Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005765
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60093/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

KB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Physsas, Counsel instructed by Gulsen & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Monday 23 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

BACKGROUND

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) promulgated on 29 September 2025 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 28 March 2024, in which the appellant’s protection and human rights claims were refused.

2. The appellant is a national of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity. He claims to be at risk from the Turkish authorities because of his support for the HDP and says that as a result of that involvement, he has been subjected to adverse treatment and fears further such treatment on return.

3. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal, largely on credibility grounds.

4. The appellant appeals the decision on three grounds summarised as follows:

Ground 1: when undertaking the credibility assessment of the appellant’s account of having been targeted and detained as an HDP supporter, the judge had failed to do so through the prism or in the context of the country guidance given in IA and others (Risk – Guidelines – Separatist) CG [2003] UKIAT 00034, as endorsed in IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 (“IK”) and country information, such as the respondent’s October 2023 CPIN Turkey - People’s Democratic Party (HDP).

Ground 2: when undertaking any assessment of risk on return to the appellant, the judge failed to have regard to the guidance and relevant risk factors identified in IA, and in IK. Having accepted the appellant was a supporter of the HDP, there was also a failure to consider whether the appellant can be expected to be discreet on return, applying the principle in HJ (Iran) v SSHD (Rev 1) [2010] UKSC 31.

Ground 3: this ground largely overlaps with and repeats the first and second grounds when challenging the Judge’s adverse credibility findings, but also argues a number of errors in the credibility assessment conducted by the judge.

5. Permission to appeal was given by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 18 December 2025 on the basis that while adequate reasons were given for the credibility findings, and while the judge was aware of the relevant country guidance, there was an arguable error of law in relation to the decision not being sufficiently clear in relation to how that guidance was taken into account. Permission was granted on all three grounds, as they were closely linked.

6. The appeal comes before me to decide whether there is an error of law. If I determine that the decision does contain an error of law, I then need to decide whether to set aside the decision in consequence. If I set the decision aside, I must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.

7. I had before me a bundle running to 320 pages containing the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant had also given notice under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, that new evidence was being adduced, and the notice and additional bundle of evidence was also contained in the composite bundle. Ms Clewley had not received a full copy of that bundle, but had been able to prepare using documents on the First-tier Tribunal’s system and was therefore able to proceed. As a result, however, there has been no Rule 24 reply from the respondent. The appellant’s solicitors are reminded that the uploading of the bundle onto CE file is not sufficient service on the respondent and that this needs to be served directly on the Home Office.

8. Two preliminary matters were raised. The appellant’s solicitors had requested an interpreter, so that he and family members could give oral evidence, but this request had been refused, as this was an error of law hearing and there was no permission for oral evidence to be heard. Ms Physsas said the appellant was not pursuing this. I also raised an issue with the notice in relation to new evidence, which all post dated the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal judge and said that the appellant would need to address the Procedure Rules and relevant legal guidance on admission of post hearing evidence. Ms Physsas said that evidence was relied upon only in the event an error of law was found and for a re-making hearing, and so it was not relied on for this hearing.

9. Ms Clewley said the respondent conceded a material error of law in relation to the decision, as a result of the failure to have regard to and apply country guidance decisions, which affected both Ground 1 and 2. There was no concession in respect of Ground 3, which related to the credibility assessment, which findings she said should be preserved.

10. I asked for clarification in connection with the concession as to Ground 1, as Ground 1 related to the credibility assessment and not solely to the assessment of risk on return. Ms Physsas said that was an accurate summary of what was pleaded, and it was the appellant’s position that having accepted a material error of law in the failure to apply country guidance and country information to the assessment of risk on return, what follows is that the assessment of credibility is similarly affected. Having taken some time to review the respondent’s position, Ms Clewley argued the credibility findings could all be preserved, but the appeal could proceed to re-making on the basis of risk on return only. I asked whether there were sufficiently clear findings to address the factors to be applied in such an assessment (set out in paragraph 16 of the grounds). For example, on whether the appellant was of the Alevi faith, had an up to date Turkish passport and to what degree it was accepted the appellant was a supporter of, or had been active for the HDP.

11. Ms Clewley acknowledged the judge had not made specific findings about the appellant’s faith, or documentation and so said the re-making hearing would require evidence on such issues. She said her reading of the judge’s decision was that support for HDP and previous activities were not accepted. Ms Physsas said her reading of the judge’s findings was that support for HDP was accepted by the judge and it was not at all clear that the entirety of the appellant’s account of activism had been rejected. However, Ms Physsas argued that if it was not possible to be clear on what the judge found on this point, then a fresh hearing on all aspects of the case was necessary, as clear findings needed to be made on credibility, and whether or not the appellant was a supporter of the HDP and the nature and degree of that support and any activities. These were intrinsically relevant to the assessment of risk on return. It was also accepted that the medical report before the judge had been withdrawn at that previous hearing, and while there was new medical evidence post-hearing, the appellant’s instructions were that he was now being treated for mental health problems, which would arguably need to be taken into account in any future credibility assessment.

12. Both representatives made detailed submissions, to which I have had regard.

DISCUSSION

Grounds 1 and 2

13. I have addressed these grounds together as there is some overlap.

14. As set out in the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, of 1 November 2024, any failure to follow an applicable country guidance case, is likely to be regarded as an error of law.

15. It is not in dispute that the judge did not make any reference to either IA or IK in the decision. There was no assessment of which of the relevant risk factors identified in those decisions applied, and the impact they had upon risk on return, if any. That is not to say that the judge was not fully aware of that guidance and the respondent’s CPINs, or did not have them in mind. However, as is accepted in the grant of permission, there is no explicit reference to the relevance of these country guidance decisions, or the impact of them on findings, and this amounts to an arguable error of law.

16. The appellant also argues that having found he was a genuine sympathiser of HDP, who distributed leaflets in Turkey and attended demonstrations, and given that he is accepted to be an Alevi Kurd, the judge should have considered the areas in which his account was consistent with what is said in both country guidance cases, and in the respondent’s CPIN, about the treatment of HDP supporters. These matters were relevant to the credibility assessment that the judge was required to make, which must be made in light of all of the evidence, and through the prism of available country information and country guidance decisions. They are also relevant factors to be considered in the assessment of risk on return.

17. I accept the failure to have regard to the country guidance, country information and assess evidence in light of what that says, is an error of law. The respondent concedes that and accepts this is a material error of law, which means that the decision must be set aside.

18. The question going forward is whether that error undermines the credibility assessment and decision as a whole, or whether there are any findings that can be preserved. Ms Clewley argued that all of the findings could be preserved, but acknowledged that there is still a need for further evidence and findings on matters relevant to the risk assessment that must be conducted, and the factors that must be considered under IA and IK.

19. As to what was in dispute between the parties at the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent accepted the appellant was a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity. No specific concession was made about whether or not it was accepted he was of the Alevi faith. The respondent also noted the appellant had travelled by plane and questioned whether he had used a passport to do so, but made no specific concession or dispute about whether the appellant had an up to date passport. The respondent disputed the appellant had established that he comes from a political family, that he had ever been politically active or that he had given a credible account of past persecution. These issues or factors were all relevant to the assessment of risk on return and were matters the judge was required to determine. It was also said in the respondent’s review [at 11] that simply being a member or supporter of HDP, or being Kurdish, did not by itself establish a risk of persecution on return.

20. Both representatives agreed the judge did not make any findings on the appellant’s faith, or on documentation.

21. As to whether or not the judge accepted support for the HDP or involvement in any activities for the party in Turkey, Ms Physsas and Ms Clewley did not agree. This finding would be relevant to the credibility assessment, as it is the appellant’s political motivations which he says led him to activities for the party, and the profile created by any political activism is relevant to any assessment of risk on return under Ground 2, in relation to which a material error of law is conceded by the respondent. Another issue to be determined is whether the appellant would be required to be discreet, in accordance with the principle in HJ (Iran), and the extent of the appellant’s political convictions is relevant to that issue.

22. As to the judge’s findings on support for the HDP, the judge made a number of adverse credibility findings about various aspects of the evidence, and found:

“16. He was asked at the hearing in what had prompted him to become politically active in 2015. Again his answer was very vague, lacking in substance or specificity, and not indicative of anyone with any real political awareness or interest. I note that he has engaged in no significant Sur Place activity in the UK of any substance at all. Whilst this is of course not required, I find this is an Appellant with very limited evidence of any real political interest or commitment to any political cause.”

23. The judge relied too on the appellant’s failure to mention any involvement with HDP at the screening interview, as undermining his credibility.

24. The parties agreed that while the judge specifically made a finding on whether the appellant was a member of the HDP, he did not specifically address in that section of the decision whether he was genuinely motivated to ‘support’ the party, although Ms Physsas said the final sentence was indicative of that being accepted:

“Membership of the HDP

The skeleton claims that he had evidence of membership of the HDP but this had been destroyed. He claimed in AIR2, Q 35 that he was a member of the party, although I note at Q37 he said just supporter. At the hearing he was clear he was only ever a supporter, not a member. Given the possible different interpretation of such terms as member/supporter and lack of evidence of HDP membership requirements, I do not give this discrepancy itself any significant weight in terms of its effect on his credibility. However, it is clear that at the highest his claim is now only that he was a supporter.”

25. Finally, at paragraph 33, the judge did not accept the appellant was politically active ‘in any meaningful way in Turkey’ but there was no agreement on whether this meant there was low level support, for example, the account of distributing some leaflets and attending a demonstration was accepted, or the judge found no political activity or support for HDP at all had been established. If it was the latter, the question would be why there was no specific finding to the effect that the appellant had not been politically active at all, rather than finding he had not demonstrated political activity in a ‘meaningful way’.

26. For it to be possible to preserve the findings in the decision, and proceed to deal with only one aspect of the appeal, it would be necessary to have clarity on what the preserved findings were, and adequate reasons for them. I accept Ms Physsas’s submission has some force, that where it is unclear whether the judge accepted whether or not the appellant was a supporter to any level, but not a member of the HDP, or whether he participated in some HDP activities, or not, is relevant to the assessment of risk on return, since this is a factor which must be considered in accordance with the country guidance.

27. This is also an integral credibility point, and it is difficult to see how it can be addressed discretely, when it goes to the heart of the appellant’s claim. Findings are also necessary on each of the relevant risk factors, which findings themselves are likely to be impacted by the credibility assessment.

28. While I am not persuaded all of the matters pleaded under Ground 3 in relation to criticisms of the credibility assessment have force, I am mindful too of the cumulative impact on the overall credibility assessment of the issues raised by the appellant, such as the lack of reference to country information and guidance when assessing the consistency of the appellant’s account in the context of what is known about practices and attitudes of the Turkish authorities to perceived supporters of HDP. Also the appellant’s assertion that he had been experiencing mental health symptoms as a result of his experiences, and while the medical report before the judge was withdrawn, there was no clear consideration of the possible impact of claimed trauma on the credibility assessment.

29. I therefore find that as conceded by the respondent, there is a material error of law, as pleaded in Ground 2, in relation to the failure to have regard to and apply country guidance and information in relation to the assessment of risk on return.

30. In relation to re-making the decision, further evidence is required to enable such an assessment to be made. I also find there are likely to be inherent difficulties in hearing evidence on some matters and not others, without a fresh consideration of credibility on matters that go to the heart of those findings.

31. I also find there are cumulative issues in relation to the credibility assessment, as raised in Ground 1 and 2, which means that no findings can be preserved, as the issues go to the heart of the credibility assessment, which means the case needs to be heard afresh, with findings made on all relevant issues.

32. As to the evidence which accompanied the Rule 15(2A) notice in relation to mental health and family members, the appellant can submit this at a fresh hearing to be considered by the First-tier Tribunal when his claim is re-heard, but it has not formed part of this decision.

CONCLUSION

33. For the reasons set out above, the decision contains an error of law. I therefore set that aside in its entirety and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a full de novo hearing.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision promulgated on 29 September 2025 involves the making of an error of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a different judge.

H Graves
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Graves
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 January 2026