the Judge refers at [24] to evidence given “during the hearing” that it was the sponsor’s uncle who provides the majority of financial assistance to the appellants.
20. It is correct to say that the Judge does not mention in his decision the £3,000 from the his award of damages that the sponsor says he paid to his uncle so it could be returned to “the various family members who contributed to supporting my family over the last few years”. I agree however with Mr Terrel’s submission that neither this nor the sponsor’s expressed ambition to repay his uncle all the money the uncle sends to the appellants, has any bearing on the factual finding that, as at the time of the hearing the appellants were primarily being financially supported by the sponsor’s uncle, the brother of the second appellant.
21. Further, the assertion in this ground of appeal that an error in the Judge’s finding about where financial support comes from, means that the Judge’s finding about the existence of family life is irrational has no merit. As is made clear at [50] and [51] of the decision in IA and Others financial support provided has never been considered by the ECtHR to be sufficient to constitute additional ties of dependency and accordingly family life between adult family members. Even if the Judge were mistaken and the sponsor was responsible for the majority of the financial support provided to the appellants, he could still rationally conclude on a holistic assessment of all the evidence that there was not a family life that engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention.
22. For all these reasons I dismiss the appeal on ground one.
Ground two
23. The assertion in ground two is that the Judge failed to engage with the report of Dr Hillen, regarding the effect of ongoing separation on the sponsor. Ms Rea acknowledged that the Judge did explicitly address the report of Dr Hillen in his decision in the context of the sponsor’s mental health but submits that the Judge failed to “turn his mind” to Dr Hillen’s summary of the sponsor’s account to the Doctor about the strength of his relationships with the appellants. Mr Terrel by contrast submits that it cannot be said on a fair reading of the Judge’s decision that the Judge disregarded the contents of the report. Mr Terrel asserts that instead the Judge rationally concluded that the evidence in the report did not establish the existence of family life.
24. It is apparent from [40] of his decision, in which the Judge says that he notes and accepts the medical conclusions in the medical reports about the sponsor and his mental health difficulties, that the Judge did consider the report of Dr Hillen. Likewise at [21] when considering whether there is a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention between the sponsor and the seventh – tenth appellants, the Judge refers again to the “serious mental health concerns of the sponsor himself, described in the expert medical reports” (emphasis added). It is clear from his decision therefore that the Judge did turn his mind to the report of Dr Hillen and that he accepted Dr Hillen’s conclusions about the sponsor’s mental health. That being the case there is no reason to infer that the Judge ignored the explanation for reaching those conclusions that Dr Hillen gave in his report. There was no requirement on the Judge to refer explicitly to that explanation in his decision. As was made clear in Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iii)] the mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean he overlooked it.
25. In the present case, the assertion that the Judge did not engage with the report of Dr Hillen is in reality a complaint that having done so the Judge did not reach the conclusion the appellants sought, namely that the relationship between the sponsor and the appellants engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention. That however was an assessment that it was for the Judge to make based on a holistic assessment of all the evidence in the round. The evidence of Dr Hillen could only ever have had a limited impact on that assessment being a second hand account of the sponsor’s explanation of his relationships with his family. It was unarguably weighed together with the other evidence about the family’s circumstances and the individual circumstances of the appellants and the sponsor in the Judge’s holistic assessment. Accordingly I dismiss the appeal on ground two.
Ground three
26. Ground three is a complaint that it was irrational for the Judge to conclude that interference with the Article 8(1) family life shared between the sponsor and his parents in Syria would be proportionate in the light of his finding at [45] that the sponsor’s mental health will be damaged and his suicidal ideation may be increased by the refusal of entry clearance to his parents. Ms Rea submitted that the Judge gave insufficient weight to the sponsor’s mental health especially since it is the Article 8 rights of the sponsor that is the primary concern in the proportionality assessment. Mr Terrel submitted that there was nothing irrational about the Judge’s proportionality assessment in which he also considered the factors available to manage the risk to the sponsor’s mental health. Mr Terrel pointed to [172] and [173] of IA and Others as an example of where refusal of entry clearance was found to be proportionate notwithstanding the adverse effect that would have on the mental health of a sponsor in the United Kingdom.
27. The threshold for irrationality is a high one, requiring a decision which no reasonable First-tier Judge, properly directing himself, could have reached. The Judge’s careful assessment of the proportionality of interference with the family life between the sponsor and the first and second appellant comes nowhere near reaching that high threshold of irrationality.
28. At [40] of his decision the Judge explicitly gives weight in the proportionality assessment to the sponsor’s “serious mental health difficulties” and to the fact that refusal of entry clearance will cause him to suffer further mental health problems. The Judge however went on to consider other factors within his holistic assessment as he was required to do. Those factors included the support the sponsor will receive through the NHS and broader social care system and also the regular and close support he receives from family members who are based in the United Kingdom. The Judge’s finding that these factors would militate the adverse effect that refusal would have on the sponsor was entirely rational.
29. As will be discussed further in relation to the other grounds of appeal, the Judge was required to balance the adverse effect that refusal would have on the sponsor’s health against the public interest which as Article 8(2) makes clear includes the economic well being of the country and the interests and rights of others. That is what the Judge did at the end of [40] when he said that although the effect of refusal will be harsh on the sponsor it will not be unjustifiably harsh in the light of the respondent’s interest in immigration control.
30. The suggestion implicit in this ground is that once a conclusion is reached that refusal will have an adverse effect on the health of a sponsor in the United Kingdom the only rational conclusion is that interference with family life is disproportionate. That proposition fails to recognise the balancing exercise that is required in what is an evaluative exercise. It is inconsistent with the decision reached by the Court of Appeal in IA and Others which does not serve as a factual precedent but did demonstrate that a conclusion that interference with Article 8(1) family life would be proportionate can be rationally reached notwithstanding the fact that the United Kingdom based sponsor would suffer as a result. For these reasons I dismiss the appeal on ground three.
Ground four
31. In ground four the appellants complain about the comments made at [23] and [34] of the Judge’s decision about the cultural context of family life in Syria. I set those comments out in full because it is important that they are considered in context:
23. ...The children are too young and too far away for the sponsor to play any significant role in their lives and while I note what the sponsor and other family members say about the cultural context for family life in extended families in Syria, that is not the cultural context in the United Kingdom.”
34. … While the financial support from the sponsor is limited, I take the view that the statements of the mother in particular, and of the sponsor, clearly show more than the normal emotional ties that one might expect between an adult child and his parents. While I note the statement of the mother that the cultural context in Syria is that a son would live with his mother, that is not the cultural context in the United Kingdom and does not carry significant weight in my judgement.
32. Ms Rea submits that the Judge erred by failing to have regard to the sponsor’s subjective experience and his evidence that as a result of his cultural context he views himself as the head of the family with responsibility for their well-being. Mr Terrel submitted that rather than saying that cultural context was irrelevant the Judge was addressing the facts in this particular case. Mr Terrel pointed out that the comment at [34] came as part of the Judge’s finding that Article 8(1) family life is shared by the sponsor and his parents.
33. As the extracts from the Judge’s decision set out above make clear, the references to the cultural context for family life come as part of the Judge’s consideration first of whether there is Article 8(1) family life between the sponsor and his three nieces and nephews and later as part of the Judge’s consideration of whether there is family life between the sponsor and his parents. The fact that the Judge reached different conclusions as to the existence of family life between the sponsor and these distinct groups of appellants demonstrates that the Judge was indeed considering the case on the basis of its particular facts and the different circumstances that pertain to the different relationships.
34. The Judge’s finding was that the sponsor’s nieces and nephews are too far away from him for the sponsor play a significant role in their lives. It was in the framework of that finding that the Judge made the comment about cultural context for family life in Syria. It is apparent that this comment was, in the circumstances a recognition of the fact that while the sponsor may wish to play a greater role in the lives of his nieces and nephews in line with cultural expectations, the factual circumstances involving him in the United Kingdom and them in Syria with their mother and grandparents were not indicative of their being a family life that engages Article 8(1) between them. As Mr Terrel submitted, a desire for there to be a relationship of dependency does not itself create a relationship of dependency.
35. Likewise the Judge’s finding that there is family life between the sponsor and his parents was made on the basis that “the evidence shows that they are very close indeed and have maintained continuing bonds of love and affection, and committed emotional support flowing in both directions.” It was a finding made on the facts as the Judge found them to be rather than on the basis of cultural expectations or context.
36. Contrary to the assertion made in ground four, the Judge did not treat cultural context as irrelevant but instead he correctly made findings about the existence or otherwise of a family life that engages Article 8(1) on the facts that existed rather than on the basis of expectations, desires or intentions for the future. This approach from the Judge did not involve an error of law.

Grounds five and seven
37. In these two grounds the appellants argue that the Judge’s finding that there was no Article 8(1) family life between (ground five) the sponsor and the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth appellants, and (ground seven) the third, fourth, fifth and sixth appellants, was irrational. In relation to ground seven Ms Rea submits that the Judge failed to recognise that the sponsor enjoyed family life with his siblings before leaving Syria and that their relationship since then has not changed. Mr Terrel submits that the Judge’s findings were rational and that whilst the history of the sponsor’s relationship with his siblings was relevant it was the relationship that existed at the day of hearing that the judge was assessing.
38. It is clear from his decision at [22], [30] and [35] that when considering the existence or otherwise of a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention the Judge applied the test of looking for “real committed or effective support” which was, as the Court found in IA and Others a lower test than the one of “additional elements of dependency” that should be applied. As the appellants were the beneficiaries of the Judge applying a lower test than required this did not involve a material error of law.
39. The appellants say that the Judge’s conclusion applying that lower test was irrational. As I have previously identified, the threshold for a decision to be irrational is a high one. The assessment of family life a distinctly fact specific evaluation capable of reasonably resulting in different decisions by different tribunals. In the present case the evaluation made by the Judge that Article 8(1) family life was not present was clearly one which a reasonable tribunal judge properly directed could reach and in realty the complaint in these two grounds of appeal is no more than a disagreement with the decision reached by the Judge.
40. In relation to the relationship between the sponsor and his siblings, the question for the Judge was not whether there was Article 8(1) family life when they were all together cohabiting in Syria, but whether there was such a family life at the date of the hearing. At [29] the Judge identified that the siblings were at the time of the hearing being cared for by their parents, and that at that time the sponsor provides very limited financial support. The Judge concluded that although there is regular contact between the sponsor and his younger siblings, and that they worry about each other, this was “the kind of support and contact one would expect from any sibling with any other sibling.” The Judge’s overall conclusion expressed at [30] that “I do not find the evidence goes anywhere near establishing more than normal emotional or other ties or the kind of real effective or committed support flowing in either direction which would create family life between an adult brother and his siblings” was in these circumstances, entirely rational.
Ground six
41. In ground six it is said that the Judge failed to refer to or engage with the evidence of Dr Boucher concerning the seventh appellant. Ms Rea submits that it is apparent from Dr Boucher’s report that the sponsor and the seventh appellant share a close relationship which transcends the usual ties between siblings. Mr Terrel accepts that the Judge did not refer explicitly to Dr Boucher’s report in his decision but argues that it should be presumed that the Judge has considered all the evidence unless there is good reason to show otherwise. Mr Terrel submits that it is apparent from the Judge’s finding of a close relationship between the sponsor and the seventh appellant and from the Judge’s reference to the seventh appellant’s complex medical needs that the Judge did consider the evidence of Dr Boucher.
42. It is correct that the Judge does not directly refer to the report from Dr Boucher in his decision. Given the bundle of evidence consisted of more than 2,000 pages however, it is unrealistic to expect every piece of evidence to be specifically referenced in the decision and indeed it would be unnecessary and disproportionate for the Judge to do so. It is equally correct that, as Mr Terrel submitted, an appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration (see Volpi v Volpi at [2(iii)]). In the present case there is no compelling reason to conclude that the Judge has failed to consider Dr Boucher’s evidence, on the contrary there are clear indications in the Judge’s decision that he has had regard to that evidence.
43. At [6] the Judge notes that the expert reports and skeleton argument were larger than specified in the relevant practice direction but admits them in evidence in any event. It would be highly unlikely that having expressly referred in his decision to admitting the evidence the Judge would then ignore it. At [21] the Judge commences his consideration of the relationship between the sponsor and the seventh appellant with the acknowledgment that the seventh appellant “has complex health issues.” The source of the evidence of those complex health issues was of course the report of Dr Boucher. At [23] the Judge refers to the fact that the sponsor and the seventh appellant speak to each other regularly and that they are very concerned about each other’s circumstances. This finding is consistent with what Dr Boucher records the seventh appellant telling her and again indicates that the Judge has had regard to the report of Dr Boucher.
44. Ms Rea argued that the report of Dr Boucher was strongly indicative of there being an Article 8(1) family life between the sponsor and the seventh appellant. The reality is that the Judge has recognised those features of Dr Boucher’s report that points towards the existence of such a family life but having considered all the evidence in the round has come to a different conclusion. Again that was the Judge performing the holistic evaluative assessment that was required of him. The fact that the Judge reached a conclusion different to the one the appellants argued before him does not mean he has failed to consider relevant evidence.
Ground eight
45. Ground eight asserts that the Judge gave undue weight to the public interest in maintaining immigration control when applying paragraph ADR7.1 of Appendix Adult Dependant Relative to the Immigration Rules and concluding that interference with the family life shared by the sponsor and his parents would not “result in unjustifiably has consequences for the applicants or their family”. Ms Rea submits that the Judge was wrong to consider the public interest in immigration control in this assessment and that he was confused about consideration of the appellants case within as opposed to outside of the Immigration Rules. Mr Terrel by contrast submits that the purpose of paragraph ADR7.1 is to make the rules compliant with Article 8 of the Convention and that the effect of the paragraph is the requirement to undertake a proportionality assessment. In those circumstances he submits that the distinction between consideration within and outside of the Rules takes one nowhere.
46. I am satisfied that this ground of appeal is misconceived and that the distinction between consideration of paragraph ADR7.1 and a proportionality assessment outside of the Rules is a distinction without a difference. The title for paragraph ADR7.1 in the Rules is “Eligibility under Article 8 ECHR for an Adult Dependant Relative.” The paragraph provides that an Adult Dependant Relative will be eligible for entry clearance where the decision maker is: “satisfied that refusal of the application would breach Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family.” Paragraph ADR7.1 therefore explicitly requires a decision maker to consider whether refusal of the application would breach Article 8, in other words it requires the decision maker to consider the same question as would be considered “outside the Rules”.
47. Further, by requiring the decision maker to consider whether refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or a family member the paragraph is requiring the decision maker to undertake a proportionality assessment. That is the purpose of the word unjustifiably in the paragraph – it recognises that some harsh consequences are justified but requires the decision maker to assess whether the consequences are so harsh as to be unjustifiable. That necessarily involves the decision maker undertaking a balancing exercise, weighing the rights of the applicant and their family on the one side of the scales against the public interest on the other. If the consequences of refusal will be unjustifiably harsh in comparison to the public interest the applicant will be eligible, but if the consequences will not be unjustifiably harsh in comparison to the public interest then the applicant will not be eligible.
48. Whether it is was as part of his consideration of whether the first and second appellants met the eligibility requirements of paragraph ADR7.1 or whether it was as part of the Judge’s consideration of the first and second appellants’ case “outside the rules” what was required therefore was the balancing of the strength of the family life the Judge found them to share with the sponsor against the strength of the public interest in the refusal of their application. As the Judge correctly identified the weight of that public interest comes from the interest in effective immigration control for the economic well-being of the country and the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
49. In the end the Judge undertook that balancing exercise twice. First the Judge did so at [38] – [42] of his decision by reference to the Immigration Rules and paragraph ADR7.1 in particular. He did so again at [43] – [47] stating that he was now considering the case outside the Rules. In the second consideration the Judge had regard to the fact the two appellants do not speak English and would not be financially independent on their arrival in the United Kingdom factors which s.117B of the 2002 Act state are relevant to the public interest. There would however have been no error had the Judge considered those factors as part of his consideration of paragraph ADR7.1 since they are relevant to the question of whether the harsh consequences the appellants are likely to face are justified.
50. Overall therefore, whilst the Judge’s assessment of the proportionality of interference with the family life the Judge found the first and second appellants share with the sponsor was more complicated than it needed to be and involved some unnecessary repetition, there was no error of law in the Judge’s assessment. The Judge correctly balanced the consequences of interference with the family life, which he found would be harsh, against the weight of the public interest and found that the strength of that public interest in immigration control meant that the harsh consequences that will result were not unjustifiable but instead were proportionate. The parts of the grounds of appeal which suggest that the factors identified by the Judge “clearly amount to unjustifiably harsh consequences” are no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluative assessment.
Ground nine
51. In ground nine, it is argued that the Judge’s finding at [41] that the first and second appellants can access healthcare in Syria contradicted the evidence in the relevant Country Policy Information Note (CPIN) relied upon by the appellants. Ms Rea submitted that it was a finding that was “not open to the Judge”. Mr Terrel submitted that the Judge made this finding of fact on the basis of the evidence about accessing healthcare in Syria that was given by the appellants themselves, and that it did not involve any error of law.
52. Although not described as such, in substance this ground again involves an assertion that the Judge made a finding of fact that no reasonable judge could make. As noted previously that is a high threshold to reach. The evidence before the Judge included the CPIN which refers to a shortage of medical equipment and supplies especially medications and also critical shortages of qualified specialised health care workers. As Mr Terrel pointed out, the evidence in the CPIN did not say that it was impossible to obtain healthcare in Syria. More significantly, the evidence before the Judge also included the first appellant’s statement in which she describes her and her husband taking regular medication to manage their diabetes and a doctor examining the third appellant and recommending treatment for a broken bone in her nose. There was therefore clear evidence before the Judge that despite the challenges, the appellants were accessing healthcare in Syria. In the light of this evidence the Judge’s finding that “they have been able to access some treatment for their conditions over a long period of time” and that “this is not a case where no treatment is available” was without doubt one which a reasonable judge could reach.
Ground ten
53. In the final ground of appeal it is submitted that the Judge failed to consider evidence that, due to the second appellant’s disabilities, the first appellant is the acting head of the household and as a seventh appellant is a single mother, the family are at increased vulnerability, facing additional risks and obstacles to accessing services. Ms Rea argued that the Judge overlooked gender completely. Mr Terrel submitted that throughout the Judge’s decision he refers to the vulnerability of the appellants which clearly features in his analysis and consideration.
54. As with other grounds relied upon by the appellants, the complaints in this ground establish no compelling reason to deviate from the general position that an appeal court is bound to assume that the Judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The Judge was plainly aware of the gender of the appellants and their vulnerabilities. The Judge found that there was no family life that engages Article 8(1) involving the sponsor and the seventh appellant so did not need to go on to separately consider the proportionality of interference with such a family life. Having found an Article 8(1) family life established between the sponsor and the first two appellants, the Judge explicitly considered the appellant’s circumstances, the evidence of their living conditions, their ability to access services and concluded that the consequences of separation from the sponsor would be harsh but not unjustifiably harsh. That was a finding that was open to the Judge and there no reason to conclude that the Judge has not taken into account the whole of the evidence before reaching that conclusion.
Conclusion
55. Despite the number of grounds raised and the clear wish of the appellants and the sponsor to live together in the United Kingdom, the appellants have not established that the decision of the Judge involved an error of law. The appeal was a human rights appeal and the Judge was required to consider whether Convention rights were engaged and if so whether interference with those Conventions rights was proportionate. That is exactly what the Judge did and whilst the assessment of the Judge comes as a disappointment to the sponsor and to the appellants it was an reasonable and rational assessment taking account of the whole of the evidence presented.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ruth did not involve an error of law and shall stand.
The appellants’ appeals are dismissed.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 March 2026