Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005730
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01284/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Smith, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 20 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 18 October 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
3. The appellant is a serious foreign criminal sentenced in 2006 to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment because he was found to be dangerous under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. He was sentenced to a minimum term of 612 days for offences which included attempted arson at a residential property where he resided with other tenants. In addition to finding the dangerousness provisions satisfied, the sentencing judge recommended that he be deported. It is important to note that the FtT findings, that he was excluded from protection under the Refugee Convention and under humanitarian protection principles, are not under challenge in the error of law proceedings and will stand undisturbed. While the appeal was dismissed on Article 8 grounds on the basis that there were not very compelling circumstances, the grounds of appeal were directed to the lawfulness of the judge’s reasoning in relation to the claim that he could not be returned to Iran without breaching his Article 2 and Article 3 human rights to life and not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment on account of his political and religious view, his sexual identity and his mental health conditions. Articles 2 and 3 are absolute rights and do not involve any balancing exercise which would take in considerations of the public interest in removing him as a foreign criminal.
The Relevant Parts of the FTT Decision
4. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the judge’s decision:
• At [4], the judge noted that the appellant remained subject to the indeterminate sentence passed in 2006 and he was detained in prison when the appeal was heard. At [19], he recorded that the appellant appeared remotely by video link from prison and that it had been decided that he would not give evidence for medical reasons. The judge proceeded to hear oral submissions.
• Between [20] and [32], the judge summarised the rival cases and noted that the appellant claimed to have been detained and mistreated in Iran before he left the country and arrived in the UK some time in 2003. The claim involves the assertion that he was persecuted on account of his political views and because of his homosexuality. The respondent accepted that if the appellant were found to be homosexual and that he intended to live openly according to his sexual identity in Iran, he would be at risk of persecution ([29]).
• The judge summarised the seriousness of the underlying offence of arson between [34]-[35]:
[34] He had fallen out with a fellow tenant for some reason. To demonstrate his annoyance the appellant had turned on all gas appliances in a room. He had doused the carpet with petrol. He had lit a candle and placed it on the settee as a fuse. He then left. He had stolen property belonging to fellow tenants.
[35] His fellow tenant came home. She found fortunately that the candle had gone out. It was pure chance that there had not been a catastrophic explosion which would have destroyed the property and probably those adjacent to it. There was a substantial danger to life.
• The judge rejected, between [38]-[48], the proposition that the appellant had rebutted the statutory presumption that he continued to represent a danger to the community of the UK. In coming to this conclusion, the judge noted, at [43], the letter of a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr Fulton, who described how the appellant had “become unmanageable in prison because of his conduct” and that “[i]f he did not like the way in which he was treated he had deliberately disengaged from treatment and tried to sabotage his clinical progress”. Dr Fulton was noted to believe that this was deliberate conduct. Having failed to rebut the presumption that he continued to be a danger, the appellant could not succeed as a refugee or under humanitarian protection principles, but these findings did not apply to similar factual considerations under Articles 2 and 3.
• Between [49] and [73], the judge considered the appellant’s claim to be at a real risk of being killed or tortured on account of his political opinions and his sexuality. An important aspect of this analysis was the judge’s consideration of a previous judicial decision from 2003 which rejected similar arguments. The previous judge found the appellant’s claim to have been detained and mistreated by the Iranian authorities to be a fabrication, that he was never the subject of adverse interest ([51]-[53]) and that his decision to leave for the UK was likely to have been driven by the greater tolerance for homosexuality here than in Iran, where he had been able to practice his homosexuality ([55]). The judge referred to the importance of the previous judge’s findings for the purposes of the issues he had to decide at [56] before referring to new evidence relied upon by the appellant to bring about a different outcome, at [57]. The new evidence was summarised and assessed between [58] and [73]:
[58] The new evidence concerning his political activities is a further statement by the appellant at AB page 81. The appellant says that in addition to being arrested by the Iranian authorities on 27 August 2002 he had been sentenced to imprisonment on an earlier occasion for drinking alcohol during Ramadan. This is something he had not raised before.
[59] The appellant also says that he had been involved in a demonstration before the Iranian Embassy in 2004.
[60] Apart from these bare assertions there is nothing new. The Adjudicator made findings and gave an explanation of why he found those findings. He found that the appellant’s account of having been detained by the authorities to be a fabrication. There is nothing in the evidence before me to make me depart from that finding.
[61] I do not find that the appellant has ever come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities because of his political opinions. I do not find that he was on bail and absconded. Apart from the appellant’s assertion that he demonstrated before the Iranian Embassy in 2004 there is little to support that claim. No evidence has been put before me to indicate that even if the appellant had that it was a matter which would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
[62] The appellant is not at risk in Iran because of his political opinions. He does not succeed on that basis.
[63] The respondent does not accept that the appellant is a homosexual man. There is a previous adjudication. Although his homosexuality had not been a direct issue in that appeal there is nonetheless a finding of the Adjudicator. There is nothing to make me depart from that adjudication. I find that the appellant is a homosexual man.
[64] It is accepted that a homosexual man who practices his homosexuality openly in Iran would be liable to persecution.
[65] I take into account the guidance in HJ (Iran) and HT Cameroon and SSHD [2010 UKSC 31] and in particular the guidance of Lord Hope at paragraphs 35 and 36 and Lord Rodger at paragraph 82.
[66] The finding of the Adjudicator, apparently upon evidence given by the appellant, was that the appellant had never experienced any problems in Iran because of his homosexuality. He appears to have gone about matters discreetly. The issue to be decided is whether the appellant on return to Iran would choose to live openly as a homosexual man. In this case he would succeed.
[67] He cannot be expected to hide his homosexuality unless he wishes to. If he chose to behave discreetly, as he appears to have done in the past, the issue is then whether this would be due to fear of persecution or whether he chose to because of social pressure, cultural, or religious reasons, not because of fear of persecution.
[68] There is no presumption of how the appellant will behave or what his reasons for doing so will be. This is a matter for the appellant to establish with evidence even to the low standard of proof.
[69] The appellant now says in his witness statement that he did experience problems with the authorities in Iran because of his homosexuality. He says that the father of a partner, M, referred the matter to the authorities. It was partly because of that that he was arrested.
[70] He had not made that assertion in his previous appeal. The adjudicator found that he had fabricated his account of being detained. I have found that as well.
[71] The appellant did not give evidence. He may have had good reason for not doing so. However the effect of this is that he could not be questioned or cross-examined about the matter. This inevitably reduces the weight which I can put upon his contentions.
[72] The decision of the previous adjudication was that he had practised his homosexuality without issue in the past. He had behaved discreetly. I do not find that he would do any differently now or that he would choose to be discreet for fear of persecution rather than for reasons of social pressure, cultural, or religious reasons.
[73] The appellant therefore does not succeed under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR on the basis of his homosexuality.
• Between [74] and [86], the judge assessed the appellant's claim to be at a real risk of suffering conditions which would breach Articles 2 and 3 on health grounds. The judge began his analysis in the following way, at [74]:
[74] There was little dispute about the appellant’s condition. It seems to be accepted that the appellant is not suffering from a mental illness but does have a personality disorder. That conclusion is recorded in the letter from the Prison Offender Manager, AB page 70. It is recorded in the letter from Dr Fulton, RB page 36. It is recorded in the report of Professor Dr Sen dated 17 September 2025, AB page 9.
• The judge summarised some of the medical evidence before him at [75]-[78]:
[75] Professor Sen said that the appellant had a diagnosis of borderline emotionally unstable personality disorder and dissocial personality.
[76] Such conditions may not be capable of remedy or cure. The appellant’s behaviour was managed by detention, supervision, and with the administration of an antipsychotic depot and a mood stabilizer, sodium valproate.
[77] Dr Sen believed the appellant was of high risk of deterioration if he returned to Iran. If released in the United Kingdom he would need to live in supported accommodation with 24-hour supervision. He would need to be monitored by a probation officer. He would need access to a mental health team.
[78] Professor Sen accepted the appellant’s account of having been arrested and detained in Iran. He was the opinion that if the appellant were questioned in Iran he would be a high risk to himself or others. He thought that the appellant would be unable to access suitable treatment in Iran. As a consequence his condition would deteriorate.
• At [79]-[80], the judge directed himself as to the legal principles which apply to Article 3 claims made on health grounds. At [81]-[82], it was noted that the appellant had not suggested that suitable treatment was unavailable, but that he would not seek out such treatment due to his behaviour.
• The Article 2 and 3 health claim was rejected for the following reasons between [83] and [86]:
[83] The appellant had said in his most recent statement that if he were deported then he would kill himself. This would be a conscious decision of choice not arising from any mental illness. He has a history of self-harm. Self-harm is not the same as attempted suicide. It is done for different purposes. The evidence from Dr Fulton was that the appellant was manipulative. He would choose to modify his behaviour and cooperation with medical treatment to seek to impose his will.
[84] The appellant is said to be an intelligent man. His personality disorder is unlikely to be a recent occurrence. He had lived independently in Iran, in various European countries, and in the United Kingdom until his arrest.
[85] His evidence is that his parents still live in Iran. He is in touch with them regularly. They are no doubt concerned about his welfare and his condition. The appellant can choose whether to accept medical treatment. Such treatment is available in Iran. There is no reason to suppose that he would not return to his parents. They can monitor his condition and seek to ensure that he obtains any treatment which he requires.
[86] I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that there would be a real risk of serious, rapid, and irreversible decline if the appellant returned to Iran. The respondent has demonstrated that medical care would be available for him in Iran. He has parents who be able to assist him to obtain it. It is a matter for him whether he chooses to obtain it. The appellant does not succeed under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR on medical grounds.
• Between [87] and [101], the judge dealt with the appellant’s Article 8 human rights claim which could only succeed if he established that there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the strong public interest in his removal given the seriousness of his crimes. Given the focus of the grounds of appeal in the error of law proceedings were on the Articles 2 and 3 parts of the judge’s decision, it is unnecessary to summarise this part of the decision in detail. However, it was clear from the judge’s observations at [88] that he considered his previous findings to have a bearing on the Article 8 analysis.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on three grounds of appeal, all of which challenged the lawfulness of the judge’s reasons which went to his consideration of the Articles 2 and 3 human rights claims founded on his political opinion, sexuality and health.
6. In a decision dated 1 December 2025, a different judge of the FtT granted permission for all grounds to be argued.
7. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
8. In the FtT proceedings, the judge was considering the appellant’s appeal against the backdrop of a previous judicial decision decided on overlapping facts. Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00702 remains the touchstone as to how such subsequent proceedings fall to be considered. The observations made by Judge Ockleton at [37]-[40] bear emphasis:
[37] […] The first Adjudicator's determination stands (unchallenged, or not successfully challenged) as an assessment of the claim the Appellant was then making, at the time of that determination. It is not binding on the second Adjudicator; but, on the other hand, the second Adjudicator is not hearing an appeal against it. As an assessment of the matters that were before the first Adjudicator it should simply be regarded as unquestioned. It may be built upon, and, as a result, the outcome of the hearing before the second Adjudicator may be quite different from what might have been expected from a reading of the first determination only. But it is not the second Adjudicator's role to consider arguments intended to undermine the first Adjudicator's determination.
[38] The second Adjudicator must, however be careful to recognise that the issue before him is not the issue that was before the first Adjudicator. In particular, time has passed; and the situation at the time of the second Adjudicator's determination may be shown to be different from that which obtained previously. Appellants may want to ask the second Adjudicator to consider arguments on issues that were not - or could not be - raised before the first Adjudicator; or evidence that was not - or could not have been - presented to the first Adjudicator.
[39] In our view the second Adjudicator should treat such matters in the following way.
(1) The first Adjudicator's determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant's status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.
(2) Facts happening since the first Adjudicator's determination can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. If those facts lead the second Adjudicator to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the appellant makes his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first Adjudicator and at that date, is not inconsistent.
(3) Facts happening before the first Adjudicator's determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. The first Adjudicator will not have been concerned with such facts, and his determination is not an assessment of them.
[40] We now pass to matters that could have been before the first Adjudicator but were not.
(4) Facts personal to the Appellant that were not brought to the attention of the first Adjudicator, although they were relevant to the issues before him, should be treated by the second Adjudicator with the greatest circumspection. An Appellant who seeks, in a later appeal, to add to the available facts in an effort to obtain a more favourable outcome is properly regarded with suspicion from the point of view of credibility. (Although considerations of credibility will not be relevant in cases where the existence of the additional fact is beyond dispute.) It must also be borne in mind that the first Adjudicator's determination was made at a time closer to the events alleged and in terms of both fact-finding and general credibility assessment would tend to have the advantage. For this reason, the adduction of such facts should not usually lead to any reconsideration of the conclusions reached by the first Adjudicator.
[…]
9. The Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FtT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles:
[26]  Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i)  The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 at para 30;
(ii)  Where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: eg MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45;
(iii)  When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 ;
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];
(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;
(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.
10. In addition to recent observations in R v Ullah, the touchstone for considering inadequacy of reasoning as an error of law remains R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At [13]-[14] of the judgment of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning are articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57] the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny. 
11. In seeking to challenge the judge’s strength of reasoning, the grounds of appeal referred to his suggested failure to pay due regard to the appellant’s detailed witness statement and narrative accounts he had provided to healthcare professionals over the years. To the extent that these assertions were subsequent consistent statements to those which were previously considered by the Immigration Adjudicator who dismissed a protection appeal in 2003, the appellant had a considerable hurdle to overcome as reflected by [40(4)] of Devaseelan. In circumstances where his credibility had been roundly rejected and his factual claims were regarded as fabrications, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the FtT judge did not consider it necessary to say more than he did about these subsequent consistent statements which he was required in law to treat with circumspection. However, the applicable legal principles required the judge to take a different approach in principle to evidential developments which, in substance, post-dated the 2003 decision and came from ostensibly independent sources.
12. An example of an event which post-dated the 2003 decision and was discussed by the appellant and reflected in records prepared by professionals with whom the appellant came into contact is the description of his conduct during a protest against the Iranian authorities in 2004. This was vividly described at [6a] of the grounds of appeal: “[…] he exhibited extreme self-harm where he pinned his lips together, attached a page of the Quran and a picture of a penis from a sex magazine onto his chest using the same and self-inflicted two abdominal wounds. This led to the Appellant’s first admission to psychiatric services in March 2004”. I have summarised the FtT decision in some detail above. It discloses no meaningful consideration of this episode and whether, if it occurred as described, the striking and memorable nature of the protest might have attracted the attention of the Iranian authorities such that he might be at risk of treatment which would breach his Article 2 or Article 3 human rights. To give this claim anxious scrutiny, in view of the fundamental and absolute nature of the rights at stake, this was a dimension of the appellant’s factual case which called for consideration by assessing the evidence in the round. It is impossible to make sense of what the judge made of this episode and whether it was productive of risk on return. The concern I have expressed should not be confused as being any kind of encouragement for a judge to find that this element occasions risk on return. Lawful reasoning might draw upon the historic nature of the event relied upon, or the extreme quality of what unfolded, as tending to support the notion that the Iranian regime will not be aware today of the appellant’s role or, if it is aware, that it would not treat the protest as a serious expression of political opinion as opposed to a manifestation of serious mental illness. However, it is not for me to assess whether this aspect of the claim puts the appellant at risk but to assess whether the judge adequately reasoned his findings in law. It is simply not possible to rationalise, or even infer, what the judge made of this element of the claim which demonstrably post-dated the previous determination which fell to be treated as a starting point for the subsequent judicial analysis.
13. The above point dovetails with the lack of judicial reasoning in the assessment of how the appellant would be likely to behave on return to Iran. A central plank of the appellant’s case before the judge was that his constellation of mental health conditions caused him to act in a disinhibited, provocative and unpredictable way when under stress. On the appellant’s behalf, it was indicated by Ms Smith, without contradiction from the respondent, that she had directed the judge’s attention to the various parts of the independent medical evidence which supported such behavioural traits which would be dangerous when expressed in the face of the Iranian authorities and their likely ‘hair trigger’ response. The judge was said to have been expressly referred to paragraph [5.1] of Professor Sen’s expert report [see pages 72-73 of the error of law bundle]: “[…] He experiences unstable and capricious mood. He has the marked tendency to act unexpectedly and without consideration of consequences, a marked tendency to quarrelsome behaviour and get into conflict with others, a liability to outbursts of anger and violence and recurrent acts of self-harm […]”. It cannot be reasonably understood what the judge found would be likely to unfold at the pinch point of return when the appellant is questioned about why he had spent the past two decades in the UK. This was an essential and fundamental component of any lawful judicial analysis of whether the appellant would be at a real risk of suffering breaches of his Article 2 and Article 3 human rights. Again, none of this to say that the appellant would succeed in his case that he would be at a real risk if he returns to Iran, but the judge was required to turn his mind to independent expert evidence which reached the conclusion that he would be likely to behave in a way which would arouse the most extreme response of the Iranian authorities.
14. In answer to the above point about how the appellant would be likely to behave on return, Ms Simbi referred to [83]-[84] of the judge’s decision and invited me to infer that the judge would have inevitably come to the conclusion that the appellant’s disinhibited behaviour was no more than a manifestation of his manipulative tendencies. I will address below the concerns I have with this part of the judge’s analysis, but, in any event, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to transpose findings made in an entirely different context of the Article 3 health claim to the Article 3 claim founded on how the Iranian authorities might respond to his behaviour. They are very different questions. Even if the judge transferred his findings at [83]-[84] to the distinct and separate analysis between [49]-[73], it could not satisfactorily explain what the Iranian authorities would be likely to do if confronted with this kind of behaviour from the appellant.
15. In addition to the above concerns about significant and material gaps in the judge’s reasoning going to the protection dimension of the appellant’s Article 2 and 3 human rights claims, a further concern stems from the failure to assess expert evidence related to signals in the appellant’s mental health presentation and diagnoses which lent support to the factual claims previously rejected in 2003. Devaseelan is clear that a subsequent judge may reach a different conclusion to a previous judge about a factual matter if new evidence supports a departure from the analytical starting point. Again, without contradiction from the respondent, Ms Smith indicated that she drew, at length, the judge’s attention to fresh evidence at paragraph [5.6] of the report of Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr Ali:
[5.6] If you feel able to do so so [sic] many years after the event, please comment on whether [MA]’s mental health presentation is consistent with someone who has suffered the type of ill-treatment described by [MA]
[5.6.4] In my clinical experience, patients do struggle many years after a significant trauma in their life and it affects their day-to-day life. In [MA]'s case, there is no doubt about the severity of his personality disorder and its relevance to his upbringing, stress and traumatic incidents in his life. I am struck by [MA]'s reluctance to be deported to Iran and any suggestion, indication or discussion about the same has caused significant anxiety to him. I am of the opinion that his presentation stems from the trauma that he has described of being raped as a child and his experience of ill treatment and torture in his early thirties.
16. This evidence from Dr Ali was independent of the appellant and was demonstrably not before the previous judge who rejected the appellant’s narrative claims of being detained and tortured by the Iranian authorities before he left the country. Evidence of such mental scarring was certainly capable in law of bringing about a different finding of fact about what the appellant experienced in Iran. This is important because paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules reflects long-established principle that previous acts of persecution amounts to a serious indication of a real risk of such harm being repeated unless there are good reasons to find otherwise. The judge might have assessed this evidence and concluded that he could not attach weight to the expert’s conclusions or, if worthy of weight, that there were good reasons why any such treatment might not be repeated in future, for example, by looking to the extensive passage of time since the events occurred. What the judge is not entitled to do is to fail to deal with such a clinical expert opinion which, on its face, tends to support that a departure from the 2003 judicial decision is merited on the facts as they were subsequently before him. I have been unable to discern any part of the decision which could conceivably be described as engagement with the expert evidence tending to support the existence of mental health signals of the claimed past persecution and consequential trauma. This was another central plank of the appellant’s case which was not the subject of any judicial reasoning.
17. Turning to the lawfulness of the reasoning which addressed the Articles 2 and 3 health claims, I am satisfied that there were serious deficiencies in the judicial analysis. The consideration of this element of the appellant’s claim started in borderline irrational fashion, at [74]. Taken at face value, it is exceptionally difficult to make sense of how the judge concluded that “it seems to be accepted that the appellant is not suffering from a mental illness but does have a personality disorder”. The judge predicated this surprising finding by observing that it seemed to be accepted that the appellant did not have a mental illness. Such an acceptance by the parties would be impossible to reconcile with the evidence relied upon by the parties where the appellant’s fundamental case was that he was so profoundly mentally unwell that it would breach his human rights to be returned to Iran. It was not suggested by the parties before me that there was anything to support the notion that there was any concurrence between the parties that the appellant did not have a mental illness. It would be surprising in the extreme if they had expressed any such agreement given the evidence relied upon. The latter half of paragraph [74] seeks to justify the position adopted at the outset by referring to parts of the evidence which simply cannot support such a conclusion. To prefer the unqualified medical opinion of a Prison Offender Manager who stated in her letter of 8 May 2025 that the appellant did “not have a mental illness or disorder, however has severe personality disorders” over the detailed and qualified expert witness reports relied upon by the appellant to the contrary required a clear rationale. Professor Sen reached a clinical conclusion which is difficult to reconcile with the judge’s assessment when he said this at paragraph 5.1 of his report: “[MA] suffers from emotionally unstable personality disorder of the borderline type, according to the International Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, version 10 (ICD-10)”. During her balanced and realistic submissions, Ms Simbi recognised that the judge’s findings at [74] were “unhelpful”.
18. It is fair to say that the judge did not stop his analysis of the health claim at paragraph [74]. He went on to consider the remaining sequential and staged analysis set out in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 and rejected his case at each juncture. However, I agree with Ms Smith’s argument that it is difficult to separate and compartmentalise the assessment in circumstances where the judge began his analysis by baselessly downplaying the extent to which the appellant was mentally ill. The foundations on which the overall assessment was built was unstable and founded on a misunderstanding of the evidence and the parties’ respective positions. This error tainted and infected the analysis which followed.
19. The above analysis would be sufficient to set aside the decision as involving material errors of law, but there was a further part of the decision which merits consideration and which Ms Simbi also characterised as “unhelpful”. In his findings, at [83], the judge found that the appellant would be exercising a choice if he attempted suicide upon being returned to Iran and that this would be unconnected to any mental illness. In coming to this conclusion, the judge referred to the appellant’s history of self-harm as being distinct from a risk of suicide and his manipulative behaviour. The judge did not engage with the extensive range of expert opinion which traced a direct line between the appellant’s recognised mental health conditions and a high risk of suicide on return. This was yet another example of the failing to engage with important evidence going to central matters he was required to decide.
20. I am satisfied that the judge’s decision involved repeated failures to engage with critical evidence such that it cannot be understood why the judge rejected key components of his claim under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. I reject the notion that any errors were immaterial to the overall outcome. I have set out above how a proper, lawful and adequately reasoned judicial analysis might have produced a different outcome in this appeal. As Ms Smith rightly acknowledged during her oral submissions, none of this is to say that the appellant’s appeal will ultimately be allowed. He has significant legal hurdles he must overcome. The legal tests which apply in this field are not undemanding, as recognised by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe). However, anxious scrutiny and lawfully adequate reasons are required before the dismissal of a human rights claim founded on the absolute right to life and not to suffer inhuman and degrading treatment. Important evidence in support of such a claim must be confronted and judicially assessed. That did not happen here and the decision must, accordingly, be set aside.
Disposal
21. The parties were agreed that if all of the grounds of appeal succeeded, as they have, the appropriate procedural course would be to remit the matter to the FtT to be decided afresh following a de novo hearing. I agree that remittal is appropriate given the scope of the fact-finding which remains to be undertaken in this complex appeal. I preserve the findings of fact reached by the judge [38] and [48] as these conclusions were not the subject of challenge. I do not preserve the conclusions reached under the rubric of Article 8 because, as the judge himself acknowledged, these findings cannot be disentangled from the conclusions reached under Articles 2 and 3.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the judge involved material errors of law. The decision is set aside. However, the findings of fact between [38] and [48] are preserved. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be decided following a de novo hearing before a judge other than the judge whose decision is the subject of this decision.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 March 2026